International Macroeconomics Lecture 3.2: Crises, the 'Trilemma,' and Global Financial Institutions

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Putting It All Together

- How do exchange rates impact current account imbalances (and vice versa)?
- First, understand difference between real and nominal ER
 - 1. Real Exchange Rate: $R_t = \frac{\textit{Basket Price in Home (in apples)}}{\textit{Basket Price in Foreign (in apples)}}$
 - 2. Nominal Exchange Rate: Relative price of currencies
 - Units of ϵ_t : $\frac{home\ currency}{foreign\ currency}$
- Currency is strong when
 - 1. R_t is large
 - 2. ϵ_t is small
- In either case: Foreign goods relatively cheap

- Suppose currency strength shifts exogenously
- When currency is strong, easy to purchase foreign goods
 - 1. Propensity to import increases: $TB_t \downarrow$
 - 2. Must be financed, since B_t cannot change in t and

$$CA_t = TB_t + rB_t$$

- 3. CA_t falls to equilibriate market for goods/capital
- Strong currency puts downward pressure on current account
- Capital tends to flow into the country
- Opposite happens when currency is weak (capital tends to flow out)

Putting It All Together III

- Causality often flows other direction, as well!
- Exchange rates are prices
 - Reflect movement in fundamentals
- Suppose capital flowing into a country e.g. Switzerland during crisis (safe haven), Latin America in '70s (productive investment)
 - 1. Capital flowing in $\implies CA_t \downarrow$
 - 2. Market for goods/capital must clear: $CA_t = TB_t + rB_t$
 - Sometimes LHS is referred to as Capital Account and RHS is labeled Current Account
 - In equilibrium, they must be equal
 - 3. B_t cannot change this period, so TB_t must fall
 - 4. Currency strengthens to encourage imports
 - ϵ_t falls
 - If \(\epsilon_t \) pegged, domestic prices rise to induce more imports
 ⇒ \(R_t \)↑: Inflation over time

"It is not the speed that kills; it is the sudden stop." -Rudiger Dornbusch

- Many international financial crises share common features
- Often referred to as 'sudden stops': Tend to happen very quickly relative to build-up
 - Tends to come from 'sell-off' or 'fire sale' of home country's assets
 - Both from foreign investors and domestic residents
- Typical Sudden Stop Features (good metrics for crisis)
 - 1. Drop in output/GDP
 - 2. Spike in interest rates
 - Rise in sovereign default risk spread (more later)
 - Endogenous central bank response (stem capital outflow)
 - 3. Nominal exchange rate devaluation
 - 4. Current account reversal: $CA_t < 0$ and $CA_{t+1} > 0 \iff$ Capital flight
 - 5. Increased frequency of default on foreign debt

Sudden Stops: Examples

- Often underlying causes of sudden stop vary, but result looks similar
 - 1. Illiquidity/Inability to roll over large short-term liabilities (Mexico, 1994)
 - 2. Banking crisis results in government bailout \implies Normally solvent governments at risk of insolvency (East Asia, 1997)
 - 3. Terms of trade shock/speculative attack on currency (Russia, 2015)
 - 4. Sudden, large increase in risk-free borrowing costs (Latin America, Early 1980's)
 - 5. Natural disasters (Small Caribbean economies following large hurricanes)

Mundell's Model

- Studies consequences of monetary and fiscal policy under different ER regimes
- Assumes no capital controls/free mobility of capital
 - 1. Under a flexible ER policy
 - Monetary policy has expansionary bite
 - Fiscal policy has no bite
 - 2. Under a fixed ER policy
 - Monetary policy has no expansionary bite
 - Fiscal policy has bite
- Roles of two switch based on regime!

Assumptions of Mundell's Model

- 1. 4 'sectors'
 - Government, private, foreign, banking
- 2. 4 'markets'
 - Goods, securities (domestic assets), money, international reserves (foreign assets)
- 3. Cagan-type equation for domestic money demand:

$$m_t - p_t = -\eta i_{t+1} + \phi y_t$$

- 4. Nominal ER = Real ER: $e_t = q_t$
- 5. ER impacts output via trade surplus
 - Depreciation \rightarrow Surplus \uparrow and $y_t \uparrow$
- 6. Low/Stable inflation \rightarrow Nominal/Real Interest rate same and fixed abroad

Benchmark Table

TABLE I

Market Sector	Goods		Securities		Money		International Reserves	
Government	T-G	+	Government Borrowing	+	Government Dishoarding	+	*1	= 0
Private	S^+_{-I}		+ Private	,	+ Private		*2	= 0
rrivate			Borrowing	+	Dishoarding	+	_	= 0
Foreign	$\stackrel{+}{M-}X$	+	Capital Outflow	+	*3	+	Increase in Reserves	= 0
	+		+		+		+	+
Banking	*4	+	Open Market	+	Monetary	+	Foreign	= 0
			Sales		Expansion		Exchange Sales	
	Į.		1		1		Į.	
	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	= 0

