
Phase Transitions and Hub Vulnerability in Networked Truth Recovery under Misinformation

Anonymous Author(s)

Affiliation

Address

email

Abstract

1 This paper examines how networked agents recover ground truth when initial
2 knowledge is incomplete and contaminated by misinformation. We ask: (1) under
3 what conditions can networks reconstruct the correct knowledge base, (2) how
4 does centrality affect recovery across informational environments, and (3) what
5 structural vulnerabilities emerge when misinformation dominates? We develop
6 a multi-agent simulation where agents begin with a mix of true and false facts,
7 exchange information with neighbors, and update beliefs using a redundancy-based
8 scoring rule with contradiction resolution. The system aims to reconstruct the full
9 ground-truth knowledge base. Experiments on the ca-GrQc collaboration network
10 reveal abrupt bandwidth thresholds: below a critical share budget (the maximum
11 number of facts an agent can transmit per round), convergence never occurs;
12 above it, recovery typically completes within 1–3 rounds and yields complete
13 accuracy across agents that converge. Information quality defines three regimes.
14 In clean environments (truth $\geq 70\%$), centrality strongly predicts success. At
15 a boundary near 50% truth, centrality effects collapse ($\rho \approx 0.2$ or less). In
16 polluted environments (truth $\leq 40\%$), central nodes amplify errors, producing
17 a *hub vulnerability paradox*. These findings identify structural weaknesses in
18 information systems and show that resilience depends jointly on communication
19 capacity, network topology, and information quality.

20

1 Introduction

21 The challenge of forming accurate collective beliefs from distributed, partial, and often noisy infor-
22 mation is a fundamental problem in social systems. Individuals rarely possess a complete picture
23 of reality; instead, they receive fragments of information through their social connections, some of
24 which may be incorrect or deliberately misleading. This process is central to how societies establish
25 norms, make collective decisions, and construct a shared understanding of the world. With the growth
26 of online social networks, the scale and speed of this process have increased dramatically, making the
27 study of collective belief formation more urgent than ever. Classic theories of diffusion and social
28 learning describe how individuals aggregate information, but they often assume either reliable signals
29 or gradual, continuous adjustment—assumptions that break down in environments saturated with
30 misinformation.

31 To study these dynamics, we propose a minimal multi-agent model in which agents begin with a
32 mixture of true and false facts, exchange information with their neighbors, and update beliefs using
33 a redundancy-based heuristic with contradiction resolution. This heuristic is deliberately simple:
34 agents count repetitions of facts without assessing credibility, coherence, or source reliability. Such a
35 rule is intentionally conservative, since it makes recovery more difficult than under richer cognitive
36 strategies. Any successful recovery observed under this baseline therefore represents a lower bound
37 on what more sophisticated reasoning agents might achieve.

38 Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide an additional motivation. LLMs are
39 trained on web-scale corpora that contain both reliable information and misinformation, and their
40 tendency to confidently generate plausible falsehoods parallels how individual agents propagate errors
41 in social networks. As LLMs are increasingly deployed in multi-agent settings—interacting with one
42 another to solve problems or negotiate—they mirror the collective dynamics we study. To illustrate
43 this connection, we include small demonstration runs with LLaMA 3.0 agents, while the main results
44 rely on large-scale symbolic simulations.

45 This framework enables systematic study of how collective truth recovery depends on three key
46 factors: information quality, network topology, and communication bandwidth. We focus on three
47 questions: (1) under what conditions can networks reconstruct the correct knowledge base; (2) how
48 does centrality affect recovery across environments; and (3) what structural vulnerabilities emerge
49 when misinformation dominates?

50 **Contributions.** This paper makes three contributions: (1) We formalize a simulation model of
51 distributed truth recovery under misinformation, providing a transparent baseline where agents operate
52 with minimal cognitive assumptions. (2) Using symbolic experiments on the ca-GrQc collaboration
53 network, we show bandwidth-dependent thresholds and identify three regimes—clean, boundary,
54 and polluted—with distinct centrality–performance relationships. (3) We uncover and formalize the
55 *hub vulnerability paradox*: in misinformation-rich settings, centrality becomes harmful, as highly
56 connected agents amplify falsehood rather than truth, reversing classical diffusion expectations. This
57 finding reveals structural fragilities in both human networks and highlights the need to examine
58 similar risks in emerging multi-agent LLM systems.

