Reviwers on Roger Mac Ginty: Governance and Negotiations: Whose Quality Standards?

This chapter is mostly a critique of the way in which current peace building efforts understand and assess both quality peace and success/failure of peace implementation. The argument, which has been developed elsewhere and summarized here, is solid. The notion of hybridity encapsulates the notion of a fluid process with ups and downs that must be understood from the perspective of interactions between locals and internationals, between centers and regions, between top-down and bottom-up.

Reducing it to a chapter that brings the local into the conversation may be underestimating the breadth of Mac Ginty's contribution. The editors may want to consider this as a chapter on the evaluation/measurement of quality peace. If so, pairing it with a chapter by Erik Melander on the Quality Peace Index may be appropriate.

Editors' Response: It is true that this paper is a wider contribution than simply highlighting the local dimension, and in that sense, talks more directly to the topics of our Introduction. At the same time, the Guardado et al. paper pursues some of the issues raised by Mac Ginty, and thus leads into a concrete discussion. That could be indicated with a footnote or worth mention in the conclusions of the chapter.

We are puzzled by the reference to Melander as this volume does not contain a contribution of this author. We are, of course, aware of the planned accompanying volume by Melander and others.

Governance and Negotiations: Whose Quality Standards?

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Introduction

This chapter makes three points. Firstly, given the focus of this volume on the quality of peace, it points to the prevalence of a success/failure benchmark for international peace-support interventions. It is argued that such a stark rubric is inconsistent with the messy nature of peace processes and peace accord implementation, and may be a poor guide to making assessments on the quality of peace. Secondly, the chapter advances the notion of hybridity as a way of understanding the dynamic nature of peace processes and implementation environments. Hybridity rests on the notion that no actor is able to unilaterally impose its will on others, and thus helps us transcend the success/failure rubric. Peace process environments are often an amalgam of top-down and bottom-up, as well as formal and informal, forces that conflict and coalesce to produce a hybridized context. Thirdly, the chapter makes the point that the governance skills and environment surrounding peace process negotiations are often different from those surrounding peace accord implementation and acceptance. While peace negotiations may operate according to the formalized rules of governance, the acceptance or rejection of a peace accord often relies on informal negotiation and governance that occurs at the individual, family and community levels. This informal governance, of the internalization of a peace process or accord by individuals and communities, is understudied yet seems crucial to the quality of peace.[1]

Absolutist notions of 'success' and 'failure' have become a feature of debate in politics, policymaking and business. Illustrations from the business world are perhaps the most stark; corporations can be said to be in 'trouble' or 'failing' despite making multi-million profits. Over the past decade, for example, analysts questioned the long-term viability of Research in Motion, the Canadian company that makes BlackBerry smartphones. It has

had a rough time as it has faced competition from Apple and Android devices. Yet, it is still profit-making and, in 2015, sat on a cash balance of US$3.27bn. The big problem for markets was that its economic performance did not much the expectation of analysts.[2] Similarly skewed perspectives can be found in the political and policymaking worlds in which deviation from the stated path can be ordained as 'failure' and prompt calls for resignations and radical policy rethinks. Moreover, political and media actors may have unrealistic timeframes that fail to see peacebuilding as a long-term endeavour. This chapter recommends a more measured perspective on what might constitute success, failure and quality with regards to governance and negotiations in peace processes, an thus in quality peace. It advances the notion of hybridity as a way of understanding peace processes and the implementation of peace accords, and as a way of transcending the blunt success/failure rubric.

Success and Failure

Peace processes often involve constructive ambiguity, fudging, and the dissemination of different messages to different constituencies. Conflicts have messy legacies with a complex mix of awkward stories at the institutional, community and personal levels. This is especially the case in deeply divided societies in which different communities continue to share the same space and must engage in creative conflict avoidance strategies that involve a good deal of looking the other way and pretending not to notice. This might especially be the case at the local level. Practical and ethical dilemmas abound concerning the rights of victims, the responsibilities of perpetrators, and who should be included in any negotiations or political process. Many of the dilemmas prove irresolvable, though sometimes they can be minimized through the passage of time and the very human skills of constructive ambiguity.

