

FATBULL

Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report

Security Report

December 2021

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Report Summary

Title	FATBULL Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	FATBULL		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura	Revision date	14/12/2021
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited	Approval date	14/12/2021
		Nº Pages	45

Overview

Background

FATBULL's team requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their Fat Smart Contract.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **December 14**: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **December 14**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of FATBULL.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

FATBULL Project:



FAT.txt

Introduction

Given the opportunity to review FATBULL Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

About FATBULL: -

Item	Description		
Issuer	FATBULL		
Website	www.fatbulltoken.io		
Platform	Solidity		
Audit Method	Whitebox		
Latest Audit Report	December 14, 2021		

The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description	
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the	
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the	
	critical vulnerabilities.	
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.	
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.	
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project	
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should	
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.	
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to	
	reproduce in engineering.	

The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item	
	Constructor Mismatch	
	Ownership Takeover	
	Redundant Fallback Function	
	Overflows & Underflows	
	Reentrancy	
	MONEY-Giving Bug	
Rasic Coding Rugs	Blackhole	
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	
	Revert DoS	
	Unchecked External Call	
	Gasless Send	
	Send Instead of Transfer	
	Costly Loop	
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	
	Transaction Ordering Dependence	
	Deprecated Uses	
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks	
	Business Logics Review	

	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security	
Advanced Deri Sciutiny	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.	
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.	
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.	
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.	
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.	
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.	

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the FATBULL's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract sourcecode and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	1
Medium	0
Low	5
Total	7(1 Compilation Error)

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **1 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 5 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well- designed and engineered. And for the issues the recommendations to resolve them have been mentioned in the detailed findings section.

Functional Overview

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + [Int] IERC20
 - [Ext] totalSupply
 - [Ext] balanceOf
 - [Ext] transfer #
 - [Ext] allowance
 - [Ext] approve #
 - [Ext] transferFrom #
- + Context
 - [Int] _msgSender
 - [Int] _msgData
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router01
 - [Ext] factory
 - [Ext] WETH
 - [Ext] addLiquidity #
 - [Ext] addLiquidityETH (\$)
 - [Ext] removeLiquidity #
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #
 - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #

- [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #
- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens (\$)
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
- [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens (\$)
- [Ext] quote
- [Ext] getAmountOut
- [Ext] getAmountIn
- [Ext] getAmountsOut
- [Ext] getAmountsIn
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router02 (IUniswapV2Router01)
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (\$)
 - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Factory
 - [Ext] feeTo
 - [Ext] feeToSetter
 - [Ext] getPair
 - [Ext] allPairs
 - [Ext] allPairsLength
 - [Ext] createPair #
 - [Ext] setFeeTo #
 - [Ext] setFeeToSetter #
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Pair
 - [Ext] name
 - [Ext] symbol

- [Ext] decimals - [Ext] totalSupply - [Ext] balanceOf - [Ext] allowance - [Ext] approve # - [Ext] transfer # - [Ext] transferFrom # - [Ext] DOMAIN_SEPARATOR - [Ext] PERMIT_TYPEHASH - [Ext] nonces - [Ext] permit # - [Ext] MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY - [Ext] factory - [Ext] token0 - [Ext] token1 - [Ext] getReserves - [Ext] price0CumulativeLast - [Ext] price1CumulativeLast - [Ext] kLast - [Ext] mint # - [Ext] burn # - [Ext] swap # - [Ext] skim # - [Ext] sync # - [Ext] initialize # + [Lib] IterableMapping - [Pub] get - [Pub] getIndexOfKey - [Pub] getKeyAtIndex

- [Pub] size

- [Pub] set #
- [Pub] remove #
+ Ownable (Context)
- [Pub] <constructor> #</constructor>
- [Pub] owner
- [Pub] renounceOwnership #
- modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] transferOwnership #
- modifiers: onlyOwner
+ [Int] IDividendPayingTokenOptional
- [Ext] withdrawnDividendOf
- [Ext] withdrawnDividendOf- [Ext] accumulativeDividendOf
- [Ext] accumulativeDividendoi
+ [Int] IDividendPayingToken
- [Ext] dividendOf
- [Ext] distributeDividends (\$)
- [Ext] withdrawDividend #
+ [Lib] SafeMathInt
- [Int] mul
- [Int] div
- [Int] sub
- [Int] add
- [Int] toUint256Safe
+ [Lib] SafeMathUint
- [Int] toInt256Safe

+ ERC20 (Context, IERC20) - [Pub] <Constructor> # - [Pub] name - [Pub] symbol - [Pub] decimals - [Pub] totalSupply - [Pub] balanceOf - [Pub] transfer # - [Pub] allowance - [Pub] approve # - [Pub] transferFrom # - [Pub] increaseAllowance # - [Pub] decreaseAllowance # - [Int] _transfer # - [Int] _mint # - [Int] _burn # - [Int] _approve # - [Int] _setupDecimals # - [Int] _beforeTokenTransfer # + [Lib] SafeMath - [Int] tryAdd - [Int] trySub - [Int] tryMul - [Int] tryDiv - [Int] tryMod - [Int] add - [Int] sub - [Int] mul - [Int] div - [Int] mod