- Central bank purchases domestic assets from domestic banks (open-market operations)
 - 1. Banks sell domestic assets (1) For cash (increase M) and (2) Substitute out for foreign assets (capital outflow)
 - 2. Money supply increases causes ER depreciation: Raises output (trade surplus)
 - Through money demand, increase in money supply must raise output more than proportionally since interest rate fixed (multiplier)
 - 4. Output increase raises taxes/domestic saving, but also reduces government debt fosters saving abroad
 - 5. Further capital outflow \rightarrow Further output (trade surplus) increase
- Monetary policy has no impact on interest rate, but causes ER depreciation
 - Capital outflows, export increases, output rises

TABLE I

Sector\ Market	Goods		Securities	Money		International Reserves	
Government	T-G	+	Government Borrowing	+ Government Dishoarding	+	*1	= 0
D	S-I		+	+ II D :		+	+
Private	3-1	+	Private Borrowing	+ Private Dishoarding	+	72	= 0
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Foreign	V M-X	+	Capital Outflow	+ **	+	Increase in Reserves	= 0
	*4		_ +	+		+	+
Banking	*4	+	∏Open Market	+ AMonetary	+	Foreign	= 0
			V Sales ■	■ Expansion		Exchange Sales	
	Į.		Į.	.			
	0	+	0	+ 0	+	0	= 0

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Market Sector	Goods		Securities	Money		International Reserves	
Government	$\bigcap T-G$	+	Government Borrowing	+ Government Dishoarding	+	*1	= 0
Private	\int_{S-I}^{+}	+	+ Private Borrowing	+ + Private Dishoarding	+	+ *2	= 0
Foreign	$ \prod_{M-X} + X $	+	+ Capital Outflow	+ *3	+	+ Increase in Reserves	= 0
Banking	*4	+	Open Market	+ + Monetary Expansion	+	+ Foreign Exchange Sales	= 0
	o	+	0	+ 0	+	0	= 0

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Foreign	$\int_{0}^{\infty} M^{+}_{-X}$	+	+ Capital A Outflow	+ **3	+	+ Increase in Reserves	= 0
Banking	*4	+	Open Market	+ + Monetary Expansion	+	+ Foreign Exchange Sales	= 0
	ő	+	0	+ 0	+	0	= 0

Flexible ER: Alternative Monetary Policy

- Central bank purchases foreign assets using printed money
 - 1. Reserves increase; Causes ER depreciation through impact on money supply
 - Money supply increase causes ER depreciation: Raises output (trade surplus)
 - Through money demand, increase in money supply must raise output more than proportionally since interest rate fixed (multiplier)
 - 4. Output increase raises taxes/domestic saving, but also reduces government debt fosters saving abroad
 - Further capital outflow → Further output (trade surplus) increase
- ER policy has symmetrical impact as monetary policy
 - Capital outflows, exports increase, output rises
 - Increase in foreign reserves instead of domestic assets on CB balance sheet

Flexible ER: ER Policy

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Sector	et Goods		Securities	Money	International Reserves
Government	T-G	+	Government Borrowing	+ Government Dishoarding	+ *1 = (
Private	$\int_{0}^{+} S^{+}I$	+	+ Private Borrowing	+ + Private Dishoarding	+ *2 = 0
Foreign	$\prod_{M} \prod_{M=X}^{+}$	+	+ Capital Outflow	+ *3	+ Increase = 0
Banking	*4	+	Open Market Sales	+ Monetary Expansion	+ Foreign = 0 Exchange Sales
	ő	+	0	+ 0	+ 0 = 0

Flexible ER: Fiscal Policy

- Government issues debt to finance spending
 - 1. Normally increases output, but
 - Cagan model: Interest rate fixed; money supply fixed
 - Output cannot change
 - 2. Output constant implies domestic behavior unchanged
 - Capital inflows finance borrowing
 - ER appreciates: Trade balance weakens
- Fiscal policy has no bite
 - Borrow from abroad to consume foreign goods (higher imports)
 - No change in output/GDP

Flexible ER: Fiscal Policy

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Foreign	$\bigwedge^+ M - X$	+	Capital Outflow	+	*3	+	+ Increase in Reserves	= 0
Banking	*4	+	+ Open Market Sales	+	+ Monetary Expansion	+	+ Foreign Exchange Sales	= 0
	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	= 0

Fixed ER: Monetary Policy

- Central bank purchases domestic assets from domestic banks
 - Cannot alter money supply without altering ER: Sell reserves to finance
 - 2. Reduction in reserves \iff Outflow of capital
 - 3. No effect on real variables (output, trade balance, etc.)
- Monetary policy (open-market operation) completely neutered, since money supply can't change!

