Chapter 8

Judging Peacebuilding: Attending to Values in Evaluation

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Evaluation challenges conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners to *determine the value* of their work and, in the process, identify *what is valued*. The two different dimensions of evaluation are at times conflated, and attention to the former often obscures attention to the latter. When phrased as "determine the value of this work," the emphasis is on the mechanisms of appraisal and the final determination. Akin to a home appraisal, the value—financial and otherwise—of the investment is determined based on a set of pre-established criteria. When phrased as "what is valued," the focus shifts to the criteria used for the assessment (i.e., criteria that are going to be used to judge worth and value). Extending the home appraisal metaphor, it means discussing what makes a home valuable, such as its location, energy efficiency, the quality of life and relationships of those living within it, its functionality as a shelter, and its aesthetic appeal.

Here we articulate the value foundation upon which we make our judgments of what will constitute "good," such as sustainability, basic needs, quality of life, or cash resale value. This gets us into a different type of discussion, which involves ethical deliberation around what constitutes good.

The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to and explore ways in which the question of *what is valued* is understood prior to and as part of determining the value of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in evaluation. This critical and underexplored terrain dramatically alters an evaluation's focus and the affirmed meaning and worth of the work. The analysis of *what is valued* involves excavating and weighing ways of thinking about what constitutes good. Moral philosophy particularly helps in understanding on what basis we judge what is good and right. After examining the relationship between valuation and evaluation, the chapter explores what is commonly judged as "good" in pre-established peacebuilding evaluation criteria. An exploration of alternate ways of thinking about what is good and right in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, resourced by moral theories, follows. The chapter argues that it is important to discuss and weigh values, and that without this step as part of (ethical) deliberation, evaluations tend to reinforce problematic power dynamics between funders and communities in which peacebuilding occurs.

VALUATION AND EVALUATION

One of the unique things about evaluation is that it involves making formal judgments of worth, value, or merit. Deborah Fournier's definition of evaluation in the *Encyclopedia of Evaluation* recognizes that "it is the value feature that distinguishes evaluation from other types of inquiry, such as basic science research" (2005, 140–141). We ask questions about consequences, such as the intended and unintended effects, or questions about the merit of the approach and whether we did the right things. For the

purposes of evaluation, a choice must be made about what will constitute worth and merit. This makes evaluation an exercise in ethical thinking and moral judgment as well (Neufeldt 2016b).

Thinking about morals and ethics is common for conflict resolution and peace practitioners. Many people enter this field because of its values: they want to contribute to reduce violence and the negative effects of conflict, as well as help build a just peace. A popular textbook, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, begins by stating common assumptions in the field that foreground its value base. It reads thus: "War is one of humanity's most pressing problems; peace is almost always preferable to war and, moreover, can and must include not only the absence of war but also the establishment of positive, life-enhancing values and social structures" (Barash and Webel 2009, 4). Here we see the value of the work articulated in its ambitious aims and good intentions. Questions of accountability and consequence, which are front and center as we think about the value of the work in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, are also morally informed questions. Here, good refers to effecting positive change and attending to negative consequences. For example, the collaborative Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project aimed to understand why all the good peace work was not adding up to greater results (Anderson and Olson 2003).

Intriguingly, deliberating on values as part of the evaluation process, at times noted as important, receives limited attention in resources to aid evaluators and those being evaluated (evaluands). For example, the African Evaluation Association's (AfrEA) *African Evaluation Guidelines—Standards and Norms* document notes the importance of values identification in a subpoint under the discussion of the principle of utility (African Evaluation Association 2006/7, 5); yet there are no clear guides to assist. Likewise, seasoned researcher and evaluator Michael Quinn Patton notes in his popular tome *Utilization-Focused Evaluation* that judgments about whether the data and findings are good or bad varies "depending on the values brought to bear" (Patton 2008, 500), thus identifying its significance in drawing out the meaning of evaluation findings. However, this section spans a mere two pages, and does not appear formally as part of

the "Evaluation Focus Options" chapter, which, in comparison, is thirty-four pages in length. Peacebuilding evaluation resources are similarly framed and delimited (e.g., Church and Rogers 2006; OECD 2012).

