# Time-Inseparable Utility

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#### Introduction

- We consider two types of lifetime utility functions that are not time separable: habit persistence and recursive utility.
- Habit persistence utility allows past consumption to play a role in determining current utility.
- Two examples are the "internal" habit model of Constantinides (1990) and the "external" habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
- Recursive utility makes current utility depend on expected values of future utility, and we study a continuous-time version of the model by Obstfeld (1994).

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## Constantinides' Internal Habit Model Assumptions

- Constantinides' internal habit formation model derives a representative individual's consumption and portfolio choices in a simple production economy.
- **Technology**: A single capital-consumption good can be invested in up to two different technologies. The first is a risk-free technology whose output,  $B_t$ , follows the process

$$dB/B = r dt (1)$$

ullet The second is a risky technology whose output,  $\eta_t$ , satisfies

$$d\eta/\eta = \mu \, dt + \sigma \, dz \tag{2}$$

where r,  $\mu$ , and  $\sigma$  are constants so there are constant investment opportunities.

# Assumptions (continued)

 Preferences: Representative agents have date t consumption of C<sub>t</sub> and maximize

$$E_0 \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u\left(\widehat{C}_t\right) dt \right] \tag{3}$$

where  $u\left(\widehat{C}_{t}\right)=\widehat{C}_{t}^{\gamma}/\gamma$ ,  $\gamma<1$ ,  $\widehat{C}_{t}=C_{t}-bx_{t}$ , and

$$x_t \equiv e^{-at}x_0 + \int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)}C_s ds$$
 (4)

- $\bullet$   $x_t$  is an exponentially weighted sum of past consumption.
- b=0 is time-separable constant relative risk aversion utility, while b<0 implies "consumption durability."
- When b > 0,  $bx_t$  is "subsistence" or "habit" consumption with  $\widehat{C}_t = C_t bx_t$  referred to as "surplus" consumption.

## Additional Parametric Assumptions

- Let  $W_0$  be the initial wealth of the representative individual.
- The additional parametric assumptions are made:

$$W_0 > \frac{bx_0}{r+a-b} > 0$$
 (5  
  $r+a > b > 0$  (6

$$a + a > b > 0 ag{6}$$

$$\rho - \gamma r - \frac{\gamma(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} > 0$$
 (7)

$$0 \leq m \equiv \frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} \leq 1 \quad (8)$$

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### Reasons for Assumptions

- Conditions (5) and (6) ensure that an admissible (feasible) consumption and portfolio choice strategy exists that enables  $C_t > bx_t$ .
- To see this, note that the individual's wealth dynamics are

$$dW = \{[(\mu - r)\omega_t + r]W - C_t\} dt + \sigma\omega_t W dz \qquad (9)$$

where the risky technology weight satisfies  $0 \le \omega_t \le 1$ .

• Now if  $\omega_t = 0$  for all t and consumption equals a fixed proportion of wealth,  $C_t = (r + a - b)W_t$ , then

$$dW = \{rW - (r + a - b)W\} dt = (b - a) Wdt$$
 (10)

• Equation (10) implies

$$W_t = W_0 e^{(b-a)t} > 0 (11)$$

## Reasons for Assumptions

• This implies  $C_t = (r + a - b) W_0 e^{(b-a)t} > 0$  and

$$C_{t} - bx_{t} = (r + a - b)W_{0}e^{(b-a)t}$$

$$-b\left[e^{-at}x_{0} + \int_{0}^{t}e^{-a(t-s)}(r + a - b)W_{0}e^{(b-a)s}ds\right]$$

$$= (r + a - b)W_{0}e^{(b-a)t}$$

$$-\left[e^{-at}bx_{0} + b(r + a - b)W_{0}e^{-at}\int_{0}^{t}e^{bs}ds\right]$$

$$= (r + a - b)W_{0}e^{(b-a)t}$$

$$-\left[e^{-at}bx_{0} + (r + a - b)W_{0}e^{-at}(e^{bt} - 1)\right]$$

$$= e^{-at}\left[(r + a - b)W_{0} - bx_{0}\right]$$
(12)

which is greater than zero by assumption (5).