In such circumstances, absolutist notions of success, failure, victory and loss seem unrealistic. Yet a series of oppositional binaries are often used to conceptualize peace and

conflict. It is very common for humans to perceptually order their world according to a series of dyadic categories. In conflict situations these binaries may have an added pejorative dimension, with some categories associated with rightness and good, and others associated with wrongness and evil. Thus the perceptual and linguistic landscape of conflict and peacemaking is littered with a series of words and phrases that pigeonhole individuals, groups and behaviours as legitimate or illegitimate: terrorist/freedom fighter, autocratic/democratic, irrational/rational, corrupt/accountable, evil/good etc. Such binaries are attractive in reducing complex situations into understandable sound bites and can serve to reinforce the righteousness of the group that imposes the categorisation while demonizing the out-group. Instructive in this regard is a side-by-side reading of the addresses by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to the 2011 United Nations General Assembly. Each depicts the other side as obstructionist and uninterested in peace, while emphasizing the patience and goodwill of their own side.[3] While the speeches were made to an international audience, they were also addressed to home audiences who wanted a reaffirmation of the righteousness of their own cause and the iniquity of the other side.

In a conflict situation, the success/failure rubric maintained by antagonist groups is likely to depend on their ultimate goal, for example, secession, security, mastery over an out-group, or survival. Win/lose mentalities often help explain the perpetuation of conflicts and the failure of antagonists to investigate conflict transformation (as opposed to more limited conflict resolution and conflict management outcomes).[4] The 'total victory' syndrome is often fuelled by in-group rivalries in which ethnic entrepreneurs seek to depict their co-religionist or co-ethnic competitors as weak, naive or traitorous. 'Ethnic outbidding' militates against peace processes and explicit compromises with opponents.[5] In cases where there have been peace processes and accords, those involved are faced with a tricky decision on where to draw the line between a 'mature and hard-won compromise' and defending the interests of

the in-group. This is a difficult path to follow, as illustrated – at various times - by the fortunes of the United National Party in Sri Lanka, the Ulster Unionist Party in Northern Ireland, and the Labor Party in Israel all of whom were derided for being 'weak' for pursuing peace opportunities. In other cases, of course, combatants have been able to make breakthroughs and to sell peace accords as historic compromises involving give and take on both sides.

Given the interest of this volume in third parties, it is worth concentrating on the extent to which such interveners might use, and suffer from, an overly rigid adherence to a success/failure rubric. This raises questions about the meanings of success and failure in peace processes, and the extent to which these meanings are distorted by other factors that may not be immediately connected to the conflict zone.

International intervening powers, whether mediators in peace negotiations or supporters of reconciliation and reconstructions programmes, often suffer from 'process bias'.[6] Intervening parties may have tightly confined goals and deviation from these goals is deemed to be failure. Given that these goals are often publicly articulated, then deviations may attract the full glare of publicity. With regards to both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, external mediators and interveners have displayed either partiality, a commitment to a preferred outcome, or both. In Bosnia, local opinions that did not match the 'script' preferred by the Office of the High Representative were often ignored or devalued.[7] In some cases, it seemed that the implementation of the preferred process was more important than alternative outcomes that may have delivered different (possibly better) results. Yet 'process bias' is not always in evidence. Norwegian third parties in Sri Lanka's failed peace process in the mid-2000s, for example, were careful to offer a facilitation rather than power-mediation role. They saw their role as facilitating the construction of a peace process by the

participants to the conflict rather than of providing a peace process template and recommending that the participants follow it. [8]

Process bias is reinforced by a Western (though by no means exclusively Western) political and economic culture that regards failure as unacceptable. Few political or business leaders can be seen to be wrong, and to admit failure or a mistake often leads to resignation or sacking. George Stephanopoulos's memoir of his time in the Clinton White House is revealing of a political culture in which the media script of 'success' has priority over reality.[9] His account of the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel on the White House lawn shows the extent to which the American voter rather than the Middle East was the primary audience, and so a story of success had to be promoted.

