



Level 0x05

Offensive Security Researcher



Topics

- Kevin F
- Offensive Security Life

Kevin Finisterre

- Drone Hacking “OG”
 - Kickstarted drone hacking scene
 - I used a lot of his tools and guides when drone hacking myself
 - <https://www.guinnpartners.com/kevin-finisterre-departement-13/>
 - Firmware decryption tools
 - Communication tools
 - Exposed many DJI abuses / privacy issues
 - Leaked photos
 - It's hard to find photos of Kevin, cause most of his photos are leaked DJI drone photos
 - User tracking




Life of a Offensive Cyber Engineer

- Offensive Security
 - Trying to hack / break into systems
 - For US government (else usually illegal)
- Targets
 - Adversary militaries or governments
 - Terrorists
 - Could we target US citizens?
- Objectives
 - Intelligence / Data collection
 - 5 Ds: Deny, Degrade, Disrupt, Deceive, or Destroy
 - Persist




Example Case: Drones

- Air, sea, land, they are everywhere
- Commercial, agriculture, military / purpose built
- Hardware
 - Advanced computers
 - RF, Wi-Fi communication
 - Advanced Imagery / Camera
 - GPS / GLONASS positioning
 - Phones / display computers
- Intelligence?
- Threat?
 - Can kill personnel
 - Can destroy equipment
 - Can destroy infrastructure
 - Can surveil forces



Reverse Engineer Hardware




- Identification of hardware
 - Processors / capabilities
 - Memory devices
 - Communication interfaces
- Extract memory
 - So we can reverse engineer software
 - Hidden secrets, password hashes, keys
 - Logs
- Interfaces
 - Capture messages between devices
 - UART - Debug interfaces / console
 - JTAG - talk to CPU
 - RF capabilities
- Research



Number	Part Number	Datasheet	Usage
1	BoyaMicro 25Q64ESSIG	Link	SPI Flash, non-volatile storage
2	BAT32G135 MCU	Website Overview , Datasheet	32 bit ARM Cortex M0 MCU
3	CST4056	Link	Standard Linear Li-Ion Battery Charger
4	TMI8118S	Link	Brushed DC Motor Driver

Extracting and Capturing

- Desolder / In-circuit interrogation
- JTAG
- UART



Analyze Memory Contents

- Code
 - Boot code
 - Application code
 - What memory address?
- Data
 - Encrypted?
 - File system?
 - Can I extract files?
 - Logs?
 - Password file?
 - Permissions?

```
pi@pifex:~/targets/toothbrush$ hexdump -C -n512 spi.bin
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 a2 6b ad 94 b2 9c f3 [...]km....]
00000010 8c 71 52 aa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...]qR.....]
00000020 00 00 0b cd ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [...]km.....]
00000030 f7 9e 31 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...]..Z....]
00000040 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [...].....]
00000050 21 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 e7 3c ff ff ff ce 50 [...]Z.....]
00000060 31 00 18 c3 5a cb f7 be ff ff ff ff a5 34 00 00 [...].....4..]
00000070 00 00 4a 69 ff ff ff ff ff df 10 82 00 00 00 00 [...]..Jl.....]
00000080 00 00 52 aa ff ff ff ff ff df 10 82 21 24 8c 71 [...]..R.....[S]q]
00000090 ff ff ff ff ad 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 [...]..U.....]
000000a0 ef 7d ff ff ff ff 42 28 4a 69 bd d7 ff ff ff ff [...]..B(Jl.....]
000000b0 84 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c6 18 ff ff [...].....]
000000c0 ff ff 0b 0d 03 2c d6 9a ff ff ff ff 03 0c 00 00 [...]..kmc,...C...]
000000d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ad 75 ff ff ff ff 8c 51 [...].....U...Q]
000000e0 73 ae de fb ff ff ff ff 5a cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...]s.....Z.....]
000000f0 00 00 00 00 0c f3 ff ff ff ff 94 b2 7b cf e7 1c [...].....]
00000100 ff ff ff ff 52 aa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...]..R.....]
00000110 9c d3 ff ff ff ff 9c d3 73 ae de fb ff ff ff ff [...]..S.....]
00000120 5a cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c f3 ff ff [...]Z.....]
00000130 ff ff 04 b2 03 2c d6 9a ff ff ff ff 03 0c 00 00 [...]..C.....]
00000140 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ad 75 ff ff ff ff 8c 51 [...].....C...Q]
00000150 4a 69 bd d7 ff ff ff ff 84 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...]Jl.....]
00000160 00 00 00 00 c6 18 ff ff ff ff 6b bd 21 04 8c 71 [...].....km...q]
```

FFFF_FFFF	Reserved
E00F_FFFF	
E000_0000H	Cortex-M0+ internal peripherals
4005_FFFF	
	Reserved
4000_0000H	Peripherals
	Reserved
2000_1FFFF	
2000_0000H	SRAM (8KB)
	Reserved
0050_05FFF	
0050_0000H	data flash (1.5KB)
	Reserved
0000_FFFF	
0000_0000H	code flash (64KB)