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## Reasons for Assumptions

- Condition (7) is a transversality condition that ensures that if the individual follows an optimal policy, the expected utility of consumption over an infinite horizon is finite.
- Condition (8) ensures that the individual chooses a nonnegative amount of wealth in the risky and risk-free technologies.
- Note that  $m\equiv \frac{\mu-r}{(1-\gamma)\sigma^2}$  is the optimal risky-asset portfolio weight for the time-separable, constant relative-risk-aversion case.

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## Consumption and Porfolio Choices

• The individual's maximization problem is

$$\max_{\{C_s, \omega_s\}} E_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho s} \frac{[C_s - b x_s]^{\gamma}}{\gamma} ds \right] \equiv e^{-\rho t} J(W_t, x_t)$$
 (13)

subject to (4) and (9).

- Given the infinite horizon, we can simplify the indirect utility function  $\widehat{J}(W_t, x_t, t) = e^{-\rho t} J(W_t, x_t)$ .
- Note from (4) that the dynamics of x(t) are:

$$dx/dt = -ae^{-at}x_0 + C_t - a\int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)}C_s ds$$
, or (14)

$$dx = (C_t - ax_t) dt (15)$$

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# Bellman Equation

• The Bellman equation is then

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$$0 = \max_{\{C_{t},\omega_{t}\}} \{ U(C_{t}, x_{t}, t) + L[e^{-\rho t}J] \}$$

$$= \max_{\{C_{t},\omega_{t}\}} \{ e^{-\rho t} \gamma^{-1} (C_{t} - bx_{t})^{\gamma} + e^{-\rho t} J_{W}[((\mu - r)\omega_{t} + r)W - C_{t}] + \frac{1}{2} e^{-\rho t} J_{WW} \sigma^{2} \omega_{t}^{2} W^{2} + e^{-\rho t} J_{X} (C_{t} - ax_{t}) - \rho e^{-\rho t}J \}$$

$$(16)$$

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#### First Order Conditions

• The first-order condition with respect to  $C_t$  is

$$(C_t - bx_t)^{\gamma - 1} = J_W - J_x, \text{ or}$$

$$C_t = bx_t + [J_W - J_x]^{\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}}$$
(17)

ullet The first-order condition with respect to  $\omega_t$  is

$$(\mu - r)WJ_W + \omega_t \sigma^2 W^2 J_{WW} = 0, \text{ or}$$

$$\omega_t = -\frac{J_W}{J_{WW}W} \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma^2}$$
(18)

## Equilibrium Partial Differential Equation

• Substituting (17) and (18) back into (16):

$$0 = \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} [J_W - J_X]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} - \frac{J_W^2}{J_{WW}} \frac{(\mu-r)^2}{2\sigma^2} + (rW - bx)J_W + (b-a)xJ_X - \rho J$$
 (19)

• When a=b=x=0, we saw that  $J(W)=kW^{\gamma}$ , so that  $u=C^{\gamma}/\gamma$ ,  $u_c=J_W$ , and

$$C_{t}^{*} = (\gamma k)^{\frac{1}{(\gamma - 1)}} W_{t} = W_{t} \left[ \rho - r\gamma - \frac{1}{2} (\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}) \frac{(\mu - r)^{2}}{\sigma^{2}} \right] / (1 - \gamma)$$
(20)

and

$$\omega_t^* = m \tag{21}$$

# Solution for Derived Utility of Wealth

For the time-inseparable case, we try the form

$$J(W, x) = k_0[W + k_1 x]^{\gamma}$$
 (22)