Western-dominated approaches to peacemaking, such as those favoured by leading states in the global North and their allied international financial institutions, are not alone in maintaining intolerance to alternative approaches to peacemaking. There is little to recommend the Chinese 'peace' in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Russian 'peace' in Chechnya or the Saudi Arabian 'peace efforts' in Yemen or Bahrain. Yet leading states in the global north are able to mobilize considerable material and symbolic power that promotes its version of peace as superior and legitimate, and alternatives as somehow deficient. This projection of a preferred form of peacemaking stretches, in various formats and degrees of intensity, from Timor Leste to the Balkans. The October 2011 mobilization of western states and institutions against the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UN General Assembly is instructive of the ability of a cohort of leading states and international institutions to sideline proposals that do not 'fit the script'.[10] Proponents of liberal internationalism may also be dismissive of forms of peacemaking that may draw on traditional or indigenous sources.[11] Indeed, alternative voices may even be labelled as 'resistance'.[12]

One reason for the readiness of the proponents of internationally-supported peacemaking to approach their task with a success/failure metric is the growing use of technocracy in peacebuilding.[13] Technocracy is often more visible in post-accord peacebuilding and statebuilding environments than during the negotiation phase of peace processes. The rise of technocracy in peacebuilding is connected to much wider trends in information management and business organization whereby increasing power is ceded to 'experts' and to systems that were often developed for the needs of business organizations.[14] The result has been the 'businessification' of peacebuilding, or the ascension of the bureaucratic imperative. The effects of this 'technocratic turn' are profound yet rarely commented upon. It can be seen in the creation of a cadre of peace 'professionals' and 'experts', the identification of 'best practice', and the standardisation of operating procedures. There is also the proliferation of consulting firms and contractors who engage in 'peacebuilding' and related tasks such as monitoring and evaluation. None of these initiatives are in themselves wrong. Potential problems can arise, however, because the technocratic turn risks reinforcing particular approaches to peace, and the positions of particular peacemakers. As a consequence, alternative non-technocratic approaches to peacebuilding may be overlooked, at least by actors close to formal peacebuilding programmes. Thus, for example, forms of peacebuilding that draw on customary or traditional practices and social networks may not be considered viable forms of peacebuilding. Technocrats tend to recommend technocratic approaches to conflict, and this, in part, explains how many activities that are described as 'peacebuilding' are actually more precisely a technocratic remodelling in the form of statebuilding, institutional reform, and good governance interventions.

It is worth stressing that technocracy *per se* is not problematic. Yet, the emphasis on technocracy in contemporary approaches to peacemaking has two significant consequences

from the point of view of this chapter. Firstly, technocracy, or the bureaucratic imperative, has a tendency to exclude creativity, innovation and alternatives. It has an in-built path dependency that emphasizes routine and systemic approaches to problems. As a result, alternative approaches to peace, that stray beyond technocratic or prescribed guidelines, may be undervalued. Secondly, technocratic approaches to peace are skewed towards a reliance on the success/failure rubric. For complex institutional reasons, many of them reasonable and entirely understandable, projects and programs are likely to have a series of metrics upon which success or failure can be judged: is the project on time; is it on budget; does it meet its aim as set down in the terms of reference; does it target the constituencies it is meant to target? All of these questions can be answered in a stark 'yes' or 'no' way, or often in measurable ways that point towards success or failure.

US policy in Afghanistan is revealing on the extent to which a series of metrics have been assembled by the Department of Defense and others to give Congress and the Presidency indications of 'success' or 'failure'. About fifty measurements combine to make up the government's metric, including the number of Afghan troops trained and the on-time delivery of US resources.[15] The metrics tend to be quantitative and observable, and to some extent, are creations of the political and economic dynamics of Washington rather than the exigencies of Afghanistan. The timeline for reporting, and judging success or failure, is set by the US electoral cycle rather than the on-the-ground situation in Afghanistan. Such metrics risk creating a sometimes absurd political economy whereby, for example, US military commanders are judged on their 'burn rate' or the rate at which they distribute cash to clients or the number of shuras (local councils) they hold.[16]

Away from the stark example of Afghanistan, we can see that many peacebuilding programs are measured according to skewed metrics that emphasize quantity of delivery rather than quality. Perhaps the main bias is the focus on the intervention (project, program or

initiative) rather than on the wider post-peace accord environment. This is well-illustrated by the European Union's PEACE III peacebuilding Programme in support of the Northern Ireland peace process. The Programme's aim was to 'reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to progress reconciliation'. The Programme was broken into a series of 'targets', many of them projects that were suspiciously close to recurrent expenditure by local and national government. Progress on meeting targets was measured by how much of the budget was spent, how many meetings were held, the numbers of people enrolled in conflict resolution training projects, and the number of roadbuilding and adjustment schemes underway.[17] It requires quite a leap of the imagination to equate these targets 'reinforc[ing] progress towards a peaceful and stable society', yet they were taken as metrics of peacebuilding.

