

# Supplementary Material: Face-saving or fair-minded: What motivates moral behavior?\*

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This documents contain the online supplementary appendices A and B that are referred to in the main paper.

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## A Additional description and analysis

We here provide supplementary material, as referred to in the main text.

### A.1 Payment procedures

Special care was taken so that the payment procedure ensured that the experiment was double blind. At the end of the experiment the computer assigned a payment code to each of the dictators, and a group of assistants, who were not present in the lab during the experiment, prepared envelopes containing the payments corresponding to each payment code. It was impossible to match the payment code back to a particular participant. The assistants also made sure that it was impossible to identify the amount of money by simply looking at the envelope. After bringing the envelopes to the lab, the assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out in accordance with the payment codes. This procedure ensured that the payment to participants did not reveal any information about the choices made by the participants in the experiment. Participants were informed of this procedure at the start of the experiment and we have no indications that the participants doubted the credibility of the procedure.

To ensure that the dictators could trust that the transfer would actually take place if they decided to give away a share of the money, they were informed (in all treatments) that after the experiment, they could obtain an anonymous copy of the transaction from the school's accounting department as verification. The participants would then have to send an e-mail with their payment code to the school's accounting department, who would verify that the transfer had taken place. 1 out of 200 dictators did request a verification. The participants were also given the opportunity to provide anonymous comments on the experiment. In these comments no one expressed any doubt about the transfers taking place.

### A.2 Anchoring effects

We here provide some further discussion of the possibility that anchoring effects shaped the behavior of the participants in the treatments where both the dictator and the recipient had been working and earned 100 NOK.

We cannot rule out that the information that each had earned 100 NOK created an anchoring effect on the decision in addition to an entitlement effect. We tried to minimize the anchoring effect by, on the decision screen, only providing information about the sum of money earned by the two participants (rather than the earnings of each of them): "You and the other participant have earned 200 NOK in total for the task you have performed". The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment I2 was as follows: "You have been selected to receive  $x$  NOK

from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students in the room you were sitting in during the experiment on Tuesday November 3. In this experiment a participant in a different room, who is also a student at NHH, has earned 100 NOK by performing the same task as you. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the other students that participated in the experiment (i.e. you). He was informed that you had completed the same task. He was also informed that you had earned the same amount, 100 NOK, but that you had not been informed about this. We then asked him to decide how much of the joint earnings of 200 NOK, he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter. He decided to give you  $x$  NOK, which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of the money that the two of you had earned.”

### A.3 Further details on the treatments

The non-informative letter accompanying any money transferred in NI1-NI3 would only state the following basic information: “You have been selected to receive  $x$  NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH).” Thus, the recipient would not know that the money he received reflected a choice made by another person or have any information about the amount of money actually available in this experiment. If the dictator decided not to send any money in these treatments, we did not send a letter to the recipient. This is just an extreme version of the recipient not being given any information about the context and the dictator’s decision.

In treatments NI3 and I3, the recipient was a client in PRIDE Tanzania, which is the largest microfinance institution in Tanzania, with approximately 70 000 clients. The clients involved in the present study were all selected from a branch in Dar es Salaam. Norway is one of the richest and Tanzania one of the poorest countries in the world, a fact that is well-known among most Norwegians. GDP per capita is 47 times higher in Norway than in Tanzania (Table 6 in International Comparison Program (2008)), and the Norwegian government and Norwegian donors are extensively involved in aid work in Tanzania. For a more detailed discussion of the clients and context of PRIDE Tanzania, see Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2015).

The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment I3 was as follows: “You have been selected to receive  $x$  NOK (equivalent to  $y$  USD) from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Norway. Your name has been randomly selected among the clients in the micro finance institution PRIDE TANZANIA in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In this experiment

a participant, who is a student at NHH, earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the clients in PRIDE TANZANIA in Tanzania (i.e. you), and was asked to decide how much of his earnings he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter. He decided to give you  $x$  NOK (equivalent to  $y$  USD), which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of the money that the two of you had earned.”

