

Question 1 :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{a. } \max U &= q_1, q_2 & (1) \\ \text{s.t. } 2q_1 + 5q_2 &= 100 & (2) \end{aligned}$$

set up a Lagrangian Eqn:

$$\mathcal{L} = q_1 q_2 + \lambda (100 - 2q_1 - 5q_2)$$

take the first order derivative of q_1, q_2 respectively;

$$[q_1]: q_2 = 2\lambda$$

$$[q_2]: q_1 = 5\lambda$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{q_2}{2} = \frac{q_1}{5} \Rightarrow q_2 = \frac{2}{5}q_1 \quad (3)$$

plug (3) into (2).

$$\Rightarrow 2q_1 + 5 \cdot \frac{2}{5}q_1 = 100$$

$$\Rightarrow 4q_1 = 100 \Rightarrow q_1 = 25$$

b. The price elasticity:

$$e_{d_1} = \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial p_1} \cdot \frac{p_1}{q_1}$$

$$= 0$$

Because the price of q_1 is pre-determined, and it's constant, which means we are in competitive market, thus, the elasticity of demand of q_1 is 0.

2.

$$(a) \quad MC = \frac{\partial TC}{\partial Q} = 0.12Q^2 - 1.8Q + 10$$

$$\frac{\partial MC}{\partial Q} = 0.24Q - 1.8 = 0 \Rightarrow Q^* = 7.5$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 MC}{\partial Q^2} = 0.24 > 0$$

As the second order derivative of MC with respect to Q is positive, so at Q^* , MC could get minimum.

$$(b) \quad AVC = \frac{7VC}{Q} = \frac{0.04Q^3 - 0.9Q^2 + 10Q}{Q}$$

$$= 0.04Q^2 - 0.9Q + 10$$

$$\frac{\partial AVC}{\partial Q} = 0.08Q - 0.9 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow Q^* = 11.25$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 AVC}{\partial Q^2} = 0.08 > 0$$

Since second order derivative is positive, so at point Q^* , we can get the minimum AVC.

plug Q^* into AVC, AVC at $Q^* =$

$$\Rightarrow 0.04 \times Q^{*2} - 0.9Q^* + 10$$

$$= \frac{81}{16} - \frac{81}{8} + 10$$

$$AVC = \frac{79}{16}$$

(c) When $MC = AVC$

$$\Rightarrow 0.12Q^2 - 1.8Q + 10 = 0.04Q^2 - 0.9Q + 10$$

$$0.08Q^2 - 0.9Q = 0$$

$$Q(0.08Q - 0.9) = 0$$


$$\Rightarrow Q_1 = 0$$

$$Q_2 = 11.25$$

We first eliminate $Q = 0$ as $Q > 0$

$\Rightarrow Q = 11.25 = Q^*$ at (b) where Q^* is the minimum point of AVC curve.


(d)



3.

(a) True

Because if in the inelastic curve, where's competitive market where $P = MR = MC$, the monopolistic producers will not get any profits and mark up ($P - MR = 0$) if they enter this market. The only possible scenario for monopolistic producers to enter ^{and produce} is the mark-up [$P > MR$] is positive, which is on the elastic portion of demand curve.



So the point A' as seen in the above is located in the minimum point of long-run average cost.

(c.) (i) The third degree price discrimination is the producers sell the same products to different groups, and they charge different prices for each group.

(ii) Because different groups of consumers have different elasticity of demand curve, the monopolists can get higher mark up if they charge different prices for each group. \Rightarrow higher total profits for the monopolists.

⑤ conditions: 1) No collusion between different groups. [if different group can exchange goods, the strategy will be fail]

2) The monopolist need to find a method to differentiate different groups.

3) The products are heterogeneous.

④ Example:

Theater: children have children price ^{for} the ticket & adults have adult price for the ticket.

Restaurant: Restaurants near Fordham University give Fordham students some meal discounts.

$$\text{Id, } MR = P(1 + \frac{1}{e})$$

$$MR_1 = MR_2$$

$$\Rightarrow P_1(1 + \frac{1}{e_1}) = P_2(1 + \frac{1}{e_2})$$

$$\Rightarrow 12(1 - \frac{1}{3}) = P_2(1 - \frac{1}{2})$$

$$\Rightarrow 8 = \frac{P_2}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow P_2 = 16$$

So need to charge \$16 at market 2.

4.

a. Suppose the price of product market is $P(Q)$, [As it's imperfect market]
 production function is $Q(V_1, V_2)$, as in the input market,
 it's perfect competition, so the price for each input factor is
 unchanged, the firm wants to maximize its profits.

$$\Rightarrow \max_{Q, V_1, V_2} \pi: P(Q)Q(V_1, V_2) - \bar{P}_{V_1} V_1 - \bar{P}_{V_2} V_2$$

Take the first order derivative of V_1, V_2 .

$$[V_1] \quad MR \frac{\partial Q}{\partial V_1} = \bar{P}_{V_1}$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{aligned} MR MPPV_1 &= \bar{P}_{V_1} & MR &= \frac{\bar{P}_{V_1}}{MPPV_1} \\ MR MPPV_2 &= \bar{P}_{V_2} \end{aligned}$$

$$[V_2] \quad MR \frac{\partial Q}{\partial V_2} = \bar{P}_{V_2}$$


From these formulas, we can get the specific inputs V_1, V_2 for the
 firms to maximize its profits.

As $P > MR$ at imperfect market.

$$\Rightarrow P \cdot \frac{\partial Q}{\partial V_1} > MR \frac{\partial Q}{\partial V_1}$$

$$\Rightarrow VMPPV_1 > MR PV_1$$

For $MEV_1 = \bar{P}_{V_1}$ at this case b/c input market is
 competitive.



7. The figure is for U_1 , but the same for U_2 .

In the figure, MEV_1 intersects w/ $MRPV_1$ at point B, if we extend Q of B up and below to $VMPV_1$ and S_1 , respectively, we can get. And C, $VMPV_1 > MRPV_1$ for each point b/c in imperfect market, $P > MR$.

$MRPV_1$ is negative w/ Q, so $\frac{\partial MRPV_1}{\partial Q} < 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial^2 \pi}{\partial Q^2} < 0$, which means it's the point of max π .

BC in my figure represents the "monopolistic exploitation".