SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA - LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE

A CASE STUDY OF LIBERIA:

Developments in norms of legislative oversight

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Introduction

Countries like Liberia which have gone through a long and brutal civil war want to establish republican security forces that are oriented to the public good; the country has suffered a crisis of confidence in the state's security forces and now seeks a professional army that is regulated by a legal framework established by democratically elected law makers and one that is outside the immediate reach of a President in Liberia. In other words, the state security forces are intended for the security of the population and not as a prop of the regime in power. The goal of security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia is to assure good governance of the security sector. The United Nations defines SSR as 'a process of assessment, review and implementation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law' (United Nations Security Sector Reform, 2008, Report of the Secretary General). What the present study attempts to present is how far these objectives have been realized. Specifically this chapter examines the many ways that the legal architecture for security sector governance has been transformed thanks to new democratic and constitutional oversight and initiatives of the Liberian legislature.

Part one of this chapter will provide the background and context to this case study. Part two describes the decision to focus on just two elements of the security sector: the military and the police. The next section of the case study will be a close study of security legislation and oversight in Liberia and the various actors involved in this process. The final section asks about the next steps in security sector reform in Liberia.

Part 1: Background: I**ntroduction to case context.**

Liberia degenerated into civil war in late 1989 which became protracted. The brutal civil conflict quickly transformed the national army into an armed faction. Finally, the coordinated efforts of the international community led by the United States resulted in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the warring factions in August 2003. No single body of the security forces was at the service of the population after the take-over of Charles Taylor as President in 1997. The year 2003 was the watershed that ended a period of completely arbitrary rule and initiated a period of far-reaching reform.

This year 2003 was a watershed in the history of Liberia because it brought to an end an authoritarian style of governance that had characterized the Republic since its foundation in 1847. Furthermore the CPA had been preceded by at least twelve failed attempts at achieving disarmament of the warring factions and an agreed roadmap for peace. Finally, it marked the end of Charles Taylor's term as President of Liberia and sought to usher in the new era of genuine democracy.

One result of the CPA and the external intervention in and oversight over the security forces was a transition from war to a negative peace (Galtung, 1964). Negative Peace refers to the absence of violence; it is negative because whilst something undesirable has stopped happening, the desired result has not been achieved. So, this is not yet Positive Peace. Although the fourteen year armed struggle had at last ended true reconciliation and justice remained a challenge to be achieved in a society that had moved from being for many of its members a closed one to an open one in which everyone has at least the possibility of having his or her voice heard. The challenge of becoming an open society has not yet been achieved but this second transition is well and truly under way.

Liberia is also making a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Following two years of a transitional administration 2003-5, the country held its first free and fair elections since its inception in 1847, which brought in Africa's first elected female president, and the country's 52nd legislature. This new tradition of free and fair elections has been maintained with the holding of the second post-war presidential and legislative elections in late 2011, when the 53rd legislature took office. The concern is these electoral processes retain the role and participation of the population, since most candidates are elected primarily based on 'acquaintance' rather than 'vetted assessment of candidates'.

This transition from authoritarianism to democracy also affected the security sector. In the past the security sector was controlled from the office of the President of the Republic who ruled in an authoritarian and sometimes arbitrary manner.

The two examples of this approach offered here both come from the period of the original settler regime of the True Whig Party. William V. S. Tubman (1895-1971), who was the 19th President of Liberia from 1944 until his death in 1971, gave three laws to the security sector: Law One: Obey (me); Law Two: Obey (me); Law Three: Obey (me). His successor was William R. Tolbert, Jr., (1913-1980), who had been Tubman's Vice President for 19 years and became the 20th President from 1971 until 1980 when he was assassinated in a *coup d'etat*. An important event that led to the overthrow of his regime was the "Rice Riot" in early 1979 caused by a proposed price increase in the Liberian staple. 2000 activists began what was planned as a peaceful protest march on the Executive Mansion. The march degenerated into a riot when they were joined by 10,000 "back street boys". The widespread looting that resulted was ended by a contingent of troops called into Liberia without consultation by Tolbert from neighboring Guinea. This led to widespread disaffection within the Liberian security sector. Under the regimes of Tubman, Tolbert and their predecessors stretching back to the foundation of the Republic in 1847 security policy was conceived and then implemented by a highly centralized authority based in the office of the President. The national security under development in Liberia today constitutes a departure from previous processes and policies in the Republic because it is driven by democratic legislative initiatives and oversight. Yet challenges to democratic security sector governance linked to Liberia's legacy of patrimonial style of politics remain. This dictatorial style of governance was part of the aetiology of later security sector problems in contemporary Liberia: corruption, physical threats to citizens and the approach taken by the United Nations (UNMIL) to reform.