#### A.4 Further details on opting in and out of information

Overall, very few of the participants who decide to switch information condition revise their initial dictator decision. The eight participants who switch from the no information condition to the complete information condition increase on average the share given from 20.3% to 23.7%; the three participants who switch from the complete information condition to the no information condition decrease on average the share given from 28.3% to 6.7%. Only two out of the 58 participants who give away a positive share in the treatments I1-I3 decide to keep everything for themselves when given the option of switching to the no information condition.

The participants who decide not to switch are given the hypothetical question of what they would have given away if they had faced the other information condition initially. Here we observe a greater effect of information than for the group that actually switched, see A.4; in the information treatments, they respond that they would have given less if they had faced the no information condition and in the no information treatments they respond that they would have given more if they had faced the complete information condition.

#### A.5 Additional Tables

Table A.1: Regression analysis – separate dummies for the moral treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Student - working	0.14*** (0.05)		0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.13* (0.07)
Client - needy	0.41*** (0.05)		0.32*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.44*** (0.07)
Information		0.08* (0.05)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)		
Student - working × info			0.08 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)		
Client - needy × info			0.17 (0.11)	0.13 (0.10)		
Charity				0.10** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Left-wing				0.10** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Female				0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
Age				0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Business education				-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)
Constant	0.11*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.71*** (0.26)	-0.08 (0.36)	-1.38*** (0.37)
Observations	200	200	200	200	98	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.232	0.014	0.255	0.349	0.303	0.454

Standard errors in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

*Note:* The table reports regressions corresponding to the regressions reported in Table 3, but with separate dummies for each of the moral treatments. Columns (1)-(4) include all observations, column (5) includes all observations from treatments NI1-NI3, and column (6) includes all observations from treatments I1-I3. The treatments are defined in Table 1 of the main paper. 'Student - working' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator is in the treatments I2 and NI2, 'Client - needy' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator is in the treatments I3 and NI3-I3, 'Information' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator is in the treatments I1-I3, 'Charity' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator has given 500 NOK or more to charitable organizations in the previous year, 'Left-wing' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator voted for a party in the left-wing coalition government in the previous election, 'Female' is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator is a female, 'Age' is the age of the dictator in years, 'Business education' is years of business education of the dictator, and 'Information + Moral × Information' is the linear combination (sum) of the parameters Information and Moral × Information. Standard errors in parentheses (\* :  $p < 0.10$ , \*\* :  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* :  $p < 0.01$ ).

Table A.2: Statistical tests: no information versus information

	<i>t</i> -test	Mann-Whitney
Student - not working	0.971	0.879
Student - working	0.253	0.246
Client - needy	0.096	0.103

*Note:* The table reports *p*-values for statistical tests of a difference between each of the moral treatments with no information and with information (first row: NI1 vs I1, second row: NI2 vs I2, third row: NI3 vs I3); the treatments are defined in Table 1.

Table A.3: Statistical tests: different moral treatments

	Information			
	no		complete	
	<i>t</i> -test	Mann-Whitney	<i>t</i> -test	Mann-Whitney
Students - working vs non-working	0.112	0.119	0.007	0.008
Student - non-working vs needy clients	< 0.001	0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001
Client - working vs needy clients	0.012	0.033	0.001	0.001

*Note:* The table reports *p*-values for statistical tests of a difference between two moral treatments with no information or with information (first row: NI1 vs NI2 and I1 vs I2, second row: NI1 vs NI3 and I1 vs I3, third row: NI2 vs NI3 and I2 vs I3); the treatments are defined in Table 1.

Table A.4: Treatment differences: Hypothetical responses

<b>Recipient</b>	<b>Information</b>	
	no	complete
Student – not working	0.017 (0.013)	-0.053 (0.036)
Student – working	0.046 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.027)
Client – needy	0.197 (0.065)	-0.055 (0.046)
Total	0.088 (0.027)	-0.050 (0.021)

*Note:* The table reports the difference in share given between what a participant gave away initially and what a participant answered on the hypothetical question that she would have given away if she had faced the other information condition; calculated on the subset of participants that *did not* change the information provided to recipients when given this opportunity in the second part of the experiment. The treatments are defined in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.

## Bibliography

Berge, Lars Ivar Oppedal, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden (2015). “Human and financial capital for microenterprise development: Evidence from a field and lab experiment,” *Management Science*, 61(4): 707–722.