- [Int] sub - [Int] div - [Int] mod + DividendPayingToken (ERC20, IDividendPayingToken, IDividendPayingTokenOptional) - [Pub] <Constructor> # - modifiers: ERC20 - [Ext] < Fallback > (\$) - [Pub] updateMasterContract # - modifiers: onlyMaster - [Pub] updateUniswapV2Router # - modifiers: onlyMaster - [Pub] updateDividendTokenUser # - modifiers: onlyMaster - [Pub] getDividendTokenUser - [Pub] distributeDividends (\$) - modifiers: onlyMaster - [Pub] distributeTokenDividends # - modifiers: onlyMaster - [Pub] withdrawDividend # - [Prv] swapEthForTokens # - [Int] _withdrawDividendOfUser # - [Pub] dividendOf - [Pub] withdrawableDividendOf - [Pub] withdrawnDividendOf - [Pub] accumulativeDividendOf - [Int] _transfer # - [Int] _mint # - [Int] _burn # - [Int] _setBalance #

+ FAT (ERC20, Ownable) - [Pub] <Constructor> # - modifiers: ERC20 - [Ext] <Fallback> (\$) - [Int] restoreFees # - [Ext] swapAndLiquifyOwner # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateDividendTokenUser # - [Ext] getDividendTokenUser - [Ext] updatedividendTime # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateBuyBackMode # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateTradingEnabledTime # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateMinimumBalanceForDividends # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateMaxWalletAmount # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateSwapAtAmount # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateMarketAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateCharityAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateBuyBackAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateMarketTokenFeeAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateCharityTokenFeeAddress #

- modifiers: onlyOwner

- [Ext] updateBuyBackTokenFeeAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateBuyFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateSellFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateDividendTracker # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateUniswapV2Router # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] excludeFromFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] blacklistAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] excludeFromDividends # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] enableDividends # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] excludeMultipleAccountsFromFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setAutomatedMarketMakerPair # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Prv] setAutomatedMarketMakerPair # - [Pub] updateGasForProcessing # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] updateClaimWait # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] getClaimWait

- [Ext] getTotalDividendsDistributed

- [Pub] isExcludedFromFees
- [Pub] withdrawableDividendOf
- [Pub] dividendTokenBalanceOf
- [Ext] getAccountDividendsInfo
- [Ext] getAccountDividendsInfoAtIndex
- [Ext] processDividendTracker #
- [Ext] claim #
- [Ext] getLastProcessedIndex
- [Ext] getNumberOfDividendTokenHolders
- [Pub] getTradingIsEnabled
- [Prv] swapAndLiquify #
- [Prv] swapEthForTokens #
- [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
- [Prv] swapTokensForTokens #
- [Int] addLiquidity #
- [Prv] swapAndSendDividends #
- [Int] _transfer #
- + FATDividendTracker (DividendPayingToken, Ownable)
 - [Pub] <Constructor> #
 - modifiers: DividendPayingToken
 - [Ext] updateMinimumBalanceForDividends #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Ext] updateTokenForDividend #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Int] _transfer #
 - [Pub] withdrawDividend #
 - [Ext] excludeFromDividends #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Ext] enableDividends #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner

- [Ext] updateClaimWait #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] getLastProcessedIndex
- [Ext] getNumberOfTokenHolders
- [Pub] getAccount
- [Pub] getAccountAtIndex
- [Prv] canAutoClaim
- [Ext] setBalance #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] process #
- [Pub] processAccount #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner

Detailed Results

Compilations Issues.

1. DeclarationError: Undeclared identifier.

- Description: In the function transfer the require statement "require(amount <= maxSellTransactionAmount, "Sell transfer amount exceeds the maxSellTransactionAmount."); "has undeclared identifier 'maxSellTransactionAmount'. Due to this the whole code cannot be compiled as having the DeclarationError.
- Recommendation: Please declare the undeclared identifier.

"Please Note that, during our audit we've assumed the declaration has been done properly and after that we've started the analysis and testing."

Issues Checking Status

1. Integer Overflow and Underflow

- SWC ID:101Severity: HighLocation: Fat.sol
- Relationships: CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation
- Description: The arithmetic operation can overflow. It is possible to cause an arithmetic overflow. Prevent the overflow by constraining inputs using the require() statement or use the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library for integer arithmetic operations. Refer to the transaction trace generated for this issue to reproduce the overflow.

```
function updateMinimumBalanceForDividends(uint256 newAmountNoDecimials) external onlyOwner{
minimumTokenBalanceForDividends = newAmountNoDecimials * (10**18);
}
```

• Remediations: It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently throughout the smart contract system.