 The deeply entrenched networks of corruption and ethnicity were a central cause of the collapse of the security sector during the civil conflict and its resulting violence. Liberians have sought to move away from the past towards a clean accountable government that would place the legitimate rights of its

citizens before the self-interest of its power-holders. Ten years after the signing of the CPA, and with support of many academic and regional actors, this vision is under serious threat and stay far from target.

Dysfunctional political economic structures remain deeply embedded at all levels, including the government. Nevertheless, hesitant, albeit slow, progress is being made in the implementation of the reform process. For instance, the International Contact Group in Liberia (ICGL) and the Government of Liberia imposed the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in September 2005, and Liberia was also the first state to comply with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) rules, and the first West African country to pass a Freedom of Information Act to support more transparent government. Recently the government signed up to the Open Government Partnership and committed itself to a series of ambitious goals to become more accountable. Many of these initiatives have come thanks to President Sirleaf, but former President and governance activist, Prof. Amos Sawyer has criticized the faulty logic that "once a 'good' person is elected President the (institutional) problems will then be addressed" (Sawyer 2002) maintaining that the high and continued risk of misuse of power derives from a failure to address the flawed political institutions, and specifically the centralization of power in the Presidency.

Part 2: Scoping conditions.

The internationally driven attempt to radically reform the security sector since the war's end in 2003 is a major chance to improve democratic security governance and prevent new destabilization. The UN family of organizations quickly identified security-sector reform as a prime task: "In Liberia, one of the key reasons for the relapse into violence after the end of the first civil war and the 1997 presidential election was the lack of reform of the armed and security forces" (UN Security Council, Progress Reports 2005; 2006). SSR programs have been unprecedented in ambition but have enjoyed only mixed results.

In Liberia, a comprehensive approach to SSR was "a road not taken". It has had a narrow focus on only two elements of the security sector: the military and the police.

Following the 2006 elections, it soon became clear that the 52nd Legislature was composed of some 75% freshmen (first time Legislators). Being privileged to be part of a consortium for the capacity building of this Legislature, especially the committees on Security and Defence of both upper and lower chambers, we worked with groups like the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG), Center for Democratic Development (CDD), the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), among others. This process was in the form of working sessions, consultations, research, and experience sharing.

Members of the four committees were brought face to face with other experienced Legislators in Ghana and the UK with learning experiences shared by past legislators from several other countries. Liberian Legislators learned through these sessions the process of legislating security sector with emphasis on civilian oversight and making the sector more accountable. We became very vocal on the inclusion of traditional leaders in the mainstream of SSR as they play vital roles in enhancing security in many local communities. We witnessed local leaders providing mechanisms for justice and reforms in the

immediate aftermath of the Liberian civil crisis even up to the few years of the post-war elected government.

Other critical areas covered during the sessions included the development of united security architecture that mutually support each other in contrast to the many overlapping functions of the current structures; roles and functions of the inter-agencies responsible to support the security sector.

SSR in Liberia began in 2004 with the first reform initiatives begun by the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) of the Liberian National Police (LNP). Ten years of efforts to reform the LNP has resulted in an increasingly professional police force. However openly observed abusive behavior, a culture of impunity, and endemic corruption disclosed by a Human Rights Watch report in August 2013 continue to erode the LNP (No Money, No Justice).

There are deep doubts at present about the competence and integrity of police among Liberian citizens who have experienced the opposite of what the new LNP is meant to be. Unless and until these doubts are laid to rest, suspicion of police involvement in crimes removed, the LNP will not enjoy the cooperation it needs to be effective, and citizens will attempt to provide for their own safety from crime and violence, with counterproductive effects.

