# WARMUN 2021

# The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

Agenda I:
*Discussion for a relationship "reset"*
*between Security council members & allies and "rogue states"*

Agenda II:
*Setting New International Standards for Inter-state Weapons Trading*

Chaired by Gareth Pang and Elena Baciu

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# LETTER FROM THE CHAIRS

*Dear delegates,*

*Welcome to the 2021 Warwick Model United Nations (WARMUN), and to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). Our names are Gareth Pang and Elena Baciu and we will be your chairs for 2021 DISEC. It is our privilege to have the opportunity to chair DISEC and interact with open-minded and passionate delegates like yourselves.*

*We hope that you will have an amazing time at this conference, debating, making allies, constructing arguments, and enjoying your time, all while maintaining courteous behaviour. To make the most out of WARMUN, we would strongly encourage you to step out of your comfort zone and participate actively in council sessions, exchanging opinions with others. The topics were carefully selected to urge delegates to think critically and engage with meaningful issues which can affect the world, while giving you sufficient insight into the world of diplomacy and International Relations. Should you experience any difficulties, we will be present to guide you and offer advice.*

*We hope that you will have a meaningful experience engaging in the topics and interacting with fellow delegates.*

*If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us.*

*We are looking forward to meeting everyone.*

*Gareth Pang and Elena Baciu*

# YOUR CHAIRS



| ***Gareth Pang*** | ***Elena Baciu*** |
|---|---|
| *A first-year student studying Economics, Politics and International Studies, Gareth started his MUN journey in 2016 and has continued ever since, with a keen focus on security issues. His hope is for delegates to enjoy themselves, make new friends, and have a meaningful experience.* | *Currently in her first year of Politics, Philosophy and Law, Elena has taken many roles in the world of MUNs, from delegate to chair and even Secretary-General. She hopes to make this committee an unforgettable experience for the delegates, while being able to provide meaningful support.* |

# INTRODUCTION TO DISEC

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). DISEC was established in January 1946, being the first and one of the main committees of the General Assembly. Disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that affect the international community, all fall under the purview of the committee, which aims to find solutions to the challenges in the international security arena.

The role of DISEC is outlined in Chapter IV, Article 11 of the UN Charter which states: "The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both."

This committee works in close cooperation with the UN Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.

# AGENDA I: Discussion for a relationship "reset" between Security council members & allies and "rogue states"

## STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

International Relations are not only shaped by the interaction between states, but also influenced by the intrinsic actions of each state. Although each state has the sovereign power of acting in its chosen manner, wrongful actions attract punishment from the international community, alongside classifications such as "rogue" states. It is important to acknowledge that such classifications shape the interactions between states, create dissent, and threaten stability. With this catastrophic implication in mind, it is necessary to move towards actions of peace-building and solidarity, by trying to mediate the conflict between the "rogue" states and the members of the Security Council.

# INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

The main aim of this topic is to address, explore and solve the current situation between the "rogue" states and the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Hence the scope of the debate is to find the possible circumstances and compromises in which a reset of the relationship is possible. It is important to find such a solution, as the relationship between "rogue" states and UNSC members creates inequalities and disputes in the international community. Firstly, it can be argued that the concept of a "rogue" state arises out of a biased perception and interpretation of the internal actions of other states, which requires this committee to look in-depth into the problems of defining the factors which contributed to the label of "rogue state", while taking notice of the existence of principles such as internal and external sovereignty. Secondly, the sanctions which are imposed on such states have severe consequences on both social and economic levels, urging us to rethink the way in which we approach the relationship with rogue states. This leads to some of the main points of the debate which are "how do we move towards finding solutions in these circumstances, searching for a middle ground, where a solution can be reached based on concessions" and "how do we define the concept of a rogue state". We strongly encourage the delegates to regard the concept of a "reset" on one side as a move towards preservation of peace, security, and solidarity by solving the discord between the "rogue" states and UNSC members and on the other as a debate regarding the facts which contribute to labeling a state as "rogue". By having a fixed, universal, undisputed definition of "rogue" states and the factors which determine this, future altercations in the international community can be successfully avoided.