International Comparison Program (2008). “2005 international comparison program: Tables of final results,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank.

## B Experimental instructions

In this appendix, we present a translation of the instructions (including screenshots) and the letters used in the experiment. Instructions given to dictators in treatment T2 are presented in Section B. In the paper, we explain how the other treatments differ from T2. The letters for all the treatments are presented in Section B.7.

### B.1 Introduction (applies to all treatments)

Welcome to this experiment. My name is X and I shall be in charge of the experiment.

The results from this experiment will be used in a research project, and it is important that everyone follows the rules of conduct given to you. If you have questions or problems along the way, please raise your hand and we will come to you. You must not attempt to open other web-pages than those of the experiment. If you break these rules, you must leave the room. There will be waiting periods during the experiment, and it is important that you then remain quiet.

You will be anonymous in the experiment. It won't be possible for us, the other participants, or anyone else to find out what choices you make in the experiment.

When the experiment is finished, you will be given a payment code on the screen. You should write this code down on a form at your workstation. When you leave the room after the experiment, you present this form and you will be given an envelope with the money you have earned. The envelope will be prepared by persons who will not be in this room when the envelopes are distributed. We do this to make sure that no-one will know how much each of you earned in this experiment.

The experiment has two parts, and I shall know explain what you will do in the experiment.

The first thing you will do in this experiment is to work on a task that lasts for 15 minutes. The task is to find a certain number in a matrix with a large number of different numbers. You get one point each time you tick off the correct number in the matrix and you lose one point each time you tick off an incorrect number. You can move to a new matrix at any time. To complete the task, you will have to collect 70 points within the time limit. You will be informed about the number of points you have earned during the task. If you finish the task before the time limit you will be told so. You can then await further instructions.

### B.2 Production phase (applies to all treatments)

[ Figure B.1 about here. ]

### **B.3 Distribution phase - introduction (T2)**

You reached the production target in the first part of the experiment and for this you have earned 100 NOK.

You have been randomly matched with another participant in this experiment who is also a student at NHH, but who is in a different room. This person has also earned 100 NOK for doing the same task as you, but has not been informed about this.

This person will not be matched with other participants than you. You will not be told who this person is, and this person will not be told who you are.

You will be asked to determine how you want to distribute the amount you and the other participant have earned together, 200 NOK, between yourself and him (or her). After the experiment is finished, the person you are matched with will be sent a letter. In this letter this person will be informed that he (or she) randomly has been drawn to be a recipient in this experiment. The person will also be informed that he has been matched with another participant (i.e. you), and that both you and him have earned 100 NOK for the task you performed, and that you have been asked to determine how much of the earnings from the experiment he should have. The money you decide to distribute to him will be enclosed to the letter. If you decide to give nothing to this other participant, the letter will be sent without any money enclosed.

Your payment from the experiment will be your show up fee plus the amount you decide to keep for yourself. When the experiment is completed you will be given a payment code on the screen that you should write down. When you leave the room, you present this code and you will receive an envelope with your money. To ensure anonymity, the envelopes will be prepared by persons who will not be in the room when the envelopes are distributed. Therefore, none of us present in this room will know what amount is in the envelope you receive.

On the payment form you will also find contact information for a person in the administration at NHH. By reporting your payment code to this person you will, if you want, be sent an anonymized copy of the letter sent to the other participant and a copy of the receipt in the accounts of NHH that confirms that the amount you decided to distribute to the recipient was actually transferred to the recipient.

Before you go on you will be given the opportunity to view the letter that will be sent to the recipient. When you have looked at this letter you will be given the opportunity to move on.

### **B.4 Distribution phase - distributive choice (T2)**

[ Figure B.2 about here. ]

Figure B.1: Production technology. Screenshot to the left, translated text to the right.

## Produksjonsoppgave

Du tjener et poeng for hvert korrekt tall du krysser av, og taper et poeng for hver feil avkryssing.

Produksjonen er ferdig når du når 70 poeng.

Du kan få frem en ny tabell når som helst ved å trykke på "Send" knappen.

I tabellen under, kryss av tallet **892**.