Liberia now has a pool of nearly 2,000 rigorously vetted and well-trained military, only 5% of whom consisted of former AFL soldiers and with no ethnic group accounting for more than 15%. The vetting process in particular was a notable success; several experts have described it as the best they have witnessed anywhere in the world (International Crisis Group, 2009). Despite this successful work, in 2009 the UN Secretary-General reported "significant capacity deficit" in the AFL (UN Security Council Report 2009).

The newly formed Liberian army has qualified to participate in their first peace-keeping operations in Mali sending there a 54-person strong company, and this operation has been renewed and expanded. The development of a capable managerial and leadership core within the military is an organic process that must be nurtured by both the Liberian government and its international partners. Thus despite some early missteps, army reform appears to be showing temporary success.

Part 3: Process: Close Study of security legislation and oversight in Liberia

Public Hearings on national security

In August 2005 the Ministry of Justice of Liberia in concert with UNMIL conducted a national dialogue on the security sector (Liberia National Dialogue). This unprecedented consultation was based on the conviction that dialogue on SS would help broaden the constituency of actors working to develop a collective vision of security in Liberia. The event was jointly facilitated and funded by the Conflict Security and Development Group of King's College, University of London, the Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos, Nigeria, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland. Stakeholders in the dialogue included the United Nation, the transitional legislature, judiciary, civil society, relevant ministries, and organizations responsible for implementing reform.

With respect to the security sector architecture at that time the word used by some participants was "over-bloated". Furthermore the caliber of the personnel was questioned and it was suggested that several security personnel were recruited on the basis of patronage and not experience. A key shortcoming of security institutions in Liberia has been the gross abuse of human rights of Liberians, often with impunity, by security personnel through torture, arbitrary arrests and the use of official powers for private gains. Related to this is the lack of effective oversight. This is due to several factors including excessive presidential powers and lack of capable parliamentary administration. The lack of adequate remuneration and the proliferation of small arms make a difficult security situation even worse.

Among the features desired in Liberia's security system were institutions that were law abiding and respectful of human rights. Another feature much talked about in the dialogue was a security system in which the mandate of each security institution is clear and in which each security system is comprised of and reflects all Liberia's ethnic and religious groups. Constructive civil society input should be encouraged and, finally, each security organization should be comprised of suitably qualified and well trained personnel who are recruited through a transparent process.

Concern was expressed during the dialogue that Liberia's security system needs the capacity to secure its borders and natural resource endowments and also needs to be one which is sensitive to sub-regional security imperatives. Last but not least Liberia needs a security system which it can afford, albeit with initial international support.

The necessary steps for a new security sector include good governance, a comprehensive peace building process of which it plays its part, the reintegration and rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers and control of the proliferation of small arms.

Constitutional reform was discussed. There was need for revision, it was felt, in two areas: (1) to deal with the overlapping of security sector institutions through constitutional clarification of the roles of all statutory institutions; (2) to deal with the possible abuse of power by the President who appoints virtually all the leaders of the security apparatus.

The conclusion of the dialogue was that while the international community and other external actors may be available and ready to assist in SSR, Liberians have the primary responsibility for reform not only of their own security sector, but for the entire post conflict reconstruction process. It has been incorporated in the new Defense Act that Liberia shall cooperate with its former ally the United States in the process of its security development with reliance on other support from other international partners both in Africa and elsewhere. This has so far enabled Liberia to get support from Ghana, Nigeria, China, etc in training middle level and senior managers of the security sector, thanks to collaborative efforts earlier mentioned thus giving at least partial benefits of South-South cooperation and experience sharing.

2008 new National Defense Act

Definition of the respective roles of the AFL, LNP, the Liberian Seaport Police, the Police Quick Reaction Unit, the Special Security Service (SSS)[now Executive Protection Service, EPS], the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), and other key sectors of the security system in Liberia was apparently a difficult process. Only in late November 2007 was the national security strategy begun to be finalized (UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 5 December 2007").

