
Can AI Deliberate? Evaluating Deliberative Quality and Belief Revision in Multi-Agent LLMs

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Abstract

1 Can large language models (LLMs) deliberate with quality across varying discussion
2 structures? This study investigates this question by examining how structural
3 norms and attitude certainty shape the deliberative quality and belief dynamics
4 of multi-agent LLM dialogues. We implemented a 2×2 factorial design (structured
5 vs. unstructured × high vs. low certainty) in which role-conditioned LLM
6 agents engaged in multi-round debates on the commercial use of AI-generated art.
7 Dialogue transcripts were evaluated using the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI)
8 and stance-flow analysis to capture both static deliberative quality and dynamic
9 belief revision. Results show that structure enhanced civility and coherence, while
10 certainty improved justification and interactivity. The combination of structured
11 interaction and high certainty produced the strongest overall deliberative quality,
12 whereas unstructured low-certainty dialogues consistently underperformed. Across
13 all conditions, however, constructive solution-building remained limited, and LLMs
14 failed to replicate the nuanced facilitative role of human moderators. These findings
15 suggest that while LLMs can approximate key features of deliberation under
16 controlled conditions, further advances—such as memory and planning modules or
17 hybrid human–AI facilitation—are needed to move beyond procedural compliance
18 toward genuinely constructive deliberation.

19

1 Introduction

20 Deliberation has long been regarded as a core mechanism of democratic politics and public decision-
21 making. It emphasizes reason-giving, mutual justification, and the willingness to revise one's position,
22 thereby providing an institutional foundation for policy legitimacy and civic understanding (Habermas,
23 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). However, traditional studies of deliberation in real-world and
24 laboratory settings face substantial challenges, including high costs, limited replicability, and lack
25 of representativeness, making it difficult to systematically evaluate the quality of deliberation under
26 varying conditions (Novelli et al., 2024).

27 With the rapid development of large language models, artificial agents now engage in sustained multi-
28 party dialogues rather than simple question–answer exchanges. This raises a central question: can
29 they deliberate with quality? If agents approximate key features of human deliberation, this expands
30 our understanding of AI behavior while opening possibilities for democratic practice and policy
31 simulation. “AI deliberation” also provides a low-cost, replicable sandbox for testing mechanisms
32 that shape dialogue quality, free from the complexities of real-world settings. Practically, it can be
33 used to simulate policy debates before implementation or to train negotiation and facilitation skills in
34 safe environments.

35 This study focuses on two key dimensions: structure and attitude certainty. The former determines
36 whether interaction follows procedural norms such as turn-taking and justification requirements,
37 thereby influencing coherence and civility. The latter concerns the extent to which participants

38 maintain or revise their positions, shaping the depth of reasoning and the dynamics of belief change.
39 Empirical studies of human deliberation show that structured procedures significantly enhance
40 dialogue quality, while attitude certainty influences openness, persuasion, and responsiveness (Zhang,
41 2015; Kunda, 1990). We therefore hypothesize that these factors will also play a critical role in
42 AI-mediated deliberation

43 To test this hypothesis, we designed a 2×2 experimental framework (structured vs. unstructured
44 \times high certainty vs. low certainty) and employed the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI) and belief
45 revision as the primary evaluation metrics. By comparing multi-agent LLM dialogues across these
46 conditions, we aim to address the following questions: Can AI deliberation exhibit human-like
47 deliberative features? How do structure and attitude certainty shape deliberative quality and belief
48 revision? Do they interact in shaping discourse dynamics?

49 In sum, this study provides an initial empirical exploration of AI deliberation in digital environments.
50 By integrating deliberative democratic theory with systematic evaluation using DQI and belief
51 revision, we seek not only to assess the normative potential of LLMs in multi-turn dialogues but also
52 to lay the groundwork for future research on the role of AI in public discourse, policy simulation, and
53 democratic practice.

54 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framing

55 2.1 Deliberative Norms and the Possibility of AI-to-AI Deliberation

56 What counts as deliberation in artificial agents, and whether it can approximate the normative ideals
57 of human discourse, remains an open empirical and philosophical question. Classically, deliberation
58 is the structured exchange of reasons among free and equal participants, oriented toward mutual
59 understanding and grounded in principles of public justification, reciprocity, responsiveness, and
60 openness to revision (Cohen, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge et
61 al., 2010). Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action further links these practices to democratic
62 legitimacy through reasoned discourse (Habermas, 1984).