Monitoring and evaluation plays a central role in formal peacebuilding, with donors often expecting particular sorts of metrics.[18] A difficulty with many metrics is that questions of quality may be overlooked in the quest to measure quantity. Moreover, many metrics are prone to measuring the success or failure of the intervention (program or project etc.) rather than the extent to which peace prevails or is becoming more embedded.

The key point of this section is to underline how a simplistic success versus failure rubric is often applied to peacemaking by third parties. This is not to say that local actors do not maintain similarly stark rubrics. Yet international actors often wield immense power in constructing the dynamics of peacemaking and so it is worth paying attention to the ways in which they adjudicate over the quality of an outcome.[19] Moreover, international actors may be predisposed to 'seeing' a conflict and peacemaking effort in particular ways.[20] They may be prone to a series of biases that encourage them to focus on peacemaking efforts that are formal, elite-level, focused on reaching a peace deal, and sponsored or approved by the international community. Such peace efforts may be important and have enormous potential,

but to focus only on such peace efforts may overlook other initiatives, particularly those that may operate at the community and local levels. Such 'initiatives' may take the form of everyday diplomacy by individuals and families as they navigate their way through the complexities of a deeply divided society.[21] They may include travel to an area dominated by the outgroup, or economic activity with outgroup members. Much of this activity is likely to be highly localized, and to occur 'under the radar' of international actors. It takes the forms of everyday conversations between Nepalese citizens, some of whom may have sympathized with the Maoists and others who were loyal to the monarchy.

While peacemaking at all levels can be prone to being judged against a success/failure rubric, formal and elite peacemaking may be more prone to being judged according to this scale. For example, a formal peace process may have a series of definitive 'judgment points' in the form of ceasefires to be observed, deadlines to be met, documents to be agreed upon, or peace deals to be voted upon in a parliament or more generally through a referendum. Local and community peace initiatives and reconciliation processes are also likely to have judgement points, but these may be informal and the repercussions of 'failure' may be localized and contained.

Hybridity

Having cautioned against a blunt success/failure rubric for the measurement of peace processes and peace accord implementation, this section recommends the lenses offered by the concepts of hybridity and hybridization as a way of capturing complexity. In particular, the hybridity lens encourages us to see the totality of a peacemaking situation over time, rather than compressing it into an elite-level and time-limited process.

Hybridity is not taken as the simple grafting together of two discrete units to make up a third unit. Instead, it is conceived as a much longer-term process involving the interchange and negotiation between actors, ideas and practices to form a composite.[22] All societies are

hybrids, but societies undergoing peace-support interventions are often prone to considerable hybridizing pressures as a series of international and local actors and norms engage in dizzying processes of conflict and cooperation. The interstices between these international and local actors are the scene of hybridization and pattern the peace outcomes as an international-local mix.[23]

Hybridization is likely to be visible in a post-accord statebuilding program, as internationally-mandated standards meet with local customs. The extent of hybridity will differ from context to context. It can be seen, for example, in the adoption of customary practices alongside western-style judicial processes in Timor Leste.[24] Countless subtle hybridizations abound as the local and the international mingle, often promoted by globalization and the influx of new ideas and actors as a result of statebuilding.

This chapter visualises hybridity in terms of a four-part model whereby various actors in a peace or conflict situation are in constant contact with each other, by accident or design. The parts of the model are in constant movement, and actors in the model need not necessarily act with any degree of consistency. The four parts of the model are:

- The ability of international actors, structures and networks to impose their will on local actors
- The ability of international actors, structures and networks to incentivize local actors to perform in certain ways
- The ability of local actors, structures and networks to adapt, resist, subvert, exploit, delay, ignore and avoid international pressures
- The ability of local actors, structures and networks to construct alternatives to international actors and their version of peace

The lenses offered by hybridity have implications for how we might view peace processes and peace accord implementation. In short, they introduce us to a world in which no actor is able to steer a unilateral course; local actors must take account of international actors and pressures and vice versa. So peacemaking is not simply a case of top-down imposition. Local actors may have considerable agency in terms of delaying, exploiting, ignoring, complicating and reinterpreting a peace process, and related peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives. International powers are capable of mobilizing considerable resources, but they are also likely to experience blowback and mimicry as their ideas and practices meet with local ideas and practices. In almost every recent conflict zone, local actors have been able to frustrate the exhortations of coalitions of external actors. At the same time, local actors, however geographically remote, cannot exist in splendid isolation.