The new National Defense Act of 2008 superseded its predecessor of 1956 and envisaged a carefully vetted and well trained force with the specific mandate to protect Liberia's sovereignty. The 1956 legislation by way of contrast mandated compulsory military service for all males and specialized training of officers. The number of soldiers was only limited to the ability of the government "to provide shelter, subsistence, uniform (sic), arms and ammunition and hospitalization."

The AFL now follows the legislation of the new National Defense Act of 2008. The primary mission of the AFL is to defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Liberia. As well the remit of the AFL includes international peacekeeping and humanitarian support of the civil authority in the event of disasters. Section 2.3 e of the Act states that the duties of the AFL include support to the national law enforcement agencies when such support is requested and approved by the President. During peacetime the AFL shall not engage in law enforcement. The AFL will intervene only as a last resort, when the threat exceeds the capability of the law enforcement agencies to respond. In Section 2.5 of the Act it is stated that the AFL shall perform its duties in a non-partisan manner. All of these prescriptions respond to the difficult experience of the AFL during the civil conflict when it became entangled in the war.

The Act did not deal with some of the other problems arising from the recent history of the AFL. For instance, the failure of the law suit filed by over 200 retired AFL soldiers and the Deceased AFL Widows suggests that there are ongoing problems in Liberia between civilians and the military. The claim that the court rejected in November 2013 was that the GoL disbanded the AFL unconstitutionally and that it failed to give them retirement benefits (Parley; Gbelewala). The ex-soldiers contended that instead of restructuring the AFL, as provided for by the CPA, the government dissolved the army without a retirement scheme for the former soldiers.

2011 National Security and Intelligence Reform Act (NSIR)

The long awaited National Security Reform and Intelligence Act *(NSIRA)* has been enacted. Civilian oversight is a cornerstone of this legislation, but this call for oversight has not been fully translated into mechanisms that are adequate to this task. In a similar way the actors governed by this act do not possess the basic equipment needed to carry out their tasks and more advanced training for them is required. Without greater attention to civilian oversight, effective community outreach, reduction in the rates of corruption and adequate working tools the current plans described in the NSIRA could be thwarted (Peacebuilding Commission).

This Act submitted August 30, 2011 for approval by the President, went back and forth with two amendments, due to issues of merger and abolishment of certain security institutions. For instance, the Ministry of National Security was abolished in the first version, but reestablished by an amendment. This Act was finalized only by May 2013 although the Act refers to itself as 'work in progress' seemingly owing to the many challenges and unresolved issues that normally surround such undertakings.

Many interests played out in the attempt to scrap institutions deemed to have served the ends of divided political elites. Some concerns bordered on varying understanding of functions of said institutions. Several executive and legislative joint working sessions happened to bridge the impasse.

The NSRIA of 2011 is a 'work in progress' (National Security, Reform and Intelligence Act). In 2013 several important amendments were made to it in order to revise the security architecture it had set up (An Act to Repeal and Amend Sections). Two new chapters were added to the original Act of 2011 creating the Ministry of National Security (MNS) and reactivating the National Bureau of Investigations (NBI). These took over some duties and responsibilities assigned by the 2011 Act to the LNP and the National Security Agency (NSA).

Security institutions recognized under this Act to form part of the National Security Architecture include:

- ➢ The Liberia National Police
- ➢ Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Ministry of Justice)
- ➢ Ministry of National Security
- ➢ Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
- ➢ Drugs Enforcement Agency
- ➢ Bureau of Customs and Excise
- ➢ National Bureau of Investigation
- ➢ National Fire Service
- ➢ National Security Agency
- ➢ Special Security Service (now, Executive Protection Service)

The MNS takes over the task of organizing and validating data provided to the GoL by other branches of the Security System and to co-ordinate and share this with the relevant agencies such as the NSA. Cyber-crime and other 'high tech' criminal activity are also part of the remit of the MNS as well as the duty to advise the President on the activities of the other security agencies.

The NBI has the duty of investigating major crimes such as murder, arson, illegal entry into Liberia, and the theft of government property. It is the NBI which would maintain and update records on known criminals and pass this information on to the LNP and other relevant agencies.

These amendments to the original 2011 Act bear testimony to the challenge of security and intelligence today. While the obligations of those entrusted with "state secrets" are stressed, other than the general oversight of the Legislature and the President and his or her Executive there is no clear way that would prevent the MNS, the NBI or the NSA from over-stepping their authority. This is because the role of the judiciary is not mentioned in the original Act or its amendments. There is no independent avenue of appeal nor is there any recourse for someone who feels himself wrongly suspected of national crimes.

Part 4: Actors

There are a number of critical actors in the process of SSR. Given that Liberia had become a "failed state" the involvement of the international community was and is necessary. Liberia must undertake SSR with extensive external involvement.

With respect to local ownership and democratic participation in the SSR process all local actors except the executive have been marginalized. For instance DynCorp has refused to report to the Liberia parliament on the rebuilding of the AFL, citing contractual obligations to the US State Department. The contracting out of reform made it extremely difficult for the legislative body and civil society actors to exercise any kind of monitoring function, let alone have a genuine input into the new security policy. The definition of the nature, content and character of Liberia's new armed forces without consultation with parliament or civil society is evidence of a serious lack of transparency in the SSR process. Both government officials and civil society groups have voiced their concern about a lack of local ownership, and have called for a "Liberianisation" of the process (Anderson 2006, pp. 4-5; Onoma, A.K., 1).

The Liberian legislature is a crucial actor in SSR. The legislature faces many issues which include: executive domination, lack of integrity among individual legislators and corruption. The process of selecting committee members have been broadened beyond the Speaker thereby making for robust work and openness in the legislature.

Civil society should be another crucial actor in the new Liberian security system. In the past their role has been confined to information sharing rather than consultation, and their role needs expansion. With the exception of Article VII (3) of the CPA statements regarding the strengthening of civilian oversight and local participation in Liberia's SSR are conspicuous by their absence in the CPA (Bendix, D. and Stanley, R, p.23).

Speaking more generally, civil society was not incorporated into the GoL's reform framework from the beginning (Ebo 2007). The case of the exclusion of civil society in Liberia's SSR illustrates the common tendency to posit a tension between the principle of efficiency and the principles of legality, transparency, and accountability (Bendix and Stanley, p. 27). However this lack of local inclusion seem to have been due to the situation leading to when the US severed its relationship with Dyncorp and took over direct responsibility for mentoring the AFL, including a process of "liberianisation" of leadership characterized by fast-track promotions and ultimately a Liberian chief of staff.

Within the police, community policing forums were an external policy designed to increase civil society and public input into policing. Also the GRC and the SSR Working Group became much more active in reform by 2008.

Another important initiative in SSR after the enactment of the National Defense Act was the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) launched in 2009. The GRC was set up by the President of Liberia in 2009 to provide advice and leadership for SSR. It assessed the country's security sector and reviewed existing legislation. It concluded that the SSR process in Liberia was "taking place within very volatile, uncertain and fragile internal and external environments" (Jaye 2006). The centralization of power in the presidency, the lack of an independent judiciary and one party rule in the past represented significant

challenges according to the GRC. The National Security and Intelligence Reform Act was an important step in the SSR called for by the GRC.

Other independent bodies created to support effective functioning of SSR include the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) established in August 2008 by an Act of the National Legislature with a broad mandate and functions to implement appropriate measures and undertake programs geared toward investigating, prosecuting and preventing acts of corruption, including educating the public about the ills of corruption and the benefits of its eradication; and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), created by recommendation of the Liberia TRC in 2009.

Part 5: Sustainability: *Next Steps*

New Legal Footing for the Security Sector

It is pleasing to note that in the past nine years Liberia's security architecture has evolved from a multi-agency condominium full of duplications to a stream lined sector with clearly defined boundaries of function and responsibility; thanks to some of the legislative capacity building efforts previously mentioned. The legal framework for the security sector is almost complete with the passage in 2011 of the NSRI Act and its amendments in 2013.

Future SSR work that awaits attention, it was gathered, include several other pieces of legislation to be dealt with by the legislature: a police act, reform of the drug enforcement agency, the National Defense Strategy and the Firearms Control Act. In addition several legal topics also need attention: a clarification of the relationship between the security services and the political process in order to avoid the politicization of the services and the process of appointments of top officials, whether political or non-political.

New Police Law

"Just because the guns have been silent for 10 years doesn't mean everything's OK here," said Thomas Nah of the Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia. "Liberia is going nowhere as long as the police remain like this," he said. Given that corruption is widespread in every Liberian institution, the abuses found within the LNP are especially egregious because they are the most public government officials and on the street and, in the words of Cecil Griffiths, president of the Liberia Law Enforcement Association, "the face of the state." Given the LNP's capabilities and complexity, the question of oversight is critical (Gompert et al 2009).

An important recent initiative has been the establishment of the Professional Standards Division (PSD), the LNP's internal monitoring unit. Since it began its work LNP officers have been more inclined to report the abusive behavior of others. However, Human Rights Watch and local bodies alike have urged the Government of Liberia and the LNP to go further than the PSD and to establish an independent civilian oversight board to field complains about acts of misconduct.

There is, therefore, a clear need for full implementation of the new police law. There are a variety of modalities through which this need can be met. Although it would be challenging to enact, such a law could be part of an omnibus security bill. Another possibility would be to update the Act to Amend the

Executive Law with respect to the National Police Force of 1975 (Jaye 2008, 169). In either case the police law would complement the National Defense Act of 2008 with respect to the AFL.

Among the provisions to which such an act would need to address itself would be arrest and detention practices. Without an efficient, fair, and transparent system of arrest, trial and incarceration, those accused of crimes might simply find themselves in jail without due process or, by way of contrast, find their way right back onto the street without prosecution (Crane et al, p. 57). This unfortunately is currently replete in today's Liberia. The LNP in this legislation should come under the authority and management oversight of the Ministry of Justice, and the ancillary police services should be consolidated into the LNP (Ibid, 77).

Provisions for stronger legislative Oversight

According to Thomas Jaye effective security sector reform in Liberia requires strengthening legislative oversight in three areas: authority, ability, and attitude (Jaye 2009). Article 34 of the Liberian Constitution gives ample power to deal with all security sector issues. Furthermore, the way that the legislature operates gives scope for the establishment of committees on security and defense which can supervise the security sector. Senate committees enjoy similar power to hold hearings and summon witnesses.

Historically, Liberia's legislature has usually yielded to the will of the executive. This is no longer the case. The relevant committees have been active in insisting that they have input on security issues and do not hesitate to summon ministers to explain issues to them. Thus, the emerging role of the legislature, on the one hand, should help to provide legitimacy for the state security apparatus and, on the other hand, empower the legislature *vis à vis* the executive.

Efforts aimed at transparency such as the "Open Budget Initiative" makes the military and other security sector budget provisions publically known, and has the potential to improve public confidence. Legislative oversight should further enhance this. The limitation reported in this system in its implementation is the constant budget short-fall which permits the executive to make many re-allocations without legislative approval. This *is even* more pronounced in actions to do with emergencies and security threats.

However, authority is not the only variable for effective legislative oversight. Legislators must also enjoy the capacity to do so. The complexity and especially the secrecy of the security sector represent serious problems to oversight. Security officials can and do hide behind "national security interests" in order to limit the role of legislators. Another challenge is turnover. By the time legislators develop some knowledge and expertise on defense, security and intelligence matters they find themselves moved to another committee or their tenure as a Legislature will have ended. Finally, there is the problem of the generally low educational attainment of legislators.

The final condition to effective oversight of the security sector is attitude. Since independence in 1847 the will and commitment of the Legislature to fulfill their oversight role has been hampered by single party rule and the imperial style of the presidency. And because of these two factors the Legislature in the past has always yielded to the will of the Executive and party loyalty has undermined the independence of the Senate and House of Representatives.

This is changing. Even though the president is vested by the constitution with considerable power the Legislature has begun to use its legal authority to address issues that were previously rubber stamped by its predecessors.

There are many reasons to be optimistic that Liberia is now taking a new direction with its security sector, one that has begun legislative supervision and civilian control over it. Failing a radical revision of Liberia's constitution the executive will continue to enjoy more control than the other two branches of government over the security sector, but within the past ten years since the signing of the CPA much progress has been made.

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