• Substituting into (19) and setting the coefficients on x and W equal to zero, we find

$$k_0 = \frac{(r+a-b)h^{\gamma-1}}{(r+a)\gamma}$$
 (23)

where

$$h \equiv \frac{r+a-b}{(r+a)(1-\gamma)} \left[ \rho - \gamma r - \frac{\gamma(\mu-r)^2}{2(1-\gamma)\sigma^2} \right] > 0 \quad (24)$$

and

$$k_1 = -\frac{b}{r+a-b} < 0. {(25)}$$

# Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Weights

• Given the solution for J, (17) and (18) imply

$$C_t^* = bx_t + h\left[W_t - \frac{bx_t}{r+a-b}\right]$$
 (26)

and

$$\omega_t^* = m \left[ 1 - \frac{bx_t/W_t}{r+a-b} \right] \tag{27}$$

• Since r + a > b, so that  $\omega_t^* < m$ , agents invest less in the risky asset and wealth has lower volatility compared to the time-separable case.

# Dynamics of Consumption

• Consider the dynamics of the term  $\left| W_t - \frac{bx_t}{r+a-b} \right|$  in  $C_t^*$ :

$$d\left[W_{t} - \frac{bx_{t}}{r+a-b}\right] = \left\{\left[(\mu - r)\omega_{t}^{*} + r\right]W_{t} - C_{t}^{*} - \left(28\right)\right\}$$
$$-b\frac{C_{t}^{*} - ax_{t}}{r+a-b}dt + \sigma\omega_{t}^{*}W_{t}dz$$

• Substituting in for  $\omega_t^*$  and  $C_t^*$ , one obtains

$$d\left[W_{t} - \frac{bx_{t}}{r+a-b}\right] = \left[W_{t} - \frac{bx_{t}}{r+a-b}\right] [ndt + m\sigma dz]$$
(29)

where

$$n \equiv \frac{r - \rho}{1 - \gamma} + \frac{(\mu - r)^2 (2 - \gamma)}{2(1 - \gamma)^2 \sigma^2}$$
 (30)

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## Equilibrium Consumption Growth

• Using (29) and (26), one can show

$$\frac{dC_t}{C_t} = \left[ n + b - \frac{(n+a)bx_t}{C_t} \right] dt + \left( \frac{C_t - bx_t}{C_t} \right) m\sigma dz \quad (31)$$

- From the term  $\left(\frac{C_t bx_t}{C_t}\right) m\sigma dz$ , consumption growth is smoother than in the case of no habit persistence.
- For a given equity (risky-asset) risk premium, this can imply a relatively smooth consumption path, even though risk aversion,  $\gamma$ , may not be high in magnitude.
- Recall the Hansen-Jagannathan bound for the time-separable case

$$\left| \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right| \le (1 - \gamma) \, \sigma_c \tag{32}$$

## Hansen-Jagannathan Bound

• For the current habit persistence case, from (31):

$$\sigma_{c,t} = \left(\frac{C_t - bx_t}{C_t}\right) m\sigma$$

$$= \left(\frac{\widehat{C}_t}{C_t}\right) \left[\frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2}\right] \sigma$$
(33)

• Define the surplus consumption ratio  $S_t \equiv \widehat{C}_t/C_t$  and rearrange (33):

$$\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)\,\sigma_{c,t}}{S_t} \tag{34}$$

• Since  $S_t \equiv \frac{C_t - b x_t}{C_t} < 1$  habit persistence may help reconcile the empirical violation of the H-J bound.

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# The Campbell-Cochrane External Habit Model

- This model has "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences and makes the following assumptions.
- **Technology**: There is a discrete-time endowment economy where date t aggregate consumption output,  $C_t$ , follows the lognormal process:

$$\ln(C_{t+1}) - \ln(C_t) = g + \nu_{t+1}$$
 (35)

where  $v_{t+1} \sim N\left(0, \sigma^2\right)$  and is independently distributed.