2. Floating Pragma

SWC ID:103Severity: LowLocation: Fat.sol

- Relationships: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.6"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.7.6;
/**
```

• Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

3. Reentrancy

- SWC ID:107
- Severity: Low(Impact)
- Location: Fat.sol
- Relationships: CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
- Description: Write to persistent state following external call. The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

```
411
                        function owner() public view virtual returns (address) {
                            return _owner;
              412
              413
671
          function balanceOf(address account) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
              return _balances[account];
672
673
          }
         function withdrawableDividendOf(address owner) public view override returns(uint256) {
1271
           return accumulativeDividendOf(_owner).sub(withdrawnDividends[_owner]);
1272
1273
         }
1287
         function accumulativeDividendOf(address _owner) public view override returns(uint256) {
           return magnifiedDividendPerShare.mul(balanceOf(_owner)).toInt256Safe()
1288
             .add(magnifiedDividendCorrections[_owner]).toUint256Safe() / magnitude;
1289
1290
   2103
                  account = _account;
   2104
   2105
                  index = tokenHoldersMap.getIndexOfKey(account);
   2106
   2107
                  iterationsUntilProcessed = -1;
   2108
                  if(index >= 0) {
   2109
   2110
                      if(uint256(index) > lastProcessedIndex) {
   2111
                          iterationsUntilProcessed = index.sub(int256(lastProcessedIndex));
   2112
                      }
                   2126
                   2127
                                   lastClaimTime = lastClaimTimes[account];
                   2128
            2151
            2152
                           address account = tokenHoldersMap.getKeyAtIndex(index);
            2153
```

- Remediations: The best practices to avoid Reentrancy weaknesses are:
 - Make sure all internal state changes are performed before the call is executed. This is known as the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern
 - ➤ Use a reentrancy lock (ie. OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard.

4. DoS with Failed Call

- SWC ID:113Severity: LowLocation: Fat.sol
- Relationships: CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
- Description: Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction. This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

```
2151
2152 address account = tokenHoldersMap.getKeyAtIndex(index);
2153
```

- Remediations: It is recommended to follow call best practices:
 - Avoid combining multiple calls in a single transaction, especially when calls are executed as part of a loop
 - ➤ Always assume that external calls can fail
 - > Implement the contract logic to handle failed calls

5. Authorization through tx.origin

- SWC ID:115
- Severity: Low
- Location: Fat.sol
- Relationships: CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function
- Description: Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control. Using "tx.origin" as a security control can lead to authorization bypass vulnerabilities. Consider using "msg.sender" unless you really know what you are doing.

```
function processDividendTracker(uint256 gas) external {
1729
                (uint256 iterations, uint256 claims, uint256 lastProcessedIndex) = dividendTracker.process(gas);
1730
                emit ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, false, gas, tx.origin);
1731
1732
2867
              if(|swapping && canDividend) (
                  uint256 gas - gasForProcessing;
2868
2009
                  processDividendTime +- dividendTime;
2010
                 try dividendTracker.process(gas) returns (uint256 iterations, uint256 claims, uint256 lastProcessedIndex) {
                      emit ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, true, gas, tx.origin);
2011
2012
                 )
2013
                 catch (
2014
                 3
2015
```

• Remediations: tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use msg.sender instead.

6. Block values as a proxy for time

- SWC ID:116Severity: LowLocation: Fat.sol
- Relationships: CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
- Description: A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable. The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

```
2132 secondsUntilAutoClaimAvailable = nextClaimTime > block.timestamp ?
2134 nextClaimTime.sub(block.timestamp) :
2135 0;
```

• Remediations: Developers should write smart contracts with the notion that block values are not precise, and the use of them can lead to unexpected effects. Alternatively, they may make use oracles.

Automated Tools Results

Slither: -

```
ateDlvidendTracker(address) (Fat.sol#1599-1613):
                                         try in FALLopateurtyteenorracker(audress) (Fat.sol#159-1615);
    newDividendTracker.excludeFronDividendS(address(newDividendTracker)) (Fat.sol#1607)
    newDividendTracker.excludeFronDividendS(address(this)) (Fat.sol#1607)
    newDividendTracker.excludeFronDividendS(address(this)) (Fat.sol#1607)
State variables written after the call(s):

    - dividendTracker = newbividendTracker (fat.sol#1612)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

    FAT. transfer(address,address,wint256).claims (Fat.sol#2010) is a local variable never initialized 
FAT. transfer(address,address,wint256).lastProcessedIndex (Fat.sol#2010) is a local variable never initialized 
FAT_transfer(address,address,wint256).terations (Fat.sol#2010) is a local variable never initialized 
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Bocumentation#uninitialized-local-variables
   FAT.claim() (Fat.sol#1734-1736) ignores return value by dividendTracker.processAccount(msg.sender.false) (Fat.sol#1735)
FAT.addLiquidity(uint256.uint256) (Fat.sol#1856-1871) ignores return value by untswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH[value: ethAnount](address(this),tokenAno
unt.g.b,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1862-1869)
FAT.transfer(address,address_uint256) (Fat.sol#1895-2817) ignores return value by dividendTracker.process(gas) (Fat.sol#2816-2815)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
    DividendPayingToken.comstructor(string.string); name (fat.sol#1139) shadows:

- ERC20, name (Fat.sol#610) (state variable)

BividendPayingToken.comstructor(string.string); symbol (Fat.sol#1139) shadows:

- ERC20, symbol (fat.sol#811) (state variable)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
   DividendPayingToken.updateMasterContract(address) (Fat.sol#1149-1151) should enit an event for:
- nasterContract = newAddress (Fat.sol#1150)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-access-control
     FAT.updatedividendTime(uint256) (Fat.sol#1518-1528) should emit an event fur:
. dividendTime = dividendTime (Fat.sol#1526)
FAT.updateTradingEnabledTime(uint256) (Fat.sol#1526-1528) should emit an event for:
 dividendTine = dividendTine (fat.sol#3519)

FAT.UpdateTradingEnabledTine(wint250) (Fat.sol#3520-1528) should enit an event for:
    tradingEnabledTine(wint250) (Fat.sol#354-1530) should enit an event for:
    naxWalletAnount(wint250) (Fat.sol#354-1530) should enit an event for:
    naxWalletCoken = menAnountDoctinials * (10 ** 18) (Fat.sol#3535)

FAT.UpdateSwapAtAnount(wint250) (Fat.sol#358-1540) should enit an event for:
    swapTokenaAtAnount = menAnountDoctinials * (10 ** 18) (Fat.sol#3539)

FAT.UpdateSwapAtAnount(wint250) (Fat.sol#358-1540) should enit an event for:
    swapTokenaAtAnount = menAnountDoctinials * (10 ** 18) (Fat.sol#3539)

FAT.UpdateGeos(wint250, wint250, wint250, wint250, wint250) (Fat.sol#3579)

FAT.UpdateGeos(wint250, wint250, wint250,
urlable 'FAT.swapAndi(quify(uint256).sent (Fut.sol#1781)' in FAT.swapAndi(quify(uint256) (Fat.sol#1756-1797) potentially used before declaration: (se
     Variable 'FAT.swapAndLiquify(uint256).sent (Fat.sol#1781)' in FAT.swapAndLiquify(uint256) (Fat.sol#1750-1797) potentially used before declaration: (se nt) = buyBackAddress.call[value: buyBackFeeBalance]() (Fat.sol#1791)
Variable 'FAT.swapAndLiquify(uint256).sent (Fat.sol#1781)' in FAT.swapAndLiquify(uint256) (Fat.sol#1780-1797) potentially used before declaration: (se nt) = charityAddress.call[value: charityFeeBalance]() (Fat.sol#1786)
Variable 'FAT._transfer(address.gaddress.gaint256).iterations (Fat.sol#2618)' in FAT._transfer(address.gaddress.gaint256) (Fat.sol#1895-2817) potentially used before declaration: ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations.claims.lastProcessedIndex.true.gas.tx.origin) (Fat.sol#1895-1817) potentially used before declaration: ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations.claims.lastProcessedIndex.true.gas.tx.origin) (Fat.sol#281)
Variable 'FAT._transfer(address.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddress.gaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddresgaddres
```

```
ansfer(address,address,uint256) (Fat.sol#1895-2817):
                   uniswapV2Bouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeDnTransFerTokens(token&mount.0.path.address(this).block.timestamp) (Fat.solW1825-1
                  (sest) = tharttyAddress.call(value: charttyFeeBalance)() (fat.sol#1786)
(sent) = buyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBalance)() (fat.sol#1791)
swepAndSendOvtdendS(dvidendAmount) (fat.sol#3985)
swepAndSendOvtdendS(dvidendAmount) (fat.sol#3985)
swepAndSendOvtdendS(dvidendAmount) (fat.sol#3985)
swepAndSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvtdendSendOvt
                                    uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensFarTokensSupportingFreOnTransferTakens(tokenAmount,8.path,recipient,block.tlmestamp) (Fat.sol#1846-18
                                    success = IERC20(DividendTaken), transfer(address(dividendTracker), dividends) (Fat.sal#IBB0)
                                     (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (fat.sol#1886)
dividendTracker.distributeTokenDividends(dividends) (Fat.sol#1886)
              External calls mending eth:
- swapAndLiquify(adminAnnumt) (Fat.sol#1984)
                                    uniswapy/Pouter.addliquidttyETH(value: ethAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1862-1865)
uniswapy/Pouter.swapExactf7HForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,receiver.block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1866-
              - (sent) = marketAddress.call(value: marketFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
- (sent) = charttyAddress.call(value: charttyFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
- (sent) = buyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1792)
- swapAndSendOlvidendS(dvidendSmaunt) (Fat.sol#1985)
- (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (Fat.sol#1886)
State var(ables witten after the call(s):
- swapAndSendOlvidendS(dvidendAmaunt) (Fat.sol#1985)
- allowances[owner][spender] = amount (Fat.sol#844)
Reentrancy in FAT _transfer(address,address,uint256) (Fat.sol#1895-2017):
External calls:
                   uniswapV2Router.swaptxactTakensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransFerTokens(tokenanount,0,path,address(this),block.tirestamp) (Fat.sol#1825-
                                    (sent) = marketAddress.call{value: marketFeeBalance}() (Fat.sol#1781)
(sent) = charityAddress.call{value: charityFeeBalance}() (Fat.sol#1786)
(sent) = bugSackAddress.call{value: buyBackFeeBalance}() (Fat.sol#1791)
SendOlvidends(dividendAnount) (Fat.sol#1905)
                                    unitwapVZRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeDnTransferTokens(tokenAmount.8.path.address(this).block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1825-1
                                    uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,8,path,recipient,black.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1846-18
                  (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (fat.sol#1886)
dividendTracker.distributeTokenOlvidends(dividends) (fat.sol#1896)
dividendTracker.setBalance(address(from),balanceOf(from)) (fat.sol#1899)
              - dividendiracker.setBalance(address(to),balanceOf(to)) (Fat.sol#2005)

