



# General Assembly

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## Eightieth session

Agenda item 99 (bb)

**General and complete disarmament: steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons**

## Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 2025

[on the report of the First Committee ([A/80/534](#), para. 7)]

### 80/48. Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* that achieving a world without nuclear weapons is a common goal for the international community,

*Recalling* that it has been 80 years since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

*Reaffirming* the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>1</sup> as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and an important element in facilitating the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology, and also reaffirming its determination to fully and steadily implement the Treaty across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars, including article VI of the Treaty, and to further enhance the universality of the Treaty,

*Noting* that the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirm the validity of all existing commitments undertaken, including those contained in the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,<sup>2</sup> the outcome document of the 2000 Review Conference,<sup>3</sup> especially the unequivocal

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

<sup>2</sup> *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I* ([NPT/CONF.1995/32 \(Part I\)](#) and [NPT/CONF.1995/32 \(Part I\)/Corr.2](#)).

<sup>3</sup> *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vols. I–III ([NPT/CONF.2000/28 \(Parts I and II\)](#), [NPT/CONF.2000/28 \(Part III\)](#) and [NPT/CONF.2000/28 \(Part IV\)](#)).



undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference,<sup>4</sup> and also reaffirm that the full and effective implementation by all States Parties of the commitments outlined above is essential to the integrity and credibility of the Treaty,

*Noting also* the deliberations at the working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held from 24 to 28 July 2023, and the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held from 31 July to 11 August 2023, from 22 July to 2 August 2024 and from 28 April to 9 May 2025, the working paper from the Chair of the working group, the Chair's summary of the 2024 session of the Preparatory Committee, the reflections by the Chair of the 2023 and 2024 sessions of the Preparatory Committee on potential areas for focused discussions at the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee, and the recommendations to the 2026 Review Conference by the Chair of the 2025 session of the Preparatory Committee, welcoming the practice of the Chair of drafting such papers, and stressing that such deliberations and papers are a useful contribution for the 2026 Review Conference,

*Expressing deep concern* at the deteriorated international security environment, including the ongoing actions against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as irresponsible nuclear rhetoric affecting regional and international security, that make the threat of nuclear weapons use today higher than at any time since the heights of the cold war,

*Sharing* the concern at the rapid and non-transparent quantitative expansion and opaque qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States that includes the development of advanced nuclear weapons and new types of means of their delivery, and the continued role of nuclear weapons in security policies, as well as uneven levels of transparency surrounding these activities,

*Noting* the expiration in February 2026 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), which has purportedly been suspended unilaterally, and calling for good-faith negotiations on a future nuclear arms control framework by the three States with the largest nuclear arsenals to restrain their nuclear arsenals,

*Reaffirming* the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to initiate and actively engage in arms control dialogues in good faith on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing and help to prepare the way for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and calling upon nuclear-weapon States to pursue dialogue and concrete actions to reduce nuclear risks, both bilaterally and multilaterally,

*Bearing in mind*, in accordance with the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022, that, *inter alia*, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and that we must make every effort to avert the danger of such a war, affirming the need for the nuclear-weapon States to pursue concrete actions for the implementation of the commitments contained therein, including through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence and prevent

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<sup>4</sup> 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vols. I–III ([NPT/CONF.2010/50 \(Vol. I\)](#), [NPT/CONF.2010/50 \(Vol. II\)](#) and [NPT/CONF.2010/50 \(Vol. III\)](#)).

an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all, and reminding all nuclear-weapon States of the importance of meeting their commitments to engage through structured efforts to exchange views on nuclear concepts, doctrines, policies and risk reduction,

*Noting with grave concern the lack of substantial progress towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, welcoming the further discussion at the Conference on Disarmament, also welcoming the declared voluntary moratoriums by some nuclear-weapon States on the production of such material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, stressing the importance of political will to make progress on such a treaty, and welcoming efforts in this regard,*

*Reaffirming the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to all existing obligations and commitments related to negative security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, either unilaterally or multilaterally, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994,*

*Encouraging the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where they do not exist, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission,<sup>5</sup> adopted by consensus,*

*Recognizing the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty,<sup>6</sup> the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),<sup>7</sup> the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga),<sup>8</sup> the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok),<sup>9</sup> the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)<sup>10</sup> and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk),<sup>11</sup> as well as the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,*

*Recognizing also the importance of implementing the decisions and the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>12</sup> and the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, reaffirming its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region and in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and noting the efforts in this regard,*

*Emphasizing the importance for all States, especially for the nuclear-weapon States, of taking further practical steps and effective measures towards the total*

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42)*, annex I, sect. C.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 634, No. 9068.

<sup>8</sup> *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7), appendix VII.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1981, No. 33873.

<sup>10</sup> A/50/426, annex.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2970, No. 51633.