Fixed ER: Monetary Policy

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Banking	*4	+	Open Market	+	+ Monetary Expansion	+0	+ Foreign Exchange Sales	= 0
	Ö	+	0	+	0	+	0	= 0

Fixed ER: Fiscal Policy

- Government issues debt to finance increased expenditure
 - 1. Both foreign and domestic investors purchase issued debt
 - 2. Saving and imports rise as a consequence
 - 3. Exogenous shift in y_t : Money demand can (and must) rise without impacting ER
 - 4. Households sell domestic assets to acquire money
 - Private sector demands more money as well: Sell assets for cash
 - Causes even further capital outflows
 - 5. To prevent ER appreciation, CB prints money for private sector and purchases reserves
- Fiscal policy causes tendency to appreciation
- Since ER cannot move, CB increases money supply to offset
- Monetary expansion allows for real expansion to take place
 - Capital outflows, exports increase, output rises

Fixed ER: Fiscal Policy

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Sector Market	Goods		Securities		Money		International Reserves	
Government	\mathbf{r}^{T-G}	+	☆ Government Borrowing	+	Government Dishoarding	+	*1	= 0
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Fixed ER: Fiscal Policy

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Foreign	$\bigcap_{M} M - X$	+	Capital Outflow	+	*3		Increase n Reserves	= 0
Banking	*4	+	Open Market Sales	+ 1	Monetary Expansion	+ \ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	Foreign Exchange Sales	= 0


Other Scenarios

- 1. Speculative attack build-up described
- 2. Notes contradiction in Sterilization Policy with fixed ER
 - Sterilization policy: All shifts in foreign assets met by equal shifts in domestic assets (no money supply movement)
 - In fixed ER world, if government increases spending...
 - Must be met by increase in reserves
 - But increase in reserves is sterilized with foreign domestic asset sales rather than monetary expansion
 - Without monetary expansion, fiscal expansion of GDP could never have occurred to begin with!
 - Contradiction: Inconsistent policy
 - Can't peg ER and sterilize all asset purchases
 - Something's 'gotta give'. Either
 - ER peg collapse
 - · Money supply responds: Abandon sterilization
 - Forecasted collapse of Bretton Woods (fixed ER; gold sterilization)

Why a 'Trilemma'?

- Because results hold only under perfect capital mobility
- Can in principle limit capital mobility with policy
 - Capital Controls are legal restrictions on cross-border financial transactions
- Examples
 - Illegalize currency trading (Malaysia 1997)
 - Illegalize foreign deposits at domestic banks (Brazil, recent)
 - Cap foreign transfers of funds (Greece, 2015)
- Black markets always emerge (limited effectiveness)
- 'Trilemma' in words: When capital is freely mobile, floating ER allows for effective monetary policy

Trilemma Graphically



Pre-Wars Era

- Increasing globalization throughout 19th century
- Currency stability becoming progressively more important
 - Gold standard adopted by many countries
 - 1. 15% of countries in 1870
 - 2. 70% of countries in 1913
 - Not always easy: William Jennings Bryan's 'Cross of Gold' speech in 1896
 - Why gold? Network externality
- Collapsed with WWI
 - 1. Inflation tax required
 - 2. War substantially reduced trade ($\approx 100\%$ warring, 50% non-warring)

Inter-War Era

- International gold standard still prevalent, but shaken
 - 1. Trade flows stayed low post-WWI
 - 2. Extreme volatility in 20's and 30's raised cost of pegging (trilemma)
 - 3. Large asymmetry in gold reserve allotment after war: Difficult for many countries to peg

Speculative Attacks in early '30s caused

- Abandon peg
 - Britain, US
- Impose capital controls
 - Austria, Germany, Latin America
- Those remaining on gold standard (France, Switzerland, etc.)
 paid heavy price: 21-26% loss of output relative to others

Bretton Woods System

- 44 states/governments met in July, 1944 in Bretton Woods, NH
 - During WWII. Discussed global financial system in expectation of victory
- Stability of gold standard still preeminent/desired
 - Distrust of foreign financiers: "Drive...the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance." -Henry Morgenthau (U.S. Treasury Secretary)
 - Aimed for capital controls of a sort while maintaining worldwide pegs and autonomous monetary policy
- World would peg to US\$ and US\$ pegged to gold
 - Tried to place legal restrictions on 'speculative trade,' to limit capital mobility without hindering trade finance
 - Hard to enforce in long-run