Static Reverse Engineering

- Strings
 - Program output
 - Commands / messages
- Disassemble
 - Binary Ninja / Ghidra / IDA
 - Decompiler
- Understand code
 - Function names
 - Data structures
 - Software flow / modes
- Identify Encryption
- Hidden features?
 - Debug modes?
 - Backdoors?

```
10002e84      set_ram_unknown_region_to_val(0xff);
10002e90      oled_display("V1", 0x74, 0x39, 1);
10002e9c      oled_display("SELF TEST", 0x25, 0xa, 1);
10002ea8      oled_display("BUTTONS:", 1, 0x14, 1);
10002eb4      oled_display("KEYS:", 1, 0x1e, 1);
10002ebe      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1f) < 0)
10002ebc      {
10002ec4          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[0] = '0';
10002ec4      }
10002ecc      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1e) < 0)
10002eca      {
10002ed2          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[1] = '1';
10002ed2      }
10002eda      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1d) < 0)
10002ed8      {
10002ee0          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[2] = '2';
10002ee0      }
10002ee8      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1c) < 0)
10002ee6      {
10002eee          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[3] = '3';
10002eee      }
10002ef6      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1b) < 0)
10002ef4      {
10002efc          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[4] = '4';
10002efc      }
10002f04      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x1a) < 0)
10002f02      {
10002f0a          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[5] = '5';
10002f0a      }
10002f12      if (((uint32_t)g_piano_key_pressed) << 0x19) < 0)
10002f10      {
10002f18          g_pianoKeysPressedStr[6] = '6';
10002f18      }
```


Dynamic Reverse Engineering

- Debug / see code as it runs
 - Can sometimes debug on target hardware
- Emulation
 - Write software to simulate how hardware runs software
 - Write tools to analyze software as it runs
 - Tile viewers, OS introspection



Bug finding / Fuzzing

- Static research / using your brain
- Research existing bug databases
- Fuzzing - feed program corrupt data and cause it to crash
 - Corpus: files / messages to corrupt
 - Corruption
 - Random data
 - AI driven corruption
 - Crash Triage
 - Capture crash data (inputs and outputs)
 - Repeatable?
 - What went wrong
 - Where do we do this?
 - Target hardware
 - Emulators



american fuzzy lop 2.42b (xmllint)		
process timing		overall results
run time : 2 days, 7 hrs, 11 min, 16 sec		cycles done : 0
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 26 min, 14 sec		total paths : 5441
last uniq crash : none seen yet		uniq crashes : 0
last uniq hang : none seen yet		uniq hangs : 0
cycle progress	map coverage	
now processing : 2064 (37.93%)	map density : 7.37% / 18.75%	
paths timed out : 1 (0.02%)	count coverage : 4.04 bits/tuple	
stage progress	findings in depth	
now trying : arith 8/8	favorable paths : 851 (15.64%)	
stage execs : 113k/12.7M (0.89%)	new edges on : 1254 (23.05%)	
total execs : 20.5M	total crashes : 0 (0 unique)	
exec speed : 33.91/sec (slow!)	total tmouts : 2921 (269 unique)	
fuzzing strategy yields	path geometry	
bit flips : 1410/3.34M, 120/1.89M, 118/1.89M	levels : 2	
byte flips : 1/235k, 32/235k, 24/234k	pending : 5229	
arithmetics : 347/2.98M, 0/193k, 0/0	pend fav : 733	
known ints : 71/298k, 21/1.48M, 11/2.33M	own finds : 3310	
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 98/2.47M	imported : n/a	
havoc : 1050/1.39M, 0/0	stability : 98.53%	
trim : 0.36%/26.5k, 0.12%		

[cpu000:101%]

Exploitation and Development


- Implant: Convert your exploit into our code running on target
- Persistence: can we stay running on hardware after reset
- Communication: command and control of implant
- Effects:
 - Move onto network
 - Collect data
 - 5 D's
- Packaging: how does a soldier or operator use?
 - Hardware / Smartphone app?
 - USB drive / Rubber ducky
 - Transmit via wireless

METASPLOIT MODULES

Metasploit provides you with modules for:

- **Exploits:** Tool used to take advantage of system weaknesses
- **Payloads:** Sets of malicious code
- **Auxiliary functions:** Supplementary tools and commands
- **Encoders:** Used to convert code or information
- **Listeners:** Malicious software that hides in order to gain access
- **Shellcode:** Code that is programmed to activate once inside the target
- **Post-exploitation code:** Helps test deeper penetration once inside
- **Nops:** An instruction to keep the payload from crashing

VARONIS



VARONIS





Links

- <https://www.guinnpartners.com/kevin-finisterre-department-13/>
- <https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2019/04/deny-degrade-disrupt-deceive-de-destroy/>
- <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-04/diy-weapons-innovation-drones-in-ukraine-war-russia/101910506>
- <https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-vows-repair-planes-damaged-ukraine-massive-drone-attack-claims-were-not-destroyed>
- <https://voidstarsec.com/blog/brushing-up-part-2>
- <https://testfully.io/blog/fuzz-testing/>
- <https://www.rferl.org/a/anti-drone-evolution-ukraine-war-russia/33020303.html>
- <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer>