Virus Scanning as Model Checking

Mihai Christodorescu mihai@cs.wisc.edu

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Overview

- 1. The Problem:
 - Virus writers are getting smarter!
- 2. Smart Virus Scanner
 - Model checking
- 3. Encouraging Results
- 4. Future Directions

Why Another Virus Scanner?

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
Why Another Virus Scanner?

- · The Problem:
 - Viruses are becoming better at hiding themselves in binaries
 - Virus writers use complex techniques to obfuscate virus code in a host program

Why Another Virus Scanner?

- · The Problem:
 - Viruses are becoming better at hiding themselves in binaries
 - Virus writers use complex techniques to obfuscate virus code in a host program
- Current commercial virus scanners are inadequate

Simple obfuscation methods




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· Simple obfuscation methods

· Simple obfuscation methods




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· Simple obfuscation methods

=> Easy detection:




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· Simple obfuscation methods

=> Easy detection:




· Signature matching

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· Simple obfuscation methods

=> Easy detection:





- Signature matching
- Very successful against first-gen viruses!

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 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine






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 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine


 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine



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
 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine



=> Detection methods:

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 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine




=> Detection methods:

Heuristic detection

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 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine




=> Detection methods:

- Heuristic detection
- · Emulation

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 Encrypted virus body + morphed decryption routine



=> Detection methods:

- Heuristic detection
- Emulation


 Current state-ofthe-art

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- Metamorphic viruses:
 - Morph the whole virus body


Program




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- Metamorphic viruses:
 - Morph the whole virus body




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- Integration of virus and program
 - e.g. Mistfall Virus Engine


Program

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- Integration of virus and program
 - e.g. Mistfall Virus Engine


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


=> Detection methods

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

- Integration of virus and program
 - e.g. Mistfall Virus Engine



=> Detection methods



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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | mov | esi, ecx |
| | mov | eax, 0d601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

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|-------|-------|-------------|
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Morphed Virus Code (from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | | CEM JAN |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | | |
| | mov | esi, ecx |
| | | |
| | mov | eax, 0d601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | 11 | . 49 |
| | call | edi |
| | | |
| | jmp | Loop |

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
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| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

Morphed Virus Code (from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | begz | N1 |
| N1: | mov | esi, ecx |
| | nop | |
| | mov | eax, Od601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | call | edi |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | begz | |
| N2: | jmp | Loop |

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | mov | esi, ecx |
| | mov | eax, 0d601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

Morphed Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | begz | N1 |
| N1: | mov | esi, ecx |
| | nop | |
| | mov | eax, Od601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | call | edi |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | begz | N2 |
| N2: | jmp | Loop |

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | mov | esi, ecx |
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| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

Morphed Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | pop nop | ecx |
|-------|---------------------------------|---|
| N2: | call xor beqz jmp | edi ebx, ebx N2 Loop |
| | nop mov pop pop nop | eax, Od601h edx ecx |
| N1: | jecxz xor beqz mov | SFModMark ebx, ebx N1 esi, ecx |

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|-------|-------------|
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| | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | mov | esi, ecx |
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| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

Morphed Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | jmp L1 | |
| L3: | call | edi |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | begz | N2 |
| N2: | jmp | Loop |
| | jmp L4 | |
| L2: | nop | |
| | mov | eax, Od601h |
| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | nop | |
| | jmp L3 | |
| L1: | jecxz | SFModMark |
| | xor | ebx, ebx |
| | beqz | N1 |
| N1: | mov | esi, ecx |
| | jmp L2 | |
| L4: | | |

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| Loop: | | |
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| | mov | esi, ecx |
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| | pop | edx |
| | pop | ecx |
| | call | edi |
| | jmp | Loop |

Morphed Virus Code

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4):

| pop | ecx |
|--------|---|
| nop | |
| jmp L1 | |
| call | edi |
| xor | ebx, ebx |
| begz | N2 |
| jmp | Loop |
| jmp L4 | |
| nop | |
| mov | eax, 0d601h |
| pop | edx |
| pop | ecx |
| nop | |
| jmp L3 | |
| jecxz | SFModMark |
| xor | ebx, ebx |
| begz | N1 |
| mov | esi, ecx |
| jmp L2 | |
| | |
| | nop jmp L1 call xor beqz jmp jmp L4 nop mov pop pop nop jmp L3 jecxz xor beqz mov |

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

What to do?

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

What to do?

- Better virus detection tool
 - Analyze the program structure (instead of signature matching)
 - More flexible

What to do?