#### **Preferences**

Preferences: A representative individual maximizes

$$E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \frac{(C_t - X_t)^{\gamma} - 1}{\gamma} \right]$$
 (36)

where  $\gamma < 1$  and  $X_t$  denotes the "habit level" that is related to the surplus consumption ratio,  $S_t \equiv \frac{C_t - X_t}{C_t}$ , where

$$\ln\left(S_{t+1}\right) = \left(1 - \phi\right) \ln\left(\overline{S}\right) + \phi \ln\left(S_{t}\right) + \lambda \left(S_{t}\right) \nu_{t+1} \tag{37}$$

and where  $\lambda(S_t)$  is the sensitivity function

$$\lambda\left(S_{t}\right) = \frac{1}{\overline{S}}\sqrt{1 - 2\left[\ln\left(S_{t}\right) - \ln\left(\overline{S}\right)\right]} - 1 \tag{38}$$

and

$$\overline{S} = \sigma \sqrt{\frac{1 - \gamma}{1 - \phi}} \tag{39}$$

# Concept of External Habit

- In Constantinides (1990) an individual's habit depends on her own past consumption, so that when choosing  $C_t$  she takes into account how it will affect her future utility.
- In Campbell and Cochrane (1999) an individual's habit depends on everyone else's current and past consumption, so that when choosing  $C_t$  she views  $X_t$  as exogenous.
- The external habit assumption simplifies the agent's decision making because habit is an exogenous state variable that depends on aggregate, not the individual's, consumption.

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### Equilibrium Asset Prices

• The individual's marginal utility of consumption is

$$u_c(C_t, X_t) = (C_t - X_t)^{\gamma - 1} = C_t^{\gamma - 1} S_t^{\gamma - 1}$$
 (40)

and the representative agent's stochastic discount factor is

$$m_{t,t+1} = \delta \frac{u_c(C_{t+1}, X_{t+1})}{u_c(C_t, X_t)} = \delta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{\gamma - 1} \left(\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}\right)^{\gamma - 1} \tag{41}$$

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#### Risk-free Interest Rate

• Let  $r = -\ln(E_t[m_{t,t+1}])$  be the continuously compounded risk-free rate between dates t and t+1:

$$r = -\ln\left(\delta E_{t} \left[ e^{-(1-\gamma)\ln(C_{t+1}/C_{t}) - (1-\gamma)\ln(S_{t+1}/S_{t})} \right] \right)$$
(42)  

$$= -\ln\left(\delta e^{-(1-\gamma)E_{t}[\ln(C_{t+1}/C_{t})] - (1-\gamma)E_{t}[\ln(S_{t+1}/S_{t})]} \right)$$

$$\times e^{\frac{1}{2}(1-\gamma)^{2}Var_{t}[\ln(C_{t+1}/C_{t}) + \ln(S_{t+1}/S_{t})]} \right)$$

$$= -\ln(\delta) + (1-\gamma)g + (1-\gamma)(1-\phi)(\ln\overline{S} - \ln S_{t})$$

$$-\frac{1}{2}(1-\gamma)^{2}\sigma^{2}[1+\lambda(S_{t})]^{2}$$

• Substituting in for  $\lambda(S_t)$  shows that the rate is constant:

$$r = -\ln(\delta) + (1 - \gamma)g - \frac{1}{2}(1 - \gamma)(1 - \phi)$$
 (43)

### Price of Market Portfolio

 Aggregate consumption equals the economy's aggregate dividends (output) paid by the market portfolio. Therefore,

$$P_{t} = E_{t} \left[ m_{t,t+1} \left( C_{t+1} + P_{t+1} \right) \right] \tag{44}$$

• The price-dividend ratio for the market portfolio is:

$$\frac{P_t}{C_t} = E_t \left[ m_{t,t+1} \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \left( 1 + \frac{P_{t+1}}{C_{t+1}} \right) \right]$$

$$= \delta E_t \left[ \left( \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right)^{\gamma - 1} \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{\gamma} \left( 1 + \frac{P_{t+1}}{C_{t+1}} \right) \right]$$
(45)

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### Solution

• Solve forward this difference equation by repeatedly updating and substituting for  $P_{t+i}/C_{t+i}$  to obtain:

$$\frac{P_t}{C_t} = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \delta^i \left( \frac{S_{t+i}}{S_t} \right)^{\gamma - 1} \left( \frac{C_{t+i}}{C_t} \right)^{\gamma} \right]$$
(46)

- The solution is computed numerically by simulating the lognormal processes for  $C_t$  and  $S_t$ , noting that  $S_{t+1}/S_t$  depends on the current level of  $S_t$ .
- $P_t/C_t$  varies only with  $S_t$ , so that the portfolio's expected returns and volatility are also functions of  $S_t$ .