External calls sending eth:
- swepAndLiquify(edxInAhount) (Fat.sol#1904)
- uniswapVZRouter.addLiquiftyETH(value: ethAhount)(address(this),tokenAhount,8,0,burnAddress,block.tinestamp) (Fat.sol#1902-1865)
- uniswapVZRouter.swipExactfiHforTokensSupportIngFeeOnTransFerTokens[value: ethAhount)(8,path,receiver,block.tinestamp) (Fat.sol#1902-1865)
                                     (sent) = charityAddress.call(value: charityFeeBelance)() (Fat.sol#1786)
(sent) = buyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBelance)() (Fat.sol#1791)
                  pwapAndSendDividends(dividendAngunt) (Fat sol#1985)
              External calls
               External Cates; = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPatr(address(this),_uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (Fat.sol#1467-1468)
State variables written infler the coll(s):
- uniswapV2Patr = _uniswapV2Potr (Fat.sol#147))
- uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router (Fat.sol#1470)
              External calls:
- annount = withdrawnOlvidendOfUser(account) (Fat.sol#ZZZJO)
- unlswapVZRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOoTransFerTokens(value: ethAnnount)(6.path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#IZIB-
- unlswapVZRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOoTransFerTokens(value: ethAnnount)(6.path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#IZIB-
               - (sent) = user.call(value: _withdrawableDividend)() (Fat.sol#1237)
State variables written after the call(s):
- lastClainTimes[account] = block.timestamp (Fat.sol#2233)
```

```
AndLiquify(vint256) (Fat.sol#1750-1797)
            External calls:
                swapfakensForEth(inithalf) (Fat.sol#1767)
uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1825-
137)
               swapEthForTokens(narketFeeBalance.marketTokenAddressForFee,marketAddress) (Fat.sol#1779)
- uniswapV2Houter.swapEnactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: wthArount)(0,path,receiver,black.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1888)
               External calls sending with:
- swaptihforTokens(narketFeeBalunce,marketAddressForFee,marketAddress) (fat.sol#1779)
- uniswapVZNouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportIngFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (fat.sol#1886
               (sent) = charityAddress.call(value: charityFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1780)
swapEthForTokens(buyNackFeeBalance,address(this),buyBackAddress) (Fat.sol#1780)
- uniswapVZRouter.swapEnactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAnount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1880

    (sent) = huyflackAddress.tall(value: buyflackFeefalance)() [fat.sol#1791)
    additoutdtty(finalHalf,finalBalance) (Fat.sol#1785)
    untswapvZRouter.additoutdttyffly(value: #thAnount)(eddress(this),tokenAnount,0,0,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (fat.sol#1802-1809)
    State variables written affer the call(s):
    additouidtty(finalHalf,finalHalance) (fat.sol#1785)

allowances[owner][spender] = amount (Fat.sol#844)
heference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
Event entitled after the call(s):
- SetAutomatedMarketMakerPatr(patr,value) (Fat.sol#1669)
eentrancy in FAT_transfer(address_address_uint256) (Fat.sol#1895-2817):
External calls:
- swapAndilquify(adminAnount) (Fat.sol#1904)
                             uniswapV2Mouter.edd.iquidityETH[value: ethAmount](address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1862-1889)
uniswapV2Mouter.swapExactETHForYokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens[value: ethAmount](0,path,retwiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1866
                             unlswapVZRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0.path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Fat.sel#1825-1
                            (sent) = marketAddress.call(value: marketFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
(sent) = charityAddress.call(value: charityFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1780)
(sent) = buyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
SendOividemdAdduv() (Fat.sol#1885)
uniswapVZRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0.path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1825-1
изий
                            uniswapyZRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,poth,recipient,block,ttmestamp) (Fat.sol#1846-18
            - success = IERCZD(DividendToken).transfer(address(dividendTracker),dividends) (Fat.sol#IBSO)
- (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (Fat.sol#IBSO)
- dividendTracker.distributeTokenDividends(dividends) (Fat.sol#IBSO)