In 1989, Thomas Schwandt explored the loss of moral discourse in evaluation in an article titled "Recapturing Moral Discourse in Evaluation." He provides a history of evaluation and the dominant social and political philosophical commitments that underpin it, which converge in an "unholy alliance of separatists, managerial and positivist ideologies" (Schwandt drawing on Scriven 1989, 11). Schwandt identifies the belief foundation for contemporary practices of evaluation that justify evaluation in terms of its contribution to efficiency, control, and utility. He then explores the consequences, noting that evaluations become almost exclusively understood and valued instrumentally. Evaluations turn into a commodity that is focused on demonstrating the utility of the practice of evaluation and the utility of information, with the moral questions effaced. Schwandt concludes his analysis by emphasizing the importance of engaging one another in meaningful dialogue on moral images, the nature of humanity, and the relationships between people and society, as a necessary part of understanding what it means to live well and to include that within the judgments made within an evaluation to recapture moral discourse (1989, 16). Schwandt's work is insightful, and his emphasis on re-engaging moral values as *part* of evaluation is significant for conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners, evaluators, and scholars to heed.

A related consideration of values exists with respect to *who* is part of the discussion, and helps determine what is valued as good. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives funded by an external donor involve at least three broad sets of stakeholders that are all interested in the question of what constitutes good and right peacebuilding: (1) the community and persons involved in and/or affected by the conflict; (2) implementing organization(s) and/or interveners, who might be local or international; and (3) the funder (Fast, Neufeldt, and Schirch 2002). Who among this set should determine what is valued as good and right in an evaluation? Evaluators tend to be in a direct contractual relationship with the

implementing organization and sometimes the donor organization; evaluators are connected to communities involved in or affected by the conflict only after signing the contract—there are some exceptions, such as if it is a participatory evaluation[2] or the evaluator happens to come from the community. This general pattern means the contracting process places the power of decision-making about what is valued with the implementing organization and donor.

For example, if USAID funded a program that an international nongovernmental organization (INGO) implemented in Colombia, the INGO writes the scope of work for the evaluation drawing on USAID's expectations and criteria. The INGO contracts the evaluator and then the evaluator visits the communities in Colombia to conduct the evaluation. Here, those with financial and technical expert power make the decisions about what is valued. Some will argue this is fair, given who is investing—the United States should assess what its funding is being used for. Others will argue that the most important group to be attended to are the most vulnerable, which in this case is likely the members in the community—the people who are supposedly being helped by the program. Yet others might argue the organization doing the work, or the practitioners, should identify the values as they are the ones who have designed a particular intervention and worked toward change.

What is missing in the aforementioned process is what Schwandt referred to as moral dialogue. This involves a discussion of the process and dynamics of decision-making, considering vulnerability and moderating the attendant financial and expert power an evaluator and funder may hold. It means having a dialogue before entering into an evaluation process about what is important and valued—a dialogue that precedes determining the type of evaluation to be done.

Inattention to the values underpinning the valuation in an evaluation, and whose values these are, can feed into problematic politics and practice when evaluations themselves contribute to divisions in conflict contexts. This notably occurs when only some stakeholder values are included as worthy to judge an intervention and other values are ignored and

marginalized in the process (Neufeldt 2016b, 2). Using the earlier example, if only USAID and INGO values are deemed important in judging the worth and value of an intervention, it can play into the already-existing divisions where outsiders are seen as determining what is important for Colombians. This can feed the conflict. The alternative is to identify the values and deliberate which will be used to guide an evaluation.

