

Term Structure Models with Differences in Belief

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
EMPIRICAL FACTS

- **Expected Excess Returns on Nominal Bonds are Highly Predictable**
 - Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Schiller (1991)
 - Cochrane-Piazzesi (2002), Le and Singleton (2013)
- But ...
- **Macro-Economic Determinants**
 - growth/inflation shocks explain a small fraction of yield shocks
 - very little covariance between bond returns and macro-factors
 - weak link between monetary policy and bond markets


Real Bonds

AVERAGE YIELD CURVES



US Nominal & Real Term Structures





UK Nominal & Real Term Structures



REAL-NOMINAL PCs





REAL-NOMINAL PCs: UK





REAL-NOMINAL PCs:

U.S Treasuries	Level	Slope	Curvature
% of $cov(y_t^{\$})$ explained	94.69	4.22	1.03
% of $cov(y_t^r)$ explained	95.14	4.41	0.43
% Nom factor explained by real factor	78	72	3
U.K Treasuries			
% of $cov(y_t^{\$})$ explained	95.56	3.64	0.79
% of $cov(y_t^r)$ explained	98.26	1.47	0.26
% Nom factor explained by real factor	83	39	27

EXCESS RETURNS



TERM STRUCTURE OF SHARPE RATIOS



MODELS FOR THE REAL SDF

1. Time-Varying Prices of Risk: Campbell Cochrane (1999)

- surplus drives predictable excess returns
- bond risk premium determined by surplus covariance with short rate:
 - ▶ intertemporal demand dominates: $\text{cov}(\text{Surp}_t, r_t) > 0 \rightarrow RP < 0$
 - ▶ precautionary savings dominates: $\text{cov}(\text{Surp}_t, r_t) < 0 \rightarrow RP > 0$

2. Time-Varying Quantities of Risk: Bansal Yaron (2004)

- expected consumption volatility drives predictable excess returns
- calibrated to equity implies
 - ▶ downward sloping (negative) real yields.
 - ▶ negative sharpe ratios


THIS PAPER ...

- studies a model where beliefs are driving
 - agent specific risk aversion (prices of risk)
 - agent specific consumption volatility (quantities of risk)
- study theoretical and empirical explanations for the
 1. **The Short Term Real Rate:**
 2. **The Cross-Section of Real Yields:**
 3. **Expected Returns on Real Bonds:**

Theoretical Framework

CONSUMPTION GROWTH FORECASTS

Consider two agents with subjective conditional probability measures dQ_t^a and dQ_t^b :



- In equilibrium ex-ante marginal utilities must balance

$$E^a(u'_a(C_T)|\mathcal{F}_t) = E^a(u'_b(C_T)|\mathcal{F}_t)$$

- Implication: models for consumption growth matter for equilibrium risk sharing

WHICH MODEL?

- No consensus on the correct model for consumption growth
 - Beeler and Campbell (2009) argue consumption has autocorrelations consistent with random walk
 - Bansal, Kiku, Yaron (2009) argue VAR estimates imply predictability of more than 15% at one-to-five year horizons.
- consumption asset pricing finds a wide range of estimates for autocorrelations:
 - 0.43 [NIPA]
 - 0.74 [Parker and Julliard (2005)]
 - 0.12 [Jagannathan and Wang (2007)]
 - -0.14 [Savov (2011)].

WHICH MODEL?


Consider an economy where agents learn about growth rates (\mathbf{g}_t) by observing realised consumption

$$dC/C = \mathbf{g}_t^i dt + \sigma_C dW_t^C,$$

Assume agents agree on the long run growth rate (θ) but hold dogmatic beliefs on the persistence (κ_g) of growth shocks:

$$dg_t^i = -\kappa_g^i (g_t^i - \theta) dt + \sigma_g dW_t^g$$

Standard linear filtering problem generates important implications for equilibrium risk sharing.



Assume the true objective $\kappa_g^o = 0.5$, one agent who believes the economy is dominated by permanent shocks $\kappa_g^a = 0.2$, and one who believes the economy is dominated by transitory shocks $\kappa_g^b = 0.8$

EQUILIBRIUM

- Individual Problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c^i\}} E_0^i \int_0^\infty \varrho_t u(c_t^i) dt, \\ \text{s.t. } E_0^i \int_0^\infty \mathcal{M}_t^i [c_t^i - e_t^i] dt \leq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_i c_t^i = C_t \end{aligned}$$

- Representative Problem:

$$U^*(C(t), \lambda) := \max_{c_a(t) + c_b(t) = C(t)} \{u_a(c_a(t)) + \lambda_t u_b(c_b(t))\}$$

