

Frequency-driven Imperceptible Adversarial Attack on Semantic Similarity

Cheng Luo* Qinliang Lin* Weicheng Xie[†] Bizhu Wu Jinheng Xie Linlin Shen

¹Computer Vision Institute, School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, Shenzhen University

²Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence & Robotics for Society

³Guangdong Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing

{luocheng2020, linqinliang2021}@email.szu.edu.cn, {wcxie, llshen}@szu.edu.cn

Abstract

Current adversarial attack research reveals the vulnerability of learning-based classifiers against carefully crafted perturbations. However, most existing attack methods have inherent limitations in cross-dataset generalization as they rely on a classification layer with a closed set of categories. Furthermore, the perturbations generated by these methods may appear in regions easily perceptible to the human visual system (HVS). To circumvent the former problem, we propose a novel algorithm that attacks semantic similarity on feature representations. In this way, we are able to fool classifiers without limiting attacks to a specific dataset. For imperceptibility, we introduce the low-frequency constraint to limit perturbations within high-frequency components, ensuring perceptual similarity between adversarial examples and originals. Extensive experiments on three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet-1K) and three public online platforms indicate that our attack can yield misleading and transferable adversarial examples across architectures and datasets. Additionally, visualization results and quantitative performance (in terms of four different metrics) show that the proposed algorithm generates more imperceptible perturbations than the state-of-the-art methods. Code is made available at <https://github.com/LinQinLiang/SSAH-adversarial-attack>.

1. Introduction

With the advent of deep learning, neural network models [10, 12, 16, 32] have demonstrated revolutionary performance in recognition tasks of real-world datasets. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) to image corruptions and adversarial examples has been unveiled [8, 35]. This problem hinders the applications of




Figure 1. Comparison of the adversarial examples and perturbations generated by three different attack methods: (a) C&W, (b) Our SSA (semantic similarity attack), and (c) Our SSAH (semantic similarity attack on high-frequency components). For the visualization, we regularize the perturbation by taking its absolute value and multiplying it by 25.

DNNs in security-critical domains and promotes research on understanding the robustness of DNNs, including adversarial attack [1, 8] and defense [22, 36, 40, 44].

The most intuitive approaches for white-box attacking are to increase the cost of the classification loss [8] to yield adversarial examples via gradient descent. Besides, they further apply ℓ_p distance to constrain the visual differences between benign and perturbed images. However, conventional approaches may suffer from the two open problems:

- **Inherent limitation in cross-dataset generalization.**

*Equal Contribution

[†]Corresponding Author

Due to the classification layer with learned weight vectors representing specific class proxies, current attack paradigms based on a white-box or surrogate classifier are limited to this setting, where images of the model training and attack domains are from the same set of categories. In real-world scenarios, however, an image from an open set [25] may belong to an unknown category to the classifier.

- **Poor imperceptibility to HVS.** Sharif *et al.* [30] have demonstrated that the ℓ_p distance metric is insufficient for assessing perceptual similarity. In other words, visual imperceptibility may not be explicitly reflected using only the perturbation intensity. For instance, C&W [1], a well-known attack method, generates easy-to-perceive perturbations on the smooth background, as shown in Fig. 1 (a).

Intuitively, a natural approach to circumvent the classification layer is to perform attacks in the feature space. In this work, we propose a general adversarial attack, namely semantic similarity attack (SSA), which builds on the similarity of feature representations. More specifically, we push apart the representations of adversarial and benign examples but pull that of adversarial and target (the most dissimilar) examples together. In this way, we can fool classifiers without the knowledge of the specific image category. The underlying assumption is that the high-level representation implies image discrimination and semantics. Hence, perturbing such representation can guide perturbations towards semantic regions within pixel space. As shown in Fig. 1 (b), SSA focuses on perturbing semantic regions such as objects in the scene while suppressing redundant perturbations on irrelevant regions.

In addition to ℓ_p norms [1, 2, 26, 27], other measures such as CIEDE2000 [46], SSIM [9] and LPIPS [18] are applied to approximate perceptual similarity. In this work, we provide a different metric from the frequency domain perspective. Generally, the low-frequency component of an image contains the basic information, whereas the high-frequency components represent trivial details and noise. Inspired by it, we measure the variations of low-frequency components as the perceptual variations in image pixel space. We further build a low-frequency constraint to limit the perturbations within imperceptible high-frequency components. As depicted in Fig. 1 (c), the perturbations generated by the proposed framework, *i.e.*, SSAH, appear mostly on imperceptible regions such as object edges. Some works show that adversarial examples may be neither in high-frequency nor low-frequency components [23], and low-frequency perturbations with much perceptibility are especially effective for attacking defended models [31]. Nevertheless, we consider that developing attacks in high-frequency components is significant, as it helps improve perturbation imperceptibil-

ity to HVS and learn robust models that better align with human perception. Recent works [38, 41] also prove that these high-frequency signals are barely perceivable to HVS but can largely determine the prediction results of DNNs.

The main contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We propose a novel adversarial attack, SSA, which is applicable in wide settings by attacking the semantic similarity of images.
- We present a new perturbation constraint, the low-frequency constraint, into the joint optimization of SSA to limit perturbations within the imperceptible high-frequency components.
- We conduct extensive experiments on three datasets, *i.e.*, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet-1K, and the experiment results show that our proposed attack outperforms the state-of-the-art methods by significantly imperceptible perturbations.
- Experimental results demonstrate that adversarial perturbations generated by our SSAH are more transferable across different architectures and datasets.

2. Related Work

Feature Space Attack. Feature space attacks [13, 29] manipulate the image representation to appear remarkably similar to the target image from a different class. The same goal of these methods is to directly minimize the Euclidean distance between intermediate layer features of source and target images in the target DNN. Similar attacks recently applied to Person Re-identification [37, 39] or Image Retrieval [7, 19] generate adversarial perturbations or patterns by minimizing the distance of the inter-class pair while maximizing the distance of the intra-class pair. In this work, we perturb the class-specific representations of image instances from the perspective of feature similarity and design a more flexible optimization scheme.

