## **Problem Set 8**

## 1. (Salience I)

Consider the model of salience and competition from the lecture. Let  $x \in \{p, q\}$  be an attribute with average value  $\bar{x}$  as explained in the lecture.

(a) Prove that the function

$$\sigma(x,\bar{x}) = \frac{|x - \bar{x}|}{\bar{x}}$$

is a salience function that verifies the defining properties "zero homogeneity" and "ordering". State a verbal interpretation of this function.

- (b) Prove that if  $\sigma(x, \bar{x})$  is a salience function, then the salience of attribute x is an increasing function of the percentage difference between x and  $\bar{x}$ . That is: If  $\frac{x'-\bar{x}'}{\bar{x}'}>\frac{x-\bar{x}}{\bar{x}}$  then  $\sigma(x',\bar{x}')>\sigma(x,\bar{x})$ .
- 2. (Salience II) Consider the salience model with price competition from the lecture. There are two firms  $j \in \{1, 2\}$ , where quality levels verify  $q_1 > q_2$  and unit costs verify  $c_1 \geq c_2$ , such that firm j = 1 is the high-quality firm. Let the salience parameter  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  satisfy

$$\delta(c_1 - c_2) < q_1 - q_2 < \frac{c_1 - c_2}{\delta}$$

(a) Let  $\frac{q_1}{c_1} > \frac{q_2}{c_2}$ . Show that a quality-salient equilibrium exists, where only firm j = 1 makes positive profits  $(j = 2 \text{ sets } p_2 = c_2)$  and

$$p_1 = \min\left\{\frac{q_1}{q_2}c_2, \frac{q_1 - q_2}{\delta} + c_2\right\}$$

(b) Suppose that  $q_1 - c_1 > q_2 - c_2$  and  $\frac{q_1}{c_1} > \frac{q_2}{c_2}$ . Prove that firm j = 1 makes *less* profits in the salience equilibrium compared to the rational

benchmark model (where  $\delta=1$ ). Why does such a *pro-competitive effect* of salience emerge?