63 Large language models (LLMs) now generate arguments and sustain multi-party dialogues, creating
64 new opportunities to evaluate deliberative practices. Park et al. (2023) show that generative agents
65 with memory and role-conditioned scripts can sustain responsive exchanges, while Argyle et al.
66 (2023) demonstrate that GPT-3, when conditioned on sociodemographic profiles, can reproduce
67 aggregate-level political attitudes.

68 Yet neither study evaluates deliberative normativity—whether agents engage in sustained, norm-
69 governed interaction involving justification, reciprocity, and position revision. Moreover, both rely on
70 GPT-3, whose limited memory contrasts sharply with newer models (e.g., GPT-4, GPT-5) that enable
71 longer, more coherent dialogues. As LLMs evolve beyond single-turn outputs, the central question
72 becomes not whether they can simulate dialogue, but whether they can deliberate in the normative
73 sense defined by deliberative theory. Thus, we ask:

74 **RQ1:** To what extent can LLM agents, under role-conditioning and iterative interaction, approximate
75 key features of human-like deliberation such as reason exchange, reciprocal responsiveness, and
76 revision of stated positions across multi-turn dialogues?

77 2.2 Structure

78 A large body of empirical research shows that the quality of deliberation depends not only on the
79 content exchanged but also on how interaction is structured. In studies of human deliberation, proce-
80 dural fairness has consistently been found to enhance perceptions of legitimacy, the interpretability
81 of disagreement, and acceptance of outcomes. Structured interaction formats—such as turn-taking,
82 justification requirements, and inclusive participation norms—improve dialogue quality and reduce
83 polarization (Zhang, 2015; Chang & Zhang, 2021). From the perspective of public reason, procedural
84 norms also perform a justificatory function: they ensure that reasons are legible to others, contestable
85 in principle, and framed in terms that can be shared across plural viewpoints (Rawls, 1993). These
86 mechanisms are particularly important in heterogeneous or ideologically diverse contexts, where
87 consensus may be difficult to achieve but mutual understanding remains a plausible goal.

88 In computational environments, LLM reasoning trajectories are likewise highly sensitive to structural
89 constraints. Recent studies show that multi-agent systems, when equipped with planning modules
90 and task scaffolds, can display coherent reasoning, adaptive error correction, and justification across
91 extended cycles of interaction (Boiko et al., 2023). Structural norms and initial configurations thus
92 prove critical to the emergence of coordinated behavior, suggesting that procedural scaffolds may
93 largely determine deliberative quality in AI-mediated settings. Thus, we ask:

94 **RQ2:** In multi-agent LLM deliberation, how does structure shape deliberative quality and the
95 likelihood of stance revision?

96 **2.3 Attitude Certainty**

97 Beyond structural norms, participants' cognitive dispositions also play a decisive role in shaping
98 deliberative outcomes. Among these, attitude certainty stands out as a key factor. Psychological
99 research shows that individuals with lower initial certainty are more open to persuasion and engage in
100 deeper cognitive processing, whereas those with higher certainty are more prone to selective exposure
101 and motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge,
102 2006). These cognitive patterns affect how participants respond to arguments, justify their positions,
103 and update their views over time.

104 Deliberative theory likewise treats reason-giving, reciprocal justification, and openness to revision
105 as normative benchmarks of democratic dialogue (Habermas, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996;
106 Mansbridge et al., 2010). Yet high attitude certainty may constrain responsiveness to counterarguments,
107 thereby weakening reciprocity (Goodin, 2003; Dryzek, 2000). Conversely, epistemic humility
108 and openness have been identified as preconditions for productive disagreement (Bohman, 1998;
109 Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019).

110 In LLM-mediated deliberation, attitude certainty can be operationalized through prompt design—for
111 instance, by varying stance strength or epistemic qualifiers. This allows for controlled experiments in
112 which agents initialized with high versus low certainty are compared in terms of their downstream
113 reasoning, engagement, and stance change. Thus, we ask:

114 **RQ3:** In multi-agent LLM deliberation, how does initial attitude certainty affect deliberative quality
115 and the likelihood of stance revision?

116 **2.4 Interaction of Structure and Attitude Certainty in Deliberative Dynamics**

117 Deliberative quality emerges not only from structural norms or participant dispositions in isolation, but
118 from their interaction. Theories of procedural justice emphasize the normative role of fair structures,
119 such as turn-taking, justification prompts, and inclusive rule enforcement, in enabling equitable
120 dialogue (Zhang, 2015; Chang & Zhang, 2021). Meanwhile, theories of epistemic engagement stress
121 that individual dispositions, such as attitude certainty, shape how participants respond to reasons and
122 whether they revise their views (Mansbridge et al., 2012; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006).

