
Authorization Flaws

Authorization

- ? What are you allowed to do
- Q Determine user permissions
- Authorization works throught settings that are implemented and maintained by the organization
- Authorization always take palce after authorization

Website Authorization flaw - Server Session



3



Broken Access Control

Access control is supposed to prevent that users can act outside of their intended permissions.

Possible Impact of Broken Access Control

- Access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as access other users' accounts
- View sensitive files
- Modify other users' data
- Change access rights

Common Attacks

- Modifying URL, internal application state, or HTML page
- Changing the primary key to another users record
- Elevation of privilege
 - Acting as a user without being logged in
 - Acting as an admin when logged in as a user
- ii Obtaining a higher level of access is also referred to as Vertical Privilege Escalation while same-level access to another user's data is called Horizontal Privilege Escalation.

- Metadata manipulation
 - Replaying or tampering with access control tokens
 - Cookie or hidden field manipulation
- Force browsing to authenticated pages as an anonymous user or to privileged pages as a standard user
- Accessing API with missing access controls for POST, PUT and DELETE

Data Factors

A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

| CWEs Mapped | Max Incidence Rate | Avg Incidence Rate | Avg Weighted Exploit | Avg Weighted Impact | Max Coverage | Avg Coverage | Total Occurrences | Total CVEs |
|----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|
| 34 | 55.97% | 3.81% | 6.92 | 5.93 | 94.55% | 47.72% | 318,487 | 19,013 |

Exercise 5.1 (**)

Assuming no access control is in place, which privilege escalations are possible by tampering with the following URLs?

- 1. http://logistics-worldwi.de/showShipment?id=40643108
- 2. http://my-universi.ty/api/students/6503/exams/view
- 3. http://document-warehou.se/landingpage?content=index.html

Exercise 5.2 (**)

- 1. Access the administration section of the store ($\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$)
- 2. View another user's shopping basket ($\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$)
- 3. Get rid of all 5-star customer feedback ($\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$)
- 4. Post some feedback for another user but without previously logging in as that user $(\star\star\star\star)$

Prevention

- Access control is only effective if enforced in trusted server-side code
- With the exception of public resources, deny by default
- Implement access control mechanisms once and re-use them throughout the application
- Enforce record ownership
- **Disable web server directory listing** and ensure file metadata and backup files are not present within web roots

More Prevention

- Log access control failures, alert admins when appropriate
- Rate limit API and controller access to minimize the harm from automated attack tooling
- Access tokens should be invalidated on the server after logout
- Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests

Access Control Design Principles

- 1. Design Access Control thoroughly up front
- 2. Force all Requests to go through Access Control checks
- 3. Deny by Default
- 4. Principle of Least Privilege
- 5. Don't hardcode roles
- 6. Log all Access Control events

Exercise 5.3 (11)

- 1. Place an order with a negative total (\star
- 2. Order the \clubsuit offer that was only available in 2014 ($\bigstar \bigstar \bigstar \bigstar$)

SSRF

Server-Side Request Forgery

Server-Side Request Forgery

SSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).


As modern web applications provide end-users with convenient features, fetching a URL becomes a common scenario. As a result, the incidence of SSRF is increasing. Also, the severity of SSRF is becoming higher due to cloud services and the complexity of architectures. [^1]



Attack Vector Examples

- Image on an external server (e.g. user enters image URL of their avatar for the application to download and use).
- Custom WebHook (users have to specify Webhook handlers or Callback URLs).
- Internal requests to interact with another service to serve a specific functionality. Most of the times, user data is sent along to be processed, and if poorly handled, can perform specific injection attacks. [^2]

SSRF Common Flow



Data Factors

A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

| CWEs Mapped | Max Incidence Rate | Avg Incidence Rate | Avg Weighted Exploit | Avg Weighted Impact | Max Coverage | Avg Coverage | Total Occurrences | Total CVEs |
|----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|
| 1 | 2.72% | 2.72% | 8.28 | 6.72 | 67.72% | 67.72% | 9,503 | 385 |

Prevention

Network Level

- Segmenting remote resource access functionality in separate networks
- Enforcing "deny by default" firewall policies or network access control rules to block all but essential intranet traffic
 - Establishing ownership/lifecycle for firewall rules based on applications
 - Logging all accepted and blocked network flows on firewalls (see Security Logging and Monitoring Failures)

Application Level

- Sanitizing and validating all client-supplied input data
- Enforcing the URL schema, port, and destination with a positive allow list
- Not sending raw responses to clients
- Disabling HTTP redirections
- Awareness of URL consistency to avoid attacks such as DNS rebinding and "time of check, time of use" (TOCTOU) race conditions

Exercise 5.4 (optional 11)

- 1. Reverse engineer a juicy malware and use what you learn from it...
- 2. ...to request a hidden resource on server through server (\star
- itself.