59 2 Related Work

60 Traditional social science has often relied on surveys and controlled experiments to investigate
61 individual and collective behavior. While these methods yield authentic data, they are expensive,
62 hard to scale, and sometimes raise ethical concerns [15, 18, 2, 22]. The rise of large language models
63 (LLMs) offers a promising alternative, as they demonstrate capabilities in reasoning, planning, and
64 role-playing that allow them to simulate human responses with high fidelity [32, 19, 1, 6]. This
65 quality, sometimes referred to as algorithmic fidelity, makes LLM-based agents especially useful for
66 reproducing human behaviors in controlled settings.

67 Current research in LLM-based social simulation is commonly organized into three tiers. **Individual**
68 **simulation** focuses on replicating distinct people or demographic groups, modeling attributes such
69 as personality, social roles, or even well-known public figures [7, 31, 3]. **Scenario simulation**
70 brings together multiple agents within structured contexts to solve domain-specific problems—for
71 example, collaborative tasks in software engineering, healthcare, or legal decision-making [30, 11,
72 4, 12, 16, 26, 14]. These studies highlight the potential for agents with complementary skills to
73 achieve collective intelligence, mirroring cooperative dynamics in human groups. Finally, **society-**
74 **level simulation** examines emergent macro-level dynamics such as opinion formation, polarization,
75 and economic behavior, arising from interactions among large numbers of heterogeneous agents
76 [27, 17, 10, 9, 23, 21, 20, 8, 25, 24].

77 These three layers are interrelated: individual simulations provide the foundation for task-based
78 scenarios, which in turn scale into society-level models. Together, they form a continuum from
79 fine-grained modeling of single agents to the study of collective processes in large populations [13, 5].
80 Prior surveys have mostly concentrated on isolated aspects such as agent architectures or single-agent
81 role-playing [28, 29, 31, 13, 33]. What distinguishes recent work is its effort to unify research at all
82 three levels—individual, scenario, and societal—providing a more systematic framework for studying
83 how distributed agents, whether human or artificial, can overcome noisy or incomplete information to
84 converge on shared understandings.

85 3 Methodology

86 We developed a multi-agent simulation platform to study how networked agents reconstruct a shared
87 reality from distributed and noisy information. Our goal was to create a minimal yet interpretable
88 setting where the conditions for collective truth recovery could be isolated and systematically tested.

89 **3.1 Information Environment**

90 We define a finite set of N elementary propositions, $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_N\}$. The complete knowledge
 91 universe is

$$\mathcal{U} = \{p_i, \neg p_i \mid p_i \in \mathcal{P}\},$$

92 which has size $|\mathcal{U}| = 2N$. Each element $f \in \mathcal{U}$ is treated as a candidate fact. From this universe
 93 we construct a latent ground-truth knowledge base (KB), $\mathcal{KB} \subset \mathcal{U}$, by sampling exactly one fact for
 94 each proposition. Thus, $|\mathcal{KB}| = N$, and for every $p_i \in \mathcal{P}$, either p_i or $\neg p_i$ is in \mathcal{KB} . This ensures
 95 completeness and consistency: there is a definitive truth value for every proposition, but agents do
 96 not initially know which version is correct. The complement $\mathcal{U} \setminus \mathcal{KB}$ is the set of false facts.

97 In the main experiments we set $N = 20$, creating a universe of 40 possible facts. Larger N values
 98 require more rounds of exchange for agents to reconstruct the KB; with our 30-round horizon,
 99 recovery becomes infeasible in practice. Pilot tests with $N = 30$ and $N = 40$ confirmed qualitatively
 100 similar results, suggesting that the findings are not sensitive to the exact size of the knowledge base
 101 but are easier to study with $N = 20$.

102 **3.2 Agents and Network**

103 Agents are situated in a social network represented as an undirected graph $G = (V, E)$. Each node
 104 $a_i \in V$ is an agent, and edges represent communication links. The neighborhood of agent a_i is
 105 denoted $N(i)$. The network constrains who can communicate with whom, which in turn shapes the
 106 collective ability to recover the truth.

107 At initialization ($t = 0$), each agent a_i is assigned a knowledge set \mathcal{K}_i^0 composed of both true and
 108 false facts. Specifically, k_{true} facts are sampled with replacement from \mathcal{KB} , and k_{false} from $\mathcal{U} \setminus \mathcal{KB}$.
 109 Sampling with replacement means that an agent may hold duplicate items initially; duplicates are
 110 stored once but contribute to a higher starting score for that fact. This design guarantees that every
 111 agent begins with partial and noisy information, mimicking realistic conditions where individuals are
 112 exposed to both accurate and misleading claims. Agents know the parameters N , k_{true} , and k_{false} , but
 113 not the truth status of any fact.