The notion of hybridity encourages us to look for fluidity both within and between categories, and to widen our gaze to include local and informal actors as well as the formally-organized elites who dominate the study of peace processes. The picture that emerges through the lenses provided by hybridity is a burr of dynamics at once competing and coalescing. This is in keeping with the messy world of societies undergoing conflict and peace processes, in which irresolvable dilemmas and apparently incompatible entities must somehow find space within the peace process and peace accord implementation program.

Governance, Negotiations and Implementation

The concept of hybridity encourages us to examine, in a full way, the processes of negotiation that we find in peace processes. These are not just the formal peace negotiations across a conference table that may result in a peace accord. They also include a series of other informal and everyday negotiations whereby individuals and groups navigate their way through the social world. All individuals and groups, at all levels of all societies, engage in constant processes of social negotiation to understand their environment, position themselves

within it, and to achieve goals (such as those related to livelihood or status). These processes of everyday negotiation may become more fraught in the midst of conflict or peace processes in which individuals and groups are confronted with new experiences and choices. For example, a white, apartheid-supporting South African in the 1990s would have been confronted with a series of changes that challenged their known universe. Coming to terms with these changes, many of them antithetical to the foundational mores of the society in which they grew up, may require considerable mental and social dexterity. For some individuals, there may be a process of new civic and social engagements, and an acceptance of the existence and grievances of 'the other side'. For other individuals there may be a sense of alienation with the new dispensation and a rejection of the notions of reconciliation and a fresh start that may be connected with the peace accord. The presence of a disaffected population may not herald the imminent collapse of a peace accord. Low electoral turnouts in many post-accord Balkan and Central American contexts indicate that there is a resignation that the political classes, and their international backers, have a secure grip on power. Yet a politically disengaged population suggests poor quality peace.

Different forms of governance and negotiation attend different types or phases of negotiation, and this might have a bearing on the quality of peace and how it may be designated as a 'success' or 'failure'. While it is too blunt to have a simple division between formal and informal sets of governance, it is possible to see loose categories around these headings. Formal governance rules are likely to have definitive indicators of whether the rules have been observed or not, or whether targets have been met. The language of 'success' and 'failure' can be more readily applied in formal governance contexts. For example, it should be possible to gauge if a justice ministry has met waypoints (such as the training of personnel, or the rebranding of a police force) on a reform program. The picture is less clear

with regards to informal governance rules, which will largely apply to the social negotiation, implementation and public interpretation of a peace accord.

The formal inter-party negotiations in a peace process are likely to have explicit, often written, rules, perhaps agreed upon through 'talks about talks' or in a framework agreement. These rules might cover the location, duration, agenda and participation list of the talks.[25] While peace process negotiations have involved guerrillas from the jungle or mountains meeting with government officials, in many cases those at negotiations have experience in negotiation and politics. The desired outcome of many peace negotiations is often a formal written peace accord, or a revised constitution. As a result, it has been common for negotiation teams to include lawyers in their delegations, or to seek negotiation training. Indeed the Lord's Resistance Army recruited lawyers to its delegation prior to its 2007 negotiations with the Ugandan government.[26] Other forms of 'expertise' have also been represented at the negotiation table, including those skilled to advise on resource sharing and technical economic matters. Formality and rules can play a crucial role in peace negotiations in terms of giving participants confidence in the negotiation process even if they do not have trust in each other. The development of, and respect for, common negotiation rules can act as confidence-building measures.

Just as formal governance rules and clear success/failure indicators are often visible in peace negotiations, they are also visible in many elements of the peace implementation phase of a peace process. This particularly applies to the statebuilding, good governance, DDR and SSR aspects, many of which may be facilitated by international actors and subject to international monitoring and evaluation. Programs and projects in these areas are likely to have metrics according to which donors can monitor progress and declare 'success' or 'failure'.