Imperceptible Attack. A rich line of works [1, 8, 9, 14, 18, 45, 46] resort to devising perceptual similarity metrics to constrain perturbations during adversarial example generation. Among these metrics, ℓ_p norms of perturbations are generally employed [1]. However, recent works have revealed that ℓ_p norms do not well align with human perception. Thus, other perceptual distances in terms of similarity of object structures [9], edges [14], color [46], and Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) [18, 45] are proposed to improve the imperceptibility of perturbations. In this work, we decompose images into various frequency components by wavelets and measure image pair similarity via the distance of their low-frequency components.




Figure 2. An overview of proposed SSAH. Left: Semantics Similarity Attack; Right: Low-frequency Constraint. $f(\cdot)$ is the mapping from an image to its embedding in representation space. $\phi(\cdot)$ is a shallow network that decomposes an image into different frequency components and reconstructs it using the low-frequency component.

Wavelets in Deep Learning. Wavelet is an effective tool for time-frequency analysis, and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is frequently used to decompose image data into various frequency components. Recent works [6, 21] explore implementing wavelet transform in deep learning for various visual tasks such as image segmentation. In particular, Li *et al.* [20] design a DWT/IDWT layer, making discrete wavelet transform easily applicable in DNNs.

3. Methodology

In a white-box setup, an adversary can access details of the target classifier (*i.e.*, architectures, parameters, gradients of the loss with respect to (w.r.t.) the input) to craft an adversarial example $\mathbf{x}^{adv} = \mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$ with the image perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ to the benign example \mathbf{x} . Generally, a distance metric \mathcal{D} is required to quantify the perceptual similarity (between an adversarial example and its original one) and is used as the constraint of the perturbation. We can formulate the adversarial examples in the untargeted attack scenario as a solution to the following problem:

$$\mathbf{x}^{adv} = \mathbf{x} + \arg \min_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \{\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) \mid \arg \max_i \{z'_i\} \neq y\}, \quad (1)$$

where $z'_i = \mathbf{w}_i^T f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta})$ denotes the logit (*i.e.*, the similarity score between the embedding vector $f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta})$ of the example and the weight vector \mathbf{w}_i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, C$), y denotes the ground-truth label and C is the number of classes.

In this work, we propose a novel semantic similar-

ity attack on high-frequency components (SSAH), and the framework is depicted in Fig. 2. SSAH is composed of an attack paradigm (semantic similarity attack) and a new perturbation constraint (low-frequency constraint). The semantic similarity attack does not require the classification layer but tends to change the similarity of pairwise feature representations. The low-frequency constraint preserves the basic information of objects and limits perturbations within imperceptible high-frequency components.

3.1. Semantics Similarity Attack

3.1.1 Attack Design

Conventional white-box attack methods solve the problem presented in Eq. (1) by maximizing the classification loss or changing logits. However, given a minibatch of N instances, *i.e.*, $\mathbf{X} = [\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N]$, we instead optimize the representation of the i -th adversarial example \mathbf{x}_i^{adv} as:

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{adv} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} [s'_{i,i} - \min\{s'_{i,j} \mid j \neq i\}]_+, \quad (2)$$

where $[\cdot]_+$ denotes $\max(\cdot, 0)$, \mathbf{x}'_i is the optimization variable and initialized as \mathbf{x}_i , $s'_{i,i} = \text{sim}(f(\mathbf{x}'_i), f(\mathbf{x}_i))$ and $s'_{i,j} = \text{sim}(f(\mathbf{x}'_i), f(\mathbf{x}_j))$ are similarity scores. In our method, we use cosine similarity of embeddings, which is defined as:

$$s'_{i,j} = \frac{f(\mathbf{x}'_i)^T f(\mathbf{x}_j)}{\|f(\mathbf{x}'_i)\|_2 \|f(\mathbf{x}_j)\|_2}. \quad (3)$$

Likewise, we can define the attack in the targeted scenario as:

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{adv} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} [s'_{i,i} - s'_{i,t}]_+, \quad (4)$$

where t denotes the index of the target image in the mini-batch. Eq. (4) aims to encourage the adversarial example \mathbf{x}'_i to be close to the target \mathbf{x}_t in terms of the feature representation. Without loss of generality, we only discuss the case of untargeted attacks.

The attack objective in Eq. (1) changes logits of the classification layer. In other words, it pushes the embedding of an adversarial example apart from its ground-truth class centroid. By contrast, we directly change pair-wise similarity: reducing the similarity between the adversarial example and its original, while increasing the similarity between the adversarial example and its most dissimilar one in the mini-batch. In this way, our attack misleads a classifier to map the example representation into a different subspace.

3.1.2 Self-paced Weighting

To avoid redundant perturbations, we design a self-paced weighting scheme to improve the optimization flexibility. This scheme design is inspired by Circle loss [33] that uses it in metric learning. It aims at adjusting the optimization pace for each similarity score as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_i^{adv} &= \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} \mathcal{L}_{SSA}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i) \\ &= \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} [\alpha_i s'_{i,i} - \beta_i \min\{s'_{i,j} | j \neq i\}]_+, \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where α_i and β_i are adjusted in a self-paced manner as:

$$\begin{cases} \alpha_i = [s'_{i,i} - m]_+, \\ \beta_i = [1 + m - \min\{s'_{i,j} | j \neq i\}]_+, \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where $m \geq 0$ is a pre-defined margin. Eq. (6) is the weight factor setting for our attack. Compared to the optimization of $(s'_{i,i} - s'_{i,j})$ in Eq. (2), we introduce the adaptive weighting as $(\alpha_i s'_{i,i} - \beta_i s'_{i,j})$. During the optimization of variable \mathbf{x}'_i , the gradient with respect to $(\alpha_i s'_{i,i} - \beta_i s'_{i,j})$ is multiplied with α_i (β_i) when back-propagated to $s'_{i,i}$ ($s'_{i,j}$). Consequently, the similarity score close to its optimum is assigned with a smaller gradient, whereas the less optimized similarity score is assigned with a larger gradient.

3.2. Low-frequency Constraint

Although SSA yields perturbations in the representation space, there is still a risk that these perturbations may distribute in regions perceptible to HVS. Conventional constraints, on the other hand, may result in a random distribution of perturbation. Therefore, we seek a new constraint into the joint optimization of SSA, limiting perturbations into imperceptible details of objects.