- Better virus detection tool
 - Analyze the program structure (instead of signature matching)
 - More flexible
- Check whether viral properties are present in a given program
 - e.g.: "program writes to an executable file"
 - e.g.: "program monitors as executables are loaded into memory and changes them"
 - e.g.: "program behaves just like virus XYZ"

Overview

- 1. The Problem:
 - Virus writers are getting smarter!
- 2. Smart Virus Scanner
 - Model checking
 - 3. Encouraging Results
 - 4. Future Directions


Use Model Checking

- Consider the vanilla virus code as a set of one or more properties
- Check that the program exhibits those properties
 - If YES => infected


- Technique for checking program properties
- 1. Build automaton for the desired property
- 2. Extract program model
- 3. Compare the model against the automaton

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu




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


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
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
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Security Automaton for P




IDA Pro (+ SDK plugins)

Transducer

(on top of CodeSurfer static analysis engine)

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

- 1. Build automaton from vanilla virus
 - Blueprint of virus behavior

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 - Blueprint of virus behavior
- 2. Build a model of the program

3. Verify that model does <u>not</u> match the blueprint

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Virus Code:

```
push
          eax
sidt
          [esp-02h]
          ebx
pop
          ebx, HookNo * 08h + 04h
add
cli
          ebp, [ebx]
mov
          bp, [ebx-04h]
mov
          esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]
lea
push
          esi
          [ebx-04h], si
mov
shr
          esi, 16
          [ebx+02h], si
mov
          esi
pop
```

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4 virus)

Virus Automaton:

Virus Code:

```
push
           xps
sidt
          [esp-02h]
          ebx
pop
          ebx, HookNo * 08h + 04h
add
cli
          ebp, [ebx]
mov
          bp, [ebx-04h]
mov
          esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]
lea
push
          EDI
          [ebx-04h], si
mov
shr
          esi, 16
          [ebx+02h], si
mov
          esi
pop
```

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4 virus)

Virus Automaton:

mov ebp, [ebx]

mov bp, [ebx - 04h]

Virus Code:

```
push
           xps
sidt
           [esp-02h]
           ebx
pop
           ebx, HookNo * 08h + 04h
add
cli
           ebp, [ebx]
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mov
           esi
pop
```


(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4 virus)

lea esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]

Virus Code:

```
push
           eax
sidt
           [esp-02h]
           ebx
pop
           ebx, HookNo * 08h + 04h
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           ebp, [ebx]
mov
           bp, [ebx-04h]
mov
           esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]
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
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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Virus Code:


```
push
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sidt
           [esp-02h]
           ebx
pop
           ebx, HookNo * 08h + 04h
add
cli
           ebp, [ebx]
mov
           bp, [ebx-04h]
mov
           esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]
lea
push
           ESI
           [ebx-04h], si
mov
shr
           esi, 16
           [ebx+02h], si
mov
           esi
pop
```

(from Chernobyl CIH 1.4 virus)




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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu



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Program to be checked:

mov ebp, [ebx]

nop

mov bp, [ebx-04h]


test ebx

begz next

next: lea esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]

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Program to be checked:

mov ebp, [ebx]

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
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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu



Program to be checked:

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mov ebp, [ebx]
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mov bp, [ebx-04h]
test ebx
beqz next
next: lea esi, MyHook - @1[ecx]
```

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

What are irrelevant instructions?

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 - Control flow instructions that do not change the control flow
 - e.g.: jumps/branches to the next instructions

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 - Instructions that modify dead registers

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 - NOPs
 - Control flow instructions that do not change the control flow
 - e.g.: jumps/branches to the next instructions
 - Instructions that modify dead registers
 - Sequences of instructions that do not modify architectural state
 - e.g.:
 add ebx, 1
 sub ebx, 1

Overview

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Current Status

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Current Status

 We disassemble and analyze program structure

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- We can detect viruses morphed in a simple manner
 - Irrelevant instructions = NOPs



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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Results

- Testing
 - Viruses used: Chernobyl, Hare
 - AntiVirus utilities
 - Command AntiVirus (F-Prot)
 - Norton AntiVirus (Symantec)

Results


- Testing
 - Viruses used: Chernobyl, Hare
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 - Norton AntiVirus (Symantec)
- 8 Not surprising!
 - Norton and Command AV do not detect "NOP"morphed viruses

Results


- Testing
 - Viruses used: Chernobyl, Hare
 - AntiVirus utilities
 - Command AntiVirus (F-Prot)
 - Norton AntiVirus (Symantec)
- Not surprising!
 - Norton and Command AV do not detect "NOP"morphed viruses
- Our Smart Virus Scanner catches "NOP"morphed viruses

- · Limitations:
 - Intra-procedural only


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- Cannot detect equivalent instruction sequences

Overview

- 1. The Problem:
 - Virus writers are getting smarter!
- 2. Smart Virus Scanner
 - Model checking
- 3. Encouraging Results
- 4. Future Directions

Future Work

- Main focus:
 - Improve detection of "irrelevant insn's"
- More (precise) information from static analysis
 - live range information
 - alias/points-to analysis
- · Library of equivalent instructions sequences

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

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 - Recognize virus code spread across subroutines

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
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 - Recognize virus code with different register usage
- Virus scanning for component-based systems
 - Recognize virus code distributed across components
- · Scan for multiple viruses at the same time

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- Security Automaton
 - For policy "Always release a resource after acquiring it."


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
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
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


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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

Abstract Representation


Abstract Representation



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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

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Mihai Christodorescu - mihai@cs.wisc.edu

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Abstract Representation