123 Deliberative systems theorists increasingly argue that context matters: under some conditions, strong
124 procedural scaffolds can mitigate the effects of epistemic rigidity; in others, even well-structured
125 formats may fail when actors hold entrenched views (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019). This suggests a
126 need to test interaction effects between deliberative structures and attitudinal dispositions.

127 In LLM contexts, these variables can be independently manipulated, allowing controlled tests of their
128 joint and relative influence on discourse quality and belief dynamics. Thus, we ask:

129 **RQ4:** Do deliberative structure and attitude certainty interact in shaping discourse quality and stance
130 dynamics, and under what conditions is each most influential?

131 **3 Method**

132 **3.1 Models and Compute Environment**

133 For our experiments, we used GPT-4o-mini, accessed via the OpenAI API. The model was configured
134 with a temperature of 0.7 and a fixed random seed (42) to balance diversity with reproducibility.

135 GPT-4o-mini was employed both to generate multi-agent deliberation transcripts and to simulate
136 role-conditioned personas in the debate.

137 We employed the Autogen framework (Microsoft, 2023) to implement the multi-agent environment.
138 Autogen enabled configurable agents with customized system prompts, managed turn-taking, and
139 orchestrated group dialogue. In our experiment, it instantiated seven stakeholder personas, assigned
140 roles and backgrounds, and conducted up to 40 rounds under different structural and certainty
141 conditions, ensuring consistency and reproducibility.

142 All experiments were run locally on a computer with an Apple M3 Max chip, 36 GB memory, and
143 macOS Sequoia 15.3.2, using Python 3.9.7.

144 3.2 Experimental Design

145 To investigate how structure and attitude certainty shape deliberative quality and belief revision in
146 AI-mediated settings, we designed a 2×2 factorial experiment. The two factors were:

147 **Structure of interaction** Under the structured condition, dialogues followed explicit procedural
148 scaffolds embedded in the system prompts and group chat configuration. Agents were instructed
149 to provide justifications, avoid repetition, and explicitly state position changes in the final round.
150 Turn-taking was automatically managed through the Autogen framework, ensuring orderly exchanges.

151 In the unstructured condition, agents received only the initial discussion topic without additional
152 procedural constraints. No turn-taking enforcement or justification prompts were provided, allowing
153 interactions to unfold more freely and spontaneously.

154 **Attitude certainty** In the high certainty condition, agents were initialized with persona descriptions
155 containing stronger conviction levels (e.g., “Conviction Level: 70%”) in their role prompts. This
156 encouraged them to defend their stance vigorously and resist revision.

157 In the low certainty condition, agents were initialized with lower conviction levels (e.g., “Conviction
158 Level: 20%”). These prompts encouraged more openness to persuasion and a higher likelihood of
159 belief revision across dialogue rounds.

160 Each condition was instantiated in multi-agent deliberations of five rounds. The deliberative setting in-
161 cluded seven persona agents, each instantiated with stakeholder-specific system prompts defining their
162 role, demographic background, and core interests (e.g., protection-oriented, collaboration-oriented,
163 open-access, equity-focused). These role-conditioned agents engaged in five-round discussions under
164 each experimental condition, producing transcripts that were subsequently analyzed using deliberative
165 quality and stance-flow metrics.

166 3.3 Evaluation Metrics

167 Two complementary metrics were employed to evaluate the outcomes of the multi-agent deliberations.

168 **Deliberative Quality Index (DQI)** We adopted the Deliberative Quality Index (Steenbergen et al.,
169 2003; Steiner et al., 2004) as a standardized measure of deliberative performance. The DQI captures
170 five core dimensions: (1) level of justification, (2) content of justification, (3) respect, (4) constructive
171 politics, and (5) interactivity. Each dimension was assessed on a three-point scale ranging from 0 to
172 3, resulting in a maximum possible score of 15 points for each transcript.

173 **Stance revision** Stance revision was examined through stance flow analysis across successive
174 debate rounds. Each agent’s expressed stance was coded into one of several predefined categories
175 (e.g., livelihood/authenticity, regulation, equity, collaboration). Trajectories of stance changes were
176 then visualized to capture thematic drift, convergence toward institutional frames, or stability within
177 initial positions.

178 **4 Results**

179 **4.1 DQI Content Analysis**

180 To evaluate deliberative quality across conditions, we applied the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI)
181 (Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004). The DQI captures five dimensions—justification level,
182 justification content, respect, constructive politics, and interactivity—each scored on a 0–3 scale, for
183 a maximum of 15 points per transcript.