External calls sending eth:
- swapAndilquiffysahiAAnount) (Fat.sol#IBSO)
- uniswapVZRouter.addLiquidityETH[value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#IBSO-IBSO)
- uniswapVZRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAnount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#IBSO-IBSO)
              - (sent) = marketAddress.call(value: marketFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
- (sent) = charityAddress.call[value: charityFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1780)
- (sent) = buyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1791)
swapAndSendOtvidends(dividendAnount) (Fat.sol#1985)
            - swapAndSendOtVidendScd(VidendAnaunt) (Fat.sol#1985)
- (sent) = divTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (Fat.sol#1880)
Event entited after the call(s):
- Approval(owner, spender, anount) (Fat.sol##85)
- swapAndSendOtVidendS(divIdendAnaunt) (Fat.sol#1985)
- SendOtVidendS(tokens, divIdendS) (Fat.sol#1981)
- swapAndSendOtVidendS(divIdendAnaunt) (Fat.sol#1985)
- fransfer(sender, recipient, anount) (Fat.sol#784)
- super. transfer(from, to, anount) (Fat.sol#1999)
- fransfer(sender, recipient, anount) (Fat.sol#784)
- super. transfer(from, address(this), fees) (Fat.sol#1997)
```

```
mmsfer(address,address,uint250) (Fat.sol#1895-2017):
          uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenArount,0.path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Fat.soi#1825-i
          - (sent) = charityAddrmss.call[value: charityPeeHalance]{} (fat.sol#1786)
- (sent) = huyBackAddress.call[value: buyBackFeeBalance]() (fat.sol#1791)
swapAndSendDividends(dividendAmount) (fat.sol#1885)
                   uniswapV2Router.twapExactTokenbForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokenb(tokenArount,0.psth,address(thts),block.timestamp) (Fat.solV1825-1
                  unismapyZRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,8.path,recipient,block.timestamp) (Fat.sql#1846-18
        - (sent) = marketAddress.call(value: marketFeeMalance)() (Fat.sol#1781)
- (sent) = charityAddress.call(value: charityFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1786)
- (sent) = blyMackAddress.call(value: blyMackFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1795)
swepAndSendOvidendos (dividendAnount) (Fat.sol#1985)
- (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (Fat.sol#1886)
success = swapEthForTokens( withdrowableOlvidend,dividendTokenUser(user),user) (Fat.sol#1243)
- unlswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransFerTokens[value: ethAmount](0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1218-
        Event emitted after the call(s):
- DividendAithdrawe(user,_withdrawableDividend,DividendToken) (Fat.sol#1248)
mcy in FAT.constructor() (Fat.sol#1457-1492):
External calls:
          e dividendiracker.excludeFrontlyLdends(pair) (Fat.sol#1606)
Event entited after the call(s):
- SetAutonatedMorketMakerPair(pair,value) (Fat.sol#1605)
- setAutonatedMorketMakerPair(,unlumapV2Pair,true) (Fat.sol#1473)
Reentrancy in FAT.constructor() (Fat.sol#1457-1492):
External calls:
         amount = withdrawDividendOffSer(account) (Fat.sol#2230)
- uniswapV2Ruuter.swapExactETHFurTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens[value: ethAmount](0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#2218
        (sent) = user.call(value: _withdrawableDividend)() (Fat.sol#1237)
Event emitted after the call(s):
        Event emitted after the catt(s):
- claim(account,aucount,aucount):
- claim(account,aucount,aucount):
- claim(account,aucount,aucount):
- claim(account,aucount):
- claim(account,aucount):
- categories (state):
- cliterations,claims,laim(processedIndex) = dividendTracker.process(gas) (fat.sol#1738)

Event emitted after the call(s):
- ProcessedDividendTracker(licrations,claims,lastProcessedIndex,false,gas,tx.origin) (fat.sol#1711)
```

```
in FAT swapAndi toutfy(uint256) (Fat col#1750 1797)
               swapEthForTokens(narketFeeBalance,marketTokenAddressForFee,marketAddress) (Fat.sol#1779)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeUnTransferTokens(value: ethAnount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1860)
               (sent) = marketAddress.call(value: marketFeeBalance)() (Fat.sal#I7B1)
swapEthForTokans(charityFeeBalance,charityTokanaddressForFee,charityAddress) (Fat.sal#I7B4)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeBnTransferTokans(value: ethAmount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sal#IBB6-
               (sent) = charityAddress.call[value: charityFeeBalance]() (Fat.sol#1786)
swapEthForTokens(buyBackFeeBalance,address(this),buyBackAddress) (Fat.sol#1789)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAnount)(0,path,receiver,block.tlmestamp) (Fat.sol#1886)

