

## 1 ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem

1. Select a prime  $p$ .
2. Consider the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot \text{ mod } p)$  (\* means excluding 0 from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ )
3. Select a primitive element  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  (generator)

$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* \rightarrow \text{Cyclic group}$$

$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \langle \alpha \rangle$$

4. Plaintext space =  $\mathbb{Z}_p$   
Keyspace =  $\{(p, \alpha, a, \beta) \mid \beta = \alpha^a \text{ mod } p\}$
5. Public Key:  $p, \alpha, \beta$   
Secret Key:  $a$   
 $\beta = \alpha^a$ , Given  $\beta, \alpha$  finding  $a$  will be hard (Discrete log problem) .
6. Select a random number  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ ,  $x$  is kept secret

7. Encryption  
 $e_K(m, x) = (y_1, y_2)$  (m: message)  
 $y_1 = \alpha^x \text{ mod } p$   
 $y_2 = m \cdot \beta^x \text{ mod } p$

8. Decryption  
 $d_K(y_1, y_2) = y_2(y_1^a)^{-1} \text{ mod } p$

$$\begin{aligned} y_1^a &= (\alpha^x)^a \text{ mod } p \\ &= (\alpha^a)^x \text{ mod } p \\ &= \beta^x \text{ mod } p \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} y_2 \cdot (y_1^a)^{-1} &= (m \cdot \beta^x) \cdot (\beta^x)^{-1} \text{ mod } p \\ &= m \text{ mod } p \end{aligned}$$

**Security** of ElGamal Cryptosystem depends on two problems:

1) **Discrete log problem** is hard  
 $\beta = \alpha^a$ , Given  $\beta, \alpha$  finding  $a$  will be hard

2) **Diffie Hellman problem** is hard  
Knowns:  $g, g^a, g^b$

Not knowns: a, b

Finding  $g^{ab}$

Because security can be broken if we are able to find  $\alpha^{ax}$  from knowns i.e.  $(\alpha, \alpha^a = \beta, \alpha^x = y_1)$  as we just need to multiply inverse of this with  $y_2$  to reveal message (m).

## 2 Discrete Log Problem

Given: Finite cyclic group G of order n, generator  $\alpha$  of G, element  $\beta \in G$ .

Find: Integer x ,  $0 \leq x \leq n - 1$  such that  $\alpha^x = \beta$

Exhaustive search (  $O(n)$  ) is inefficient.

### Baby-Step Giant-Step Algorithm:

Time complexity:  $O(\sqrt{n})$

$$m = \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil \quad \alpha^n = 1$$

If  $\beta = \alpha^x$  then we can write:

$$x = i.m + j \text{ (through Division algo)}$$

m: divisor, i: quotient, j: remainder

$$0 \leq i, j \leq m$$

$$\alpha^x = \alpha^{im} \cdot \alpha^j$$

$$\beta = \alpha^{im} \cdot \alpha^j$$

$$\implies \alpha^j = \beta \cdot (\alpha^{im})^{-1}$$

$$\alpha^j = \beta \cdot (\alpha^{-m})^i$$

For x, we need to find unique i,j which will satisfy above equation.

Now, instead of x, target is to find i and j. Size of space of i,j is strictly less than m ( $= \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil$ )

Now, aim is to find i and j in such a way that complexities don't get multiplied.

- Compute each value of j and corresponding  $\alpha^j$ . Store it in a table in a sorted manner.
- For each i :
  - Compute  $\beta \cdot (\alpha^{-m})^i$
  - get corresponding j by subtracting  $i.m$  from x
  - get corresponding  $\alpha^j$  from the look-up table
  - Compare  $\alpha^j$  with  $\beta \cdot (\alpha^{-m})^i$  for solution.

### Formal Presentation of this algorithm:

**Input:** generator  $\alpha$  of a cyclic group G,  $\text{ord}(G) = n$ ,  $\beta \in G$ .

**Output:** the discrete log,  $x = \log_x \beta$

1. Set  $m \leftarrow \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil$
2. Prepare a table T with entries  $(j, \alpha^j)$   $0 \leq j < m$

- (a) Sort T by second component
- 3. Compute  $\alpha^{-m}$  and set  $\gamma \leftarrow \beta$
- 4. For i=0 to m-1 do:
  - (a) check if  $\gamma$  is second of some entry in T.
  - (b) If  $\gamma = \alpha^j$  then we got the solution. Return
  - (c) Set  $\gamma \leftarrow \gamma \cdot \alpha^{-m}$

Storage:  $O(\sqrt{n})$

Number of multiplications:  $O(\sqrt{n})$

Sort :  $O(\sqrt{n} \cdot \log \sqrt{n}) = (\sqrt{n} \cdot \log n)$

### 3 Kerberos (Version 4) (User Authentication Protocol)

Didn't get clarity in this topic. I will come back to it later.