114 **Symbolic vs. LLM instantiation.** The main experiments use symbolic agents that follow simple
 115 redundancy-based update rules. This makes it feasible to simulate thousands of nodes on the full ca-
 116 GrQc network, isolate structural effects, and obtain stable statistics across seeds. We also conducted
 117 smaller demonstration runs with LLaMA 3.0 agents. In these demos, each agent was instantiated
 118 as an LLM process, received neighbor facts as a prompt, and output an updated belief set in natural
 119 language. These runs were illustrative only; their purpose was to check whether the symbolic
 120 redundancy heuristic plausibly reflects behaviors observed in LLM interaction. The design of these
 121 demonstrations is described in the *Experimental Setup*, and their qualitative outcomes are discussed
 122 in the *Discussion*.

123 **Information exchange (selection policy).** At each step t , agent a_i forms scores $s_i^t(f)$ for $f \in \mathcal{K}_i^t$
 124 and transmits up to B facts with the highest scores. Ties are broken deterministically by lexicographic
 125 order on identifiers; robustness checks with random tie-breaking yielded qualitatively similar results.
 126 Let \mathcal{M}_i^t denote this transmitted set (*Top-B by score*). This rule reflects the intuition that agents prefer
 127 to share information they consider most reliable, subject to communication bandwidth limits.

128 **Belief updating.** Upon receiving messages, agent a_i updates its knowledge as

$$\mathcal{K}_i^{t+1} = \mathcal{K}_i^t \cup \bigcup_{j \in N(i)} \mathcal{M}_j^t,$$

129 and increments scores

$$s_i^{t+1}(f) = s_i^t(f) + \sum_{j \in N(i)} \mathbb{I}(f \in \mathcal{M}_j^t),$$

130 with $s_i^0(f) = 1$ for $f \in \mathcal{K}_i^0$ and 0 otherwise. For evaluation, we compute:

$$\text{Precision}_i^t = \frac{|\mathcal{K}_i^t \cap \mathcal{KB}|}{|\mathcal{K}_i^t|}, \quad \text{Recall}_i^t = \frac{|\mathcal{K}_i^t \cap \mathcal{KB}|}{N}.$$

131 Exact recovery is defined as recall = 1.

132 **Contradiction resolution.** If both p_i and $\neg p_i$ are present, the item with the higher score is retained
 133 and its negation removed. If the scores are equal, the agent retains neither (the *defer rule*) until a
 134 strict score advantage arises. This conservative policy avoids arbitrarily privileging one fact, though
 135 it may slow recovery.

136 **Termination.** The simulation ends when any agent reconstructs all N true facts (“first valid
 137 proposer” rule) or when a maximum of 30 rounds is reached. Although runs stop at the first
 138 proposer, we evaluate precision, recall, and exact recovery across all agents at termination. Reported
 139 performance distributions therefore reflect the state of the entire population, not only the first proposer.




Figure 1: Belief update cycle for an agent a_i . Each round: (1) select top- B facts by score, (2) transmit to neighbors, (3) receive neighbor messages, (4) update scores, (5) resolve contradictions, and (6) check for termination.

140 4 Experimental Setup

141 4.1 Network Dataset

142 We use the ca-GrQc collaboration graph from SNAP, with 4,158 nodes and 13,422 undirected edges.
 143 The graph has heterogeneous degree, clustering, and short paths typical of social systems. This size
 144 allows full-network simulations with stable statistics while keeping runtimes practical.

145 4.2 Initialization Regimes and Bandwidth

146 Each agent starts with a mix of true and false facts. We study five regimes,

$$(k_{\text{true}}, k_{\text{false}}) \in \{(7, 1), (5, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (3, 5)\},$$

147 which correspond to truth ratios of 87.5%, 71.4%, 57.1%, 50.0%, and 37.5%. These settings cover
 148 clean ($\geq 70\%$), transition (50–60%), and polluted ($\leq 40\%$) environments. Pilot runs with nearby
 149 values produced the same qualitative behavior, so we focus on these five for tractability.

150 Communication is limited by a share budget B (maximum facts transmitted per round). We test

$$B \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20\},$$

151 with low B stressing tight bandwidth, mid-range B targeting the threshold region, and high B probing
 152 whether extra capacity helps once past the threshold.

153 For each regime- B condition we run three independent seeds (42, 43, 44), yielding 93 runs and over
 154 150,000 agent-level records. A subset of regime- B pairs is omitted to concentrate compute on the
 155 threshold region and representative extremes; the selection is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Experimental design: five information regimes crossed with twelve bandwidth values. Checks mark evaluated cells. Each evaluated cell was run with three seeds (42, 43, 44). Not all pairs were run; we focus on values near thresholds and representative extremes.