Figure 3. Illustration of our image decomposition and reconstruction by wavelet transforms. An image \mathbf{x} with complex (e.g., Part A) and smooth (e.g., Part B) contexts can be decomposed into the low-frequency component (\mathbf{x}_{ll}) and high-frequency components (\mathbf{x}_{lh} , \mathbf{x}_{hl} and \mathbf{x}_{hh}) by Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). The reconstructed image $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$ has the same fundamental shape and resolution as the original image \mathbf{x} .

We observe that HVS is more sensitive to object structures and smooth regions, whereas it is not easy to perceive object edges and complex textures. For example, the perturbations hidden in the dense bubbles of Part A (in Fig. 3) are more invisible than those in the smooth background like Part B. It motivates us to limit perturbations into regions less sensitive to HVS.

From a frequency domain perspective, the high-frequency components representing noise and textures are more imperceptible than the low-frequency component containing basic object structure. As a time-frequency analysis tool, discrete wavelet transform (DWT) can decompose an image \mathbf{x} into one low-frequency and three high-frequency components, i.e., \mathbf{x}_{ll} , \mathbf{x}_{lh} , \mathbf{x}_{hl} , \mathbf{x}_{hh} as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_{ll} &= \mathbf{LxL}^T, \mathbf{x}_{lh} = \mathbf{HxL}^T, \\ \mathbf{x}_{hl} &= \mathbf{LxH}^T, \mathbf{x}_{hh} = \mathbf{HxH}^T, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where \mathbf{L} and \mathbf{H} are the low-pass and high-pass filters of an orthogonal wavelet, respectively. As shown in Fig. 3, \mathbf{x}_{ll} preserves the low-frequency information of the original image, whereas \mathbf{x}_{lh} , \mathbf{x}_{hl} and \mathbf{x}_{hh} are associated with edges and drastic variations.

Normally, inverse DWT (IDWT) uses all four components to reconstruct the image. In this work, we drop the high-frequency components and reconstruct an image with only the low-frequency component as $\bar{\mathbf{x}} = \phi(\mathbf{x})$, where

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{L}^T \mathbf{x}_{ll} \mathbf{L} = \mathbf{L}^T (\mathbf{LxL}^T) \mathbf{L}. \quad (8)$$

Based on this process of image decomposition and reconstruction, we can obtain the main image information. It means that we can assess the perceptual similarity between

two images in terms of the main information. On that basis, we develop a new constraint between \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}' :

$$\mathcal{D}_{lf}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = \|\phi(\mathbf{x}) - \phi(\mathbf{x}')\|_1. \quad (9)$$

Consequently, the loss of perceptual information specific to perturbed images is reduced by minimizing Eq. (9).

3.3. The Unified Attack

We define the objective of SSAH as the semantic similarity attack SSA under the new constraint \mathcal{D}_{lf} . The adversarial example \mathbf{x}_i^{adv} can be obtained as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_i^{adv} &= \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} \mathcal{L}_{SSAH}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i) \\ &= \lambda \mathcal{D}_{lf}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i) + \mathcal{L}_{SSA}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i), \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where λ is a hyperparameter specific to the low-frequency constraint. In practice, we replace \mathbf{x}'_i with a variable $r_i = \operatorname{arctanh}(2\mathbf{x}'_i - 1)$ for optimization. For clarity, we present the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1 to outline the main procedures of our SSAH.

Algorithm 1 Adversarial attack with SSAH

Require: A minibatch of original images $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^N$; the number of iterations K ; the encoder $f(\cdot)$ of a classifier.

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1: Initialize  $\{\mathbf{x}'_i\}_{i=1}^N$  with  $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^N$ ;
2: for  $i = 1$  to  $N$  do
3:   Initialize the variable  $r_i$  as  $\operatorname{arctanh}(2\mathbf{x}'_i - 1)$ ;
4:   for  $k = 1$  to  $K$  do
5:     Calculate the cosine similarity scores  $\{s'_{i,j}\}_{j=1}^N$  as in Eq. (3) and use  $s'_{i,i}$  and the lowest similarity score  $\min\{s'_{i,j} | j \neq i\}$  in Eq. (5);
6:     Calculate the constraint loss  $\mathcal{D}_{lf}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i)$  as in Eq. (9);
7:     Optimize the variable  $r_i$  by minimizing  $\mathcal{L}_{SSAH}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i)$  as in Eq. (10) and obtain  $\mathbf{x}'_i$  through  $r_i$ ;
8:   end for
9: end for
10: return  $\{\mathbf{x}'_i\}_{i=1}^N$ .

```

4. Experiments

4.1. Experimental Setup

Datasets. We evaluate the performance of our method on three general datasets, namely CIFAR-10 [15], CIFAR-100 [15], and ImageNet-1K [28]. In particular, CIFAR-10 contains 50K training samples and 10K testing samples with the size of 32×32 from 10 classes; CIFAR-100 has 100 classes, containing the same number of training (testing) samples as

CIFAR-10; ImageNet-1K has 1K classes, containing about 1.3M images for training and 50K images for validation.

Implementation details. Adam optimizers with the learning rates of 0.01, 0.01, and 0.001 are used for C&W, PerC-AL [46] and our SSAH, respectively. The default values for the hyperparameters m in Eq. (6) and λ in Eq. (10) are 0.2 and 0.1, respectively. The perturbation budget (ϵ) is set to 8/255 under the ℓ_∞ for BIM [17], PGD [22], AA (AutoAttack) [3] and MIM [4], respectively. This budget is specified with the iterative step size $\alpha = 1/255$. We use ResNet-20 models that achieve the 7.4% and 30.4% top-1 test errors on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively, as the white-box model for these two datasets. For ImageNet-1K, pre-trained ResNet-50 that achieves the 23.85% top-1 error is employed. For the DWT/IDWT layer in our low-frequency constraint, Haar wavelet is used. All our experiments are conducted on a NVIDIA A100 GPU with 40GB memory.

Evaluation metrics. For the performance evaluation and comparison, we use the attack success rate (ASR) and four different metrics, including conventional average ℓ_2 distortion, maximum perturbation intensity (ℓ_∞), Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [11] and a newly introduced metric, *i.e.*, average distortion of low-frequency components (LF) based on 2D DWT, for approximating the perceptual similarity. LF ($\text{LF} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \|\phi(\mathbf{x}_i) - \phi(\mathbf{x}_i^{adv})\|_2$) is employed to quantify average variations of the basic structure information between the original and adversarial examples.

4.2. White-box Attacks

In this section, we evaluate the adversarial strength and imperceptibility of the examples generated by different approaches in a white-box scenario, where the knowledge of the target system is fully accessible.

Tab. 1 shows the performances of nine attack approaches in terms of five different metrics. It demonstrates that our attack, with the lowest ℓ_p (*i.e.*, ℓ_2 or ℓ_∞) norm of perturbations, is successful on all three datasets. More importantly, our semantic similarity attack (SSA), without tightly constraining the ℓ_p norms or other perceptual distances, can generate perturbations that are imperceptible.

Generally, FID is consistent with human judgment and well reflects the level of disturbance. It calculates the distance between the benign and perturbed images in the feature space of an Inception-v3 [34] network. The proposed SSAH achieves the FID of 3.90 on Imagenet-1K, which outperforms the state-of-the-art models like PerC-AL (11.56 FID) by a large margin. Such improvement suggests that our feature-oriented attack generates adversarial examples with more realistic visual effects in pixel space but fewer variations in feature space.

Tab. 1 also shows that our attack significantly outperforms the other methods among all cases in terms of LF. It implies that our attack can effectively preserve the ob-

| Dataset | Attack | Iteration | RunTime (s) \downarrow | ASR (%) \uparrow | $\ell_2 \downarrow$ | $\ell_\infty \downarrow$ | FID \downarrow | LF \downarrow |
|-------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| CIFAR-10 | BIM [17] | 10 | 35 | 100 | 0.85 | 0.03 | 14.85 | 0.23 |
| | PGD [22] | 10 | 37 | 100 | 1.28 | 0.03 | 27.86 | 0.34 |
| | MIM [4] | 10 | 46 | 100 | 1.90 | 0.03 | 26.00 | 0.48 |
| | AA ℓ_∞ [3] | 100 | 184 | 100 | 1.91 | 0.03 | 34.93 | 0.61 |
| | AdvDrop [5] | 150 | 392 | 99.92 | 0.90 | 0.07 | 16.34 | 0.34 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | 991 | 100 | 0.39 | 0.06 | 8.23 | 0.11 |
| | PerC-AL [46] | 1000 | 1221 | 98.29 | 0.86 | 0.18 | 9.58 | 0.15 |
| | SSA (ours) | 150 | 192 | 99.96 | 0.29 | 0.02 | 5.73 | 0.07 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 150 | 198 | 99.94 | 0.26 | 0.02 | 5.03 | 0.03 |
| CIFAR-100 | BIM [17] | 10 | 34 | 99.99 | 0.85 | 0.03 | 15.26 | 0.32 |
| | PGD [22] | 10 | 31 | 99.99 | 1.29 | 0.03 | 27.74 | 0.42 |
| | MIM [4] | 10 | 30 | 99.99 | 1.87 | 0.03 | 26.04 | 0.65 |
| | AA ℓ_∞ [3] | 100 | 184 | 100 | 1.91 | 0.03 | 33.86 | 0.61 |
| | AdvDrop [5] | 150 | 332 | 99.93 | 0.80 | 0.07 | 15.59 | 0.31 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | 751 | 100 | 0.52 | 0.07 | 11.04 | 0.19 |
| | PerC-AL [46] | 1000 | 919 | 99.61 | 1.41 | 0.21 | 12.83 | 0.37 |
| | SSA (ours) | 150 | 150 | 99.90 | 0.48 | 0.03 | 9.68 | 0.17 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 150 | 149 | 99.80 | 0.45 | 0.03 | 9.20 | 0.13 |
| ImageNet-1K | BIM [17] | 10 | 3998 | 99.98 | 26.85 | 0.03 | 51.92 | 11.18 |
| | PGD [22] | 10 | 3451 | 99.98 | 54.97 | 0.03 | 45.51 | 17.41 |
| | MIM [4] | 10 | 7847 | 99.98 | 91.78 | 0.03 | 101.88 | 39.42 |
| | AA ℓ_∞ [3] | 100 | 27312 | 96.97 | 71.62 | 0.03 | 77.49 | 30.45 |
| | AdvDrop [5] | 150 | 48355 | 99.76 | 14.95 | 0.06 | 11.28 | 5.67 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | > 100000 | 99.27 | 1.51 | 0.04 | 12.14 | 0.67 |
| | PerC-AL [46] | 1000 | > 100000 | 98.78 | 4.35 | 0.12 | 11.56 | 1.59 |
