Project: Autonomous Parking Using TRENTOS, CARLA, and TPM module

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Overview

TPM Driver

Overall concept: Autonomous driving

- CARLA (autonomous driving simulator) running on PC
- Python client receives environment data from CARLA and sends it to Raspberry Pi
- TestApp component decides how to drive, and sends it back to Python client
- Communication must happen securely...

 TPM Driver
 Secure Communication
 Since Communication

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Overall concept: Secure communication

- (Symmetrically) encrypted sockets, provided by our SecureCommunication component
- ► Key exchange using asymmetric encryption
 - SecureCommunication component implements algorithm
 - ▶ WolfTPM component implements hardware-assisted asymmetric decryption
- ▶ TPM is **authenticated** by comparing the generated key with a stored hash

Overview

TPM Driver

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Concept

- ▶ WolfTPM handles the specifics of communicating with the TPM
- ▶ But it doesn't know how to do input/output on TRENTOS
 - ⇒ Need to add custom I/O function to the HAL ("Hardware Abstraction Layer")
 - ► Custom I/O wrapper actually just a thin wrapper around the BCM2837 library
- ▶ It also doesn't have a CAmkES interface that would let it talk to other TRENTOS components
 - ⇒ That's what our custom interfaces are for

Custom Interfaces

- Larger data, e.g. keys or encrypted text, get passed over the dataport
- Functions only take the parameters needed to process the data
- No additional buffer needed, dataport pointer can immediately be passed to WolfTPM library
- + Avoids unnecessary copying of data
- Dataport doesn't show up in function signature

Custom Interfaces

if_KeyStore: Functions for getting or storing keys

```
void    getCEK_RSA2048(uint32_t *exp);
void    getCSRK_RSA1024(uint32_t *exp);
uint32_t storeKey(uint32_t keyLen);
int    loadKey(uint32_t hdl, uint32_t *keyLen);
```

Note:

- Nothing requires the data that's stored to actually be a key
- "Handle" actually just an offset, no validity checks

Custom Interfaces

if_Crypto: Functions for encryption and decryption

```
int decrypt_RSA_OAEP(int key, int *len);
int encrypt_RSA_OAEP(int key, int *len);
```

Note that this signature allows to call multiple decryption operations after each other!

```
crypto.decrypt_RSA_OAEP(IF_CRYPTO_KEY_CEK, &len);
crypto.decrypt_RSA_OAEP(IF_CRYPTO_KEY_CSRK, &len);
```

Custom Interfaces

if_TPMctrl: Functions to control the TPM itself

void shutdown(void)

Why is this needed?

- ► TPM goes into Dictionary Attack Lockdown mode if improperly shut down too often
- CAmkES appears not to have a pre_shutdown() equivalent of pre_init()
- \Rightarrow Shutdown command must be sent by TestApp

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Initialization

- Upon component startup, pre_init() gets called
- Also possible to define component-specific init functions and post_init(), but not needed for this implementation

Our pre_init() function:

- 1. Initializes BCM2837 SPI with correct parameters (MSB first, CS1, 31.25 MHz)
- 2. Pulls RESET pin high
- 3. Generates real SRK (needed for generation of other keys and for NV storage)
- 4. Loads cEK into TPM...
- Generates cSRK

Loading cEK

Problem:

- First run of the code must save cEK into TPM
- Python client also must receive the cEK, for verification
- Subsequent runs must load this cEK, not generate a new one!

Loading cEK

How to determine whether cEK already exists?

pre_init() tries to open NV storage

If it succeeds:

- ▶ Read the cEK from NV storage into a WOLFTPM2_KEYBLOB struct
- ► Load the cEK into TPM main memory

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Loading cEK

If it fails:

- ► Generate new cEK (as a WOLFTPM2_KEYBLOB struct)
- Store it in the NVRAM of the TPM
- Print a hexdump of the new key and exit
- Python client can import cEK using importEK.py

How to clear TPM and re-create cEK on purpose?

- Define CLEAR_TPM and re-compile
- ▶ That will clear the TPM and re-create the key

Secure Communication

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TPM Driver

Secure Communication

Events and Notifications


- Keeping it simple: SecureCommunication is a passive component
- NetworkStack_PicoTcp component uses run() routine to notify clients about new events
- ▶ Problem: No run() loop = No notifications = Calls like OS_Socket_wait() don't work anymore
- ► **Solution:** Merge functionality of OS_Socket_wait() with OS_Socket_connect()
 - ▶ In our usecase, OS_Socket_wait() was only called to make sure we received an event confirming the successful establishment of a connection

Key Exchange

- Key exchange must happen before sending/receiving any other data
- ▶ **Problem:** How do we synchronize SecureCommunication with the client component?
- ▶ **Solution:** A socket must always be created before you can read/write data on it.
 - ▶ Static variable in SecureCommunication keeps track of whether the key has been exchanged already.
 - ▶ Inside the code called by OS_Socket_create(), check the value of that variable, exchange key if necessary before creating socket and returning.

Encryption and Decryption Protocol

- Previously in the homeworks: static IV
- **Problem:** Using a repeated IV is unsafe!
- **Solution:** Append a fresh IV to the beginning of every message



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Sensor Data Exchange 1

- ▶ Data exchange in real-time using TCP
- ▶ **Problem:** Nagle's algorithm It aims to gain efficiency by reducing the number of packets that need to be sent over the network.
- Solution:
 - Set socket option TCP_NODELAY to disable Nagle's algorithm
- Problem: Small sliding window Window size is the amount of unacknowledged data that can be in transit at any given time.
- Solution:
 - Buffer the sensor data before sending

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Sensor Data Exchange 2

- ▶ Problem: Sensor data synchronisation
 The application doesn't know which radar detection was made at which location.
- **▶** Solution:
 - Send GNSS and Radar detections combined as pairs
- ▶ Problem: Split data pairs TCP is a byte stream protocol that doesn't preserve boundaries. OS_Socket_read could receive only half of a pair.
- Solution:
 - Add size before every pair

Park Spot Detection & Parking

- Assumptions:
 - ▶ Same street, Same vehicles, Parking space between two vehicles
- Compare each detection with last detection to get distance difference
- If distance is big enough, parking space is found
- ▶ Parking: It is a fixed procedure and consists of 4 steps
 - Stop Vehicle if parking space is found.
 - Do a right lane change
 - Drive backwards to the vehicle above parking space
 - Park vehicle