Regime	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	12	14	20
(7,1) 87.5%	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	
(5,2) 71.4%	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
(4,3) 57.1%						✓	✓	✓				
(4,4) 50.0%						✓	✓	✓	✓			
(3,5) 37.5%					✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓

156 4.3 LLaMA Demonstrations

157 In addition to the symbolic simulations, we ran small-scale demonstrations with LLaMA 3.0 agents to
 158 check whether the symbolic redundancy heuristic plausibly reflects behaviors in real language models.
 159 These runs used 50–100 agents drawn from connected subgraphs of the ca-GrQc network and were
 160 simulated for up to 10 rounds. Each subgraph preserved local degree and clustering structure while
 161 keeping the size small enough for interactive LLaMA calls. At each round, the agent received its
 162 current knowledge set \mathcal{K}_i^t and the transmitted items from its neighbors as a text prompt. The prompt
 163 was formatted as a short instruction block, for example:

164 “You are Agent #17. Here are the assertions you currently believe: [list of \mathcal{K}_i^t]. Here
 165 are the assertions just received from your neighbors: [list of \mathcal{M}_j^t]. Update your
 166 belief set. Keep assertions that are repeated, drop those contradicted by stronger
 167 evidence, and output your top 5 most reliable assertions.”

168 The model’s response was parsed to extract the updated set \mathcal{K}_i^{t+1} and associated scores. To keep the
 169 demonstration close to the symbolic rules, the prompt included explicit instructions about repetition
 170 counting and contradiction resolution, and we limited output length to match the symbolic share
 171 budget B .

172 4.4 Outcome Measures and Criteria

173 Agent accuracy is the fraction of items in \mathcal{K}_i^t that match \mathcal{KB} at evaluation time. A run *converges* if at
 174 least one agent reconstructs all N true facts before the 30-round cap (first-valid-proposer rule). For
 175 each condition we report: convergence (yes/no), median and range of rounds-to-convergence across
 176 successful seeds, and the distribution of agent accuracies at termination. We also compute Spearman
 177 correlations (ρ) between agent performance and four centrality measures (degree, betweenness,
 178 closeness, eigenvector), with bootstrap 95% CIs (5,000 resamples within run, then pooled by regime).

179 5 Results

180 We report findings from 93 experimental runs (5 regimes \times tested bandwidths \times 3 seeds), producing
 181 over 150,000 agent-level performance records. Results are organized around three discoveries: (i)
 182 threshold effects in recovery, (ii) reversal of centrality effects, and (iii) convergence timing.

183 5.1 Phase Transitions in Truth Recovery

184 Truth recovery depended critically on communication bandwidth B and the quality of initial informa-
 185 tion. Figure 2 summarizes convergence outcomes. Clean regimes (87.5% and 71.4%) display sharp
 186 thresholds: configuration (7, 1) converges reliably once $B \geq 7$, and (5, 2) converges once $B \geq 6$.
 187 The boundary regime (4, 3) shows partial convergence at $B = 7$ and achieves full convergence by
 188 $B = 8$. In contrast, the 50% boundary (4, 4) and polluted (3, 5) regimes fail to converge even under
 189 very high bandwidths ($B = 14, 20$).

190 We define *convergence* as at least one agent reconstructing the full KB before the 30-round horizon. A
 191 regime– B condition is classified as *full convergence* if all three seeds converge, *partial convergence*
 192 if two of three converge, and *no convergence* if one or zero converge. This convention captures

193 sensitivity to random initialization rather than noise in the update rules. Once above the regime-
 194 specific threshold ($B \approx 6$ –8), additional bandwidth did not reduce convergence time or improve
 195 accuracy. The transitions are discontinuous: the system shifts from non-recovery to complete
 196 recovery without intermediate states, a phenomenon we describe as a *phase transition* in a qualitative
 197 sense (sharp tipping behavior) rather than in the strict statistical physics sense of estimating critical
 198 exponents.




Figure 2: **Convergence outcomes across bandwidth and information regimes.** X-axis: bandwidth B ; Y-axis: regime by truth ratio. Markers: red X = no convergence, orange square = partial convergence (2/3 seeds), green circle = full convergence (3/3 seeds). Clean regimes converge once B reaches 6–7; the boundary (4, 3) regime requires $B \approx 8$; the 50% boundary (4, 4) and polluted (3, 5) regimes do not converge even at high B .