892	118	892	241	956	241	920	223	454	241	313	592	144	313	592	144	313	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
368	956	698	223	368	144	223	454	220	144	368	894	313	956	698	698	956	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
592	894	144	698	454	118	486	313	223	241	592	956	144	892	454	956	118	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
864	223	144	892	920	486	368	920	144	698	920	894	220	454	486	956	144	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
313	223	220	892	892	313	956	552	368	313	486	956	454	892	241	313	144	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
592	313	892	892	368	118	920	486	698	864	223	486	368	144	223	220		
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
368	313	956	241	368	223	920	144	956	241	241	144	144	698	220	241	118	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
241	598	592	956	454	956	486	118	368	220	220	118	698	592	368	118	454	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
223	894	920	118	368	454	486	698	486	920	864	920	454	864	592	486	313	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
864	220	313	698	892	956	698	241	144	220	698	592	486	956	368	313	698	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
920	956	220	144	368	956	368	920	223	486	864	220	220	864	920	368	454	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	
368	698	313	368	220	698	223	368	920	223	698	241	486	592	368	920	144	
<input type="checkbox"/>																	

Sekunder igjen: **847.8**

Send

Seconds left: 847.8 [Submit]

**Production task**  
You earn one point for each correct number you tick off, and lose one point each time you tick off an incorrect number.

The production task is completed when you reach 70 points.

You can proceed to a new matrix at any time by pressing the “submit” button.

In the matrix below, tick off for the number **892**.

[matrix]

## Valg av fordeling

Du er som vi allerede har orientert deg om, tilfeldig blitt koblet sammen med en annen deltaker i dette eksperimentet som også er student ved NHH, men sitter i et annet rom.

Denne personen vil etter eksperimentet motta brevet du nettopp har sett. Dersom du vil se brevet på nytt, klikk her

[Se på brev](#)

Du og den andre deltakeren har tjenet til sammen 200 kroner på oppgaven dere har utført.

Skriv inn hvor mye av dette beløpet du ønsker å gi til den andre deltakeren:

**Til den andre:**

[Send beslutning](#)

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## Choice of distribution

You are, as we have already informed you, randomly matched with another participant in this experiment who is also a student at NHH, but located in another room. After the experiment, this person will receive the letter you have just seen. If you want to see the letter again, hit the button below

[Look at letter]

You and the other participant have earned 200 NOK in total for the task you have performed.

Enter how much of this amount you would like to give the other participant.

**To the other:** [...]

[Submit decision]

Figure B.2: Distribution choice. Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.

## **B.5 Distribution phase - choice of information condition (T2)**

[ Figure B.3 about here. ]

[ Figure B.4 about here. ]

[ Figure B.5 about here. ]

## Mulighet til å endre informasjon

Du får nå mulighet til å endre innholdet i brevet som den du er koblet sammen med vil motta etter eksperimentet. Dersom du ønsker det, vil brevet kun inneholde generell informasjon om at vedkommende er trukket ut til å motta penger fra et økonomisk eksperiment ved NHH og ingen informasjon om at det er en spesifikk person (dvs. deg) som har tatt dette valget og at dere begge har fått penger i eksperimentet.

Dersom du velger å endre innholdet i brevet, vil du også få muligheten til å endre beløpet du sender til den andre. Dersom du dette tilfellet velger ikke å sende noe til den andre, vil vedkommende heller ikke motta brev om eksperimentet.

Du får nå se denne varianten av brevet:

[Se på brev](#)

---

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## Opportunity to change the information

You will now be given the opportunity to change the content of the letter that the person you are matched with will receive after the experiment. If you wish so, the letter will only contain general information stating that the recipient has been drawn to receive money from an economic experiment at NHH and no information there being a specific person (i.e. you) that has made this choice and that you have both earned money in the experiment.

If you decide to change the content of the letter, you will also be given the opportunity to revise the amount you give to the other participant. In this case, if you choose not to send any money, the other person will also not receive a letter about the experiment.  
You can now look at the alternative letter:

[Look at letter]

Figure B.3: Screenshot to the left, translation to the right. After the participant had looked at the letter a new button appeared that allowed him to move on.

## Valg av brevalternativ

Kryss av for det alternativet du foretrekker. Når du har valgt alternativ kan du gå videre.