    (sent) = DuyBackAddress.call(value: buyBackFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1791)
    addLiquidity(finalHalf,finalBalance) (Fat.sol#1795)
    uniswapVZRouter.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,#,#,burnAddress,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1862-1869)
    External calls sending eth:

            swaptHoorTokens(narketFeeBalance,marketTokenAddressForFee,marketAddress) (Fat.sol#1779)
            uniswapVZRouter.swapExactETHForTokenSSupportingFeeOnTransferFokens(value: ethAnount)(#,path,Fecelver,Block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1886-

               swapEthForTokens(charityFeeBalance_charityTokenAddressForFee_charityAddress) (Fat.sol#1784)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokenSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1886-
               (sent) = charityAddress.call(value: charityFeeBalance)() (Fat.sol#1786)
swapIthForTokens(buyBackFeeBalance,address(this),buyBackAddress) (Fat.sol#1789)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,receiver,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1886)
           leentrancy in FAT.swapAndSendDividends(wint256) (Fat.sol#1873-1893):
External calls:
               swspTokensForTokens(tokens,address(this)) (Fat.sol#1878)
- uniswapV2Router.swaptxactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,8,path,reciplent,block.timestamp) (Fat.sol#1846-18
               - (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (fat.sol#1886)
- dividendTracker.distr(huteTokenDividends(dividends) (fat.sol#1898)
External calls sending eth:
- (sent) = diviTracker.call(value: newBalance)() (fat.sol#1886)
Event entitled infer the call(s):
- SendDividends(tokens, dividends) (fat.sol#1891)
            mry in FMT.updateDividendTracker(address) (Fmt.solW1599-1013):
External calls:
External Calts:
- nemDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(nemDividendTracker)) (Fat.sol#1600)
- nemDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(this)) (Fat.sol#1607)
- nemDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(uniswapu2Ruuter)) (Fat.sol#1600)
Event entitled after the call(s):
- updateDividendTracker(newAddress.address(dividendTracker)) (Fat.sol#1610)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy.vulnerabilities-3
AT getTradingIsEnabled() (Fet.sul#1746-1748) uses timestamp for comparisons
      | Bongerous corportsons:
| block.timestamp >= tradingtnabledfinestamp (Fat.sol#1747)
| transfer(address,address,ulnt256) (Fat.sol#1895-2017) uses timestamp for comparisons
| transfer(address,address,ulnt256) | Tat.sol#1895-2017 | Uses timestamp for comparisons
               ngerous comparisons:
I swapping 8% tradingisEnabled 6% sutomatedMarketMakerPairs[to] 6% from 1= address(uniswapVZRouter) 6% 1 _isExcludedFromFees[to] (Fat.pol#19
               tradingisEnabled Am contemp Am 1 swapping Am 1 autumatedMarketMakerPairs[from] Am from 1= burnaddress Am to 1= burnaddress (Fat.solW1976-197
Dangerous comparisons:
- nextClainTime > block.timestamp (Fat.sol#2133-2135)
FATOlvidendTracker.canAutoClain(uint256) (Fat.sol#2157-2163) uses timestamp for comparisons
           Dangerous comperisons:
- lastClaimTime > block.timestamp (Fat.sol#2158)
- block.timestamp.sub(lastClaimTime) >= claimMait (Fat.sol#2162)
ce: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentations
```

```
Context._msgbata() (Fat.sol#95-98) is never used and should be removed

OlvidendPayingToken, transfer(address,address,uint256) (Fat.sol#1297-1383) is never used and should be removed

ERC20._setupDecimals(uintE) (Fat.sol#855-857) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath,div(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#8164-1867) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.nod(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#8163-1629) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.nod(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-982) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.tryNdd(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-982) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.tryNdd(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-977) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.tryNdd(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-977) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.tryNdu(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-977) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,uint256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed

SafeWath.trySub(uint256,int256) (Fat.sol#898-912) is never used and should be removed
     eference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
 narketfee
FAT.previousCharityFee (Fat.sol#1397) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
  - charityFee
FAT.previousBuyBackFee (Fmt.sol#1393) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- buyBackFee
  FAT.previousTokenHewnrdsFee (Fat.sol#1394) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable: tokeoRewardsFee | tokeoRewardsFee | tokeoRewardsFee | FAT.previousLigutUityFee (Fat.sol#1395) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:

    liquidityFee
    FAT.previousTotalFees (Fat.sol#1896) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:

    totalfees
    Heference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

   Pragna version»-0.0.0+8.8.8 (Fat.sul#78) is too complex
Pragna version»=8.6.2 (Fat.sul#103) allows old versions
Pragna version»=0.6.7 (Fat.sul#103) allows old versions
Pragna version»=0.5.0 (Fat.sul#245) allows old versions
Pragna versions=0.5.0 (Fat.sul#245) allows old versions
Pragna versions=0.5.0 (Fat.sul#264) allows old versions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/siither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-sulidity
  Reference: https://github.com/cryttc/sither/wiki/Detector-Documentations/evel-calls
Function IndisappyRear Docking StPanatom() (Fat.solar) is not in Accediase
Function IndisappyRear Docking StPanatom() (Fat.solar) is not in invediase
Function IndisappyRear Docking StPanatom() (Fat.solar) is not in invediase
Function IndisappyRear PRINTI-MPHASOM() (Fat.solar) is not in invediase
Function IndisappyRear Printing Rear Printing R
                    dant expression "this (Fat.sol@90)" inContext (Fat.sol@90-99)
ence: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation@redundant-statements
```

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-are-top-stmilar
 DividendPayingToken.lastArount (Fat.sol#1118) is never used in FATDividendTracker (Fat.sol#2021-2241)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
   DividendPoyingToken.lastArount (Fat.sol#1110) showld be constant
FAT.OlvidendToken (Fat.sol#1350) should be constant
FAT.OlvidendToken (Fat.sol#1350) should be constant
FAT.maxBoyFranscationArount (Fat.sol#1350) should be constant
FAT.maxSelITransactionArount (Fat.sol#1359) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Dutector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
   get(Iterablemapping.Map,address) should be declared external
  get(Iterablemapping.Map.address) should be declared external:

IterableMapping.get(IterableMapping.Map.address) (Fat.sol#329-331)
getIndexOfKey(IterableMapping.Map.address) should be declared external:

IterableMapping.getIndexOfKey(IterableMapping.Map.address) (Fat.sol#333-330)
getKeyAtIndex(IterableMapping.Map.uint250) should be declared external:

IterableMapping.getKeyAtIndex(IterableMapping.Map.uint250) (Fat.sol#340-342)
size(IterableMapping.Map) should be declared external:

IterableMapping.stze(IterableMapping.Map) (Fat.sol#344-346)
  renounceOwnership() should be declared external:

Ownsble.renounceOwnership() (fet.sol#430-433)
transferOwnership(eddress) should be declared external:
Ownsble.transferOwnership(eddress) (fet.sol#439-443)
blic-function-that-could-be-declared-external
```

MythX: -

Report for https://da	r Fat.sol ashboard.mythx.to/#/console/analyses/59fc8bc	a-c555-433b-a	fb9-fe95edbd8787
Line	SWC:Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
78	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
163	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
200	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
245	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
264	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	LOW	A floating pragma is set.
318	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	LOW:	A floating pragma is set.
341	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
368	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable " <uint> - 1" discovered</uint>
368	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
369	(SWC+110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
374	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
380	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
447	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
472	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
513	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
525	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
527	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation *** discovered
528	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and UnderFlow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
535	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
537	(SMC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
541	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
543	(SMC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
547	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
559	(SNC-103) Floating Pragma	LON	A floating pragma is set.
575	(SMC-103) Floating Pragma	LON	A floating pragma is set.
877	(SMC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
899	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
911	(SNC-161) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
924	(SMC-161) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
925	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
936	(SMC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
946	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
960	(SHC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
977	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
992	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
993	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
1011	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
1828	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
1046	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
1066	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered

1085	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
1092	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1107	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1183	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
1196	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
1214	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1215	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1288	(SMC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
1342	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1358	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1358	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1359	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1359	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1366	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1366	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1361	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1361	(SNC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1491	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1491	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1535	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1535	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1539	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
1539	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1648	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
1649	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1731	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.
1754	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
1774	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
1802	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1803	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1819	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1820	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1839	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1840	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1841	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
1929	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered

2009	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
2011	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.
2043	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation *** discovered
2043	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation **** discovered
2847	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
2047	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation **** discovered
2199	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
2205	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
2289	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
2213	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered

Solhint: -

```
Linter results:

Fat.sol:1:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.7.6 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

Fat.sol:78:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.6.0 x0.8.0 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

Fat.sol:103:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.6.2 does not satisfy the r semver requirement


Fat.sol:107:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

Fat.sol:200:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.6.2 does not satisfy the r semver requirement


Fat.sol:245:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.5.0 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

Fat.sol:264:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.5.0 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

Fat.sol:264:1: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```







Basic Coding Bugs

1. Constructor Mismatch

 Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

2. Ownership Takeover

o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

o Result: Found

Severity: Critical (In this audit High Impact found)

5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

o Result: Found

Severity: Critical (In this audit Low Impact found)

6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

10. Unchecked External Call

o Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

11. Gasless Send

 $\circ \quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

12. Send Instead of Transfer

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

17. Deprecated Uses

 Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: Found(In this audit Medium Impact found)

o Severity: Medium

Semantic Consistency Checks

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed FATBULL's Fat Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some high and low-level issues along with the compilation issues found, in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About eNebula Solutions

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in