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### Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion

Note that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is

$$-\frac{C_t u_{cc}}{u_c} = \frac{1 - \gamma}{S_t} \tag{47}$$

 As shown earlier, when consumption is lognormally distributed the H-J bound is approximately

$$\left| \frac{E[r_i] - r}{\sigma_{r_i}} \right| \le -\frac{C_t u_{cc}}{u_c} \sigma_c = \frac{(1 - \gamma) \sigma_c}{S_t} \tag{48}$$

which is similar to Constantinides' internal habit model except, here,  $\sigma_c$  is a constant and  $E[r_i]$  and  $\sigma_{r_i}$  are time-varying functions of  $S_t$ .

### Model's Match to Data

- The coefficient of relative risk aversion is relatively high when  $S_t$  is relatively low, such as during a recession.
- Moreover, the model predicts that the equity risk premium increases during a recession (when  $-\frac{C_t u_{cc}}{u_c}$  is high), which seems to be a phenomenon of the postwar U.S. stock market.
- Campbell and Cochrane calibrate the model to U.S. consumption and stock market data and, due to the nonlinear form for  $S_t$ , have more success in describing actual asset returns.

## Recursive Utility

- Recursive utility is forward looking, and was developed by Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989).
- We will follow Duffie and Epstein (1992) and study the continuous-time limit of recursive utility.
- Recall that time-separable utility takes the form

$$V_{t} = E_{t} \left[ \int_{t}^{T} U(C_{s}, s) ds \right]$$
 (49)

where  $U(C_s, s)$  is often specified  $U(C_s, s) = e^{-\rho(s-t)}u(C_s)$ .

Recursive utility, however, takes the form

$$V_t = E_t \left[ \int_t^T f(C_s, V_s) \ ds \right]$$
 (50)

where f is known as an aggregator function.

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## Features of Recursive Utility

- Utility (50) is recursive since current lifetime utility,  $V_t$ , depends on expected values of future lifetime utility,  $V_s$ , s > t.
- When f has appropriate properties, Duffie and Epstein (1992) show that a Bellman-type equation can be used to derive optimal consumption and portfolio choices.
- We consider a form of recursive utility that generalizes power (CRRA) utility.
- Unlike CRRA where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  $\epsilon$ , must equal the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $1/(1-\gamma)$ , recursive utility distinguishes  $\epsilon$  (an intertemporal consumption-savings choice concept) from  $(1-\gamma)$  (an atemporal asset risk choice concept).

## Assumptions of the Obstfeld Model

• **Technology**: There is a production economy where a capital-consumption good can be invested in two different technologies. The first is a risk-free technology whose output,  $B_t$ , follows the process

$$dB/B = rdt (51)$$

 $\bullet$  The second is a risky technology whose output,  $\eta_t,$  follows the process

$$d\eta/\eta = \mu dt + \sigma dz \tag{52}$$

• Since r,  $\mu$ , and  $\sigma$  are constants, there are constant investment opportunities.