| | SSA (ours) | 200 | 35414 | 98.56 | 2.34 | 0.01 | 4.63 | 1.05 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 200 | 38018 | 98.01 | 1.81 | 0.01 | 3.90 | 0.06 |

Table 1. Results of the attack success rate (ASR) and three metrics related with perceptual similarity by nine attack approaches in the untargeted scenario. The best results are marked in bold.




Figure 4. Adversarial examples generated by five different attack approaches on CIFAR-100.

ject structure and the low-frequency component. The results specific to the targeted attack scenario follow a similar pattern and can be found in the supplementary material.

Fig. 4 shows the adversarial examples generated by five approaches on CIFAR-100. Meanwhile, Fig. 5 displays ad-

versarial examples and perturbations (with the same regularization as Fig. 1) of higher resolution images from ImageNet-1K. It is observed that images produced by our SSAH appear more natural to HVS.

4.3. Robustness

| Defense | Attack | CIFAR-10 | CIFAR-100 |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | No Attack | 89.98 |
| FSAT [43] | AdvDrop [5] | 70.26 | 40.83 |
| | C&W [1] | 60.60 | 25.04 |
| | PerC-AL [46] | 89.80 | 74.00 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 60.43 | 4.85 |
| | No Attack | 84.92 | 56.94 |
| TRADES [44] | AdvDrop [5] | 84.42 | 56.37 |
| | C&W [1] | 81.24 | 48.51 |
| | PerC-AL [46] | 84.70 | 56.90 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 78.68 | 49.23 |

Table 2. Recognition accuracy (%) of two defense methods under four white-box attacks.

To study the robustness of the proposed attack, we com-




Figure 5. Adversarial examples and perturbations generated by three attack approaches on two high-resolution images from ImageNet-1K. This figure is best viewed in color/screen.

pare the attack success rates of four attack approaches against two defense schemes (FSAT [43] and TRADES [44]). The same network architecture as [44], *i.e.*, WRN-34-10 introduced in [42], is used to generate adversarial perturbations.

Based on the network trained with the defense method FSAT, our attack decreases the model accuracy by a large margin, *i.e.*, 29.55% on CIFAR-10 and 69.26% on CIFAR-100, and largely outperforms other approaches on CIFAR-100, as shown in Tab. 2. Against the more robust defense method (*i.e.*, TRADES), SSAH can still achieve competitive results. For CIFAR-10, an improvement of 2.56% is achieved by SSAH compared with C&W.

4.4. Transferability

To study the transferability of the proposed algorithm in an open-set setting, we evaluate adversarial examples transferred across both architectures and datasets. That is, without the knowledge of the training set and architecture of a black-box model (*e.g.*, ResNet-18), we study to which extent attack approaches, based on another architecture (*e.g.*, ResNet-20) trained on another dataset (*e.g.*, CIFAR-10), affect the classification of this black-box model on the validation set (*e.g.*, ImageNet-1K). We use Gaussian noise and input-agnostic perturbations (*i.e.*, GD-UAP [24]) as the baselines and the ℓ_∞ -norm bound of 10/255 for the perturbation generation. The experimental results in Tab. 3 show that our SSAH significantly outperforms these two baselines for eight out of eight cases.

To test attack effectiveness in real-world scenarios, we conduct experiments of attacking the online models on Mi-

| Surrogate | Training set | Attack | ResNet-18 | VGG-16 |
|-----------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| - | - | Gaussian Noise | 9.18 | 10.20 |
| ResNet-20 | CIFAR-10 | GD-UAP [24] | 14.09 | 11.44 |
| | | SSAH (ours) | 17.66 | 16.87 |
| ResNet-20 | CIFAR-100 | GD-UAP [24] | 12.72 | 10.22 |
| | | SSAH (ours) | 18.31 | 18.68 |
| VGG-11 | CIFAR-10 | GD-UAP [24] | 14.63 | 12.38 |
| | | SSAH (ours) | 16.92 | 17.52 |
| VGG-11 | CIFAR-100 | GD-UAP [24] | 12.93 | 10.39 |
| | | SSAH (ours) | 17.92 | 19.14 |

Table 3. The attack success rates (%) of transferring adversarial examples across different architectures and datasets. The first column (Surrogate) and the second column (Training set) represent the surrogate’s architecture and training set, respectively. The target classifier (*i.e.*, ResNet-18 or VGG-16) is trained on a different dataset (*i.e.*, ImageNet-1K) and the validation set of ImageNet-1K is used for the testing.

crosoft Azure¹, Tencent Cloud² and Baidu AI Cloud³. The model and training data used in their platforms are completely unknown to us. We randomly sample 200 images from the ImageNet-1K validation set (the image names are listed in our supplementary material) and perturb them using four attack approaches on ResNet-152. Tab. 4 shows the attack success rates of these attacks against the online models. In Tab. 4, the proposed attack, without any classification query, achieves an attack success rate of 37.98% against the online model on Tencent Cloud, which outper-

¹<https://azure.microsoft.com/>

²<https://cloud.tencent.com/>

³<https://cloud.baidu.com/>

| Attack | Microsoft Azure | Tencent Cloud | Baidu AI Cloud |
|--------------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| AdvDrop [5] | 16.26 | 15.83 | 17.82 |
| C&W [1] | 13.82 | 21.71 | 27.72 |
| PerC-AL [46] | 15.45 | 18.61 | 18.81 |
| SSAH (ours) | 18.70 | 37.98 | 36.63 |

Table 4. The attack success rates (%) of transferring adversarial examples to three online models.

forms the other approaches by a large margin.

4.5. Analysis

In this section, we give insight into the working mechanism of the proposed attack and study the behavior of each component in the attack.




Figure 6. The 2D feature representation of the adversarial examples using the t-SNE algorithm under (a) SSAH and (b) C&W. An adversarial example representation gradually updates from its original class (horse) to the selected target class (ship). The results in the iteration of 10, 15, 20, 30, and 40 are presented.

To study the adversarial example generation of the proposed semantic similarity attack, we visualized the iterative adversarial examples on the 2D plane in Fig. 6. In this analysis, a subset of random instances of four classes from CIFAR-10 is used for visualization. Fig. 6 shows our attack can iteratively push the adversarial example away from the benign example, and gradually guide it toward the target class in the feature representation space. Compared with C&W, our semantic similarity attack is more effective at misleading a white-box network into mapping an image to the target class subspace.

