

# Problem Set 7

## 1. Bayesian Updating

### Notation

$$\begin{cases}
 V > 0 & \text{non-fundable fixed cost} \\
 X > V & \text{prize} \\
 S & \text{the idea is a success} \\
 F & \text{the idea is a failure} \\
 \tau & \text{signal} \\
 s & \text{signal cost}
 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{acquire signal} \begin{cases} \text{yes} \\ \text{no} \end{cases} \begin{cases} + \text{ implement idea} \\ - \text{ implement idea} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{yes} & U(+, 1) \\ \text{no} & \text{acquire signal} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{yes} \\ \text{no} \end{cases} \begin{cases} + \text{ implement} \\ - \text{ implement} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{yes} & U(+, +, 1) \\ \text{no} & U(+, +, 0) \\ \text{yes} & U(+, -, 1) \\ \text{no} & U(+, -, 0) \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{yes} & U(-, 1) \\ \text{no} & \text{acquire signal} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{yes} \\ \text{no} \end{cases} \begin{cases} + \text{ implement} \\ - \text{ implement} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{yes} & U(-, +, 1) \\ \text{no} & U(-, +, 0) \\ \text{yes} & U(-, -, 1) \\ \text{no} & U(-, -, 0) \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{yes} & U(1) \\ \text{no} & U(0) \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases}
 P(+|S) = \theta \\
 P(-|F) = \theta \\
 X = 2F \\
 \theta = \frac{4}{5} \\
 P(S) = \frac{1}{2}
 \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} P(S) = \frac{1}{2} \\ P(F) = \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \begin{cases} P(+) = \frac{1}{2} \\ P(-) = \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \begin{cases} P(+|S) = \frac{4}{5} \\ P(-|S) = \frac{1}{5} \end{cases} \begin{cases} P(+|F) = \frac{1}{5} \\ P(-|F) = \frac{4}{5} \end{cases}$$

### 1(a)

#### Calculating posteriors

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(S|+) &= \frac{P(S, +)}{P(+)} \\
 &= \frac{P(+|S) \cdot P(S)}{P(+|S) \cdot P(S) + P(+|F) \cdot P(F)} \\
 &= \frac{\frac{1}{2}\theta}{\frac{1}{2}\theta + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta)} \\
 &= \theta = \frac{4}{5}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P(S|-) &= \frac{P(S, -)}{P(-)} \\
&= \frac{P(-|S) \cdot P(S)}{P(-|S) \cdot P(S) + P(-|F) \cdot P(F)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta)}{\frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta) + \frac{1}{2}\theta} \\
&= 1 - \theta = \frac{1}{5}
\end{aligned}$$

### Bayes' rule with 3 events

$$\begin{aligned}
P(A|B, C) &= \frac{P(A, B, C)}{P(B, C)} \\
&= \frac{P(B|A, C) \cdot P(A, C)}{P(B, C)} \\
&= \frac{P(B|A, C) \cdot P(A|C) \cdot P(C)}{P(B, C)} \\
&= \frac{P(B|A, C) \cdot P(A|C) \cdot P(C)}{P(B|C) \cdot P(C)} \\
&= \frac{P(B|A, C) \cdot P(A|C)}{P(B|C)}
\end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned}
P(S|+, +) &= \frac{P(+|S, +) \cdot P(S|+)}{P(+|S, +) \cdot P(S|+) + P(+|F, +) \cdot P(F|+)} \\
&= \frac{\theta^2}{\theta^2 + (1 - \theta)^2} \\
&= \frac{\frac{16}{25}}{\frac{16}{25} + \frac{1}{25}} \\
&= \frac{16}{17} \\
P(F|+, +) &= 1 - P(S|+, +) = \frac{1}{17}
\end{aligned}$$

### Conditional Independence

$$\begin{aligned}
P(S|+, -) &= \frac{P(-|S, +) \cdot P(+|S)}{P(-|+)} \\
&= \frac{P(-|S, +) \cdot P(+|S)}{P(-|S, +) \cdot P(+|S) + P(-|F, +) \cdot P(+|F)} \\
&= \frac{(1 - \theta)\theta}{(1 - \theta)\theta + \theta(1 - \theta)} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \\
P(F|+, -) &= 1 - P(S|+, -) = \frac{1}{2} \\
P(S|-, +) &= \frac{P(+|S, -) \cdot P(-|S)}{P(+|-)} \\
&= \frac{P(+|S, -) \cdot P(-|S)}{P(+|S, -) \cdot P(-|S) + P(+|F, -) \cdot P(-|F)} \\
&= \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{\theta(1 - \theta) + (1 - \theta)\theta} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \\
P(F|-, +) &= 1 - P(S|-, +) = \frac{1}{2}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P(S|-,-) &= \frac{P(-|S,-) \cdot P(-|S)}{P(-|-)} \\
&= \frac{P(-|S,-) \cdot P(-|S)}{P(-|S,-) \cdot P(-|S) + P(-|F,-) \cdot P(-|F)} \\
&= \frac{(1-\theta)^2}{(1-\theta)^2 + \theta^2} \\
&= \frac{1}{17}
\end{aligned}$$