184 Overall, the structured high-certainty condition achieved the strongest performance (14/15), char-
185 acterized by detailed justifications, appeals to broader societal concerns, consistent civility, and
186 active engagement. By contrast, the unstructured low-certainty condition scored the lowest (8/15),
187 with fragmented reasoning, narrow personal framings, and weak interaction. The two intermediate
188 conditions—structured low-certainty (11/15) and unstructured high-certainty (12/15)—displayed
189 mixed strengths, suggesting that structure enhances civility and coherence, while certainty promotes
190 justification depth and interactivity.




Figure 1: Deliberative Quality Index (DQI) scores across four transcript patterns.

191 **Level of justification** The most pronounced differences were observed in this dimension. Structured
192 high-certainty agents routinely provided multi-layered arguments (e.g., linking AI art to legal, ethical,
193 and economic risks). Unstructured low-certainty agents, by contrast, frequently presented claims
194 without elaboration. The unstructured high-certainty condition also performed well, as assertiveness
195 strengthened argumentative force. Structured low-certainty arguments tended to remain generic,
196 yielding moderate scores.

197 **Content of justification** Structured high-certainty discussions often extended to collective goods
198 (e.g., cultural heritage, institutional standards), while unstructured low-certainty arguments centered
199 narrowly on individual livelihood concerns. The other two conditions scored in between, alternating
200 between broad and narrow framings.

201 **Respect** All transcripts maintained relatively high civility, but structured conditions stood out: coun-
202 terarguments were typically prefaced with recognition of opposing views. Unstructured conditions
203 occasionally included sharper phrasing (e.g., “Your optimism ignores the reality...”), which lowered
204 their scores slightly.

205 **Constructive politics** All transcripts maintained relatively high civility, but structured conditions
206 stood out: counterarguments were typically prefaced with recognition of opposing views. Unstruc-
207 tured conditions occasionally included sharper phrasing (e.g., “Your optimism ignores the reality...”),
208 which slightly reduce their scores.

209 **Interactivity** Structured high-certainty and unstructured high-certainty transcripts both demon-
210 strated strong engagement, with explicit rebuttals and direct referencing of others’ arguments. By
211 contrast, structured low-certainty and unstructured low-certainty debates were more fragmented, with
212 participants reverting to their original positions rather than sustaining exchanges.

213 The findings indicate that both structure and certainty significantly shape deliberative quality, but
 214 through different mechanisms: structure fosters civility and coherence, while certainty drives argu-
 215 mentative strength and interaction. Yet across all conditions, constructive politics remained
 216 underdeveloped, underscoring a key limitation of AI-mediated deliberation.

217 4.2 Stance Flow Analysis

218 Analysis of the stance-flow panels reveals distinct trajectory patterns across conditions. In the struc-
 219 tured settings (Fig.2-3),¹ participants frequently reframed their arguments within broader positions.
 220 For example, protection-oriented speakers shifted from livelihood/authenticity to regulation or law/IP
 221 clarity, collaboration-oriented from optimistic to conditional frames, open-access advocates from
 222 freedom to guidelines, and equity advocates from equity-only to equity plus regulation. These
 223 within-position refractions produced longer, more articulated trajectories than in the unstructured
 224 conditions.




Figure 2: Evolving Stance Flow Across Deliberation Rounds - Structured + High Certainty




Figure 3: Evolving Stance Flow Across Deliberation Rounds - Structured + Low Certainty

225 By contrast, the unstructured settings (Fig. 3-4) displayed shorter paths and plateaus, with participants'
 226 stances remaining close to their initial categories. Changes were sporadic and often occurred only in
 227 later rounds (e.g., authenticity → regulation; freedom → guidelines). Overall, structured conditions
 228 generated greater thematic dispersion over time, whereas unstructured ones were marked by path
 229 dependence and repetition.

¹ Stance flow trajectories across five debate rounds under four conditions. Rows represent individual par-
 ticipants and columns successive rounds; colored markers denote stance categories and connectors trace
 argumentative movement.




Figure 4: Evolving Stance Flow Across Deliberation Rounds - Unstructured + High Certainty




Figure 5: Evolving Stance Flow Across Deliberation Rounds - Unstructured + High Certainty

230 Process-wise, structure acted as a channel for thematic development, enabling participants to broaden
 231 justifications while retaining their core stance. Certainty shaped direction: under high certainty,
 232 trajectories converged toward institutional frames (e.g., regulation, legal clarity), while under low
 233 certainty, movement was slower and more diffuse. Overall, structure sustained elaboration, whereas
 234 certainty determined whether discussions consolidated or remained dispersed.