To study the performance of the proposed low-frequency constraint, normalized perturbations by SSA and SSAH in different iterations are visualized in Fig. 7. This figure shows that the perturbations generated by SSA are prone to distribute on object foreground as well as some smooth background regions, whereas the perturbations by SSAH gradually appear in edges or complex textures.

To quantify the contribution of each component in SSAH, we conduct an ablation study in Tab. 5. The results in the 1st and 2nd rows of Tab. 5 show SSA, with the adjustment of SPW, significantly reduces FID by a margin of 1.20 compared to the variant without SPW. The results in




Figure 7. Normalized perturbations generated by SSA and SSAH in different iterations.

| Attack | $\ell_2 \downarrow$ | $\ell_\infty \downarrow$ | FID \downarrow | LF \downarrow |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| SSA w/o SPW | 3.12 | 0.01 | 5.83 | 1.40 |
| SSA | 2.34 | 0.01 | 4.63 | 1.05 |
| SSAH | 1.81 | 0.01 | 3.90 | 0.06 |

Table 5. Ablation study of the proposed attack on ImageNet-1K based on different modules, *i.e.*, self-paced weighting (SPW), low-frequency constraint \mathcal{D}_{lf} . w/o SPW means deleting the self-spaced weighting.

the 2nd and 3rd rows show that the proposed low-frequency constraint largely improves LF, *i.e.*, from 1.05 to 0.06.

5. Conclusion

We propose a novel framework, SSAH, for adversarial attack. It aims to perturb images by attacking their semantic similarity in representation space. Such an approach of attacking images in the feature space works well in a variety of settings. The proposed framework, in particular, could be used in more general and practical black-box settings, such as generating transferable adversarial examples across architectures and datasets, and misleading actual online models on various platforms while retaining high imperceptibility. It is more common in practice to attack in the open set scenario. For this reason, developing more effective algorithms in this scenario is worthwhile. Furthermore, the low-frequency constraint is introduced to limit adversarial perturbations within high-frequency components. Extensive experiments show that such constrained perturbations improve imperceptibility, particularly in smooth regions.

6. Acknowledgement

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Frequency-driven Imperceptible Adversarial Attack on Semantic Similarity

Supplementary Materials

Cheng Luo* Qinliang Lin* Weicheng Xie[†] Bizehu Wu Jinheng Xie Linlin Shen

¹Computer Vision Institute, School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, Shenzhen University

²Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence & Robotics for Society

³Guangdong Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing

{luocheng2020, linqinliang2021}@email.szu.edu.cn, {wcxie, llshen}@szu.edu.cn

A. Methodology for Targeted Attack

As mentioned above, we define the attack in the targeted scenario as:

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{adv} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} [s'_{i,i} - s'_{i,t}]_+, \quad (4)$$

where t denotes the index of the target image in a minibatch, $s'_{i,i} = \text{sim}(f(\mathbf{x}'_i), f(\mathbf{x}_i))$ and $s_{i,t} = \text{sim}(f(\mathbf{x}'_i), f(\mathbf{x}_t))$ are similarity scores. It aims to encourage the adversarial example \mathbf{x}'_i to be close to the target \mathbf{x}_t in terms of the feature representation.

The self-weighting scheme that is specific to this targeted attack is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_i^{adv} &= \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} \mathcal{L}_{SSA}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i) \\ &= \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}'_i} [\alpha_i s'_{i,i} - \beta_i s'_{i,t}]_+. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

As for the weighting factors α_i and β_i , we set them as:

$$\begin{cases} \alpha_i = [s'_{i,i} - m]_+, \\ \beta_i = [1 + m - s'_{i,t}]_+. \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

The targeted attack follows a similar attack design and weight factor setting as the untargeted attack. The only difference is that SSA in the targeted scenario does not need the selection of the most dissimilar example in the minibatch but requires a certain example of the target category.

B. Implementation details

For compared attack approaches, the parameters κ and c in C&W [1] are set to 40 and 0.1, respectively; the parameters α_l and α_c in PerC-AL [8] are initialized to 1 and 0.5 and gradually reduced to 0.01 and 0.05, respectively, with

*Equal Contribution

[†]Corresponding Author

cosine annealing. For evaluating the robustness of attacks against defense approaches or the attack success rates of attacks against online models, the ℓ_∞ bound of 8/255 is used for perturbation generation.

C. Additional Experimental Results

C.1. Targeted Attack in the White-box Setting

In this section, we investigate the attack performance of SSAH in the targeted scenario in Tab. 6. It shows that our SSAH remains effective at generating imperceptible perturbations for the targeted scenario.

C.2. Parameter Sensitivity Analyses




Figure 8. Sensitive analyses of λ and m in terms of attack success rate (ASR).

There are two hyperparameters in SSAH, *i.e.*, the margin m in Eq. (6) for adjusting self-paced weighting and λ in Eq. (10) for weighing the low-frequency constraint. The sensitivity analyses of these two hyperparameters are performed on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-1K. The quantitative results on CIFAR-10 are presented in Figs. 8 and 9, and the visualization results on ImageNet-1K are presented in

| Dataset | Attack | Iteration | RunTime (s) ↓ | ASR (%) ↑ | $\ell_2 \downarrow$ | $\ell_\infty \downarrow$ | FID ↓ | LF ↓ |
|-------------|------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| CIFAR-10 | BIM [5] | 10 | 33 | 99.94 | 0.67 | 0.03 | 13.36 | 0.18 |
| | PGD [6] | 10 | 38 | 99.94 | 1.19 | 0.03 | 27.23 | 0.31 |
| | MIM [2] | 10 | 35 | 99.92 | 1.88 | 0.03 | 26.67 | 0.47 |
| | AdvDrop [3] | 150 | 389 | 99.11 | 1.13 | 0.08 | 16.52 | 0.42 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | 978 | 100 | 0.45 | 0.07 | 10.34 | 0.13 |