As the meaning of the concepts "rogue" and "reset" are severely disputed in the context of this debate, the states which come under these classifications are also open to interpretation and we advise the delegates to take this into consideration throughout this debate.

# HISTORICAL SITUATION

Historically, there were a few states which have been described as "rogue" states, by the United States of America (USA), which include Cuba under Fidel Castro, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, South Yemen, Sudan, and Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milošević. Although it has to be noted that the USA's list of "rogue" states is more comprehensive, some of the states are still considered as "rogue" and will be examined in more detail in the section *Current Situation*. The scope of this section is to provide a background of the factors which led to the categorization of a state as "rogue", in the perspective of the US, and the circumstances in which the relationship reset between those states and the US has occurred, in the hope that this will guide your debate and inform your decision on definitions of "rogue" states and ways to approach a reset.

As per the definition historically used by the US, in order to be classified as "rogue", a state has to "pursue weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, severely abuse its own citizens, and stridently criticize the United States" (American Foreign Relations).

Cuba and South Yemen

Due to the strong anti-American rhetoric propagated by Castro after the successful guerilla movement which overthrew the Batista government, alongside the support from the Soviet Union to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the ideological differences in the context of the Cold War, Cuba soon made its way onto the US's list of "rogue" states. Similarly, the close relationship of South Yemen with the Soviet Union and the suspicion and mistrust which arose in the context of the Cold War led the US to label South Yemen as a "rogue" state. The reset in the relationship occurred for Cuba after the end of the Castro regime, when the leader ceased his power, while for South Yemen when it united with the Northern Yemen Arab Republic, which in both circumstances signifies a fall of the regime (Henriksen).

Iraq and Libya

The regimes under Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi meet the criteria established by the US, as the states were actively engaged in the research for the creation of weapons of mass destruction, violated international human rights, criticized the interventionist nature of the US and there existed certain allegations of links with terrorist organizations. The status of both states as "rogue" ended after the leaders were captured by US forces. It is worth noting that the US has tried, as part of a "reset", to isolate these states in order to change their behaviour, by employing tactics such as the use of airpower, no-fly zones, use of missiles, and economic embargoes.

Sudan

The classification of Sudan as a "rogue" state arose from its engagement with Islamic terrorist groups and its support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although after the incidents of September 11, 2001, Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against terrorism, the government was engaging in unabated violent acts in Darfur, which defied international human rights and determined the US government to maintain the status of Sudan as a "rogue" state ("U.S.-Sudan Relations."). After the former President Omar al-Bashir, who was responsible for the incidents in Darfur, was deposed, Sudan entered into negotiations with the US government and it lost the title of a "rogue" state (Malik). We further encourage our delegates to research on the implications and hidden economic disadvantages of this action, as an interesting topic of debate can arise.

Yugoslavia

As a result of the genocide attempts of President Milošević in Croatia and its involvement in the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, Yugoslavia was viewed as a "rogue" state. This was ended by the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992.

# CURRENT SITUATION

After having looked at the historical development of the topic, when analyzing the current situation and implicitly the solutions which can be taken in order to achieve a relationship reset, a range of problems with the previous approach should arise in the minds of our delegates such as: (1) there was one prevailing definition of a "rogue" state, which was not discussed or agreed to by the international community, (2) the nature of the reset seems unfair, as in the majority of the cases it was done through the international pressure which determined the collapse of the regime, (3) there were little concessions made on the part of UNSC members, and (4) there were a multitude of problems which arose from these classifications, which impeded the international community of providing assistance to vulnerable states and further repressed them, preventing them from exiting the state of a "rogue" state, and created further fragility and isolation. We strongly advise the delegates to keep these points in mind throughout the debate, as implications of their actions.