- Solution:

$$c_a(t) = \frac{C_t}{1 + \eta_t^{1/\gamma}} \quad , \quad c_b(t) = C_t \frac{\eta_t^{1/\gamma}}{1 + \eta_t^{1/\gamma}}$$

$$\mathcal{M}_t^* = \underbrace{\varrho_t C_t^{-\gamma}}_{\text{Homogeneous CRRA SDF}} \underbrace{\left(1 + \eta_t^{1/\gamma}\right)^\gamma}_{\text{Belief Distortion}}$$

$$\text{where } \eta_t = \frac{d\mathcal{P}_t^a}{d\mathcal{P}_t^b}$$

EFFECTIVE RISK AVERSION

- The local curvature of the investor's utility is time varying:

$$\gamma^a(t) = -c_t \frac{U_{cc}}{U_c} = \gamma \left[1 + \left(\frac{\omega_t^b}{\omega_t^a} \right)^2 \right]$$

- Effective risk aversion is state dependent as a function of *past* consumption choices
- The entire *history* of belief dispersion is important for equilibrium prices *today*

STOCHASTIC CONSUMPTION

$$d\omega_a = \underbrace{\frac{\gamma - 1}{2\gamma} \omega_a(\eta_t) \omega_b(\eta_t) \psi_t^2}_{\text{Speculative Demand}} \left[\frac{(\gamma - 1) + 2\gamma \omega_b(\eta_t)}{\gamma(\gamma - 1)} \right] dt + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\gamma} \omega_a(\eta_t) \omega_b(\eta_t) \psi_t}_{\text{Stochastic Vol}} d\hat{W}_t^C$$

- $\omega_i(t) = c_t^i / C_t$ - investor's i 's total consumption share - is stochastic
- shocks to *beliefs* about growth rates change the investment opportunity set
- speculative demand enters the drift of individual consumption streams.
 - $\gamma > 1$ the wealth effect dominates
 - $\gamma < 1$ the substitution effect dominates
- large risk tolerance generates large volatile consumption streams to due speculation


THE REAL SHORT RATE

- From the drift of $d\mathcal{M}_t^*$: risk free rate

$$r_f = \rho + \underbrace{\gamma\beta'(\omega_a(t)\hat{g}_t^a + \omega_b(t)\hat{g}_t^b)}_{\text{Consensus Aggregation Bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{2}\gamma(\gamma+1)\sigma_C^2}_{\text{Precautionary Savings}} + \underbrace{\frac{\gamma-1}{2\gamma}\omega_a(t)\omega_b(t)\psi_t^2}_{\text{Speculative Demand}},$$

- Implications
 1. Aggregation bias: the short rate is skewed towards the belief of the agent who has been relatively more successful.
 2. Inter-temporal component: depends on whether γ is greater or smaller than 1.

SHORT RATE SENSITIVITIES



- For $\gamma > 1$ the wealth effect dominates: interest rates rise to clear the market.
- When $\gamma < 1$ the substitution effect dominates: interest rates fall to clear the market

THE TERM STRUCTURE OF BOND PRICES

Real zero-coupon bonds are given by

$$P(t, T) = E_t^i \left[e^{-\delta(T-t)} \left(\frac{C_T}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} \left(\frac{1 + \eta_T^{1/\gamma}}{1 + \eta_t^{1/\gamma}} \right)^\gamma \right]$$

Requires computing the forward density for $y_T = \ln C_T$ and $z_T = \ln \eta_T$

Define the extend state $X_t = (y_t, z_t, g_t, \psi_t, g_t^2, \psi_t^2, \psi_t g_t)$

obtain prices via inversion via inversion of the CF

$$P(t, T) = e^{-\delta(T-t)} (1 + e^{\frac{1}{\gamma} z_t})^{-\gamma} \int_0^\infty \left[(1 + e^{\frac{1}{\gamma} z_T})^\gamma \frac{1}{\pi} \int_0^\infty e^{-iu_2 z_t} \phi_{y,z}(\tau; u) du_2 \right] dz_T$$

where

$$\phi_{y,z}(\tau; u) = e^{\alpha(\tau, u) + \beta(\tau, u)' X_t}$$




and $\beta(\tau)$ is a set of matrix valued RDEs.