| | SSA (ours) | 150 | 176 | 99.90 | 0.55 | 0.04 | 6.13 | 0.15 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 150 | 178 | 99.92 | 0.48 | 0.04 | 5.14 | 0.07 |
| CIFAR-100 | BIM [5] | 10 | 32 | 99.41 | 0.74 | 0.03 | 13.59 | 0.27 |
| | PGD [6] | 10 | 36 | 99.34 | 1.22 | 0.03 | 25.64 | 0.39 |
| | MIM [2] | 10 | 32 | 99.11 | 1.84 | 0.03 | 25.49 | 0.64 |
| | AdvDrop [3] | 150 | 308 | 97.70 | 1.09 | 0.08 | 15.56 | 0.43 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | 743 | 99.99 | 0.94 | 0.09 | 17.59 | 0.64 |
| | SSA (ours) | 150 | 134 | 99.15 | 1.27 | 0.08 | 10.57 | 0.52 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 150 | 138 | 99.01 | 0.99 | 0.07 | 8.88 | 0.07 |
| ImageNet-1K | BIM [5] | 10 | 2166 | 98.31 | 25.18 | 0.03 | 39.61 | 10.44 |
| | PGD [6] | 10 | 2973 | 98.65 | 53.84 | 0.03 | 37.21 | 16.87 |
| | MIM [2] | 10 | 2358 | 99.98 | 92.86 | 0.03 | 81.62 | 39.93 |
| | AdvDrop [3] | 150 | 46968 | 99.76 | 14.95 | 0.06 | 11.28 | 5.67 |
| | C&W ℓ_2 [1] | 1000 | > 100000 | 97.83 | 1.85 | 0.04 | 12.93 | 0.84 |
| | SSA (ours) | 200 | 31742 | 98.64 | 4.31 | 0.02 | 8.64 | 1.94 |
| | SSAH (ours) | 200 | 30050 | 98.06 | 3.38 | 0.02 | 6.42 | 0.47 |

Table 6. Results of the attack success rate (ASR) and four metrics related with perceptual similarity by seven attack approaches in the targeted scenario. The best results are marked in bold.




Figure 9. Sensitive analyses of λ and m in terms of LF.

Fig. 10.

Fig. 8 shows that SSAH becomes sensitive to λ when the margin m is large (e.g., $m \geq 0.2$). Taking the case of $m = 0.4$ for example, along with increasing weighting λ , the performance of SSAH decreases fast from 82.02% when $\lambda = 0.00$ to 60.98% when $\lambda = 1.00$. The reason is that we actually impose a weak attack strength on images when m value is large. In this condition, a large λ results in a strong constraint on our attack objective in SSAH, leading to a low attack success rate.

Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that an appropriate selection of m and λ is necessary. The sen-

sitivity analyses in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show that SSAH can achieve relatively stable and satisfying performances when $m \in [0.0, 0.2]$ and $\lambda \in [0.1, 1.0]$.

C.3. Batch Size

Tab. 7 reports the results with batch size from 32 to 10000. Our attack works reasonably well over this wide range of batch sizes. The results are similarly good when the batch size is from 32 to 10000, and the differences are at the level of random variations.

| Batch Size | ASR ↑ | $\ell_2 \downarrow$ | $\ell_\infty \downarrow$ | LF ↓ |
|------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| 32 | 99.94 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| 64 | 99.90 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| 128 | 99.91 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 256 | 99.95 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 512 | 99.94 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 1024 | 99.91 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 2048 | 99.89 | 0.26 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 4096 | 99.90 | 0.26 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| 10000 | 99.94 | 0.26 | 0.02 | 0.03 |

Table 7. Effect of batch sizes (CIFAR-10 evaluation attack success rate and four metrics related with perceptual similarity).




Figure 10. Adversarial perturbations to an ImageNet-1K image using different hyperparameters of m and λ in SSAH.

C.4. Additional Evaluation of Imperceptibility

In this section, we evaluate perturbation imperceptibility in terms of perceptual colour difference ($\overline{C_2}$). This metric is used in PerC-AL [8] to measure human colour perception.

Tab. 8 shows that our SSAH without the constraint of ℓ_2 ($\overline{C_2}$) distance still achieves competitive performances in terms of ℓ_2 ($\overline{C_2}$). It further demonstrates the superiority of our attack in perturbation imperceptibility.

| Attack | Iter. | ASR \uparrow | $\ell_2 \downarrow$ | LF \downarrow | $\overline{C_2} \downarrow$ |
|-------------|-------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| C&W | 1000 | 99.27 | 1.51 | 0.67 | 152.51 |
| PerC-AL | 1000 | 98.78 | 4.35 | 1.59 | 90.62 |
| SSAH (ours) | 200 | 98.01 | 1.81 | 0.06 | 124.32 |

Table 8. Results of the attack success rate (ASR) and three metrics related with perceptual similarity by three attack approaches on ImageNet-1K in the untargeted scenario.

C.5. Additional Robustness Evaluations

To evaluate the performance of our attack against image transformation-based defense, we test the robustness of the adversarial examples against bit-depth reduction [4, 7]. Fig. 11 shows our imperceptible attack on high-frequency components is still robust against this image




Figure 11. Evaluation of robustness against bit-depth reduction on CIFAR-10.

transformation-based defense (*i.e.*, bit-depth reduction).

C.6. Analysis of SPW

To further measure the effect of applying the self-paced weighting in SSAH, we randomly sample images from the testing set of CIFAR-10, and present the distributions of perturbation intensities generated by SSAH with and without self-paced weighting in Fig. 12. This figure shows that the perturbation intensities generated by SSAH with SPW appear to be smaller than those by SSAH without SPW. It




Figure 12. Distributions of perturbation intensities by SSAH with self-paced weighting (w/ SPW) and without self-paced weighting (w/o SPW) on a subset (1024 random samples) of CIFAR-10.

indicates that the weighting scheme can well reduce the redundant perturbations caused by over-optimization.

C.7. Additional Visualization Results

In this section, we present more visualization results, including adversarial examples and perturbations generated in the white-box setting (*i.e.*, Fig. 13, Fig. 14, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16) and transferable adversarial examples across architectures and datasets (*i.e.*, Fig. 17).




Figure 13. Adversarial examples generated by six different attack approaches on CIFAR-10.




Figure 14. Adversarial examples generated by six different attack approaches on CIFAR-100.




Figure 15. Adversarial examples generated by three different attack approaches on ImageNet-1K.