235 5 Discussion

236 5.1 Approximating deliberation with LLM agents

237 Our results show that LLM agents are capable of approximating several key features of human
 238 deliberation, including reason-giving, reciprocal engagement, and in some cases explicit stance
 239 revision. This aligns with prior work suggesting that LLMs can sustain context-sensitive multi-turn
 240 dialogues (Park et al., 2023; Argyle et al., 2023). However, while these behaviors suggest a capacity
 241 for deliberative approximation, they fall short of the richer, more nuanced deliberative dynamics
 242 observed among humans, particularly with respect to constructive solution-building.

243 5.2 Structural effects on deliberative quality

244 Consistent with findings from deliberative democracy research (Zhang, 2015; Chang & Zhang, 2021),
 245 our results indicate that structural guidance improves deliberative quality. Structured conditions
 246 yielded higher DQI scores overall, with particular improvements in respect and coherence. This
 247 supports the claim that procedural scaffolds provide essential guardrails for civility and order. At the
 248 same time, our findings highlight a limitation: structure did not significantly enhance constructive
 249 politics. Even with structured prompts, LLM agents struggled to generate integrative solutions,

250 echoing critiques that AI discourse tends to reproduce existing frames rather than synthesize new
251 compromises.

252 **5.3 The role of attitude certainty**

253 Attitude certainty shaped deliberative dynamics in distinct ways. High-certainty agents produced
254 more elaborate justifications and displayed stronger interactivity, consistent with psychological
255 research linking conviction to motivated reasoning (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Taber & Lodge, 2006).
256 By contrast, low-certainty agents were more open to belief revision, paralleling human studies that
257 associate uncertainty with greater receptivity to persuasion (Kunda, 1990). These results extend prior
258 findings by showing that conviction levels can be operationalized in LLM personas through prompt
259 engineering, yielding systematic differences in deliberative responsiveness.

260 **5.4 Interaction of structure and certainty**

261 Our findings suggest that structure and certainty exert complementary rather than redundant effects.
262 Structure enhanced civility and coherence, while certainty influenced argumentative depth and respon-
263 siveness. The structured high-certainty condition produced the strongest deliberative quality overall,
264 whereas the unstructured low-certainty condition performed poorest. This interaction resonates with
265 theories of deliberative systems, which argue that institutional design and participant dispositions
266 jointly determine deliberative quality (Mansbridge et al., 2012; Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019). Yet our
267 results also suggest boundaries: while the two factors jointly improved deliberative quality, neither
268 condition alone sufficed to foster sustained constructive politics.

269 **6 Implications and limitations**

270 Together, these findings demonstrate that AI-to-AI deliberation can serve as a controllable, replicable
271 sandbox for testing deliberative norms, but they also reveal its current limitations. Across all
272 conditions, agents showed persistent weaknesses in constructive politics: Although they could
273 exchange reasons and respond reciprocally, they rarely generated integrative or compromise-oriented
274 solutions. This highlights a gap between procedural compliance and substantive problem solving.

275 Another limitation concerns the absence of effective moderation. In human settings, facilitators
276 play a crucial role in guiding turn-taking, ensuring inclusive participation, and steering discussions
277 toward constructive outcomes (Escobar, 2019). While structural scaffolds partially substituted for
278 this role in our design, LLMs acting alone lacked the capacity to replicate the nuanced interventions
279 of human moderators. This suggests that hybrid settings—where LLMs operate alongside human
280 facilitators—may be better suited for sustaining deliberative depth.

281 In addition, the use of AI for deliberation raises ethical risks. Simulated debates could be misused
282 to manufacture the appearance of consensus or to manipulate public opinion, and AI participants
283 inevitably lack the authenticity and social grounding of human actors. These risks underscore the
284 importance of transparency, safeguards against misuse, and positioning AI deliberation strictly as a
285 complement—rather than a substitute—for human democratic practices.

286 Future research should therefore pursue two directions. First, the integration of memory and planning
287 modules may enable LLM agents to sustain longer-term thematic development and revisit earlier
288 arguments more effectively, potentially supporting deeper belief revision. Second, the design of hybrid
289 human–AI deliberative systems warrants exploration: humans may provide contextual judgment and
290 moderation, while AI agents contribute scale, consistency, and role diversity. Such approaches could
291 bridge the gap between simulated deliberation and the richer dynamics of human democratic practice.