#### Recursive Preferences

Preferences: Representative, infinitely-lived agents maximize

$$V_t = E_t \int_t^\infty f(C_s, V_s) ds$$
 (53)

where f, the aggregator function, is given by

$$f(C_s, V_s) = \rho \frac{C_s^{1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}} - \left[\gamma V_s\right]^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon \gamma}}}{\left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}\right) \left[\gamma V_s\right]^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon \gamma} - 1}}$$
(54)

•  $\rho>0$  is the agent's rate of time preference;  $\epsilon>0$  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; and  $1-\gamma>0$  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. When  $\epsilon=1/\left(1-\gamma\right)$ , (53) and (54) are (ordinally) equivalent to

$$V_t = E_t \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho s} \frac{C_s^{\gamma}}{\gamma} ds \tag{55}$$

## Derived Utility of Wealth

• If  $\omega_t$  is the weight invested in the risky asset (technology), wealth satisfies

$$dW = [\omega(\mu - r)W + rW - C] dt + \omega \sigma W dz \qquad (56)$$

• Define  $J(W_t)$  as the maximized lifetime utility at date t:

$$J(W_t) = \max_{\{C_s, \omega_s\}} E_t \int_t^{\infty} f(C_s, V_s) ds$$

$$= \max_{\{C_s, \omega_s\}} E_t \int_t^{\infty} f(C_s, J(W_s)) ds$$
(57)

• Due to the infinite horizon problem with constant investment opportunities, f(C, V) is not an explicit function of calendar time and the only state variable is W.

### Bellman Equation

The Bellman equation is

$$0 = \max_{\{C_t, \omega_t\}} f[C_t, J(W_t)] + L[J(W_t)]$$
 (58)

or

$$0 = \max_{\{C_t, \omega_t\}} f[C, J(W)] + J_W [\omega (\mu - r) W + rW - C]$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} J_{WW} \omega^2 \sigma^2 W^2$$

$$= \max_{\{C_t, \omega_t\}} \rho \frac{C^{1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}} - [\gamma J]^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon \gamma}}}{(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}) [\gamma J]^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon \gamma} - 1}} + J_W [\omega (\mu - r) W + rW - C]$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} J_{WW} \omega^2 \sigma^2 W^2$$

#### First-Order Conditions

• The first-order condition with respect to  $C_t$  is

$$\rho \frac{C^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{[\gamma J]^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon\gamma}-1}} - J_W = 0 \tag{60}$$

or

$$C = \left(\frac{J_W}{\rho}\right)^{-\epsilon} \left[\gamma J\right]^{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\gamma} + \epsilon} \tag{61}$$

• The first-order condition with respect to  $\omega_t$  is

$$J_W (\mu - r) W + J_{WW} \omega \sigma^2 W^2 = 0$$
 (62)

or

$$\omega = -\frac{J_W}{J_{WW}W} \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma^2} \tag{63}$$

## Equilibrium Partial Differential Equation

• Substituting the optimal values for C and  $\omega$  into (59):

$$\rho \frac{\left(\frac{J_{W}}{\rho}\right)^{1-\epsilon} \left[\gamma J\right]^{(\epsilon-1)\left[1-\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon\gamma}\right]} - \left[\gamma J\right]^{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon\gamma}}}{\left(1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right) \left[\gamma J\right]^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon\gamma}-1}}$$

$$+J_{W} \left[-\frac{J_{W}}{J_{WW}} \frac{(\mu-r)^{2}}{\sigma^{2}} + rW - \left(\frac{J_{W}}{\rho}\right)^{-\epsilon} \left[\gamma J\right]^{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\gamma}+\epsilon}\right]$$

$$+\frac{1}{2} \frac{J_{W}^{2}}{J_{WW}} \frac{(\mu-r)^{2}}{\sigma^{2}} = 0$$

$$(64)$$

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# Equilibrium Partial Differential Equation (continued)

Simplifying, one obtains:

$$\frac{\epsilon \rho}{\epsilon - 1} \left[ \left( \frac{J_W}{\rho} \right)^{-\epsilon} \left[ \gamma J \right]^{\frac{1 - \epsilon}{\gamma} + \epsilon} - \gamma J \right]$$

$$+ J_W \left[ -\frac{J_W}{J_{WW}} \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{\sigma^2} + rW - \left( \frac{J_W}{\rho} \right)^{-\epsilon} \left[ \gamma J \right]^{\frac{1 - \epsilon}{\gamma} + \epsilon} \right]$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} \frac{J_W^2}{J_{WW}} \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{\sigma^2} = 0$$
(65)