### Jeg ønsker at den jeg er koblet sammen med skal få informasjon om hvor mye vi har tjent og mitt valg. Dersom du på nytt vil se brevet som vedkommende mottar med dette alternativet, trykk

[Se brev](#)

Jeg ønsker at den jeg er koblet sammen med ikke skal få informasjon om hvor mye vi har tjent og mitt valg. Dersom du på nytt vil se brevet som vedkommende mottar med dette alternativet, trykk

[Se brev](#)

### Choice of letter

Tick off for the alternative you prefer. When you have chosen an alternative you can go on.

- I want the person that I am matched with to receive information about how much we earned and my choice. If you want to see the letter this person receives in this case once more you can hit [See letter].
- I want the person that I am matched with not to receive information about how much we have earned and my choice. If you want to see the letter this person receives in this case once more you can hit [See letter].

[Submit decision]

Figure B 4: Choice of letter. Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.

## Ønsker du å endre fordelingsbeslutning?

Du velger at den du er koblet sammen med ikke skal få informasjon om at dere begge har tatt pengar og ditt valg. Dersom du vil se brevet vedkommende vil motta på nytt, klikk her

[Se på brev](#)

Dere har tjent til sammen 200 kroner på oppgaven dere har utført.

Vælg mellom følgende to alternativer:

- Behold opprinnelig fordeling og gi den andre 40 kroner.  
 Endre fordeling og gi den andre \_\_\_\_\_ kroner.

[Send beslutning](#)

[Submit decision]

## Do you wish to revise the distribution choice?

You chose that the person you are matched with should not be informed about that you have both earned money and your choice. If you want to see the letter again, hit the button

[See letter]

You have earned 200 NOK together for the task you have done.

Choose between one of the following alternatives:

- Keep original distribution and give the other participant 40 NOK.
- Change distribution and give the other participant [...] NOK.

[Submit decision]

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Figure B.5: Revising the distribution choice. Screenshot to the left, translation to the right. (The 40 NOK amount reflects the choice made while taking screenshots, not a constant in the program.)

## **B.6 Questionnaire phase (applies to all treatments)**

[ Figure B.6 about here. ]

**Vi vil gjerne at du svarer på disse spørsmålene:**

Hvilket kull går du på?  
Hvor gammel er du?  
Hvor mye har du løpet av det siste året gitt til veldeidige formål?  
Hvilket parti stemte du på ved forrige valg?

We would like you to answer the following questions

- In which school year are you?
- How old are you?
- Are you male or female?

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Figure B 6: Background questions. Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.

## B.7 Letters

We here present all the letters used in the experiment.

[ Figure B.7 about here. ]

[ Figure B.8 about here. ]

[ Figure B.9 about here. ]

[ Figure B.10 about here. ]

[ Figure B.11 about here. ]



Navn Student NHH  
Adresse

Bergen, 03.11.2009

Kjære Navn,

Du har blitt trukket ut som en mottaker i et økonomisk eksperiment gjennomført på Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH). Ditt navn er tilfeldig trukket ut fra et utvalg av studentene på NHH.

I eksperimentet tjener en deltaker, som også er en student ved NHH, 200 kroner på å utføre en oppgave. Vedkommende ikke så beskjed om at han (eller hun) var blitt koblet sammen med annen person som var tilfeldig trukket blandt de øvrige studentene på NHH (dvs. deg), og ble bedt om å bestemme hvor mye av de 200 kronene han ville gi til deg. For han gjorde dette valget fikk han også se en kopi av dette brevet.

Han valgte å gi deg ... kroner, og disse pengene er lagt ved dette brevet. Hvis det ikke er noen penger i kongsvillet, betyr det at deltageren valgte ikke å gi deg noe av pengene han tjente.

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til eksperimentet kan du sende en mail til undernevnte (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), som er administrativt ansvarlig for eksperimentet.

Mvh  
*Trond Halvorsen*  
Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Norges  
Handelshøyskole  
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Tlf. +47 55 25 35 30  
Postboks 5030  
5020 Bergen  
Norway  
Bank Account No. 4796-0950-359

Dear Name,

You have been selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students at NHH.

In this experiment a participant, who is also a student at NHH, has earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the other students at NHH (i.e. you), and was asked to decide how much of the 200 NOK he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter.

He decided to give you x NOK, which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of his earnings.