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350 A Technical Appendices and Supplementary Material

351 For full code and deliberation text, please see the supplementary material file.

352 The following is a demo of our code.

353 Source Code: `deliberation_freeflow.py`

```
354 1 # deliberation_freeflow.py
355 2 # -----
356 3 # 7 participants + 1 moderator, free-flow discussion (no bullets)
357 4 # Requires: pip install pyautogen
358 5 # -----
359 6
360 7 import os
361 8 import autogen
362 9 from datetime import datetime
363 10 # ===== 0) LLM config =====
364 11 llm_config = {
365 12     "model": "gpt-4o-mini",
366 13     "api_key": "sk-proj-XXXX",      # masked for security
367 14     "temperature": 0.7,
368 15     "seed": 42,
369 16 }
370 17
371 18 RICH_IDENTITY_CUES = True
372 19
373 20 def make_persona_agent(agent_cls, short_role, neutral_desc, rich_desc,
374 21     name, llm_config):
375 21     identity_block = rich_desc if RICH_IDENTITY_CUES else neutral_desc
376 22     system_message = f"""
377 23 You are a participant in a roundtable discussion on whether commercial
378 24 use
379 24 of AI-generated art should be restricted to protect human creative
380 25 industries.
381 25 Stay fully in character as your assigned stakeholder. Focus on
382 26 defending your
383 26 own interests, challenging others when necessary, and seeking possible
384 27 compromises.
385 27
386 28 Output rules:
387 29 - Be concise and substantive. No greetings, thanks, or pleasantries.
388 30 - Argue from your stakeholder interests. Protect your gains, minimize
389 30 your risks.
390 31 - Do not repeat prior points unless adding a new argument or evidence.
391 32 - Respond naturally in short paragraphs, not lists.
392 32
393 33 Your role: {short_role}
394 34 Identity details:
395 35 {identity_block}
396 36
397 37 Style: direct, analytic, interest-driven, concrete. No bullet points
398 38 or numbered lists.
399 39 """
400 40     return agent_cls(name=name, system_message=system_message,
401 41         llm_config=llm_config)
402 41
403 42 # ---- Personas from the document ----
404 43
405 44 artist_neutral = "Independent visual artist focused on protecting
406 45 artistic livelihoods..."
407 45 artist_rich = (
408 46     "Name: Sofia Mart nez; Demographics: 32-year-old Latina woman
409 47         from Buenos Aires, Argentina; "
410 47     "Profile: Self-employed painter and illustrator, exhibiting
411 48         locally and online; "
```

```

41248     "Core Interests: Protecting artistic livelihoods and authenticity;
413         preventing market saturation "
41449     "by low-cost AI art. Conviction Level: 80%"
4150 )
4161 artist = make_persona_agent(autogen.AssistantAgent, "Independent
417     Visual Artist",
4182                         artist_neutral, artist_rich, "
419                         Sofia_Martinez", llm_config)
42053
42154 # (repeat definitions for pm, law, dra, curator, policy, economist...)
4225
42356 agents = [artist, pm, law, dra, curator, policy, economist]
42457
42558 groupchat = autogen.GroupChat(
4269     agents=agents,
4270     messages=[],
42861     max_round=40,
42862     speaker_selection_method="auto",
43063 )
43164
43265 manager = autogen.GroupChatManager(groupchat=groupchat, llm_config=
433     llm_config)
43466
43567 initial_prompt = "Let's begin our roundtable discussion."
43668 agents[0].initiate_chat(manager, message=initial_prompt)
43769
43870 ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
43971 with open(f"transcript_{ts}.txt", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
44072     for i, m in enumerate(groupchat.messages, 1):
44173         role = m.get("name", m.get("role", ""))
44274         line = f"[{i:02d}] {role}: {m['content']}\n\n"
44375         print(line)
44476         f.write(line)

```

445 **Agents4Science AI Involvement Checklist**

- 446 1. **Hypothesis development:** Hypothesis development includes the process by which you
447 came to explore this research topic and research question. This can involve the background
448 research performed by either researchers or by AI. This can also involve whether the idea
449 was proposed by researchers or by AI.

450 Answer: **[B]**

451 Explanation: The research team proposed the topic and research questions based on prior
452 knowledge of deliberative democracy. AI tools were consulted to assist in refining wording
453 and exploring relevant literature, but the core ideas and directions were determined by the
454 researchers.

- 455 2. **Experimental design and implementation:** This category includes design of experiments
456 that are used to test the hypotheses, coding and implementation of computational methods,
457 and the execution of these experiments.