### Solution

• Guessing a solution of the form  $J(W) = (aW)^{\gamma}/\gamma$  and substituting into (65), one finds that  $a = \alpha^{1/(1-\epsilon)}$  where

$$\alpha \equiv \rho^{-\epsilon} \left( \epsilon \rho + (1 - \epsilon) \left[ r + \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} \right] \right)$$
 (66)

• In turn, substituting this value for J into (61), one obtains

$$C = \alpha \rho^{\epsilon} W$$

$$= \left( \epsilon \rho + (1 - \epsilon) \left[ r + \frac{(\mu - r)^{2}}{2(1 - \gamma) \sigma^{2}} \right] \right) W$$
(67)

and the optimal portfolio weight of the risky asset is

$$\omega = \frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} \tag{68}$$

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### Results

- Bhamra and Uppal (2003) show that when investment opportunities are stochastic, the portfolio weight,  $\omega$ , can depend on both  $\gamma$  and  $\epsilon$ .
- Note when  $\epsilon=1/\left(1-\gamma\right)$ , equation (67) equals  $C=\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}\left[\frac{\rho}{\gamma}-r-\frac{(\mu-r)^2}{2(1-\gamma)\sigma^2}\right]W$  derived earlier for the CRRA case.
- For an infinite horizon solution to exist,  $C_t$  in (67) must be positive, requiring  $\rho > \frac{\epsilon 1}{\epsilon} \left( r + \left[ \mu r \right]^2 / \left[ 2 \left( 1 \gamma \right) \sigma^2 \right] \right)$ , which occurs when  $\epsilon$  is small.
- For example, when  $\rho>0$ , the inequality is satisfied when  $\epsilon<1$ .

# **Optimal Consumption**

• For  $C^*$  in (67), the term  $r + [\mu - r]^2 / [2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2]$  can be rewritten by substituting  $\omega = (\mu - r) / [(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2]$ :

$$r + \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} = r + \omega \frac{\mu - r}{2}$$
 (69)

- An increase in (69) raises (reduces) C when  $\epsilon < 1$  ( $\epsilon > 1$ ).
- The intuition is that when  $\epsilon < 1$ , the income effect from an improvement in investment opportunities dominates the substitution effect, so that consumption rises and savings fall.
- The reverse occurs when  $\epsilon > 1$ : the substitution effect dominates the income effect and savings rise.

### Wealth Dynamics

• Assuming  $0 < \omega < 1$  and substituting (67) and (68) into (56), wealth follows the geometric Brownian motion:

$$\frac{dW}{W} = \left[\omega^* (\mu - r) + r - \alpha \rho^{\epsilon}\right] dt + \omega^* \sigma dz \tag{70}$$

$$= \left[\frac{(\mu - r)^2}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} + r - \epsilon \rho - (1 - \epsilon)\left(r + \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2}\right)\right] dt$$

$$+ \frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma} dz$$

$$= \left[\epsilon \left(r + \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2} - \rho\right) + \frac{(\mu - r)^2}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^2}\right] dt$$

$$+ \frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma} dz$$

### Economic Growth

- Note that since  $C = \alpha \rho^{\epsilon} W$ , then dC/C has the same drift and volatility as wealth in (70).
- Thus, d ln C has a volatility,  $\sigma_c$ , and a mean,  $g_c$ , equal to

$$\sigma_c = \frac{\mu - r}{(1 - \gamma)\sigma} \tag{71}$$

and

$$g_{c} = \epsilon \left( r + \frac{(\mu - r)^{2}}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^{2}} - \rho \right) + \frac{(\mu - r)^{2}}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^{2}} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{c}^{2}$$

$$= \epsilon \left( r + \frac{(\mu - r)^{2}}{2(1 - \gamma)\sigma^{2}} - \rho \right) - \frac{\gamma(\mu - r)^{2}}{2(1 - \gamma)^{2}\sigma^{2}}$$
(72)

