

# 政治经济学第七讲

## 劳动过程：管理与榨取

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劳动力市场与劳动过程

资本主义生产管理的二重性

劳动榨取模型

## 劳动力市场与劳动过程

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


Figure 1: Paul Samuelson  
(1915-2009), 经济学诺贝尔  
奖得主

## WAGES AND INTEREST: A MODERN DISSECTION OF MARXIAN ECONOMIC MODELS

By PAUL A. SAMUELSON\*

This is straightforwardly provable by the mathematics of linear programming. It will become intuitively clear if one considers the special Ricardian case where  $b_1 = 0$  and no circular complications can arise from the fact that it takes machines ( $K_1$ ) to make machines ( $K$ ). Remember that in a perfectly competitive market it really doesn't matter who hires whom: so have labor hire "capital," paying the new market interest rate  $r' < r$ ; then labor could always use the old technology and paying less than  $r$  get better than the old real wage. If labor does not do this, it must be because it can now do even better than better.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 2: Samuelson 对马克思经济学的批评<sup>[6]</sup>

让我们同货币占有者和劳动力占有者一道，离开这个嘈杂的、表面的、有目共睹的领域，跟随他们两人进入门上挂着“非公莫入”牌子的隐蔽的生产场所吧！在那里，不仅可以看到资本是怎样进行生产的，而且还可以看到资本本身是怎样被生产出来的。赚钱的秘密最后一定会暴露出来。<sup>[2]</sup> 第 204 页

一离开这个简单流通领域或商品交换领域，——庸俗的自由贸易论者用来判断资本和雇佣劳动的社会的那些观点、概念和标准就是从这个领域得出的，——就会看到，我们的剧中人的面貌已经起了某些变化。原来的货币占有者作为资本家，昂首前行；劳动力占有者作为他的工人，尾随于后。一个笑容满面，雄心勃勃；一个战战兢兢，畏缩不前，像在市场上出卖了自己的皮一样，只有一个前途——让人家来鞣。<sup>[2] 第 205 页</sup>

# A FORMAL THEORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

By HERBERT A. SIMON<sup>1</sup>

A distinction is drawn between a sales contract and an employment contract, and a formal model is constructed exhibiting this distinction. By introducing a definition of rational behavior, a method is obtained for determining under what conditions an employment contract will rationally be preferred to a sales contract, and what limits will rationally be placed on the authority of an employer in an employment contract. The relationship of this model to certain other theories of planning under uncertainty is discussed.

IN TRADITIONAL economic theory employees (persons who contract to exchange their services for a wage) enter into the system in two sharply distinct roles. Initially, they are owners of a factor of production (their own labor) which they sell for a definite price. Having done so, they become completely passive factors of production employed by the entrepreneur in such a way as to maximize his profit.

This way of viewing the employment contract and the management of labor involves a very high order of abstraction—such a high order, in fact, as to leave out of account the most striking empirical facts of the situation as we observe it in the real world. In particular, it abstracts away the most obvious peculiarities of the employment contract, those which distinguish it from other kinds of contracts; and it ignores the most significant features of the administrative process, i.e., the process of actually managing the factors of production, including labor. It is the aim of this paper to set forth a theory of the employment relationship that reintroduces some of the more important of these empirical realities into the economic model. Perhaps in this way a bridge can be constructed between the economist, with his theories of the firm and of factor allocation, and the administrator, with his theories of organization—a bridge wide enough to permit some free trade in ideas between two intellectual domains that have hitherto been quite effectively isolated from each other.

## 1. THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY

The authority relationship that exists between an employer and an employee, a relationship created by the employment contract, will play a central role in our theory. What is the nature of this relationship?




Figure 3: Hertbert A. Simon  
(1916-2001), 经济学诺贝尔  
奖、图灵奖得主




Figure 5: Ronald H. Coase  
(1910-2013), 经济学诺贝尔  
奖得主

becomes not an organisation but an organism.<sup>4</sup> The economic system “works itself.” This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system. But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.<sup>5</sup> Sir Arthur Salter’s description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a firm, the description does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor  $A$  becomes higher in  $X$  than in  $Y$ . As a result,  $A$  moves from  $Y$  to  $X$  until the difference between the prices in  $X$  and  $Y$ , except in so far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department  $Y$  to department  $X$ , he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so. Those who


Figure 6: 科斯 1937 年经典论文<sup>[5]</sup>

## 企业内部的统制关系

1. 企业作为一个“统制经济”(command economy)
2. 资本主义企业是一个生产的社会组织，在此组织中，一些人试图使另一些人从事劳动
3. “海洋中的岛屿”

# 工人与雇主间的冲突

- 工作日长度的斗争（第六讲）
- 围绕工资率和劳动强度（努力程度）的斗争



讨论：你讨厌工作吗，为什么？

劳动本身并非天然具有某种性质，我们对它的体验很大程度上取决于劳动过程的社会历史形式和具体的组织方式

## 资本主义生产管理的二重性

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# 资本主义生产是劳动过程与价值增殖过程的统一

- 资本主义生产本质是剩余价值生产
- 人类物质生活资料生产的一种社会历史形式
- 不同于前资本主义家庭小生产，资本主义时代的劳动过程  
是协作劳动

## 一般劳动过程中生产力性质的需求

一切规模较大的直接社会劳动或共同劳动，都或多或少地需要指挥，以协调个人的活动，并执行生产总体的运动——不同于这一总体的独立器官的运动——所产生的各种一般职能。一个单独的提琴手是自己指挥自己，一个乐队就需要一个乐队指挥。**一旦从属于资本的劳动成为协作劳动，这种管理、监督和调节的职能就成为了资本的职能。** [2] 第 384 页

“资本家的管理不仅是一种由社会劳动的性质产生并属于社会劳动过程的特殊职能，它同时也是剥削一种社会劳动过程的职能，因而也是由剥削者和他所剥削的原料之间不可避免的对抗决定的。”<sup>[2]</sup> 第 431 页

由价值增殖的需要而形成的管理性质是资本主义管理的本质

资本家所以是资本家，并不是因为他是工业的管理者，相反，他所以成为工业的司令官，因为他是资本家。工业上的最高权力成了资本的属性，正像在封建时代，战争中和法庭裁判中的最高权力是地产的属性一样。<sup>[2]</sup>第386页

1. 协作产生的劳动的社会生产力表现为资本的生产力
2. 协作本身表现资本主义生产过程的特有形式

工人作为独立的人是单个的人，他们和同一资本发生关系，但是彼此不发生生产关系。他们的协作是在劳动过程中才开始的，但是在劳动过程中他们已经不再属于自己了。他们一进入劳动过程，便并入资本。作为协作的人，作为一个工作有机体的肢体，他们本身只不过是资本的一种特殊存在方式。因此，工人作为社会工人所发挥的生产力，是资本的生产力。<sup>[2] 第 386-7 页</sup>

只要把工人置于一定的条件下，劳动的社会生产力就无须支付报酬而发挥出来，而资本正是把工人置于这样的条件之下的。因为劳动的社会生产力不费资本分文，另一方面，又因为工人在他的劳动本身属于资本以前不能发挥这种生产力，所以劳动的社会生产力好像是资本天然具有的生产力，是资本内在的生产力。<sup>[2]</sup>第387页

# “边际生产力”理论

- 有了资本以后才通过协作发挥出的社会生产力成了资本的生产力
- 资本的边际生产力  $f(L, K + 1) - f(L, K)$
- 试图用生产和技术关系去合理化占有和分配问题

## 资本的边际生产力


假如一个装配工人一小时组装 10 件产品，每个产品的价格是 \$1.5, 配件成本是 \$1, 那么用生产函数表示就是  $f(1, 10) = 15$ 。假如老板今天到厂里喝茶，工人组装速度加快，一个小时组装了 11 件产品，用生产函数表示就是  $f(1, 11) = 16.5$ ，资本的边际生产力  $f(1, 11) - f(1, 10) = 1.5$

1. Taylorism: Braverman 对科学管理的分析
2. 福特主义与新福特主义
3. 南京河西环卫工配发智能手表
4. 算法与骑手
5. AI 监工 (Enable, Cerebral, 钉钉, 沃尔玛收银监控, 亚马逊仓库)


# 劳动榨取模型

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
# 劳动榨取曲线




## 等单位劳动成本线



# 最优选择





# 提高失业保险





图 12.5 更多失业保险金带来的效应

# 产业后备军与失业威胁



# 拓展练习




Figure 1.8: The sequence of moves in a one-shot game determining the payoffs to shirking. In response to the employer's statement of the no shirking level of effort  $e$ , the termination probability  $t$  and the wage  $w$ , she decides whether to exert  $e = 0$  or  $e = e$ . If she exerts effort  $e = e$ , she obtains the payoff for working and incurring disutility of effort,  $w - u$ . If she exerts no effort,  $e = 0$ , then there is a probability  $t$  she will be terminated and a probability  $1 - t$  she will not. If she is not terminated, she gets the wage  $w$  (and incurs no disutility of effort). If terminated, she will remain jobless (be unemployed) with the probability  $j$  and get unemployment benefit,  $B$ , or she will be re-employed with the probability  $1 - j$  and receive the same value of the job that she would have experienced had she not been terminated,  $w - u$ .

1. 问为了使工人选择努力工作，雇主应设定多高的工资？
2. 雇主设定的工资比工人愿意接受的最低工资高吗？
3. 如果没有办法重新找到工作的概率等于失业率， $j = 1 - H$ ，那么上一问中的工资与就业率之间是什么关系？

由

$$w - \underline{u} = (1 - t)w + t[jB + (1 - j)(w - \underline{u})] \quad (1)$$

得

$$w = B + \underline{u} + \frac{1-t}{t} \frac{\underline{u}}{j} \quad (2)$$

代入  $j = 1 - H$ , 可得

$$w^N = B + \underline{u} + \frac{1-t}{t} \frac{\underline{u}}{1-H} \quad (3)$$

## 经验证据



Figure 1.11: An economy-wide wage curve estimated for the United States economy: 1979-2013. The sample of 2.34 million workers are males aged 26-64 over the years 1979-2013. Earnings are in 2013 dollars. Source: CORE. The Economy.<sup>16</sup>

# 学习任务

## 1. 预习

塞缪尔·鲍尔斯, 等, 2013,: 《理解资本主义》, 第十三章

## 2. 阅读下列材料并撰写读书笔记, 于11月2日(周一)下午6点前提交

戴维·诺布尔, 2007,: 《生产力》, 第七章

## 3. 推荐阅读

史蒂芬·马格林, 等, 2009,: 《老板们在做什么?——资本主义生产中等级制度的起源和功能》, 《政治经济学评论》第1期

# 问答

# References

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- 马克思, 2004,:《资本论(第一卷)》, 中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局,译., 人民出版社 , 1127 pp.。
- 塞缪尔·鲍尔斯、弗兰克·罗斯福、理查德·爱德华兹, 2013,:《理解资本主义》, 孟捷, 赵准, 徐华,译., 中国人民大学出版社 , 656 pp.。
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