199 5.2 Hub Vulnerability Paradox

200 The predictive value of centrality depended strongly on information quality (Figure 3). In clean
 201 regimes ($\geq 70\%$ truth), degree centrality strongly predicted success (ρ up to 0.9, Cohen’s $d > 2$),
 202 and betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector were also positively associated. In the boundary regime
 203 (4, 3) at 57.1% truth, effects were weaker but remained positive ($\rho \approx 0.4$ –0.5).

204 At the 50% boundary (4, 4), correlations collapsed ($\rho \approx 0.2$ or less for all four measures), indicating
 205 that structural position no longer provided systematic advantage. In polluted regimes ($\leq 40\%$ truth),
 206 the direction reversed: degree centrality became negatively associated with success ($\rho \approx -0.5$),
 207 closeness and eigenvector dropped to about -0.6 , and betweenness showed weaker but still negative
 208 values ($\rho \approx -0.3$).

209 This inversion defines the *hub vulnerability paradox*: the same structural advantage that accelerated
 210 recovery in clean environments amplified misinformation in polluted ones. Bootstrap 95% CIs for
 211 ρ (5,000 resamples within run, pooled by regime) confirmed that the sign reversal was robust. For
 212 example, in the polluted (3, 5) regime, the 95% CI for degree centrality was $[-0.55, -0.44]$.

213 5.3 Convergence Timing

214 When convergence occurred, it happened within a few rounds. Across successful runs, the median
 215 convergence time was one round and no run required more than four. Using an alternative definition of
 216 convergence ($\geq 90\%$ of agents reconstructing the KB), the window remained 1–3 rounds, confirming
 217 that the speed is not an artifact of the first-valid-proposer rule.

218 Runs that failed to converge stalled quickly: in 36 of 50 non-convergent cases (72%), agents stopped
 219 acquiring new facts well before the 30-round cap. Supplementary experiments with very low
 220 bandwidth ($B = 1, 2$) and very high bandwidth ($B = 14, 20$) reinforced this pattern: low- B never




Figure 3: **Hub vulnerability paradox: centrality correlations reverse with information quality.** Spearman correlations (ρ) between centrality measures and agent performance across information regimes. All correlations $p < 0.001$ by permutation test; bootstrap 95% CIs confirm sign robustness.

221 converged due to insufficient transmission, while high- B still failed in boundary and polluted regimes,
222 showing that extra capacity cannot offset poor information quality.

223 6 Discussion

224 Our experiments revealed three consistent findings. First, collective recovery depends on bandwidth
225 thresholds: once B crosses a regime-specific critical value, networks converge almost immediately,
226 whereas below it recovery never occurs. Second, information quality determines the role of centrality.
227 In clean environments, hubs act as accelerators of recovery, but in polluted environments they amplify
228 falsehood, producing a *hub vulnerability paradox*. At the 50% boundary, structural effects collapse
229 and networks fail to converge. Third, convergence is discontinuous: when recovery occurs, it does
230 so within a few rounds; otherwise the system stalls. These results show that belief change under
231 misinformation is not gradual but threshold-driven, resembling phase transitions in a qualitative sense
232 rather than formal critical phenomena.

233 These findings highlight structural weaknesses in information systems. A well-connected hub is not
234 always beneficial; its value depends entirely on the reliability of the information it transmits. When
235 inputs are clean, hubs accelerate diffusion; when inputs are noisy, they spread error more efficiently
236 than peripheral nodes. The collapse near the 50% boundary demonstrates how small shifts in the
237 signal-to-noise ratio can trigger large systemic differences in whether truth is recovered or lost. This
238 tipping-point behavior extends ideas from network diffusion and social learning, emphasizing that
239 resilience is conditional, not structural.

240 As noted in Methods, we also ran small illustrative demonstrations with LLaMA 3.0 agents to link the
241 symbolic results to emerging AI multi-agent systems. In these runs (50–100 agents on subnetworks,
242 up to 10 rounds), each LLaMA process represented a node: it received its current assertions and
243 neighbor messages as input, generated an updated belief set in natural language, and returned a
244 shortlist of top-scored items. The agents typically repeated and reinforced neighbor information
245 rather than applying consistency checks, and sometimes deferred on contradictions, qualitatively
246 mirroring the redundancy heuristic. These demonstrations serve as plausibility checks showing that

247 symbolic redundancy captures behaviors observable in LLM interaction. They were illustrative only,
248 not statistical evaluations, but they motivate systematic tests of whether the hub vulnerability paradox
249 extends to large-scale multi-agent LLM collectives.