Where the evaluation literature struggles to resource discussions of what constitutes good beyond utility, moral philosophy fills the gap. Philosophy offers a rich set of resources and extensive analysis that can help us think more deeply about what will be used to judge good and right in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Moral theories are theories about the nature of what is right and good, as well as the method for making correct moral decisions (Timmons 2010). Western moral theories prominently include consequentialism, deontology, or duty-based ethics and relational ethics. The next section begins by exploring the current values embedded in widely used criteria for evaluating peacebuilding work, and then expands the analysis by drawing on additional moral theory perspectives to help broaden the dialogue of valuation.

DETERMINING WHAT IS VALUED

A wide set of moral values inform conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions. Evaluation guidance, in contrast, tends to be dominated by one moral theory perspective, consequentialism. I, therefore, explore this perspective first, followed by identifying ways that duty-based ethics, relational ethics, and virtue ethics at times do, or could better, inform the discussion of what is valued in evaluation. I should note here that moral theories are complex and I am using them somewhat simply here to draw attention to key assumptions about what is good, which often pass undetected in evaluation literature, in an effort to help resource the conversation about values in evaluation. It is also worth noting that where

moral theorists often argue for one overarching theory of the good, the approach here embraces multiple moral values as important.

Valuing Good Consequences

In line with Schwandt's analysis, evaluation resources for peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives tend to focus on maximizing the ends, often understood in terms of efficiency and utility. In a foundational peacebuilding evaluation manual, Church and Rogers note that criteria to use for evaluating peacebuilding projects may range from "the traditional such as identifying results, to the less traditional, such as determining if the activities of a project are in alignment with the organizational vision" (2006, 100). While they note that it is worthwhile spending time identifying the criteria for the evaluation, they narrow the discussion by presenting a utility-focused purpose, to determine "what information the project management needs to inform decisions, improve future performance, and understand more deeply how and why the project is effecting change" (Church and Rogers 2006, 100). This echoes the utilization focus of Patton, which Schwandt challenged. Church and Rogers then review criteria from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) as well as the RPP project as possible criteria to use in evaluations.

The widely used criteria for evaluating peacebuilding promulgated by OECD-DAC (2008, 2012) focus on consequences. After putting forward an initial set of criteria and guidance for feedback in 2007–2008, a revised version in 2012 was published for use by governmental and intergovernmental bodies in assessing peacebuilding, titled "Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results." The final set of five criteria identified to judge good peacebuilding in the report, which is largely similar to the criteria used for judging development interventions, are first its *relevance* to factors driving the conflict. Second, its *effectiveness* vis-à-vis intended objectives and the degree to which results were achieved. Third, its *impact*, which includes

intended and unintended positive or negative effects. Fourth, its *sustainability*, which refers to the continuation of benefits when funding stops (e.g., community ownership of peace work or continued community resilience). Fifth, the *efficiency* of resources used to produce effects (OECD 2012, 65–71). Two additional suggested OECD-DAC criteria are coherence and coordination among interveners or funders. Intriguingly, a criterion that appeared in the 2008 draft that focused on "consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values," which would have deliberately included a discussion of values in the formal evaluation valuation process, was not included in the final 2012 publication.

Based cumulatively on the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency, we see that peacebuilding programs or projects are good *if and only if* they achieve the greatest good for the most number of people or produce at least as great a good as any other course of action would produce. My framing here parallels the consequentialist framing of good articulated by Jeremy Bentham, and his student John Stuart Mill, in England over the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Consequentialists evaluate morality in terms of the progress made toward an end goal state (for concise summaries, see, for example, Fitzpatrick 2008; Timmons 2010). The concept of utility referred to the net value of the consequences of an action. Moral assessment involves comparing alternative scenarios in order to determine the action with the highest utility or positive consequences. Each of the five OECD-DAC criteria refers to slightly different aspects of consequences for judgment. Here the cost-benefit, comparative calculation focuses on ends, not on the means to the end or the nature of the character or relationships between those who pursue the end. The best peacebuilding action is therefore the one that achieves the best end—or at least as good as another action would probably achieve.