Currently, there is still no agreed definition of the factors that determine a state to be classified as "rogue" and thus no agreement on a definite list of "rogue" states. Although the definition has been expanding over the years into a more general approach such as "states that are threatening world peace", the delegates need to remember that such a broad definition would include a multitude of states such as Greece, Syria, Cyprus, Turkey or even the US, and hence need to assess the current risks of providing a comprehensive definition.

In the present, we still rely on the list compiled by the US in regards to the classification of states as "rogue", but there is an obvious difference in the criteria (they have become increasingly broad). This list includes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Afghanistan, People's Republic of China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. This section will further provide some background on the reasons why these states are classified as "rogue", and urge delegates to think critically about the reasons and evaluate comprehensive solutions to reach a reset in these situations.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran

The main reason why the states have been labelled as "rogue" is due to their nuclear programmes, as the US believes that they constitute a threat to international peace and security, considering them "dangerous and hostile" (Abramson). However, it can be argued that there is an ideological factor that has played a role, due to the repressive nature of these regimes. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that there exist certain controversies regarding the engagement of the Iranian government with terrorist organizations (U.S. Government Publishing Office).

Afghanistan

The repressive Taliban regime, under which major violations of international human rights and anti-American propaganda occurred, compelled the US to classify the former as a "rogue" state and commence its intervention in the Afghanistan War.

People's Republic of China

The most prevailing reasons why China is part of the "rogue" states list is due to the repressive nature of the regime, threats to international security that it poses towards Taiwan and states in the South China Sea, allegations of cooperation with terrorist organizations and its recent strategic alliances in Africa.

Syria

Syria was classified by both Turkey and the US as a "rogue" state due to the authoritarian nature of the regime, the violations of international human rights, engagement in supporting terrorist organizations and the eruption of the Syrian Civil War, which constituted a threat to peace and security (Ellis).

Venezuela

Venezuela was classified as "rogue" due to a multitude of factors which include the legitimacy crisis, violations of international human rights, anti-American propaganda, support of terrorist organizations and international drug traffic, and economic collapse.

We would like to stress that the background given is rather superficial, provided only so that delegates understand the prevailing idea of the current situation, and hence more independent research on the part of the delegates is required. As we have seen, the factors are very broad and easily interpretable, and the classification leads to international discord and deeply affects the already fragile states. Hence, the last point to be kept in mind is that the debate should revolve around finding a functional definition of what "rogue" states are and concessions that can be made in order to reach a reset, while keeping in mind the implications of these issues.

# MAJOR STANCES

UNSC member states

(It has to be noted that some members of the UNSC are classified as "rogue" states from the perspective of the US and shall be addressed in the *Rogue States* section). The main aim of the UNSC member states is to prevent threats to international peace and security, which motivates their actions of preventing the behaviour of "rogue" states by any means necessary, as we have historically seen. In the past, these countries have taken an interventionist approach and applied multiple sanctions such as economic embargoes on "rogue" states. We need to acknowledge the fact that only the US and Turkey have used the word "rogue" states, while other UNSC members, although they have been engaging in sanctioning these states, have never explicitly used this classification.

"Rogue" states

The "rogue" states are caught in a dilemma between acting in accordance with their internal sovereignty to pursue their preferred course of action, and making concessions with the UNSC member states in order to uplift sanctions. Although it can be argued that it would be in the interest of the "rogue" states to receive international support and aid in their fragile situation, the implications of uplifting sanctions are not always positive, as can be seen in Sudan's example under the *Historical Situation* section. Furthermore, the delegates have to consider the differences in power which occur at an international stage, when trying to make concessions in this situation.

# POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS / FOCUS QUESTIONS

1. How can we reach an agreed definition on the facts that classify a state as "rogue"?
2. Is there a way to address the problems which lead to this classification?
3. What would a relationship "reset" look like?
4. In which circumstances can we reach a reset of the relationship between "rogue" states and UNSC members? Which concessions are necessary?
5. Is there a way to respect the sovereignty of the "rogue" states while reaching a solution to enforce peace and security on a global level?
6. How can we address issues which arise from the fragile nature of the "rogue" states in a more effective way?