If you have questions regarding the experiment, you can send an e-mail to the signatory (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), who is administratively responsible for the experiment.

Yours sincerely,

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Department of Economics

Figure B.7: Informative letter (applies in treatments T1, and T1\*). Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.



Navn Student NHH  
Adresse

Bergen, 03.11.2009

Kjære Navn,

Du har blitt trukket ut som en mottaker i et økonomiske eksperiment gjennomført på

Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH). Ditt navn er tilfeldig trukket ut blant studentene som var i det rommet du satt i under dette eksperimentet, tirsdag 3. november.

I eksperimentet tjenet en deltaker i et annet rom, som også er en student ved NHH, 100 kroner på å utføre samme oppgave som du utførte den dagen. Vedkommende fikk å beskjed om at han (eller hun) var blitt koblet sammen med en annen person som var tilfeldig trukket blandt studentene som deltok i eksperimentet (dvs. deg). Han fikk ikke bekjed om at du hadde utført den samme oppgaven og klart produktjonsmålet. Han fikk også beskjed om at du hadde tatt det samme beløpet, 100 kroner, men at du ikke hadde blitt informert om dette. Vi ba deretter den andre om å bestemme hvor mye av pengene dere hadde fått til sammen, 200 kroner, han ville gi til deg. Før han gjorde dette valget fikk han også se en kopi av dette brevet.

Fan valgte å gi deg ... kroner, og disse pengene er lagt ved dette brevet. Hvis det ikke er noen penger i konvolutten, betyr det at deltakeren valgte ikke å gi deg noe av pengene dere tjente.

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til eksperimentet kan du sende en mail til undertegnede (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), som er administrativt ansvarlig for eksperimentet.

Mvh

*Trond Halvorsen*  
Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Norges  
Handelshøyskole  
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION  
Universitetsplassen 50  
NO-5014 Bergen  
Norway  
Post address: Postboks 4854 5014 Bergen  
Bank Account: NL94 7000 0900 0989 389

Dear Name,

You have been selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students in the room you were sitting in during the experiment on Tuesday November 3.

In this experiment a participant in a different room, who is also a student at NHH, has earned 100 NOK by performing the same task as you. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the other students that participated in the experiment (i.e. you). He was informed that you had completed the same task. He was also informed that you had earned the same amount, 100 NOK, but that you had not been informed about this. We then asked him to decide how much of the joint earnings of 200 NOK, he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter.

He decided to give you x NOK, which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of the money that the two of you had earned."

Yours sincerely,

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Department of Economics

Figure B.8: Informative letter (applies in treatments T2, and T2\*). Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.



Navn Student NHH  
Adresse

Bergen, 03.11.2009

Kjært Navn,

Du har blitt trukket ut til å motta krøner ... i forbindelse med et økonomisk eksperiment gjennomført på Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH). Ditt navn er tilfeldig trukket ut fra et utvalg av studenter på NHH.  
Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til eksperimentet kan du sende en e-post til underliggende (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), som er administrativt ansvarlig for eksperimentet.

Mvh

  
Trond Halvorsen

PhD student, institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Dear Name,

You have been selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students at NHH.

If you have questions regarding the experiment, you can send an e-mail to the signatory (trond.halvorsen(at)nhh.no), who is administratively responsible for the experiment.

Yours sincerely,

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Department of Economics

---

Norges  
Handelshøyskole  
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION  
Helleveien 30  
NO-5014 Bergen  
Norway  
Tel: +47 55 95 00 00  
Fax: +47 55 95 91 00  
nhh.postbox@nhh.no  
www.nhh.no  
Bank Account: NO44 7094 0500 3520  
Bank Account No: 44 7094 0500 3520

Figure B.9: Non-informative letter (applies in treatments T1, T1\*, T2, and T2\*). Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.

BREVET ER OVERSATT FRA SWAHILI, SOM ER NASJONALSFÅKET I  
TANZANIA.