Consequentialist assessments are also present in earlier guidance for evaluating peacebuilding. For example, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment asks users very direct, consequentialist questions such as "How might this initiative create conflict or build peace directly or indirectly—and what changes might be made to optimize positive impacts and

minimize negative impacts?" (Bush 2009, 16). The RPP collaborative learning project centrally focused on effectiveness. The RPP included developing criteria for effectiveness at the program level as well as the "peace writ large" level, avoiding negative impacts and improving effectiveness over time (Anderson and Olson 2003). Their argument for focusing on effectiveness rested on a critique that peacebuilders paid insufficient attention to effectiveness, and on the moral charge noted earlier, that all of the good peacebuilding work *ought* to be achieving more than it was (a duty-based claim that reinforced the importance of consequences). Likewise, other resources aim to focus potential peacebuilding evaluators primarily on impacts and relevant effects understood in terms of positive and negative consequences (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2006; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).

Often unrecognized are the assumptions about the world that are necessary for many versions of consequentialist judgments. The assumptions include an emphasis on a detached, rational analysis, which suggests one's reason from nowhere in particular—that is, one is a rational analyst whose context, family, culture, and norms do not affect his or her thinking. As critics have noted, such persons do not exist; humans are necessarily attached, at times irrational and emotional and deeply influenced by our cultural and normative contexts, which help to make us human (Thomas 2016; Hutchings 2010). A second assumption in consequentialism, particularly its utilitarian strain, relates to the unit of analysis; an individual's level of happiness (which Bentham calculated with his "felicific calculus") is factored together to determine the moral good. Consequences are determined in terms of aggregates of individuals, as opposed to a sense that a community whole might have something else to contribute in this assessment. Finally, the focus on ends allows for harms and negative effects as long as the outcome is at least as good as another outcome.

A question to consider is how and in what ways these assumptions affect judgments of what is good in evaluation. The base assumptions of consequentialism at times fit the contexts of peacebuilding and conflict

resolution initiatives, and at other times do not. For example, focusing on developing peer mediation in urban schools in Toronto, and assessing these programs based on individual participant ratings of satisfaction of peer mediation over several years fits within an individually focused system of education. However, using this same individually focused metric is problematic in an old Order Mennonite or Amish community in which the collective good is understood to be more important than an individual's perception of satisfaction. In both settings, values are shaped by the community and worldview. Using ends informed by a consequentialist perspective alone can lead to a mismatch in what is valued as good and is only capturing a small portion of what might be evaluated as good from an intervention. Rather than understanding consequences as universal and rational, it is reflective of the particular context from which it originate. The dominance of consequences appears particularly in Western donor criteria, such as the OECD-DAC criteria noted earlier.

There are several other ways of thinking about the good and right in moral philosophy, which are helpful to broaden moral dialogue about values in evaluation. At times, these other perspectives are in direct opposition to, or in tension with, the ends-based thinking of consequentialism. In Western moral philosophy, one of the strong, competing moral theories to consequentialism is deontology or duty-based ethics, which shifts focus from ends to following principles of what constitutes right action, determined in advance, to which I now turn.

Valuing Right Action

Good can rest on our action or means. Duty-based ethics focuses on identifying principles through reason, which guide action, with some acts being morally required and others allowed but not mandatory, and yet others forbidden (Odell 2004; Blackburn 2005; Rachels 1999). The eighteenth-century foundational German philosopher Immanuel Kant identified two types of duties: hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives were practical things that one could

choose in order to reach a prudent end (Kant 2002, 51); for example, skill development in mediation is helpful to reach the desired end of being a mediator. Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, were mandatory—required of everyone and everywhere, for example, the categorical imperative to always treat people as an end and never as a means to an end. For Kant, the only good was good will itself, which came prior to action and did not depend on outcomes and ends. Contemporary duty-based approaches to ethics maintain Kant's emphasis on reason, although more contextually rooted and recognizing that constraints affect actions (McNaughton and Rawling 2006). We can think about what we *ought* to do, and do it to the best of our abilities and circumstances.