Collapse of BWS

- System collapsed between 1971-1973
 - High inflation in US from Vietnam war made peg difficult to sustain
 - Capital mobility could not be capped and trilemma held
- · Different countries went different ways
 - 1. Float: US, UK, Japan, Australia, ...
 - 2. Peg: Many developing economies, Europe, ...
 - 3. Hybrid: India, Mexico, ...
 - 4. Capital controls: China
- The 'pillars' of Bretton Woods were not abandoned though
 - 1. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
 - World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

The 'Pillars' of the New BW Order: World Bank

- IMF and World Bank are owned and directed by governments of member nations
 - Designed to reconstitute and stabilize global financial system
- World Bank
 - Primary Goal: Finance economic development when private sector won't
 - 1. Infrastructure public in nature
 - 2. Too risky for private investors
 - First loans extended in late 1940's: Reconstruct Western Europe
 - In latter half of 20th century, turned attention to developing nations: More than \$330 billion lent so far

Structure Today

- World Bank has many subsidaries:
 - IBRD
 - 2. International Development Association (IDA)
 - International Finance Corporation, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and Multilateral Guarantee Agency
- 12,000 staff members in 130 different offices throughout world
 - Many different types of professionals
- > 180 member nations
 - Votes based on weighted average of GDP, openness, and 'economic variability' (same for IMF)

Operations

- Member nations share equity in the Bank
 - IBRD issues AAA bonds to raise funds
 - Bonds guaranteed by member nations
 - Invest funds in developing economies' public projects at subsidized rate
 - Developing, moderately wealthy countries
 - 12-15 year loan maturity
 - IDA funded largely by grants from member countries
 - Loans interest-free funds to severely underdeveloped countries
 - Repayment schedule: 35-40 years
- Both target development that disproportionately benefits poorest people
- Both apply same standards at the project level

The 'Pillars' of the New BW Order: The IMF

- IMF
 - Primary goal: Stabilize international financial markets.
 Members must
 - 1. Allow for unhindered foreign trading of their currency
 - Keep IMF informed of changes in fiscal/monetary policies with international ramifications
 - Modify policies on recommendation of IMF to accommodate needs of world community
 - Secondary goal: Manages a pool of funds from which countries can borrow when in danger with international capital markets
 - Loan packages come with policy requirements i.e. 'strings attached'
- Over past half-century, primary and secondary roles have swapped

Structure Today

- Unlike, World Bank, IMF has no subsidiaries
- Substantially smaller staff (2400); almost all work in DC headquarters
 - Most are professional economists/financial experts
 - A few work in branches in Paris, Geneva, and the UN in New York
- Led by Board of Governors: One from each member country
- Managing Director traditionally European (or non-American);
 WB typically US-national in contrast
 - Currently Christine Lagarde (French)

Operations

- IMF finances itself through membership fees from 180+ members
 - Size of fee contingent on size and strength
 - Can borrow in dire circumstances, but typically does not need to
- All nations, regardless of development, have access to IMF resources
 - Nearly all nations have drawn on it to smooth balance of payments problems
 - Assistance packages: Loans that mature in 3-5 years
- In theory, IMF not an independent institution
 - Supposed to channel the will of the member majority into action
 - In practice, it typically has its own (benevolent, at least in intention) agenda

Shifted Mandate

- Initially intended to smooth over Bretton Woods imbalances
- Once collapsed in 1973, re-think mandate
- Constitutional amendment in 1978
 - 1. Continue to foster currency convertibility
 - Supervise policies that influence balance of payments (rather than monitoring compliance in fixed exchange system). Advisory role
 - 3. Provide short-medium term financial assistance when member nations encounter BOP difficulties
- IMF also has its own currency! Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which have time-varying convertibility to any member nations' currency
 - Can be used in place of other currencies in international transactions

IMF Activity

- Examples of IMF Intervention
 - 1. Latin American Debt Crisis: 1980's
 - 2. Mexico: 1994-1995
 - 3. Russia: Early post-USSR (early 1990's)
 - 4. Asian Crisis: 1997-19985. Argentinian Default: 2001
 - 6. Greece/Peripheral Eurozone Economies: 2010-present

Cooperation

- Cooperation between World Bank and IMF has increased over past few decades
- IMF has turned more attention toward institutional reforms that enable long-term growth e.g. well-developed infrastructure
- World Bank subsidizes such infrastructure
- Staff frequently consult with each other (right across street in DC!)
- Since early 90's, IMF targeted assistance to 70 or so poorer member nations in conjunction with IDA

Other Post-War Institutions

- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
 - Established unified market for coal in steel in Europe in early 1950's
 - Goal: Economic integration prevent any further conflict in mainland Europe: "Make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible."
 - Marked movement toward unity very shortly after violent conflict
 - Developed into European Community (trade group), then to European Union, and (45 years later) to common currency
- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
 - Formed in 1966: Asia-focused World-Bank equivalent largely led by Japan and US
 - Headquarters in Manila, Philippines