But beyond the technocratic aspects of peace accord implementation, there are a range of local-level social negotiations less easily measured against the success/failure rubric. This refers to the interpretation and public consumption of the new peace accord and the more general environment in which it attempts to take root. This internalization of an accord is likely to vary according to the context, as well as the individual, group and region within a post-conflict area. Depending on the context, the peace accord may make a substantive impact on how people lead their lives. For example, it might offer protections that were not previously in place enabling people to take up educational or economic opportunities that were previously unavailable. Some aspects of life may be unchanged, and others may change as an indirect result of peace. For example, the peace accord may result in economic change (good or bad) that has an impact on how life is lived. Many of the these aspects of a peace process and accord are subject to informal governance, or a range of shifting societal norms and understandings that fall outside of the ambit of the formal peace process implementation rules. Individuals may speak and act differently in the private sphere, or in in-group contexts, than they might in public spheres subject to scrutiny.

Imagine governance as a circle, with formal governance measures at the center. Many of these formal governance measures will be legally enshrined, and national or international actors may be ready to enforce their observance. These measures are likely to cover the core elements of a peace accord (constitutional changes, security provisions) and the statebuilding measures involved in peace accord implementation. Spreading outwards from the center of the circle are levels of governance with weaker formality. These rely on public acceptance and an individual's navigation through a new political landscape. This navigation is unlikely to be uniform across a territory and population, and is likely to take time to change. The success/failure rubric is more likely to pertain and be measureable at the center of the circle than towards its perimeter.

The internalization of a peace accord among individuals and collectives, or the acceptance that a conflict is over and that new modes of life are possible and permissible, may often depend on lived experience. At the local level, this may be a slow process, dependent on word of mouth and observed evidence. While individuals and communities are likely to have their own informal indicators of success or failure, these are unlikely to be measurable in a way that would meet strict bureaucratic or academic standards. The sources of governance (or the rules by which people organize their lives, and possibly their observance of the peace accord) may be extremely varied and draw from a hybrid of state-based legal authority and local norms and practices. Family or religious leaders may play a key role in granting or withholding legitimacy from a peace accord or new dispensation, and encouraging subordinates to act in particular ways.

While a peace accord might prescribe or recommend certain behaviours, there may be extreme variance in the observance of these behaviours. Legal prescriptions and proscriptions can only go so far. Instead, much of the fate of a peace process is likely to lie in the realm of everyday norm-setting and local interpretation. The tiny Gorani minority in Kosovo, for example, have the same formal rights and protections as other citizens, yet they have suffered attacks and discrimination from the Albanian majority because of the perception that they were collaborators with the Serbs.[27] The persistence, among some Albanians, of a political culture in which direct and indirect violence is permissible in the political sphere, stands in contradiction with the territory's internationally-endorsed legal code.

What we see in many post-conflict societies is the development of hybrid political and legal orders in which the international and the local interact with one another (Bell 2008; Brown 2011; Mac Ginty 2011).[28] This meeting of the de jure and de facto sees the merging of customary approaches to law, security, economics and societal organization with more modern and legalistic forms that are endorsed in a peace accord or new constitution. The

result is neither fish nor fowl, and will not be pleasing to purists who might favor either traditional or modern-rational forms of governance. Herein lies a problem for those that approach peacemaking and peacebuilding from perspectives that draw on western notions of legitimacy and legalism. Many proponents of such forms of peacemaking see the development of hybrid forms of politics as a deviation from the preferred model or as policy failure. Despite talk of 'partnership', 'local participation' and 'local ownership', many peacebuilding initiatives associated with liberal internationalism betray an intolerance towards deviation from the original policy objective. Under the success/failure rubric, hybrid forms of peace and politics can be seen as 'failure'. Yet, in some cases, a more generous assessment is deserved. What western donors and policymakers may see as 'failure' may actually tell a more complex story of meaningful local engagement with policies. Formal methods of monitoring and evaluation that focus solely on a particular project or program, or on the strict observance of a peace accord, may fail to see the complex ways in which local communities may interact with a peace initiative or aspects of a peace accord.

It is important to not romanticize all things local. Hybridity can act as a mask for exclusion, discrimination or violence. Peace initiatives and accords can be diminished by local practices and interpretations that perpetuate conflict and the subordination of one group by another. Yet, in certain circumstances, hybridity can be regarded as a local engagement with aspects of a peace accord and the transformation of a formal document into a living accord. This might involve local and variable interpretations of aspects of a peace accord, and a deviation from its literal interpretation. According to a success/failure rubric, such hybridity would be failure. Yet such a view seems unrealistic given the on-the-ground experience of peace accords and peace accord implementation projects. It seems more sensible to regard peace as plural, and open to various interpretations. Rather than the complete implementation of a peace accord, most societies experience a partial implementation or a variable

implementation. It seems prudent to aim for 'enough implementation'. Of course, the immediate questions are: 'How much is enough?' and 'What elements of a peace accord are to be left unimplemented or partially implemented?'