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# AGENDA II: Setting New International Standards for Inter-state Weapons Trading

## STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

At the heart of inter-state weapons trading lies the dilemma of profiteering at the cost of increasing risk of harm to others, where the numerous armed conflicts occurring internationally cast a dark shadow on the globe. While the Arms Trade Treaty was heralded as an achievement to protect human rights, several countries have ignored it, supplying weapons to other states knowing that they could be used against civilians. It is against this backdrop that the call for new international standards to be set for inter-state weapons trading is made.

# INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

"The world organization debates disarmament in one room and, in the next room, moves the knights and pawns that make national arms imperative" (Lopate, 2021). Alas, despite efforts to regulate armament in the past such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), illicit weapon trade across state borders is still prevalent. According to the ATT, "Weapons" are defined as conventional arms such as, but not limited to small arms, battle tanks, combat aircraft, and warships. One cannot simply ignore the lucrative nature of the international trade of conventional weapons which has an estimated worth of US$100 billion a year, which has influenced powerful arm exporting countries to exploit loopholes of the ATT and continue business as usual (Jalil, 2016). The conflict in Yemen is a prime example where arms are supplied to warring parties by third party states, with the Houthis receiving arms from Iran and the Saudi-led coalition receiving arms from Western states (Wisotzki, 2018). Given the immense social cost incurred from this inter-state weapons trading, where unregulated international trade in such conventional arms exacerbates armed conflict, violent crime, and internal repression, it is imperative for the ATT to be reviewed to secure a safer future for humanity (Brehm, 2008).

# HISTORICAL SITUATION

Majority of today's discourse on international arms trade is set against the backdrop of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The first of its kind, the ATT entered into force on 24 Dec 2014. As of today, 110 states have joined the treaty, 31 states have signed but not ratified the treaty, and 54 states have not signed the treaty. The ATT is the world's international agreement to regulate the transfer of conventional arms and ammunition (Macdonald, 2015).

The Key provisions of the Treaty's arms transfer criteria are set out in Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 (3) prohibits each State Party from authorizing any transfers of arms, ammunition or parts and components if the State Party has *"knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party."* (Wisotzki, 2018).

# CURRENT SITUATION

In recent years, while international arms trade may appear to have decreased overall, one should not discount how certain actors have scaled up their export and import of weaponry. The increase in arms exports in the United States by 15% from 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, where almost half (47%) of these exports went to the Middle East, draws attention to the role of international arms trade in sustaining armed conflict (Alexandra Kuimova, 2021). Furthermore, there have been several cases where signatories of the ATT have persisted in exporting arms to war-torn regions despite the knowledge that such weapons are used to violate human rights, of which the Yemen war stands as a prime example, with the West supplying arms to the Saudi-led coalition, and Iran to the Houthi Movement (Bales, 2016). This begs the question of whether the pre-existing regulations defined in the Arms Trade Treaty have indeed achieved the intended goal of protecting human rights through the regulation of arms transfer in the international realm and subsequent prevention of illicit arms trade. Hence, it is in the interest of protecting global human rights that the existing ATT should be reviewed and strengthened such that it is not simply a paper tiger but is well able to bring about the international peace it stood for.

# MAJOR STANCES

**The United States of America**

The USA has had a tumultuous time when it comes to arms trade. Despite former US President Barack Obama's administration signing the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013, the country has yet to ratify it, and has even left the treaty under the Trump administration.  Ever since Biden took over the US Presidency in 2021, the US has yet to resign and ratify the ATT, and its foreign policy on arms trade has been heavily influenced by domestic lobbying from the National Rifles Association (NRA). Nonetheless, the US has signalled its determination to uphold universal rights and plans to revamp its arms export policy (Soubrier, 2021). However, the West has also been accused of supplying weapons to the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war despite reports accusing the latter of violating human rights (Wisotzki, 2018). Overall, the US must strike a fine balance, bearing in mind that it is also a beneficiary of exporting arms internationally to bolster security partnerships.

