

# Equilibrium in an Endowment Economy

ECON 30020: Intermediate Macroeconomics

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# Readings

- ▶ GLS Ch. 10

# General Equilibrium

- ▶ We previously studied the optimal *decision problem* of a household. The outcome of this was an optimal *decision rule* (the consumption function)
- ▶ The decision rule takes prices as given. In two period consumption model, the only price is  $r_t$
- ▶ Three modes of economic analysis:
  1. Decision theory: derivation of optimal decision rules, taking prices as given
  2. Partial equilibrium: determine the price in one market, taking the prices in all other markets as given
  3. General equilibrium: simultaneously determine all prices in all markets
- ▶ Macroeconomics is focused on general equilibrium
- ▶ How do we go from decision rules to equilibrium? What determines prices?

# Competitive Equilibrium

- ▶ Webster's online dictionary defines the word equilibrium to be "a state in which opposing forces or actions are balanced so that one is not stronger or greater than the other."
- ▶ In economics, an equilibrium is a situation in which prices adjust so that (i) all parties are content supplying/demanding a given quantity of goods or services at those prices and (ii) markets clear
- ▶ If parties were not content, they would have an incentive to behave differently. Things wouldn't be "balanced" to use Webster's terms
- ▶ A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations where (i) all agents are behaving according to their optimal decision rules, taking prices as given, and (ii) all markets simultaneously clear

# Competitive Equilibrium in an Endowment Economy

- ▶ An endowment economy is a fancy term for an economy in which there is no endogenous production – the amount of income/output is exogenously given
- ▶ With fixed quantities, it becomes particularly clear how price adjustment results in equilibrium
- ▶ Basically, what we do is take the two period consumption model:
  - ▶ Optimal decision rule: consumption function
  - ▶ Market: market for saving,  $S_t$
  - ▶ Price:  $r_t$  (the real interest rate)
  - ▶ Market-clearing: in aggregate, saving is zero (equivalently,  $Y_t = C_t$ )
  - ▶ Allocations:  $C_t$  and  $C_{t+1}$
- ▶ This is a particularly simple environment, but the basic idea carries over more generally

# Setup

- ▶ There are  $L$  total agents who have identical preferences, but potentially different levels of income. Index households by  $j$
- ▶ Each household can borrow/save at the same real interest rate,  $r_t$
- ▶ Each household solves the following problem:

$$\max_{C_t(j), C_{t+1}(j)} U(j) = u(C_t(j)) + \beta u(C_{t+1}(j))$$

s.t.

$$C_t(j) + \frac{C_{t+1}(j)}{1 + r_t} = Y_t(j) + \frac{Y_{t+1}(j)}{1 + r_t}$$

- ▶ Optimal decision rule is the standard consumption function:

$$C_t(j) = C^d(Y_t(j), Y_{t+1}(j), r_t)$$

# Market-Clearing

- ▶ In this context, what does it mean for markets to clear?
- ▶ *Aggregate* saving must be equal to zero:

$$S_t = \sum_{j=1}^L S_t(j) = 0$$

- ▶ Why? One agent's saving must be another's borrowing and vice-versa
- ▶ But this implies:

$$\sum_{j=1}^L (Y_t(j) - C_t(j)) = 0 \Rightarrow \sum_{j=1}^L Y_t(j) = \sum_{j=1}^L C_t(j)$$

- ▶ In other words, aggregate income must equal aggregate consumption:

$$Y_t = C_t$$

## Everyone the Same

- ▶ Suppose that all agents in the economy have identical endowment levels in both period  $t$  and  $t + 1$
- ▶ Convenient to just normalize total number of agents to  $L = 1$  – representative agent. Can drop  $j$  references
- ▶ Optimal decision rule:

$$C_t = C^d(Y_t, Y_{t+1}, r_t)$$

- ▶ Market-clearing condition:

$$Y_t = C_t$$

- ▶  $Y_t$  and  $Y_{t+1}$  are exogenous. Optimal decision rule is effectively one equation in two unknowns –  $C_t$  (the allocation) and  $r_t$  (the price)
- ▶ Combining the optimal decision rule with the market-clearing condition allows you to determine both  $r_t$  and  $C_t$




## Graphical Analysis

- ▶ Define total desired expenditure as equal to consumption:

$$Y_t^d = C^d(Y_t, Y_{t+1}, r_t)$$


- ▶ Total desired expenditure is a function of income,  $Y_t$
- ▶ But income must equal expenditure in any equilibrium
- ▶ Graph desired expenditure against income. Assume total desired expenditure with zero current income is positive – i.e.  $C^d(0, Y_{t+1}, r_t) > 0$ . This is sometimes called “autonomous expenditure”
- ▶ Since  $MPC < 1$ , there will exist one point where income equals expenditure
- ▶ *IS* curve: the set of  $(r_t, Y_t)$  pairs where income equals expenditure assuming optimal behavior by household. Summarizes “demand” side of the economy. Negative relationship between  $r_t$  and  $Y_t$

# Derivation of the IS Curve




# The $Y^s$ Curve

- ▶ The  $Y^s$  curve summarizes the production side of the economy
- ▶ In an endowment economy, there is no production! So the  $Y^s$  curve is just a vertical line at the exogenously given level of  $Y_t$




# Equilibrium


- ▶ Must have income = expenditure (demand side) = production (supply-side). Find the  $r_t$  where  $IS$  and  $Y^s$  cross



# Supply Shock: $\uparrow Y_t$



# Demand Shock: $\uparrow Y_{t+1}$



# Discussion

- ▶ Market-clearing requires  $C_t = Y_t$
- ▶ For a given  $r_t$ , household does not want  $C_t = Y_t$ . Wants to smooth consumption relative to income
- ▶ But in equilibrium cannot
- ▶  $r_t$  adjusts so that household is content to have  $C_t = Y_t$
- ▶  $r_t$  ends up being a measure of how plentiful the future is expected to be relative to the present

## Example with Log Utility

- ▶ With log utility, equilibrium real interest rate comes out to be (just take Euler equation and set  $C_t = Y_t$  and  $C_{t+1} = Y_{t+1}$ ):

$$1 + r_t = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t}$$

- ▶  $r_t$  proportional to expected income growth
- ▶ Potential reason why interest rates are so low throughout world today: people are pessimistic about the future. They would like to save for that pessimistic future, which ends up driving down the return on saving



## Agents with Different Endowments

- ▶ Suppose there are two types of agents, 1 and 2.  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  of each type
- ▶ Identical preferences
- ▶ Type 1 agents receive  $Y_t(1) = 1$  and  $Y_{t+1}(1) = 0$ , whereas type 2 agents receive  $Y_t(2) = 0$  and  $Y_{t+1}(2) = 1$
- ▶ Assume log utility, so consumption functions for each type are:

$$C_t(1) = \frac{1}{1 + \beta}$$
$$C_t(2) = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \frac{1}{1 + r_t}$$

- ▶ Aggregate income in each period is  $Y_t = L_1$  and  $Y_{t+1} = L_2$

# Equilibrium

- ▶ With this setup, the equilibrium real interest rate is:

$$1 + r_t = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{L_2}{L_1}$$

- ▶ Noting that  $L_2 = Y_{t+1}$  and  $L_1 = Y_t$ , this is the same as in the case where everyone is the same!
- ▶ In particular, given aggregate endowments, equilibrium  $r_t$  does not depend on distribution across agents, only depends on aggregate endowment
- ▶ Amount of income heterogeneity at micro level doesn't matter for macro outcomes. Example of “market completeness” and motivates studying representative agent problems more generally