Occasionally Long's efforts at fairness tend toward a lack of discrimination with some very minor figures receiving a level of attention their work does not merit. On balance, though, the benefits of comprehensiveness justifies the policy of inclusion. The drift from the high metaphysics of rationalism, via the scientific orientation of empiricism, through the synthesist efforts of process and neo-Thomist philosophies, to existentialism, hermeneuticism, deconstruction, and feminism suggest, as Long notes in his concluding remarks, a movement from realism to relativism. This raises the question of the future of philosophy of religion in the new century. Any conjecture in this area is likely to be question-begging with regard to the meaning of "philosophy" and of "religion." Long eschews any speculation about the future, though he writes of a shift to "an openness to the contributions of religious experience toward understanding and realizing the human." This may be true, but I suspect that it is unlikely to contribute much to the development of academic philosophy. For what it is worth, my own sense is that at least for the coming decade or two philosophy of religion is likely to be in recession. This may make Long's retrospective survey all the more useful to future students of the subject.—John Haldane, *University of St. Andrews.*

McGuire, James E., and Tuchanska, Barbara. *Science Unfettered: A Philosophical Study in Sociohistorical Ontology.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001. ix + 420 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $29.95—The authors' aim in this book is "to understand—from a philosophical standpoint—the social and historical nature of science, more precisely, its sociability and historicity" (p. 3). "This book was created within a dialogue" (p. ix) between the two authors, and between our "friends"—those who supported a hermeneutic stance toward the natural sciences—and our "antagonists"—those belonging to the analytic philosophy of science. The dialogue took place at the University of Pittsburgh where McGuire is a Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science and Tuchanska was a visitor from the University of Lodz in Poland. They describe their task as "overcoming the limits of analytic philosophy of science with respect to conceptions of the scientist, scientific cognition, and the objects of science." Expanding on this, the authors say that the task "requires going beyond the subject/object dichotomy that underlies scientific cognition and most modern philosophy. Certainly the subject/object opposition has been problematized. The names of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, Husserl, Heidegger, or Gadamer come readily to mind. Their aim was purely philosophical: to reveal elements underlying both the subject and the object of cognition predominantly from the point of view of the individual cognizer. However, apart from the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Cassirer, Collingwood, and Gadamer, few attempts have been made to situate human cognition ontologically within the social,

the cultural, and the historical. Our aim is to address these dimensions of cognition, especially in regard to scientific cognition" (p. 3).

The philosophical standpoint of the book is taken as that of German philosophy and in particular of a "hermeneutical ontology." It is influenced predominantly by the early Heidegger (of *Being and Time*) and Gadamer (of *Truth and Method*). However, the book is critical of each, Heidegger for his "existentialist" starting point in *Dasein* (chapter 2) and Gadamer for his "linguisticism" and refusal to see the hermeneutic structure of the natural sciences (chapter 2).

In chapter 3, the authors extend "fundamental ontology" to "communities and practice." In chapter 4, science is analyzed in terms of its practice. Chapters 5 and 6 are on history, becoming, and the historicity of science. Chapter 7, the final chapter, is on scientific objectivity. There is a concluding Epilogue that attempts to summarize the positive outcome of the preceding chapters by reducing it to three "ontic-ontological circles": first, "practice and its ontic structural web, the network of factual social relations . . . [and] institutions"; second, "practice and meaningfulness . . . mutually related in an analogous way"; and third, "practice and the world, which it constantly converts into reality and objectifies" (p. 329).

The genesis of the book in what the authors describe as a dialogue between German hermeneutical ontology and Anglo-American logical analysis probably accounts for many of the stylistic peculiarities of the writing. To have a true dialogue, there must be enough common ground between the participants that there is a mutually mediating discourse capable of interpreting one to the other. That seems to be lacking in the dialogue reported on in this book. As a consequence, the book is difficult to read. It tends to reinforce some of the old stereotypes about continental philosophy, that it is "confused," "jargon filled," or "mystical," and some of the old stereotypes of analytic philosophy, that it is aggressively a-contextual, a-hermeneutical, and a-historical and incapable of dialogue except on its own terms. Nevertheless, the main line of the text's development is insightful and powerful and needs to be heard.

The central problem of the book is a failure in philosophical style: the book sets out to propose a hermeneutic socio-historical style of philosophy while employing throughout the argumentative strategies of analytical philosophy. The goals, methods, and presuppositions of these styles are different and the close reader is confused. In the hermeneutic tradition, philosophy is—has to be—a very personal endeavor, and its power to persuade is more like a historical narrative than an explanatory argument; it is dependent on the resonant strength of the author's voice in speaking from some coherent grasp of historical, philosophical, and scientific traditions to achieve an elucidation of human experience from some perspective. Philosophy of this kind is not a science in the traditional sense dependent on a clarification of concepts and a network of logical arguments, nor can it be simply articulated in a coherent matrix of universally true or false sentences. Hermeneutic philosophy always retains reference to a wholeness and totality within which the finitude of an author's discourse is established principally by the author's choice of relevance, selection, and emphasis.—Patrick A. Heelan, *Georgetown University*.