**Appendix**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Labor migration* | *Family reunification* | *Asylum and refugees* | *Control mechanisms* |
| Targeting  Quotas labor  Age limits  Young age beneficial  Specific income per month  Specific financial funds  Language skills  Application fee  Job offer  Equal work conditions  List of occupations  Labor market tests  Work permit validity  Renewal of permit  Transition temporary permanent  Loss of employment  Flexibility of permit | Residence requirements  Family members  Age limits  Quotas family reunification  Financial requirements  Accommodation requirements  Language skills  Application fees  Residence permit validity  Autonomous residence permit  (Self)employment | Existence of subsidiary/humanitarian protection  Nationality  Quotas asylum  Safe third country  Safe countries of origin  Resettlement agreements  Place of application  Permit validity  Permit renewal  Permanent permit  Right to appeal  Status when crisis resolved  Free movement  (Self)employment  Form of benefits | Illegal residence  Carriers sanction  Alien’s register  Information sharing/international cooperation  Biometric information  Forged/expired documents  Aiding irregular immigrants  Identification documents  Amnesty/Regularization programs  Public schooling  Employer sanctions  Marriage of convenience  Detention |

*Notes*: Changes in items referring to labor migration, family reunification and asylum/refugees are combined into the first dependent variable “change in migration regulation”. Changes in control mechanisms constitute the second dependent variable “change in migration controls”. See Bjerre et al. (2016) for more details regarding the IMPIC dataset and the codebook.

**Supplementary Table 1: Items of the IMPIC Immigration Policy Dataset**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Dependent Variable 🡪 | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Controls | Migration Controls | Migration Controls |
| Transnational Terrorism Index | -0.319 | 0.045 | -0.131 | -0.841 | 0.158\*\* | 0.141\*\* |
|  | (0.353) | (0.080) | (0.119) | (1.125) | (0.036) | (0.051) |
| Policy Diffusion | 2.768\*\* | 2.765\*\* | 2.779\*\* | 2.064\* | 2.035\* | 2.067\* |
|  | (0.868) | (0.874) | (0.872) | (1.004) | (1.010) | (1.006) |
| Left-Wing Government | 0.567\* | 0.558\* | 0.569\* | -0.044 | -0.068 | -0.054 |
|  | (0.275) | (0.275) | (0.276) | (0.337) | (0.341) | (0.339) |
| Right-Wing Government | 0.354 | 0.333 | 0.358 | -0.454 | -0.514\* | -0.480\* |
|  | (0.251) | (0.255) | (0.255) | (0.239) | (0.246) | (0.241) |
| Government Size | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.019 | 0.022 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| Unemployment | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.082\*\* | 0.080\*\* | 0.081\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Per Capita Income | 0.941\*\* | 0.938\*\* | 0.942\*\* | 0.480\*\* | 0.462\*\* | 0.469\*\* |
|  | (0.207) | (0.202) | (0.206) | (0.163) | (0.161) | (0.161) |
| Democratic Participation | 0.896 | 0.962 | 0.897 | -0.038 | 0.085 | 0.045 |
|  | (1.509) | (1.452) | (1.500) | (1.106) | (1.093) | (1.091) |
| Index Weighting | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K | 1\*I+1\*W11\*K |
| Index Decay | No Memory | 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 … | 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 … | No Memory | 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 … | 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 … |
| Time Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.07 | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.040 |
| No. of Observations | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 |
| Notes: Logit-model estimates reported. Constant not reported. I=Number of transnational terrorist incidents. W=Number of individuals wounded in incidents. K=Number of individuals killed in incidents. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | |

**Supplementary Table 2: Further Operationalizations of Terrorism Index**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Dependent Variable 🡪 | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Controls | Migration Controls |
| Transnational Terrorism Index | 0.083 | -0.002 | -0.008 | 0.014\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.014) | (0.054) | (0.006) |
| Policy Diffusion | 1.530\*\* | 1.640\*\* | 1.210\* | 1.193\* |
|  | (0.486) | (0.504) | (0.572) | (0.561) |
| Left-Wing Government | 0.272 | 0.317\* | -0.023 | -0.028 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.157) | (0.196) | (0.194) |
| Right-Wing Government | 0.111 | 0.188 | -0.260\* | -0.273\* |
|  | (0.133) | (0.145) | (0.147) | (0.137) |
| Government Size | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.019) | (0.011) | (0.012) |
| Unemployment | 0.026 | 0.027 | 0.046\*\* | 0.045\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Per Capita Income | 0.492\*\* | 0.520\*\* | 0.267\*\* | 0.262\*\* |
|  | (0.107) | (0.119) | (0.093) | (0.090) |
| Democratic Participation | 0.535 | 0.472 | -0.009 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.743) | (0.804) | (0.618) | (0.607) |
| *Reduced-Form Results* | | |  |  |
| Military Capacity | 0.661\*\* |  | 0.651\*\* |  |
|  | (0.062) |  | (0.061) |  |
| F-Test Statistic | 112.98\*\* |  | 115.55\*\* |  |
| (Prob.>F) | (0.00) |  | (0.00) |  |
| Wald Exogeneity Test | 8.49\*\* |  | 0.12 |  |
| (Prob.>χ2) | (0.00) |  | (0.72) |  |
| Time Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of Observations | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 |
| *Notes*: Constant not reported. Reduced-form results for other covariates not reported. Null hypothesis of Wald exogeneity test: no endogeneity. Military capacity=First principal component from military spending and military spending as a share of GDP as well as military personnel and military personnel per capita. Data on military spending from WDI and National Material Capabilities Dataset (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities). All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01. | | | | |

**Supplementary Table 3: Additional Instrumental-Variable Estimates**

***Remarks on IV-Approach and Results***. As in Hendrix and Young (2014), we expect military capacity to positively predict transnational terrorism because terrorism is the reasonable (cost-efficient) tactical choice when challenging a powerful enemy (consistent with the dictum that “terrorism is the weapon of the weak”).

By contrast, there is no argument in the literature that military capacity ought to affect the likelihood of implementing stricter migration policies. First, the various policy measures captured by the IMPIC dataset (cf. Supplementary Table 1) are not related to any military activity; for instance, even if a country’s military were to patrol a country’s borders, this would not affect the IMPIC measures. Second, in many countries (e.g., the U.S., Germany) there are legal/constitutional limits to the use of military for domestic purposes (such as border protection). This further minimizes the relationship between military capacity and migration policy-making. Third, for many parts of the (developed) world, especially for OECD and EU countries considered in our analysis, border protection is conducted by specialized police forces (e.g., FRONTEX, United States Border Patrol, Israel Border Police etc.) rather than the military (for a more detailed discussion, see Andreas, 2003). If any, the military plays only a minor (auxiliary) role in today’s border protection, supporting the actual border protection agencies (Andreas, 2003); again, such an auxiliary role would not affect the data reported in the IMPIC dataset. In sum, we therefore expect military capacity to affect changes in migration policy only through its effect on the terrorism index.

Our results show that military capacity is indeed a positive predictor of terrorist activity, as hypothesized. The instrument is also sufficiently strong (as indicated by the *F*-tests). The exogeneity test suggests that an IV-approach is meaningful when analyzing the effect of transnational terrorism on migration regulation restrictiveness. However, our findings from the IV-approach (cf. model (1)) still indicate that there is no statistically significant effect of transnational terrorism on migration regulation restrictiveness, in line with the corresponding ordinary probit model findings (cf. model (2)). With respect to migration control restrictiveness, our findings (cf. model (3)) suggest that an IV-approach is not warranted (non-significant exogeneity test). An ordinary probit approach (cf. model (4)) is instead more meaningful. The ordinary probit results suggest that more transnational terrorism translates into higher migration control restrictiveness. In sum, the IV-results therefore very closely mirror those reported in Section 4.3 and Table 5.

References

Andreas, P. 2003. Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. International Security 28: 78-111.

Hendrix, Cullen S. and Joseph K. Young. 2014. State capacity and terrorism: A two-dimensional approach. Security Studies 23: 329-363.

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**Supplementary Figure 1: Effect of Time on Policy Change [Migration Regulation]**

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**Supplementary Figure 2: Effect of Time on Policy Change [Migration Controls]**