**Decision tree**



$$\begin{aligned}
U(+,1) &= P(S|+) \times (V-s) + P(F|+) \times (-V-s) \\
&= \frac{4}{5} \times (V-s) + \frac{1}{5} \times (-V-s) \\
&= \frac{3}{5}V - s
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U(+,+,1) &= P(S|+,+) \times (V-2s) + P(F|+,+) \times (-V-2s) \\
&= \frac{16}{17} \times (V-2s) + \frac{1}{17} \times (-V-2s) \\
&= \frac{15}{17}V - 2s
\end{aligned}$$

$$U(+,+,0) = -2s$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U(+,-,1) &= P(S|+,-) \times (V-2s) + P(F|+,-) \times (-V-2s) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \times (V-2s) + \frac{1}{2} \times (-V-2s) \\
&= -2s
\end{aligned}$$

$$U(+,-,0) = -2s$$

$$U(+,0) = -s$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U(-,1) &= P(S|-) \times (V-s) + P(F|-) \times (-V-s) \\
&= \frac{1}{5} \times (V-s) + \frac{4}{5} \times (-V-s) \\
&= -\frac{3}{5}V - s
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U(-,+,1) &= P(S|- ,+) \times (V-2s) + P(F|- ,+) \times (-V-2s) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \times (V-2s) + \frac{1}{2} \times (-V-2s) \\
&= -2s
\end{aligned}$$

$$U(-,+,0) = -2s$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U(-, -, 1) &= P(S|-, -) \times (V - 2s) + P(F|-, -) \times (-V - 2s) \\
&= \frac{1}{17} \times (V - 2s) + \frac{16}{17} \times (-V - 2s) \\
&= -\frac{15}{17}V - 2s
\end{aligned}$$

$$U(-, -, 0) = -2s$$

$$U(-, 0) = -s$$

$$U(1) = P(S) \times V + P(F) \times (-V) = 0$$

$$U(0) = 0$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{acquire signal} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} + \text{ implement idea} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad \frac{3}{5}V - s \\ \text{no} \quad \text{acquire signal} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} + \text{ implement} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad \frac{15}{17}V - 2s \\ \text{no} \quad -2s \end{array} \right. \\ - \text{ implement} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad -2s \\ \text{no} \quad -2s \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right. \\ \text{no} \quad -s \end{array} \right. \\ \text{yes} \quad -\frac{3}{5}V - s \\ \text{no} \quad \text{acquire signal} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} + \text{ implement} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad -2s \\ \text{no} \quad -2s \end{array} \right. \\ - \text{ implement} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad -\frac{15}{17}V - 2s \\ \text{no} \quad -2s \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right. \\ \text{no} \quad -s \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right. \\ \text{no} \quad \text{implement idea} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yes} \quad 0 \\ \text{no} \quad 0 \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.
\end{array}
\right.
\end{array}$$

**1(b)**

$$P(S|+) = \frac{1}{1 + \left(\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\right)^c \left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right)}$$

$$c = 1$$

$$P(S|+) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-p}{p}} = p \implies \text{no belief updating}$$

The entrepreneur is not willing to pay for a signal because the signal will be ignored anyways.

Optimal decision

- never acquire signal
- indifferent between implementing and not implementing

## 2. Optimal Information Acquisition

$$\begin{cases} \omega_0 & \text{project } j = 0 \text{ is successful} \\ \omega_1 & \text{project } j = 1 \text{ is successful} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} P(\omega_0) = \frac{1}{2} \\ P(\omega_1) = \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{utility} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{project } j = 0 \text{ is successful} \\ 1 & \text{project } j = 1 \text{ is successful} \\ -c & \text{project } j = 0 \text{ fails} \\ 0 & \text{project } j = 1 \text{ fails} \end{cases}$$

## 2(a)

$$\begin{aligned} EU(S) &= P(S_0) \cdot [P(\omega_0|S_0) \cdot 1 + P(\omega_1|S_0) \cdot (-c)] + P(S_1) \cdot [P(\omega_1|S_1) \cdot 1 + P(\omega_0|S_1) \cdot 0] \\ &= P(S_0|\omega_0) \cdot P(\omega_0) \cdot 1 + P(S_0|\omega_1) \cdot P(\omega_1) \cdot (-c) + P(S_1|\omega_1) \cdot P(\omega_1) \cdot 1 + P(S_1|\omega_0) \cdot P(\omega_0) \cdot 0 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [P(S_0|\omega_0) - c \cdot P(S_0|\omega_1) + P(S_1|\omega_1)] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [P(S_0|\omega_0) - c \cdot (1 - P(S_1|\omega_1)) + P(S_1|\omega_1)] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [P(S_0|\omega_0) + (1 + c)P(S_1|\omega_1) - c] \end{aligned}$$

## 2(b)

$$\begin{aligned} EU(\text{invest in } j = 0) &= P(\omega_0) \cdot 1 + P(\omega_1) \cdot (-c) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \times 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot c \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (1 - c) \\ EU(\text{invest in } j = 1) &= P(\omega_0) \cdot 0 + P(\omega_1) \cdot 1 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

DM will always choose to invest in  $j = 1$  project and gain a utility of  $\frac{1}{2}$  when deciding according to the prior.

In order to make sure separating signals yield a higher utility than deciding according to the prior, we need to set

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} [P(S_0|\omega_0) + (1 + c)P(S_1|\omega_1) - c] &> \frac{1}{2} \\ P(S_1|\omega_1) &\geq \frac{c - P(S_0|\omega_0)}{1 + c} \end{aligned}$$

## 2(c)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial EU(S)}{\partial P(S_0|\omega_0)} &= \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{\partial EU(S)}{\partial P(S_1|\omega_1)} &= \frac{1}{2} (1 + c) > \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Acquire information (direct attention) in  $P(S_1|\omega_1)$

Intuition: you want to avoid the mismatch