458 Answer: **[C]**

459 Explanation: The researchers defined the overall factorial design (structure \times certainty) and
460 specified the evaluation metrics (DQI and belief revision). However, the implementation
461 and execution of the experiments relied heavily on AI systems. The multi-agent dialogues
462 were generated and managed through the Autogen framework using GPT-4o-mini, with
463 human involvement limited to configuring prompts, roles, and parameters. In addition, AI
464 was employed to generate portions of the experimental code and to assist with preliminary
465 content analysis of the transcripts. Thus, AI carried out the majority of the experimental
466 execution and analysis under human supervision.

- 467 3. **Analysis of data and interpretation of results:** This category encompasses any process to
468 organize and process data for the experiments in the paper. It also includes interpretations of
469 the results of the study.

470 Answer: **[C]**

471 Explanation: AI was used extensively to process and analyze the experimental transcripts,
472 including assistance in coding dialogue segments for DQI dimensions and generating stance-
473 flow visualizations. The models also supported summarization of deliberative patterns across
474 conditions. Human researchers, however, reviewed these outputs, ensured coding validity,
475 and provided the theoretical interpretation linking the findings to deliberative democratic
476 norms. Thus, while AI performed the majority of the data processing, final interpretation
477 and validation remained under human supervision.

- 478 4. **Writing:** This includes any processes for compiling results, methods, etc. into the final
479 paper form. This can involve not only writing of the main text but also figure-making,
480 improving layout of the manuscript, and formulation of narrative.

481 Answer: **[D]**

482 Explanation: The majority of the manuscript text was generated by AI, including drafting
483 of the introduction, literature review, methods, results, and discussion sections, as well as
484 assistance with figure captions and formatting. Human researchers provided the research
485 outline, guided the narrative structure, and edited for accuracy, clarity, and coherence. Thus,
486 while the intellectual direction came from the researchers, over 95% of the actual text
487 production was carried out by AI.

- 488 5. **Observed AI Limitations:** What limitations have you found when using AI as a partner or
489 lead author?

490 Description: AI could not fully reproduce our initial experimental design, particularly the
491 condition requiring a high-moderation setting. The models were unable to perform the
492 nuanced facilitation and organizational functions of a human moderator, which led us to
493 drop this condition. Moreover, when used as deliberative participants, AI agents did not fully
494 capture the diversity, unpredictability, and contextual grounding of real human participants.

495 **Agents4Science Paper Checklist**

496 **1. Claims**

497 Question: Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the
498 paper's contributions and scope?

499 Answer: [Yes]

500 Justification: The abstract and introduction clearly outline the motivation for studying AI
501 deliberation, the experimental design (2×2 factorial structure \times certainty), and the evaluation
502 metrics (DQI and belief revision). The main findings reported in the results—such as
503 the complementary effects of structure and certainty and the limitations in constructive
504 politics—are consistent with these claims. The introduction also acknowledges the study as
505 an initial exploration with clear limitations, ensuring that the scope is not overstated.

506 **2. Limitations**

507 Question: Does the paper discuss the limitations of the work performed by the authors?

508 Answer: [Yes]

509 Justification: The paper explicitly discusses several limitations. These include the limited
510 ability of LLMs to generate constructive solutions, their inability to replicate the organi-
511 zational functions of human moderators, and the lack of realism when AI agents act as
512 deliberative participants. The study also acknowledges the scope constraints of the design,
513 noting that results are based on a single topic and a specific model configuration, which may
514 limit generalizability to real-world human deliberation. These limitations are discussed in
515 the discussion section to provide transparency and to inform directions for future work.

516 **3. Theory assumptions and proofs**

517 Question: For each theoretical result, does the paper provide the full set of assumptions and
518 a complete (and correct) proof?

519 Answer: [NA]

520 Justification: This paper does not present formal theoretical results or mathematical proofs.
521 Instead, the contribution is empirical, focusing on experimental design and evaluation of
522 AI-mediated deliberation. As such, the criteria regarding assumptions and proofs are not
523 applicable.

524 **4. Experimental result reproducibility**

525 Question: Does the paper fully disclose all the information needed to reproduce the main ex-
526 perimental results of the paper to the extent that it affects the main claims and/or conclusions
527 of the paper (regardless of whether the code and data are provided or not)?

528 Answer: [Yes]

529 Justification: The paper provides full details of the experimental setup, including the 2×2
530 factorial design (structure \times certainty), the role-conditioned personas, the use of GPT-4o-
531 mini via the OpenAI API, and parameter settings such as temperature and random seed. The
532 Autogen framework for multi-agent orchestration is explicitly described, and the evaluation
533 metrics (DQI scoring and stance-flow analysis) are fully documented. While GPT-4o-mini
534 is a closed-source model, access through the API ensures that other researchers can replicate
535 the experiments using the same prompts, configurations, and coding procedures disclosed in
536 the paper.