<sup>12</sup> See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)/Corr.2), annex.

elimination of nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all,

*Recognizing* that nuclear risk will persist as long as nuclear weapons exist, reaffirming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to eliminate all risks associated with these weapons,

*Reaffirming* that risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament and that efforts in this area should contribute to forward movement in and complement the implementation of article VI obligations and related nuclear disarmament commitments,

*Reiterating deep concern* at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and reaffirming that this awareness ought to continue to underpin our approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament, and welcoming the visits of leaders, youth and others to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in this regard,

*Acknowledging* that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2017, and noting that it was opened to signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017, entered into force on 22 January 2021 and held its first Meeting of States Parties from 21 to 23 June 2022, its second Meeting of States Parties from 27 November to 1 December 2023 and its third Meeting of States Parties from 3 to 7 March 2025,

*Reaffirming* that further strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture is essential for international peace and security, and also reaffirming the inalienable right of all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty, as well as the importance of nuclear safeguards, safety and security for the fullest possible use and exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and stressing that the further development of such peaceful nuclear applications can make a significant contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,

*Reaffirming also* the importance of ensuring the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men and of further integrating a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes,

*Noting* that further work is required to ensure the transparency, verifiability and irreversibility of nuclear disarmament while enhancing accountability, and welcoming the deliberations of the working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly regarding transparency, reporting and accountability measures, as well as steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate transparency with respect to their nuclear weapons, including numerical and qualitative information on their nuclear arsenals, nuclear policy, doctrine, budgeting and public sharing of information on modernization plans, and calling on all nuclear-weapon States, especially those States that have not yet demonstrated transparency in this regard, to do so,

*Mindful* of the ongoing UN80 Initiative and of the importance of strengthening efficiency and effectiveness in relation to nuclear disarmament initiatives,

1. *Urges* all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons, based on the recognition that all States have a shared interest in averting a nuclear war;

2. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to honour and respect all existing negative security assurances undertaken by them, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consistent with their respective obligations and commitments;

3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; to immediately pursue enhanced transparency measures by providing information in line with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, related to concrete data on their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, without prejudice to their national security, as well as national measures related to nuclear disarmament including their nuclear policies, doctrines and nuclear risk reduction measures, including status of production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and to provide frequent and detailed reporting on the implementation of the Treaty and opportunities for discussion of all nuclear-weapon States' reports, taking into account Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan and paragraph 187 (35) of [NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77](#) as a useful reference, recognizing the efforts made by some nuclear-weapon States in this regard; and calls upon nuclear-weapon States, especially those that have yet to do so, to engage with non-nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and avoiding an arms race, including through a regular process for an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants at future meetings in the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stressing the importance for all nuclear-weapon States to continuously engage in such practices;

4. *Emphasizes* that avoiding a new nuclear arms race, the risk of which is increasing, accompanied by the rapid and non-transparent quantitative expansion and opaque qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States, is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, and urges all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;

5. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein, and upon Conference members to engage in relevant activities of the Conference towards that goal, further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as encourages all States that have not yet done so to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in line with Action 18 of the 2010 Action Plan, and, consistent with Action 16 of the 2010 Action Plan, encourages nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful

purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

6. *Emphasizes* that the transparency of the management of civil plutonium must be maintained and any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes undermines the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, underscores the importance of the implementation of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC 549), and, in this regard, calls upon all States that committed to reporting annually their holdings of all plutonium in peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA to fulfil those commitments;

7. *Urges* all States that have yet to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty<sup>13</sup> to do so in all expediency, particularly the now nine States listed in its Annex 2, whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, and to declare or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions, as well as to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty;

8. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to commit to further identifying, exploring and implementing effective risk reduction measures necessary to mitigate risks relating to nuclear weapons use that arise from miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or accident, *inter alia*, to intensify dialogue among and between the nuclear-weapon States and with the non-nuclear-weapon States, to develop and make every effort to implement effective crisis prevention and management arrangements, mechanisms and tools, to maintain the practice of not targeting each other or any other State with nuclear weapons and keep them at the lowest possible alert levels, while noting that risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament;

9. *Also calls upon* all States to continue their strong support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards achieving the objectives of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on this matter and encouraging broad participation by all States in such initiatives, and welcomes that the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues adopted its final report by consensus in May 2023;

10. *Underscores* the importance of complying with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the safeguards system;

11. *Reaffirms* the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and the obligation of all Member States to fully implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, notes with serious concern the

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<sup>13</sup> See resolution 50/245 and A/50/1027.

announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 9 September 2022 of an updated law on nuclear policy lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and supplementation in September 2023 of nuclear force-building policy in its Constitution as well as the revelation of images of nuclear-related facilities including uranium enrichment facilities in September 2024 and January 2025, urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards, and confirms that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot and will never be recognized as a nuclear-weapon State, as stated in Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#) of 14 October 2006 and [1874 \(2009\)](#) of 12 June 2009, and in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

12. *Calls upon* all States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, which is a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, *inter alia*, efforts in which the young generation can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities, as well as to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons irrespective of their nationalities and origins, and who pass on their experiences to the future generations through long-standing grass-roots efforts around the world, including those of Nihon Hidankyo, recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize 2024, and welcomes concrete measures in this regard, *inter alia*, the Young Professionals Network of P5 academics, the Youth4Disarmament Initiative, “Disarmament education: resources for learning” and the “Youth Leader Fund for a world without nuclear weapons”;

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

52nd plenary meeting  
1 December 2025