250 Several limitations qualify these findings. Agents updated beliefs only through redundancy, without
251 credibility weighting or inference, which makes recovery harder and thus results a conservative lower
252 bound. Assertions were treated as independent, networks were static, and communication followed a
253 uniform broadcast protocol. Robustness checks—longer horizons, random tie-breaking, and stricter
254 convergence definitions—produced qualitatively similar outcomes, indicating that thresholds and the
255 paradox are not artifacts of design choices. Future work should extend the model to richer heuristics,
256 dynamic or adaptive networks, and structured knowledge bases, and evaluate the phenomena across
257 multiple synthetic and empirical networks. At the AI side, larger controlled experiments with LLM
258 collectives would clarify whether the same vulnerabilities emerge when models interact at scale.

259 7 Conclusion

260 This study examined how networks recover ground truth when initial knowledge is incomplete and
261 contaminated by misinformation. Using symbolic simulations on a large collaboration network, we
262 showed that recovery depends jointly on information quality, communication bandwidth, and network
263 structure. Systems either converge quickly to the correct knowledge base or fail entirely, indicating
264 that truth recovery is a threshold process rather than a gradual diffusion.

265 Within this framework, we identified three informational regimes. In clean environments, hubs acceler-
266 ate recovery; at the 50% boundary, structural advantages collapse; and in polluted environments,
267 hubs amplify falsehood, producing a *hub vulnerability paradox*. This paradox highlights how the
268 same connectivity that supports efficient truth recovery can create fragility when misinformation
269 dominates.

270 These results connect to concepts of percolation and tipping points in network science, showing that
271 resilience depends on both topology and the quality of transmitted information. For social networks,
272 interventions such as decentralization or hub bandwidth limits may reduce vulnerability. For multi-
273 agent LLM systems, our small demonstrations suggest similar risks, but systematic evaluation is a
274 task for future work. More broadly, robustness arises not from structure alone but from the joint
275 alignment of topology, communication capacity, and information quality.

276 References

- 277 [1] L. P. Argyle et al. Out of one, many: Using language models to simulate human samples. *arXiv*
278 *preprint*, 2023.
- 279 [2] Solomon E. Asch. Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments.
280 In *Groups, Leadership and Men: Research in Human Relations*, page 177. 1951.
- 281 [3] Authors. Rolellm: Role-based language model simulation. 2023.
- 282 [4] Authors. Simucourt: Simulating legal cases with large language model agents. In *Proceedings*
283 of [*Conference*], 2023. Available at <https://github.com/Zhitao-He/SimuCourt>.
- 284 [5] Shuaichen Chang et al. A survey on agent architectures for large language models. *arXiv*
285 *preprint*, 2024.
- 286 [6] V. Chaudhary and A. Chaudhary. Algorithmic fidelity in llm agents. *arXiv preprint*, 2023.
- 287 [7] Nuo Chen, Yan Wang, Haiyun Jiang, Deng Cai, Yuhang Li, Ziyang Chen, Longyue Wang, and
288 Jia Li. Large language models meet harry potter: A bilingual dataset for aligning dialogue
289 agents with characters. 2023.
- 290 [8] Chuang et al. Society simulation for testing social science theories. In *Proceedings of [Confer-*
291 *ence]*, 2023.
- 292 [9] Yun-Shiuan Chuang, Agam Goyal, Nikunj Harlalka, Siddharth Suresh, Robert Hawkins, Sijia
293 Yang, Dhavan Shah, Junjie Hu, and Timothy T. Rogers. Simulating opinion dynamics with
294 networks of llm-based agents. *arXiv preprint*, 2023.