Duties can be codified in rules or framed in terms of rights and responsibilities. The duty-based injunctions such as to do no harm, or the duty to consult and use a participatory methodology reflects the valuing of these duties identified prior to action. In peacebuilding and conflict resolution work, duties may be formulated as principles to guide actions generally. International Alert developed a code of conduct to guide conflict transformation work and identifies organizational values as well as conflict resolution values and principles, such as the primacy of people and humanitarian concern (International Alert 1998). The OECD-DAC peacebuilding evaluation guidance, as well as the RPP guidance, contains principles for conflict-sensitive and ethical practices in sections separated off from the consequentialist criteria used for evaluating "good" peacebuilding. This suggests, perhaps unintentionally, that these principles are good ideals to think about, but not necessary for "good" (meaning effective) peacebuilding. Evaluation organizations also have ethical principles intended to guide evaluators and their actions.

If people choose to focus on duties or principles as determining the value of peacebuilding, then the analysis shifts from an ends-focus to a principled means focus, for example, assessing if the process consistently treated people well throughout. A means-related assumption that is often made, and tied to the assumption of duty, is using nonviolent methods to stop violence or build peace. There are some forms of evaluation already developed to

focus on an organization's values or principles, such as diversity-focused evaluation, a human rights-focused evaluation, or mission-focused evaluation (Patton 2008, 301, 303), which can be used to resource this approach. In peacebuilding and conflict resolution evaluation, some resources have emphasized participatory evaluation processes as a necessary duty of evaluators to ensure that local voices are not lost, including older works, such as Fast and Neufeldt's (2005) "Envisioning Success" and inflecting newer works such as the EPI project (Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016; see also Firchow and Tilton, this volume).

As with consequentialism, duty-based valuations also involve assumptions that beg scrutiny, especially vis-à-vis the question of whose values are being elevated in the approach. With Kantian duty-based ethics, the emphasis on reasoning principles prior to action means that people are assumed to be individual, rational agents; right action is determined through reason and is assumed to be universally applicable (Hutchings 2010; Shafer-Landau 2015). Contextual, relational, and emotional aspects are again irrelevant when determining good. While this is helpful in some respects, such as assessing whether or not a project upheld rights such as gender equity in implementation, it can also encounter challenges. For example, the category of individual rights is not equally agreed upon, and contrasted with social or group collective rights—which should a project enact as part of good peacebuilding? If there is no dialogue on moral values as part of a process (including, awkwardly enough, dialogue on participation as a value), there can be a tendency to conflate the values of a particular group, such as European or Anglo-American values, with universal values (see Mills 2015). It is useful to keep this in mind in looking at the ways in which duties or rules are identified for evaluations and evaluators in order to avoid being trapped by hidden assumptions.

While consequentialism and duty-based ethics are central moral theories in Western moral philosophy, there are also other moral theories that resonate well with peacebuilding and conflict resolution. These other theories can helpfully remind us that there are valid ways of judging good outside of consequences and duties and can inform an evaluation. The next

two moral theories, relational ethics and virtue ethics, open space for further moral dialogue.

Valuing Excellence of Character

The moral theory of virtue ethics focuses on living well through embodying character excellence. Living virtuously involves embodying moral characteristics (or virtues), such as being wise, courageous, compassionate, or just—day in and day out. Of central concern is the character and quality of the individual. One acts, not out of duty to follow a moral imperative nor to achieve the best possible ends, but rather because it is simply worthy to do so. To illustrate, a Catholic priest embodying the virtue of solidarity might act to prevent a vulnerable community from being attacked (see Whitmore 2010); here intervention is not a means to an end or a response to a categorical imperative but rather an act of solidarity, and living out a virtue.