537 **5. Open access to data and code**

538 Question: Does the paper provide open access to the data and code, with sufficient instruc-
539 tions to faithfully reproduce the main experimental results, as described in supplemental
540 material?

541 Answer: [Yes]

542 Justification: The paper is accompanied by anonymized supplemental material that includes
543 both code and data necessary to reproduce the experiments. This material contains the full
544 implementation of the Autogen framework setup, persona prompts, model configuration
545 (e.g., GPT-4o-mini parameters), and stance-flow visualization scripts. In addition, the dataset
546 of anonymized transcripts is provided. Clear instructions and environment specifications

547 are included to ensure that other researchers can faithfully replicate the main results. At
548 submission time, anonymized links are used to preserve double-blind review.

549 **6. Experimental setting/details**

550 Question: Does the paper specify all the training and test details (e.g., data splits, hyper-
551 parameters, how they were chosen, type of optimizer, etc.) necessary to understand the
552 results?

553 Answer: [Yes]

554 Justification: The paper specifies the full experimental setup, including the 2×2 factorial de-
555 sign (structured vs. unstructured \times high vs. low certainty), the set of seven role-conditioned
556 personas, and the deliberation procedure (five debate rounds per condition). Model parame-
557 ters are detailed, including the use of GPT-4o-mini with temperature set to 0.7 and random
558 seed fixed at 42. The Autogen framework configuration for multi-agent orchestration is
559 also described. These details, together with the supplemental material, provide sufficient
560 information for readers to understand and replicate the reported results.

561 **7. Experiment statistical significance**

562 Question: Does the paper report error bars suitably and correctly defined or other appropriate
563 information about the statistical significance of the experiments?

564 Answer: [Yes]

565 Justification: The study does not rely on traditional statistical significance testing, as the
566 focus is on qualitative comparison of deliberative quality across a limited set of controlled
567 conditions. Instead, robustness is demonstrated by reporting DQI scores across all dimen-
568 sions and conditions, together with stance-flow visualizations that capture the full trajectory
569 of participants. These results are interpreted holistically rather than through p-values, but
570 they provide sufficient transparency and variability information for readers to assess the
571 reliability of the findings.

572 **8. Experiments compute resources**

573 Question: For each experiment, does the paper provide sufficient information on the com-
574 puter resources (type of compute workers, memory, time of execution) needed to reproduce
575 the experiments?

576 Answer: [Yes]

577 Justification: The paper specifies that all multi-agent dialogues were generated using GPT-4o-
578 mini through the OpenAI API, with execution managed locally via the Autogen framework.
579 Since the model runs on OpenAI's cloud infrastructure, no specialized local hardware
580 (GPU or large-memory servers) was required beyond a standard CPU environment to run
581 orchestration scripts. Each deliberation consisted of five rounds across seven persona agents,
582 taking approximately 2 minutes per condition. The total experimental workload across the
583 four conditions was under 1 hours of API calls. These details provide sufficient information
584 on compute requirements for reproducibility.

585 **9. Code of ethics**

586 Question: Does the research conducted in the paper conform, in every respect, with the
587 Agents4Science Code of Ethics (see conference website)?

588 Answer: [Yes]

589 Justification: The research fully conforms to the Agents4Science Code of Ethics. All
590 dialogue data were generated by AI agents and do not involve human subjects, private
591 information, or sensitive content. The study avoids harmful or deceptive applications and is
592 conducted solely for scholarly purposes. The paper also ensures transparency, reproducibility,
593 and discussion of limitations, aligning with ethical standards of responsible AI research.

594 **10. Broader impacts**

595 Question: Does the paper discuss both potential positive societal impacts and negative
596 societal impacts of the work performed?

597 Answer: [Yes]

598 Justification: The paper highlights both positive and negative societal implications. On
599 the positive side, AI-to-AI deliberation provides a low-cost, replicable sandbox for testing
600 democratic dialogue, potentially supporting more inclusive institutional design and advanc-
601 ing deliberative theory. On the negative side, the approach could be misused to create the
602 appearance of artificial consensus or to manipulate public opinion, and AI agents lack the
603 contextual grounding of real human participants, which could mislead research or policy
604 applications. To mitigate these risks, the paper emphasizes transparency in methods, open
605 access to code and data, and the importance of hybrid designs where human oversight
606 complements AI deliberation.