CALIBRATED PARAMETERS

δ	γ	σ_C	θ	σ_g	ρ_{cg}	κ_g^a	κ_g^b
0	(0.5 : 3.0)	3%	3%	1.5%	0.80	0.20	0.80

- Agent A: Growth rate shocks have a half life of $T_{1/2} \sim 3.5$ years
- Agent B: Growth rate shocks have a half life of $T_{1/2} \sim 0.90$ years
- $\rho_{cg} > 0 \rightarrow$ homogeneous real bonds have negative sharpe ratios

TERM STRUCTURES: EQUAL WEALTH SHARES



RISK PREMIA

- The bond risk premium under the measure of each agent is

$$\mu_i^P(t, T) - \mu_i^Q(t, T) = -E_t^i \left[\frac{dP_t}{P_t} \frac{d\mathcal{M}_t^i}{\mathcal{M}_t^i} \right] = \kappa_t(t) \sigma_{P,D}(t, T)$$



- The risk premium from the perspective of an unbiased econometrician is

$$\frac{\mu_e^P(t, T) - \left(\omega_t^a \mu_a^Q(t, T) + \omega_t^b \mu_b^Q(t, T) \right)}{\sigma_{P,D}(t, T)} = \gamma \sigma_C + \frac{1}{\sigma_C} \left[g_t - (\omega_t^a g_t^a + \omega_t^b g_t^b) \right]$$

- Bond sensitivities to shocks are



$$[\sigma_{P,D}(t, T), \sigma_{P,s}(t, T)] = \frac{1}{P(t, T)} \left[\frac{\partial P(t, T)}{\partial x} \right] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{g,D} & \sigma_{g,s} \\ -\psi_t & 0 \\ \sigma_{\psi,D} & \sigma_{\psi,s} \end{bmatrix}$$

RISK PREMIA : EQUAL WEALTH SHARES





- both panels : **symmetric** economy ($\omega^a = \omega^b = 0.5$)

RISK PREMIA : OPTIMISM VS PESSIMISM



- left panel : **optimistic** economy ($\omega^a = 0.75$ & $\omega^b = 0.25$)
- right panel : **pessimistic** economy ($\omega^a = 0.25$ & $\omega^b = 0.75$)

BELIEF RISK



- When agents are myopic the term structure is bounded by homogeneous solutions.
- If the short rate is pro-cyclical ($\rho_{c,g}^i > 0$) term structures will be downward sloping.
- When $\gamma \neq 1$ and $\omega_a \approx \omega_b \approx 0.5$ the real term structure is upward sloping

TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS


- H_{01} : **Short Term Real Rate.**
 - disagreement enters the the real short rate. The sign of its effect depends on $\gamma \gtrless 1$
- H_{02} : **The Cross-Section of Real Yields.**
 - disagreement is a state variable affecting the level and slope of the term structure. To the extent that past beliefs proxy for contemporaneous wealth fluctuations, distance lags of disagreement should affect today's cross-section of yields.
- H_{03} : **Expected Returns on Real Bonds**
 - from the perspective of an econometrician, disagreement drives positive (negative) variation in expected returns if the economy is on average pessimistic (optimistic).
 - risk compensation on intermediate to long term bonds depends on future belief risk.

Data

SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS

- **BlueChip Financial Forecasts:**
 - Large data source of subjective expectations
 - Available at monthly frequency and out to 5-quarters
 - GDP forecast to proxy for consumption growth expectations

DISPERSION VARIABLES



Green line plots a policy uncertainty factor studied by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)
Blue line plots the IQR of 1-quarter GDP forecasts.

STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES

1. Prices of Risk: Wachter (2006)

- Proxy for consumption surplus s_t as weighted average of monthly consumption growth rates:

$$s_t = \sum_{j=1}^{120} \phi^j \Delta c_{t-j}$$

where weight is chosen to match the quarterly autocorrelation of the P/D ratio.

2. Quantities of Risk: Bansal and Shaliastovich (2012)



- Fit a VAR(1) to inflation and growth expectations:

$$g_{t+1}^e = \underset{(0.08)}{0.63} + \underset{(0.02)}{0.86} g_t^e - \underset{(0.01)}{0.08} \pi_t^e + \epsilon_{g,t+1}$$

$$\pi_{t+1}^e = \underset{(0.12)}{0.93} - \underset{(0.03)}{0.20} g_t^e + \underset{(0.02)}{0.87} \pi_t^e + \epsilon_{\pi,t+1}$$

- Project square root of the sum of squared residuals over the next 12 months on the date t cross-section of yields.
- Square the fitted values which forms the uncertainty measures for date t .

STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES



Empirical Results

H_{01} : SHORT TERM RATE

	$E(g)$	$\psi(g)$	$\sigma^2(g)$	$Surp$	Lag y^{3m}	\overline{R}^2
real y^{3m}	-0.23 (-1.22)	-0.28 (-2.32)				0.06
real y^{3m}	-0.39 (-2.01)	-0.31 (-2.42)	-0.04 (-0.34)	0.31 (3.20)		0.12
real y^{3m}	0.00 (0.00)	-0.11 (-2.13)	-0.06 (-1.21)	0.02 (0.26)	0.88 (19.52)	0.78

Sample = 1990.1 - 2010.1

H_{02} : THE CROSS SECTION OF YIELDS

	$E_t(g_t)$	ψ_t^g	ψ_{t-6}^g	$\sigma_t^2(g)$	$Surp_t$	\bar{R}^2
Real $Slope_t$	0.76 (2.64)	0.50 (4.95)				0.31
Real $Slope_t$	0.81 (3.56)	0.41 (5.29)	0.28 (4.07)			0.38
Real $Slope_t$	1.02 (3.94)	0.40 (5.29)	0.21 (2.62)	-0.01 (-0.10)	-0.20 (-1.87)	0.39

Sample Period : 2000.1 - 2010.1


REAL COCHRANE-PIAZZESI (2002)

- Adapt CP in order to compare real and nominal return predictability.
- Project 3-month excess returns on 3-month forward rate spreads.
- Common factors are then formed from real and nominal forward rates by factorizing the first stage regression as

$$\frac{1}{3} \sum_{n=1}^3 r_{t+0.25}^n = \bar{\alpha} + \gamma' (f_t^{[5 \ 7 \ 10]} - y_t^{(0.25)}) + \bar{\epsilon}_{t+0.25}$$

$$CP_t = \gamma' (f_t^{[5 \ 7 \ 10]} - y_t^{(0.25)})$$

REAL COCHRANE-PIAZZESI (2002)



REAL COCHRANE-PIAZZESI (2002)

	<i>const</i>	$CP_t^{\$}$	\overline{R}^2	<i>const</i>	CP_t^r	\overline{R}^2
$hprx_t^{(5)}$	0.06 (0.16)	0.71 (4.47)	0.16	0.02 (0.03)	0.81 (2.44)	0.08
$hprx_t^{(7)}$	0.00 (0.00)	0.98 (4.47)	0.17	-0.01 (-0.01)	0.98 (2.63)	0.09
$hprx_t^{(10)}$	-0.03 (-0.05)	1.22 (3.98)	0.15	0.00 (0.00)	1.15 (2.76)	0.09

$$hprx_t^{(n)} = E_t[p_{t+3}^{(n-3)}] - p_t^{(n)} - r_t^{3m} = const + \beta CP_t + \varepsilon_{t,t+3}^{(n)}.$$

H_{03} : EXPECTED RETURNS

	$\psi(g)$	Lag $\psi(g)$	$\sigma^2(g)$	<i>Surp</i>	\overline{R}^2
CP Nom	0.34 (2.82)				0.12
CP Real	0.32 2.28				0.10
CP Nom	0.21 (2.07)	0.43 (3.87)			0.30
CP Real	0.23 (1.69)	0.26 (2.19)			0.15
CP Nom	0.12 (0.87)	0.29 (3.89)	-0.08 (-0.38)	-0.39 (-3.83)	0.40
CP Real	0.30 (3.35)	0.32 (4.28)	-0.19 (-0.99)	0.24 (1.76)	0.23

Sample Period : 2000.1 - 2010.1

H_{03} : EXPECTED RETURNS

$$hpr_{t,t+12}^{(n)} = const + \beta RiskFactors_t + error_{t+12}^{(n)}$$

	$\psi(g)$	Lag $\psi(g)$	$\sigma^2(g)$	Surp	\overline{R}^2
n = 2	0.42 (3.97)				0.18
n = 5	0.36 (3.88)				0.12
n = 2	0.32 (3.66)	0.24 (2.81)			0.22
n = 5	0.25 (3.15)	0.24 (2.62)			0.17
n = 2	0.29 (3.48)	0.26 (2.99)	0.12 (0.90)	0.05 (0.32)	0.23
n = 5	0.25 (2.90)	0.24 (2.38)	-0.01 (-0.04)	-0.01 (-0.05)	0.16

Sample Period : 1990.1 - 2010.1

CONCLUSIONS

Existence of time-varying bond risk premia is one of the most interesting and challenging topic in fixed income. The weak empirical link between observable macro variables and bond returns has been a long standing puzzle.

In this study, we learn that:

1. disagreement is important for explaining time-varying in the real discount factor.
2. regressions on dispersion measures consistent with models in which agents speculate on growth rate forecasts.
3. dispersion in beliefs explains a steep yield curve through:
 - Low short term interest rates
 - Large positive bond risk premia
4. fluctuations in relative wealth (past disagreement) important for the cross-section of yields today
5. positive real sharpe ratios and $cov(DiB, hprx)$ consistent with average pessimism