Personal excellence is explored in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (2002), where he argued that the best life for a human was one that embodied and exercised the virtues. We also see an emphasis on personal moral excellence in a variety of religious traditions (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism). Modern virtue ethics adds the idea that virtues are located within the living practices of a community; this means that virtues are located within specific contexts and historical moral traditions (MacIntyre 1981). This allows for both continuity of virtues and adaptation and context-specificity within traditions.

Individual transformation and individual commitments to being peaceful and modeling good character are part of peace and conflict studies, but less commonly identified as a "good" in evaluations of peacebuilding or conflict resolution interventions. To some extent, religious peacebuilding focuses on personal character as do programs such as youth leadership programs in conflict-affected areas (Steele and Wilson-Grau 2016; Rookwood and Wassong 2010). To take virtue ethics seriously in evaluation means focusing on the self: on the men and women who are peacebuilders and

conflict interveners, the evaluators and participants as well as funders and community members who are involved in the initiative. It suggests examining everyday and routine practices as part of judging an intervention (as virtues become habit). It suggests the need to think about work as part of living a worthy life. If peacebuilding is judged in terms of valuing *personal excellence*, the lens moves from focusing on activities or ends to examining the ways in which peacebuilding initiatives support moral character development, practical wisdom, and excellence or the ways in which these are enacted as part of interventions. Again, the emphasis is not on the end but rather on living a life well and in so-doing help constitute a flourishing society.

The assumptions underpinning virtue ethics differ from those of the preceding moral perspectives. Here the focus is on actions and reasoning within specific contexts and experiences. Wisdom is needed to determine what is virtuous in a given moment, although one can look at moral exemplars to help identify the right thing to do (Hursthouse 1996). Wisdom to know what is morally salient in a given context, and respond to it, prevents a character trait from becoming a flaw, such as can happen when in deficit or excess. Wisdom develops over time, through experience and moral education. To return to the example at the start, the priest who enacts solidarity learns what solidarity means over time—from religious teaching, from watching models of moral excellence, and from experience—and so responds by riving in the direction he expects an attack is coming to protect a community in Northern Uganda (Whitmore 2010).

One of the concerns about a virtue's perspective that is worth considering for peacebuilding is with respect to who determines what is virtuous. There are critiques that those determining what is virtuous come from the elite in society. If virtues are being valued and evaluated, then understanding the origins of the named virtues within a context is important, as is exploring questions of elitism. Identifying standards and expectations may also matter, as there is a concern in the literature that virtue ethics is too demanding in that it requires people to be virtuous all of the time (for general critiques, see Shafer-Landau 2015). Nevertheless, bringing in a

virtue's lens into assessing what good means in peacebuilding and conflict resolution can enrich the discussion of what matters and should be judged good in the evaluation.

Valuing Relationality

A fourth way to think about good that is evident in moral theory involves viewing relationships and responsiveness to others as a moral good. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts centered on building or restoring right relationships reflect this similar commitment (e.g., Lederach 1995; Bush and Folger 2004), which suggests this moral theory perspective may be a good fit for identifying what is valued and judged in an evaluation. While relationships are often central to theories of change, they are less commonly included in evaluation criteria on their own terms as a good in and of themselves. For example, assessing if social capital building is successful may appear in an evaluation. However, this view of relationships identifies them as a means to the end, and therefore the judgment is consequentialist. The alternative view here is that relationality itself is a good to be valued.

There are at least two vantage points from which to examine relational ethics in moral theory: feminist ethics of care and Ubuntu ethics. Ethics of care centers on practices and being responsive to others' needs, which may be material, psychological, or even cultural (Gilligan 1982; Held 2006; Tronto 1993). Responsiveness can range from listening to direct action, as well as building trust, and nurturing and sustaining relationships. Here, people are naturally interconnected, dependent, and interdependent in contrast to the idea that individuals are autonomous moral agents (an assumption present to varying degrees in the previous moral theories). Care, then, responds to dependence and involves understanding and engaging others (Held 2006). Fiona Robinson (1999) argues that ethics of care must critically uncover the relationships that exist among and within social groups in social and political contexts, which means also understanding

how relations of difference and injustice are constructed and maintained in society.