Time-Inseparable Utility

# Comparative Statics

- From (72), if  $r + [\mu r]^2 / [2(1 \gamma)\sigma^2] > \rho$ , growth rises with  $\epsilon$  as individuals save more.
- The squared Sharpe ratio,  $[\mu-r]^2/\sigma^2$  is a measure of the attractiveness of the risky asset, and the sign of  $\partial g_c/\partial \left([\mu-r]^2/\sigma^2\right)$  equals the sign of  $\epsilon-\gamma/(1-\gamma)$ .
- For the CRRA case of  $\epsilon = 1/(1-\gamma)$ , the derivative is positive, so that  $\partial g_c/\partial \mu > 0$  and  $\partial g_c/\partial \sigma < 0$ .
- In general,  $\partial g_c/\partial \left(\left[\mu-r\right]^2/\sigma^2\right)<0$  if  $\epsilon<\gamma/\left(1-\gamma\right)$  since from (68) as agents invest more in the faster-growing risky asset they also raise  $\mathcal{C}_t$  (and reduce savings) when  $\epsilon<1$ .
- Thus, when  $\epsilon < \gamma/(1-\gamma)$ , less savings dominates the portfolio effect and the economy grows more slowly.

### Financial Market Globalization

- Obstfeld points out that the integration of global financial markets that allows residents to hold risky foreign, as well as domestic, investments increases diversification and effectively reduces individuals' portfolio variance,  $\sigma^2$ .
- The model predicts that if  $\epsilon > \gamma/(1-\gamma)$ , financial market integration causes countries to grow faster.
- This recursive utility model does not help in explaining the equity premium puzzle since, from (71), the risky-asset Sharpe ratio,  $(\mu r)/\sigma$ , equals  $(1 \gamma)\sigma_c$ , the same form as with time-separable utility.

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#### Risk-Free Rate Puzzle

• Recursive utility might explain the risk-free rate puzzle: substitute (71) into (72) and solve for *r*:

$$r = \rho + \frac{g_c}{\epsilon} - \left[1 - \gamma - \frac{\gamma}{\epsilon}\right] \frac{\sigma_c^2}{2} \tag{73}$$

ullet Recall that when  $\epsilon=1/\left(1-\gamma
ight)$  we have

$$r = \rho + (1 - \gamma) g_c - (1 - \gamma)^2 \frac{\sigma_c^2}{2}$$
 (74)

- Empirically,  $g_c \approx 0.018$  is large relative to  $\sigma_c^2/2 \approx 0.03^2/2$  = 0.00045, so the net effect of higher risk aversion,  $1 \gamma$ , needed to fit the equity risk premium implies too high a risk-free rate in (74).
- (73) may circumvent this problem because  $g_c$  is divided by  $\epsilon$ .

# Estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution

- From (70) and (72), if the risky-asset Sharpe ratio,  $(\mu r)/\sigma$ , is independent of the level of the real interest rate, r, then  $\epsilon$  can be estimated by regressing consumption growth,  $d \ln C$ , on the real interest rate, r.
- Tests using aggregate consumption data find that  $\epsilon$  is small, often close to zero.
- Other tests based on disaggregated consumption data find higher estimates for  $\epsilon$ , often around 1.
- A value of  $\epsilon=1$  makes r independent of  $\gamma$  and, assuming  $\rho$  is small, could produce a reasonable value for r.

# Summary

- For utility with habit persistence, the standard coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $1-\gamma$ , is transformed to  $(1-\gamma)/S_t$  where  $S_t < 1$  is the surplus consumption ratio.
- These models may imply aversion to holding risky assets sufficient to justify a high equity risk premium.
- Recursive utility distinguishes between an individual's level of risk aversion and his elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
- Such utility might allow a high equity risk premium and a low risk-free interest rate that is present in historical data.

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