**The People's Republic of China**

As one of the 5 largest exporters and importers of military equipment, China is one of the most recent countries to join the Arms Trade Treaty in 2020, heralded as a significant step forward for the agreement. Attaching great importance to the humanitarian concerns caused by conventional arms, the PRC has called on parties to tighten the regulation of military items, prevent the exporting of arms to non-state actors as well as to not interfere in sovereign states' internal affairs through arms export.  However, it should also be noted that China has actively exported its domestically produced military equipment to the surrounding countries, particularly to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, and has increased its arms sales to the Middle East (Alexandra Kuimova, 2021). Furthermore, the PRC has never published the exact figures of sales in missile manufacturing and shipbuilding (Nichols, 2020), potentially stumbling regulatory efforts.

**The Russian Federation**

Potentially the 2nd largest exporter of arms, Russia is one of the few arms exporters that have not signed the Arms Trade Treaty, refusing to endorse the agreement which requires governments to ensure their exports will not fuel conflicts. Russia has actively exported its military equipment to over 45 states, accounting for around 20% of arms trade since 2016, of which India, China, and Algeria are major recipients of Russian arms exports (Alexandra Kuimova, 2021). Known to ask fewer questions about how weapon systems might be used once sold, Russia is increasingly seen by the Middle East as an attractive arms supplier compared to the West, where the Middle East has been plagued by armed conflicts (Dudley, 2021). Bearing in mind that the sales of arms could also expand Russia's geopolitical influence along with increasing economic benefits, Russia has been actively denouncing any attempts to regulate such arms trade.

**The European Union**

All EU members are parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, and have actively campaigned for adherence to the terms of the ATT. In the recent EU Outreach Programme on the ATT which received over 7 million euros in funding across 3 years, the EU aimed to establish and strengthen arms export control policies and institutions, promoting the sharing of experience on the regional level. It is the belief of the EU that the universal adoption and implementation of the ATT are crucial to reducing violence and human suffering in conflict-affected regions. However, several EU members such as France and Italy have been accused of supplying weapons to the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war, despite reports that the latter has been allegedly violating human rights (Wisotzki, 2018). Additionally, the establishment of the European Peace Facility which has the capacity to provide training and equipment, including lethal weapons, to non-European military forces is worth noting, where critics have expressed that the EPF increases the risk of harm to civilians (Lenzu, 2021). Hence, the EU has to strike a balance between its security interests, an increasing concern ever since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its liberal ideals of protecting human rights.

**Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia is one of several countries that have not signed the Arms Trade Treaty. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been increasing its imports of arms due to its involvement in the Yemen war which sees the Saudi-led coalition (consisting of mainly Sunni Arab states) on the offensive against the Houthis which are suspected to be backed by Iran, a Shia Arab state and rival of Saudi Arabia. Reliant on equipment supplied by the West, the state has been repeatedly accused of conducting indiscriminate bombing, killing civilians in the process (Sabbagh, 2021). Aware that the West may not be willing to export arms to itself due to the atrocities committed in the Yemen War, Saudi Arabia has shifted its gaze, looking towards Russia and China as alternative arms suppliers.

**African Union**

Despite arguably being the continent that has experienced the most devastating impacts of the unregulated global arms trade, there has not been a common stance among African states regarding the Arms Trade Treaty, where 14 out of 54 members of the African Union have not joined the Treaty. The region has been seeing an increased inflow of weapons, with countries like Turkey and even North Korea selling military equipment to African states such as Ghana and Uganda respectively (Morgan, 2019). Plagued by domestic strife, the importing of weapons is alleged to increase the risk of harm to civilians in the region, hence making it imperative to regulate arms trade.

# POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS / FOCUS QUESTIONS

1. How do we strike a balance between selling weapons for economic profit and preventing weapon sales to preserve human life?
2. How can we enforce transparency of weapons trade?
3. Is it feasible to have a governing body overseeing weapons trade? If so, who would be members of this group and how would it operate?
4. How can we ensure better cooperation for the reporting of arms trade figures?

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