Similar to ethics of care, an Ubuntu ethic embraces the idea that we live interconnected and communal lives, and it involves practices. The term Ubuntu comes from the Bantu languages found in east, central and southern Africa, and the word *muntu* which means human or person (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009; Murithi 2009). Frequently it is summed up in the phrase "A person is a person through other people." In Ubuntu, one acts in ways that build the humanity of others as part of one's own humanity. The community defines a person and judges whether he or she has reached the expected standard, which values hospitality, compassion, generosity, and tolerance (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, 71). As Archbishop Desmond Tutu famously noted, someone with Ubuntu has "a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are" (1999, 31). Interestingly, acting selfishly can diminish one's humanity and make one become less than human (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, 71).

If relationality is valued in evaluation, then what is judged as good are the ways in which people are cared for, compassionate, and contribute to the greater whole—the ways people build the humanity of others, with responsiveness and generosity. This includes those working on the initiative, as well as those in conflict, and the expanding circles of people connected to the initiative (including funders). It requires asking questions focused primarily on hearing and being responsive to needs and building collective humanity. For example, listening for the ways in which people involved in an initiative speak of their treatment, and whether they felt respected, heard, and reciprocally engaged. An evaluation conceptualized within a relational context, views relationships as good in and of themselves, and reflects this in the methodology used. This perspective appears to fit well with community-based and participatory research and evaluation methodologies such as Empowerment Evaluation, Action Evaluation, or Transformative Evaluation (Rothman 2003; Mertens 2007;

Fetterman, Kaftwarian, and Wandersman 2015). However, it fits these when and if the approach is relationally structured— that is, designed in a responsive and reciprocal fashion, as opposed to being designed as participatory because an intervener or evaluator seeks it as a duty or obligation. Drawing attention to the value of responsiveness and care in evaluation can expand and enrich the moral discussion, helping evaluations to avoid becoming purely instrumental.

Moral Discussions and the Values of Evaluation

The preceding four families of values present an important, yet limited, set of moral values. There will be other moral values to be considered as part of valuing the merit of peacebuilding and conflict resolution within unique contexts. Of course, when there are multiple values prioritized by stakeholders, conflicts between values become more likely. It is reasonable to assume that some values will be more important to some stakeholders than to others. This final section then addresses the ways in which moral dialogue and deliberation might be better included in evaluation processes in ways that respond to power differentials and potential value conflicts.

I use the term power here in terms of influence that can alter people's choices, decisions, and actions. Drawing on French and Raven's early work (1959), sources of power include expertise, position, financial resources, as well as the ability to reward and punish. While participation is often highly valued in conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives, there are dynamic inequalities, such as who funds peacebuilding, or who provides expert or perceived legitimate power. Often it is outsiders, with higher education and economic privilege. In an evaluation setting, those who hold expert and financial power are typically the ones who name the purpose of an evaluation, rather than those on the receiving end of an initiative. For example, the OECD-DAC criteria and donor countries prioritize consequentialism. This valuing of consequentialist ends may be at odds with community values, such as fully contextualized views of relational care or character excellence.

The question "who decides what will be valued" is critical. This is not a new concern (see, e.g., d'Estrée et al. 2001). If stakeholder values are to be considered equally in the discussion of what will be judged in an evaluation, it is important to attend to the ways in which values are hierarchically organized prior to or during evaluations. Power differentials are ever-present, which suggests that it is important to directly discuss power (and whose values matter) as part of the valuation discussion. Aspects to consider include identifying major stakeholders, how they are involved, and their voices weighed in decision-making. Consultation groups or processes will need to enable the hearing of multiple voices. Also important to discuss is how to address significant moral value differences. Engaging with these aspects is an important step to including moral dialogue as part of evaluations.