- 295 [10] Yun-Shiuan Chuang and Timothy T. Rogers. Computational agent-based models in opinion
296 dynamics: A survey on social simulations and empirical studies. *arXiv preprint*, 2023.
- 297 [11] MetaGPT contributors. Chatdev: Multi-agent collaborative software development with large
298 language models. In *Proceedings of [Conference]*, 2023.
- 299 [12] Zhihao Fan, Jialong Tang, Wei Chen, Siyuan Wang, Zhongyu Wei, Jun Xi, Fei Huang, and
300 Jingren Zhou. Ai hospital: Interactive evaluation and collaboration of llms as intern doctors for
301 clinical diagnosis. *arXiv preprint*, 2024.
- 302 [13] Yihan Gao et al. Large language model based multi-agent systems: A survey. *arXiv preprint*,
303 2024.
- 304 [14] Zhaolin Gao, Kianté Brantley, and Thorsten Joachims. Reviewer2: Optimizing review genera-
305 tion through prompt generation. *arXiv preprint*, 2024.
- 306 [15] Mark S. Granovetter. The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6):1360–
307 1380, 1973.
- 308 [16] Zhitao He, Pengfei Cao, Chenhao Wang, Zhuoran Jin, Yubo Chen, Jie Xin Xu, Huaijun Li,
309 Xiaojian Jiang, Kang Liu, and Jun Zhao. Simucourt: Building judicial decision-making agents
310 with real-world judgement documents. *arXiv preprint*, 2024.
- 311 [17] Rainer Hegselmann and Ulrich Krause. Opinion dynamics driven by various ways of averaging.
312 *Computational Economics*, 25:381–405, 2005.
- 313 [18] Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn. *The social psychology of organizations*. Routledge, 2015.
- 314 [19] Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, and Yusuke Iwasawa.
315 Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing
316 Systems*, volume 35, pages 22199–22213, 2022.
- 317 [20] Li et al. Econagent: Simulated economic agents for macroeconomic phenomena. *arXiv preprint*,
318 2023.
- 319 [21] Yuhan Liu, Xiuying Chen, Xiaoqing Zhang, Xing Gao, Ji Zhang, and Rui Yan. From skepticism
320 to acceptance: Simulating the attitude dynamics toward fake news. *arXiv preprint*, 2024.
- 321 [22] Stanley Milgram. Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*,
322 67(4):371, 1963.
- 323 [23] Xinyi Mou, Zhongyu Wei, and Xuanjing Huang. Unveiling the truth and facilitating change:
324 Towards agent-based large-scale social movement simulation. *arXiv preprint*, 2024.
- 325 [24] Authors of OASIS paper. Oasis: Large-scale online agent society simulation. *arXiv preprint*,
326 2023.
- 327 [25] Joon Sung Park, Carrie Cai, Joseph C. O’Brien, Meredith Ringel Morris, Percy Liang, and
328 Michael S. Bernstein. Generative agents: Interactive simulacra of human behavior. In *Pro-
329 ceedings of the ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology*, pages 1–18,
330 2023.
- 331 [26] Chau Pham, Boyi Liu, Yingxiang Yang, Zhengyu Chen, Tianyi Liu, Jianbo Yuan, Bryan A.
332 Plummer, Zhaoran Wang, and Hongxia Yang. Let models speak ciphers: Multiagent debate
333 through embeddings. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2024.
- 334 [27] Thomas C. Schelling. Dynamic models of segregation. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*,
335 1(2):143–186, 1971.
- 336 [28] Timo Schick, Jane Dwivedi-Yu, Roberto Dessì, Roberta Raileanu, Maria Lomeli, Eric Hambro,
337 Luke Zettlemoyer, Nicola Cancedda, and Thomas Scialom. Toolformer: Language models
338 can teach themselves to use tools. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*,
339 volume 36, 2024.

- 340 [29] Noah Shinn, Federico Cassano, Ashwin Gopinath, Karthik Narasimhan, and Shunyu Yao. Re-
341 flexion: Language agents with verbal reinforcement learning. In *Advances in Neural Information*
342 *Processing Systems*, volume 36, 2024.
- 343 [30] Xiangru Tang, Anni Zou, Zhuosheng Zhang, Yilun Zhao, Xingyao Zhang, Arman Cohan, and
344 Mark Gerstein. Medagents: Large language models as collaborators for zero-shot medical
345 reasoning. *arXiv preprint*, 2023.
- 346 [31] Xintao Wang, Yunze Xiao, Jen tse Huang, Siyu Yuan, Rui Xu, Haoran Guo, Quan Tu, Yaying Fei,
347 Ziang Leng, Wei Wang, Jiangjie Chen, Cheng Li, and Yanghua Xiao. Incharacter: Evaluating
348 personality fidelity in role-playing agents through psychological interviews. 2024.
- 349 [32] Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Fei Xia, Ed Chi, Quoc V. Le,
350 and Denny Zhou. Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models. In
351 *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 35, pages 24824–24837, 2022.
- 352 [33] Jiaxin Xu et al. Towards autonomous agents with llms: A survey of single-agent and multi-agent
353 systems. *arXiv preprint*, 2023.

354 **Responsible AI Statement**

355 This research was produced with substantial involvement of AI systems. The AI was responsible
356 for producing most of the simulation code, analyzing outputs, and drafting large portions of the
357 manuscript. Human authors verified correctness of the code and results, and edited the text for
358 precision and consistency.

359 The use of AI accelerated experimentation and writing, making it possible to explore multiple design
360 choices and present results more efficiently. At the same time, AI systems occasionally introduced
361 details that were not implemented in code or overstated the strength of certain findings, requiring
362 human correction.

