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Agenda item 99

General and complete disarmament

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 2025

[*on the report of the First Committee (A/80/534, para. 7)*]

80/23. Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons are the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹ in which it is stated that all States should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of humankind is not endangered,

Acknowledging that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, there is an urgent need for further effective, concrete and transparent measures to reduce the risk of use of nuclear weapons, and to contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, and affirming that nuclear risk reduction measures are not a substitute for nuclear disarmament,

Mindful that States have started to increasingly integrate artificial intelligence into a broad array of applications in the military domain, including into weapons, weapon systems, and other means and methods of warfare, as well as systems that support military operations, and in this regard taking note of resolution 79/239 of 24 December 2024,

Concerned about the possibility that artificial intelligence-driven decision-making related to command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons could reduce human control and oversight, increasing the possibility of induced

¹ Resolution S-10/2.



distortions in decision-making environments and shortened action and response windows, particularly when related to the most sensitive and critical stages such as decision to launch, which could heighten the risk of accidental, unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,

Concerned also that inherent technical limitations of artificial intelligence systems, including but not limited to the potential for malfunction, exploitation or intrusion, and cognitive and automation biases impacting training data and algorithmic design, could produce hallucinations and flawed, inaccurate or misleading outputs and understandings, which in turn could have serious and catastrophic outcomes such as the accidental, unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note of the affirmation made by China and the United States of America, on 16 November 2024, to “maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons” in the context of the development of artificial intelligence technology in the military field, and urging other similar explicit declarations,

Taking note also of the affirmation made by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of their long-standing policy in this regard, to “maintain human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions”,

Taking into account potential opportunities for artificial intelligence to be further developed to enhance verification, irreversibility, transparency and accountability for nuclear disarmament, which should be fully explored and relevant research, innovation and development be promoted in this regard, and bearing in mind that the development of artificial intelligence applications related to nuclear weapons should also contribute to risk reduction in support of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Demands* that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight is maintained over command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons, including those that integrate artificial intelligence technology;

2. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, *urges* those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, to adopt and publish national policies and doctrines explicitly affirming and operationalizing that command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons that integrate artificial intelligence will remain subject to human control and oversight and that such systems will not autonomously initiate decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, and, without prejudice to national security, to voluntarily inform relevant forums about these measures and implementation mechanisms;

3. *Stresses* the urgent need to address and develop, within the respective mandates of the disarmament machinery, meetings of parties to relevant treaties and other related multilateral and regional forums, common understandings, confidence-building measures and other appropriate measures to ensure that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight is maintained over command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, a sub-item entitled “Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons”.

52nd plenary meeting
1 December 2025