Perhaps such questions are best answered by way of an example. Consider the case of Nepal where a Comprehensive Peace Accord was reached in 2006. The Accord, reinforced by a revised constitution, is a detailed document envisioning a socio-economic transformation as well as steps towards a political accommodation that would end the insurgency. The latter has ended (although final agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration did not occur until late 2011) and very considerable political and security sector restructuring has taken place. Yet, many of the more ambitious socio-economic and cultural aims have only been addressed partially, or not at all. Moreover, the April 2015 earthquake has added to already daunting development and reconstruction problems. The peace accord seeks to 'end discriminations based on class, ethnicity, language, gender, culture, religion and region and to address the problems of women, Dalit, indigenous people, ethnic minorities (Janajatis), Terai communities (Madheshis), oppressed, neglected and minority communities and the backward areas' (CPA Nepal 2006). The resolution of such discrimination will involve long-term processes operating at all levels of society and involving multiple internal and external institutions.[29] A literal evaluation of the peace accord may be tempted to declare progress in these areas as 'failures' (just as an examination of discrimination in societies in the global north is likely to reveal some unpalatable truths). In some cases, however, a mix of formal (new legislation) and informal (conversations among families, observed experiences) governance may mean that there are some advances with regards to tackling discrimination. Such hybrid forms of governance would not meet the standards of western liberalism, but they may be the modus vivendi required for the post-peace accord society to move on.

Concluding discussion

The key question stemming from this chapter is to consider whose quality standards are the best to judge peace? When discussing top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace it is tempting to demonise all things international and external, and romanticize all things local and indigenous. In truth, both sets of actors and the values that they bring with them are likely to have merits and drawbacks. Moreover, both sets of actors and their values are likely to contain much diversity.

It seems that a balance has to be struck in our analyses of peace. There has been a strong trend, driven by technocratic pressures, towards ways of measuring peace that tend to overlook the everyday and locally-lived experience of war-to-peace transitions. Many of these measures focus on the quantity of peace rather than on its quality. At the same time, those interested in the quality of peace cannot be expected to undertake a permanent ethnography that provides a micro-analysis of each community or individual during a war-to-peace transition. What is needed though, is an epistemology that is mature enough to appreciate both quantitative and qualitative approaches to peace, and has a humility that does not prioritize western social science above all other possible ways of capturing peace. At the moment, many approaches to gauging the quality of peace seem overly focused on post-accord statebuilding milestones, and on the cessation of direct violence. These aspects of peace are important, but they cannot be considered sufficient measures of the quality of peace.

One of the noticeable aspects of many post-Cold War peace accord societies is that they have been able to chug along after the initial peace accord euphoria with low levels of popular legitimacy and often poor social and economic inclusion. As long as the society does not slip back into all out civil war, and as long as it does not upset the international order, then it is regarded as ‘at peace’. Yet, these are more accurately described as ‘no war, no

peace' situations and can be found in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador and many other locations. Popular disaffection has not led to a reversion to civil war, but at the same time the absence of a new civil war should not be taken as an indicator of a quality peace.

[1] This is a theme discussed also in the contribution by Brounéus and Guttrey, Chapter XX in this volume
[2] Dummett, Ben, 'BlackBerry posts surprise quarterly profit', *Wall Street Journal* (27 March 2015). Accessed at http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackberry-swings-to-a-profit-1427455450.
[3] Haaretz, "Full Transcript of Abbas speech at UN Assembly" and "Full Transcript of Netanyahu speech at UN Assembly", (23 and 24 September 2011). Accessed at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-abbas-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386385 and http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-netanyahu-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386464.
[4] Lederach, John Paul. 1995. *Preparing For Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures.* Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.
[5] Devotta, Neil. 2005. "From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Basis for Sri Lanka's Separatist War." *Nations and Nationalism*, 11(1): 141-159, specifically 141-142.
[6] Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. *Powersharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, p. 94.
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