Figure 16. Adversarial examples and their corresponding perturbations generated by six different attack approaches on ImageNet-1K. The 1st, 3rd and 5th rows are adversarial examples, while the 2nd, 4th and 6th rows are their perturbations.



Figure 17. Adversarial examples generated by SSAH based on a surrogate model trained on the source domain to a target model trained on the target domain. The original examples are selected from the validation set of ImageNet-1K. A B → C D denotes that model A trained on dataset B is used to craft perturbations to fool model C trained on dataset D.

D. Image Samples in Transferable Attack

In the experiment of attacking online models, we randomly sample 200 images from the ImageNet-1K validation set. For reproducibility, we list the names of these used images as follows:

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| n02108089/val_00016416, | n01917289/val_00047927, |
| n03877845/val_00026991, | n02125311/val_00024128, |
| n03661043/val_00018698, | n02085620/val_00031154, |
| n03691459/val_00023671, | n03888257/val_00025121, |
| n02276258/val_00032773, | n01704323/val_00038815, |
| n02342885/val_00027868, | n01632458/val_00031521, |
| n03770439/val_00013597, | n02231487/val_00009943, |
| n03478589/val_00040225, | n02111277/val_00046591, |
| n02840245/val_00031888, | n04398044/val_00041709, |
| n07892512/val_00017146, | n01694178/val_00025511, |
| n03873416/val_00047900, | n02114367/val_00033884, |
| n02092002/val_00022857, | n03976467/val_00033699, |
| n02342885/val_00041792, | n02457408/val_00041441, |
| n03773504/val_00022433, | n03930313/val_00002877, |
| n09193705/val_00038734, | n02804414/val_00008402, |
| n03124170/val_00026251, | n01806143/val_00023973, |
| n01818515/val_00021663, | n03376595/val_00040795, |
| n02226429/val_00045770, | n02655020/val_00008184, |
| n02484975/val_00045387, | n03478589/val_00000035, |
| n02951585/val_00023091, | n01692333/val_00033244, |
| n02281406/val_00046852, | n02389026/val_00014369, |
| n04310018/val_00038429, | n03956157/val_00038501, |
| n04200800/val_00018851, | n01968897/val_00030526, |
| n01608432/val_00043085, | n03444034/val_00026796, |
| n02342885/val_00047769, | n02814533/val_00005978, |
| n01843383/val_00037244, | n02422106/val_00035337, |
| n02963159/val_00030024, | n13052670/val_00039616, |
| n01829413/val_00036044, | n02823750/val_00041752, |
| n03602883/val_00039677, | n12985857/val_00038482, |
| n04005630/val_00004526, | n04487394/val_00033068, |
| n03127747/val_00011868, | n02701002/val_00028205, |
| n03124170/val_00033776, | n03355925/val_00006767, |
| n03042490/val_00025402, | n02787622/val_00019653, |
| n03837869/val_00036456, | n04523525/val_00019004, |
| n04409515/val_00014503, | n13052670/val_00033352, |
| n02074367/val_00023213, | n03075370/val_00021941, |
| n02971356/val_00023953, | n03126707/val_00043871, |
| n02641379/val_00008847, | n01440764/val_00017699, |
| n03457902/val_00049086, | n03180011/val_00043506, |
| n01980166/val_00005836, | n04392985/val_00003756, |
| n07747607/val_00005888, | n04417672/val_00046924, |
| n02165105/val_00030936, | n03290653/val_00015959, |
| n03933933/val_00030150, | n03709823/val_00001860, |
| n02028035/val_00010037, | n04118538/val_00045773, |
| n02361337/val_00037480, | n03529860/val_00022699, |
| n04204347/val_00036559, | n02606052/val_00014777, |
| n02104365/val_00035049, | n02494079/val_00002579, |
| n01877812/val_00022693, | n01687978/val_00029055, |

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| n02107683/val_00035628, | n02804414/val_00047642, |
| n03891332/val_00036752, | n02113186/val_00009045, |
| n02105162/val_00030963, | n02172182/val_00045513, |
| n01560419/val_00018672, | n02134084/val_00016340, |
| n02794156/val_00006960, | n01484850/val_00016988, |
| n03016953/val_00021529, | n04404412/val_00049571, |
| n03888257/val_00023107, | n02909870/val_00036628, |
| n02105641/val_00030831, | n09468604/val_00028882, |
| n02097658/val_00015119, | n02172182/val_00031062, |
| n02106030/val_00014342, | n02493793/val_00013076, |
| n03976467/val_00032721, | n01924916/val_00037245, |
| n01944390/val_00022381, | n03954731/val_00005903, |
| n02883205/val_00003045, | n04004767/val_00008345, |
| n01693334/val_00022937, | n02443484/val_00018383, |
| n04597913/val_00016472, | n03670208/val_00010364, |
| n02009912/val_00026861, | n02326432/val_00002413, |
| n04229816/val_00047467, | n02971356/val_00000831, |
| n04192698/val_00001173, | n02791270/val_00044488, |
| n03595614/val_00025275, | n03126707/val_00038038, |
| n04613696/val_00014904, | n04235860/val_00006430, |
| n01484850/val_00045730, | n02835271/val_00033559, |
| n02128385/val_00036527, | n02395406/val_00033668, |
| n02115913/val_00026888, | n02930766/val_00049552, |
| n02403003/val_00017987, | n02655020/val_00005213, |
| n04049303/val_00018090, | n04553703/val_00048784, |
| n03868863/val_00011676, | n03769881/val_00001207, |
| n04399382/val_00006985, | n03394916/val_00003759, |
| n07760859/val_00025973, | n04069434/val_00001854, |
| n02093647/val_00000883, | n02690373/val_00030319, |
| n01728920/val_00020274, | n02132136/val_00006703, |
| n04141327/val_00003236, | n03743016/val_00038715, |
| n02102480/val_00004185, | n02974003/val_00021691, |
| n03018349/val_00020100, | n02074367/val_00030029, |
| n04149813/val_00032339, | n03594945/val_00037128, |
| n04399382/val_00039275, | n04372370/val_00003304, |
| n03388549/val_00041363, | n01984695/val_00002243, |
| n02489166/val_00000206, | n02037110/val_00011196, |
| n04418357/val_00028155, | n04251144/val_00005522, |
| n02795169/val_00025956, | n02113799/val_00016697, |
| n04461696/val_00021814, | n09468604/val_00041897, |
| n02093991/val_00004687, | n07802026/val_00040001, |
| n03992509/val_00046414, | n03662601/val_00023517, |
| n02110958/val_00011495, | n03467068/val_00020240, |
| n02869837/val_00015695, | n02127052/val_00036625, |
| n11879895/val_00012320, | n02747177/val_00002145, |
| n02966687/val_00008803, | n02704792/val_00030917, |
| n07613480/val_00000620, | n07930864/val_00039707, |
| n04389033/val_00030415, | n02128385/val_00024214, |
| n02391049/val_00015124, | n01616318/val_00006250, |
| n04536866/val_00024173, | n03467068/val_00049842, |
| n03180011/val_00049615, | n02099429/val_00040055, |
| n03291819/val_00011445, | n04447861/val_00038921. |

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