363 **Reproducibility Statement**

364 We have taken steps to ensure reproducibility of our results. The dataset (ca-GrQc collaboration
365 network) is publicly available from the SNAP repository. Simulation parameters, including the
366 number of propositions, truth/false fact initialization ratios, bandwidth values, and random seeds,
367 are fully described in the paper. Each regime–bandwidth configuration was replicated three times,
368 yielding 93 runs and over 150,000 agent-level records. All update rules and contradiction resolution
369 rules are specified mathematically.

370 While anonymized code cannot be released at submission time, we will provide complete simulation
371 scripts and configuration files upon acceptance.

372 **Agents4Science AI Involvement Checklist**

- 373 1. **Hypothesis development**
374 Answer: **[B]**
375 Explanation: AI was used to suggest possible framings and directions, but the authors
376 generated the central research question and finalized the research hypotheses. AI input was
377 supportive rather than leading.
- 378 2. **Experimental design and implementation**
379 Answer: **[D]**
380 Explanation: The simulation code, parameter settings, and most of the implementation were
381 produced by AI systems. Human involvement was limited to debugging, validation, and
382 ensuring alignment with the research objectives.
- 383 3. **Analysis of data and interpretation of results**
384 Answer: **[C]**
385 Explanation: AI produced the bulk of descriptive summaries, preliminary interpretations,

386 and draft correlations. The authors verified the outputs, corrected inaccuracies, and provided
387 the final interpretations.

388 **4. Writing**

389 Answer: [C]

390 Explanation: AI generated the majority of text across sections. The authors revised drafts
391 for accuracy, removed redundancy, and ensured the writing was precise and consistent with
392 the results.

393 **5. Observed AI Limitations**

394 Description: While AI assistance accelerated drafting and prototyping, it also introduced
395 recurring limitations. Generated text was often verbose, repetitive, or imprecise, and re-
396 quired substantial human editing to maintain clarity and academic tone. Code suggestions
397 sometimes ignored model assumptions. In several instances, the AI produced fabricated
398 datapoints or misleading visualizations when prompted to generate analysis or figures. The
399 AI also tended to overstate the robustness of results without verifying statistical validity.
400 These issues made continuous human oversight essential to ensure methodological sound-
401 ness, validate outputs against raw data, and refine the interpretation of findings. Human
402 authors were responsible for checking code execution, re-running experiments, verifying
403 figures, and editing the narrative.

404 **Agents4Science Paper Checklist**

405 **1. Claims**

406 Answer: [Yes]

407 Justification: The abstract and Introduction state three main contributions (simulation model,
408 phase transitions, hub vulnerability paradox), which are directly supported by Methods,
409 Results, and Discussion.

410 **2. Limitations**

411 Answer: [Yes]

412 Justification: The Discussion explicitly addresses assumptions (redundancy heuristic, inde-
413 pendent facts, static network) and highlights future extensions.

414 **3. Theory assumptions and proofs**

415 Answer: [NA]

416 Justification: The paper does not present formal theorems or proofs; it is simulation-based.

417 **4. Experimental result reproducibility**

418 Answer: [Yes]

419 Justification: Dataset (ca-GrQc), parameter regimes, seeds, evaluation metrics, and statistical
420 methods are all specified in the Experimental Setup section, enabling replication.

421 **5. Open access to data and code**

422 Answer: [No]

423 Justification: The ca-GrQc dataset is public, but simulation code is not yet released. Authors
424 plan to release scripts after acceptance.

425 **6. Experimental setting/details**

426 Answer: [Yes]

427 Justification: Training/test details are not relevant here, but all experimental parameters,
428 regimes, and replication details are described in §Experimental Setup.

429 **7. Experiment statistical significance**

430 Answer: [Yes]

431 Justification: Results include confidence intervals, Spearman correlations, *p*-values, and
432 effect sizes (Cohen's *d*).

433 **8. Experiments compute resources**

434 Answer: [Yes]

435 Justification: Experiments were computationally light (network simulations). Runtime and
436 replication details are described; hardware requirements are minimal.

437 **9. Code of ethics**

438 Answer: [Yes]

439 Justification: The research uses publicly available network data and synthetic simulations.
440 No human subjects or sensitive data are involved.

441 **10. Broader impacts**

442 Answer: [Yes]

443 Justification: The Discussion notes societal implications: hubs can be harmful in misinfor-
444 mation environments, suggesting resilience strategies. This has both positive applications
445 (robust system design) and potential risks (understanding vulnerabilities).