Navn til mottaker: PRIDE TANZANIA  
Dares Salaam  
TANZANIA

THE LETTER IS TRANSLATED FROM SWAHILI WHICH IS THE OFFICIAL  
LANGUAGE OF TANZANIA

Kjære Navn,

Du har blitt trukket ut til å motta ... norske kroner (tilsvarende ...USD) i forbundelse med et økonomisk eksperiment gjennomført på Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH) i Norge. Ditt navn er tilfeldig trukket ut blandt kunderne i mikrokredittorganisasjonen PRIDE TANZANIA i Dares Salaam i Tanzania.

I eksperimentet, ble det en deltaker, som er en student ved NHH ... norske kroner (tilsvarende ...USD) på turen en oppgave. Vedkommende fikk så beskjed om at han (eller hun) var blitt koblet sammen med en person som var tilfeldig trukket blandt kunderne i PRIDE TANZANIA i Dares Salaam (dvs. deg), og ble bedt om å besremme hvor mye han ville gi til deg. For han gjorde dette valget fikk han også se en kopi av dette brevet.

Han valgte å gi deg ... norske kroner (tilsvarende ...USD) og disse pengene er lagt ved dette brevet. Hvis det ikke er noen penger i konvolutten, betyr det at deltakeren valgte ikke å gi deg noe av pengene han tjente.

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til eksperimentet, kan du ta kontakt med lederen for din avdeling i PRIDE TANZANIA eller sende en e-mail til undernevnte (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), som er administrativt ansvarlig for eksperimentet.

Mvh

*Trond Halvorsen*

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

<p>Norges Handelshøyskole NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION</p>	<p>Tlf. +47 55 95 60 00 E-post: <a href="mailto:trond.halvorsen@nhh.no">trond.halvorsen@nhh.no</a> Baks. kontonr.: N-6740 Trondheim</p>
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Dear Name,  
You have been selected to receive x NOK (equivalent to y USD) from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Norway. Your name has been randomly selected among the clients in the micro finance institution PRIDE TANZANIA in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

In this experiment a participant, who is a student at NHH, earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the clients in PRIDE TANZANIA in Tanzania (i.e. you), and was asked to decide how much of his earnings he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter.

He decided to give you x NOK (equivalent to y USD), which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of the money that the two of you had earned.  
If you have questions regarding the experiment, you can contact the head of your branch in PRIDE TANZANIA, or send an e-mail to the signatory (trond.halvorsen(at)nhh.no), who is administratively responsible for the experiment.

Yours sincerely,

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Department of Economics

Figure B.10: Informative letter (applies in treatments T3, and T3\*). Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.



BREVETTERT OVERSATT FRA SWAHILI, SOM ER NASJONALSPRÅKET I  
TANZANIA.

Navn Lærliker PRIDE TANZANIA  
Dar es Salaam  
TANZANIA

THE LETTER IS TRANSLATED FROM SWAHILI WHICH IS THE OFFICIAL  
LANGUAGE OF TANZANIA

Bergen, 03.11.2009

Kjære Navn,

Du har blitt tildelt til å motta ... norske kroner (tilsvarende ...USD) i forbindelse med et økonomisk eksperiment gjennomført på Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH) i Norge. Ditt navn er tilfeldig trukket ut blandt lærerne i mikrokreditorganisasjonen PRIDE TANZANIA i Dar es Salaam i Tanzania.

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til eksperimentet, kan du ta kontakt med lederen for din avdeling i PRIDE TANZANIA eller sende en e-mail til undernevnte (trond.halvorsen@nhh.no), som er administrativt ansvarlig for eksperimentet.

Mvh

*Trond Halvorsen*  
Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Dear Name,

You have been selected to receive x NOK (equivalent to y USD) from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Norway. Your name has been randomly selected among the clients in the micro finance institution PRIDE TANZANIA in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

If you have questions regarding the experiment, you can contact the head of your branch in PRIDE TANZANIA, or send an e-mail to the signatory (trond.halvorsen(at)nhh.no), who is administratively responsible for the experiment.

Yours sincerely,

Trond Halvorsen  
PhD student, Department of Economics

Norges  
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Postbox 3050  
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IBAN: NO94 PIBG 0950 000  
BIC: PIBGNOOS  
Bank Account: NL64 PIBG 0950 000  
IBAN: NO94 PIBG 0950 000  
BIC: PIBGNOOS

Figure B.11: Non-informative letter (applies in treatments T3, and T3\*). Screenshot to the left, translation to the right.