A second aspect to consider is how to dialogue and decide when values diverge. A number of evaluator guides provide a modicum of advice on the subject. The American Evaluation Association's "Guiding Principles for Evaluators," under the topical heading "responsibilities for general and public welfare," notes the domain of values and identifies that evaluators have a responsibility to articulate and consider the diversity of interests and values of multiple stakeholder groups—including the general public—related to an evaluation (Principle E in American Evaluation Society 2004). The AfrEA similarly emphasizes the importance of recognizing and involving community participants and respecting human dignity and worth in evaluation, as part of the "African Evaluation Guidelines" (African Evaluation Association 2006/7). This latter point includes ensuring participants are not harmed nor their "cultural and religious values compromised." It also has a section that identifies values within a section focused on utility:

> *U4 (*modified*) Values Identification*. The perspectives, procedures, and rationale used to interpret the findings should be carefully described, so that the bases for value judgments are clear. *The possibility of allowing multiple interpretations of findings should be transparently preserved, provided that these interpretations*

respond to stakeholders' concerns and needs for utilization purposes. (Reproduced in Rouge 2004, 62)

These guiding principles point to the importance of attending to values and culture *because* they are part of utilization. This framing suggests that utility is the overarching value, which unfortunately places it above other values stakeholders might be concerned about when making judgments about values for an evaluation and points to efforts to avoid conflict by imposing one value over another.

When there are competing values, such as between valuing care and valuing aggregated effects, the tension can signal an opportunity to open up space for creative thinking. Rather than being trapped in dichotomous either/or thinking, value discussions can make use of conflict resolution's basic methodologies for creative problem-solving (Weston 2007). A first step, however, involves understanding more about the values, and their importance in a given context. Then, it involves engaging in brainstorming, non-binary thinking, careful listening, and additive thinking (Neufeldt 2016a, 95–117) to develop possible alternatives and ways of combining values in an evaluation where possible. One might ask, how can our evaluation embody and capture a relational orientation and at the same time look at effects? Or, how can we include an assessment of character virtue as equally important to ends? There are some creative efforts underway to do just this and more can be imagined (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016; d'Estrée et al. 2001; Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson 2007).

Importantly, evaluation methodologies and evaluators can provide entry points for value discussions with stakeholders as part of a more ethical evaluation process. Action Evaluation, in particular, offers a well-developed model that begins with articulating goals as well as drawing out the values and beliefs that explain why the goals are important (Rothman 2003, 1997; see also Rothman and Sachare, this volume). This process lays the groundwork for a robust discussion on what is valued and what matters to stakeholders. Other evaluation processes suggest setting up reference

groups that include all key stakeholders, which offer some potential in terms of raising up issues during an evaluation. While prioritizing utilization, Michael Quinn Patton advocates for an evaluation reference group or task force to ensure an evaluator is not "some stakeholder's political puppet" (Patton 2008, 529); the group then helps to make decisions about the evaluation's purpose, focus, and methodology. Patton notes that these groups help integrate diverse perspectives and values, as well as increase transparency and openness if well facilitated (Patton 2008, 537–539). Evaluators, during the initial contracting process, can open discussion on values during the contracting process, and if an organization is not open to reviewing their values as part of the evaluation, an evaluator can decide not to bid for an evaluation contract (Neufeldt 2016b).

In sum, dialogue around values can be a rich part of an evaluation process. The current primary valuing of ends or consequences and the secondary prioritizing of duty-based thinking lead evaluations to run the risk of reinforcing problematic power dynamics, and imposing values in sometimes subtle ways. This means challenging evaluations of peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions to be more inclusive and/or expansive in the guiding moral values behind the judgments. It may mean attending to values such as relationality and character excellence. This requires careful, thoughtful work, which can help constitute quality within evaluation and help evaluation fit the *raison d'être* of conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives.

NOTES

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2. See d'Estrée, chapter 1, this volume.