

SUBMITTED

“Neither a beast nor a god”: A Philosophical Anthropology of Humanistic Management

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ARTICLE HISTORY

Compiled June 30, 2023

ABSTRACT

Is freedom and capability enough to sustain our well-being? For human flourishing to progress, defer, and avoid decline, managers as persons must grow in virtue to transcend to the ultimate source of the good. We ask four questions about the humanistic manager as a person: what is the goal, end, good; what form, structure guides the manager; what materials, resources, technology, and context does the manager use within the structure to meet the end and exceed the goals, what is the means of effecting the change needed to meet the manager's goals. Each of these questions form the basis to construct a philosophical anthropology of humanistic management. To these four questions we add three types of finality: the usual absolute terminal and horizontally immanent finalities plus the vertical finality of every growing and developing person among other persons in community. The need for a philosophical anthropology derives from concomitant requirement of what sort of ethical project does the manager, as person, undertake. What and how the person knows, wills, acts on provides the reality within which the manager, as person, operates. Along the way we will visit topics of transcendence, secularism, vulnerability, authentic personhood, and virtue. We conclude with a description, which is a dynamically evolving scheme of the meaning of a manager in the world, the social, and perhaps, the terminal goods of order. We move far from the *homo faber* of a technology-led world whose thought conforms being. We have begun to extend our manager into the species *homo transcendens* where being conforms thought and responsible action.

KEYWORDS

humanistic decision making, authenticity, integrity, values, humanistic management, transcendence, philosophical anthropology, vulnerability, virtue anthropology

“We are living in an era dominated by the profit motive and anxiety over national economic objectives... It is people who matter ultimately, profits are only instrumental means to human lives. The purpose of development ... is to enable people to live full and creative lives developing their potential and fashioning a meaningful existence commensurate with their equal human dignity.” Martha C. Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: A Human Development Approach*, p. 185.

“In pursuing the view that development as freedom, we have to examine – in addition to the freedoms involved in political, social, and economic processes – the extent to which people achieve outcomes they value and have reason to value (p. 291) ... Viewing development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means that, inter

alia, play a prominent role in the process. (p. 3)” Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*.

He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. Aristotle, *Politics*, bk. 1, 1253a 27–9.

Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. . . [T]here is a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the human person, since he stands above all things, and his rights and duties are universal and inviolable. . . Hence, the social order and its development must invariably work to the benefit of the human person. . . It must be founded on truth, built on justice and animated by love; in freedom it should grow every day toward a more humane balance. An improvement in attitudes and abundant changes in society will have to take place if these objectives are to be gained.” Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes*, 26.

1. Introduction

To achieve any notion of the human good, and with organizations especially, the good of order, we must directly insert authentic human behavior into our decisions. Authentic human behavior derives from the moral agent who makes and executes decisions in the complex of relationships we call family, affinity groups, organizations, polities, cultures. Why? We need just refer to the rise in transnational crime correlated with corruption and transnational organizations to glimpse ongoing failure in human decision making. Nearly every organization has, on paper, ratified by stakeholders, a code of conduct, multiple overlapping compliance requirements, subject to severe market, civil and criminal penalties, including loss of franchises and concessions as well as irreparable harm to long held positive reputations.

This essay will deploy prevailing recommended practices, as well as some aspirational leading practices, to challenge current purely rationalistic approaches to decision making and *moral inquiry*, propose a multi-pronged framework for inclusion and extension of horizons of inquiry and the strength of feelings about value by *moral agents* into the *moral universe* within which we all operate with a *moral life*. Any human being constructs a worldview along four successive movements: an objective *moral universe*, within which *moral agents* deploy *moral inquiry* for the purpose of leading the *moral life*. For even if we do not include the four dimensions of any human being’s worldview explicitly, we, as human makers and decisioners and actors, imply whatever we happen to believe (justified or not) in all of our conscious, intuitive, affective and rationally contrived supports for the decisions we make. Throughout this essay we will echo the call for capabilities, freedom, but be guided by the greater common good in *Gaudium et Spes*.

The title of this essay is from Aristotle (Aristotle 1941) and acknowledges that humans think and feel, but in the end are fallible decision makers who need the collaboration of other humans to progress. We require much development and practice to get it right. Byrne (2018) builds on Lonergan (1972) Lonergan (1957) to develop a *moral inquiry* based on the jointly discerning heart and mind. Within this development are relations among feelings, values, and beliefs in the *moral agent* as constitutive of ethical judgment. Building on this foundation we pose three questions in this essay to

focus on the decision maker as *moral agent*.¹

1. What is the nature of the *moral agent*, the human who decides and acts to promote the good of order?
2. Why does this characterization of human nature matter to the good of order?
3. How does the authentic human nature transmit, develop, transform the decline of the good of order into progress?

In what follows we begin to sketch the structure to frame answers to these questions. The sketches will help support our thesis that all human decision makers are vulnerable beings who can only progress to the attainment of a common good through growth in the virtues, at the least, prudence, self-care, justice, and gratitude, all in support of charity whose fruit is love.²

2. A Proposal

We will not be asking whether transborder enterprises in promote human welfare (usually when they support their inly goals); or whether technology will save us from ourselves (it will not since we make technology); or whether assiduously, and arduously, manage humans in order to solve war, poverty, suffering. All laudable questions and goals, but we will ask here who is it, who are we to manage ourselves in this world?

Many scenarios motivate our deliberations here, and we restrict them to two. First, the more we create new artifacts, processes, enterprises, in a word, technology, to support, enhance, extend human development, the more, paradoxically, we create a new layer of abstraction from nature. The abstraction comes from complexity at the least. And at the least, this gennetic³ development results in an increasing retreat from a position of being previously less complex and less abstract from nature.⁴

Second, the use of indentured labor pervades nearly all economies. To indenture means effectively to allow another, a company for example, to have a specific, often overriding claim on one's time and even space to pay off a debt, often fronted by the employer. We might explain the practice by the so-called free will consent of parties to *sign up* for whatever the task might be.⁵ What if a coercion violates the relative peace in a mutually beneficial contract? Is there "free will," a choice which propels the parties

¹Byrne (2018) proposes three questions in the style of Longeran (1957) *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* for *moral inquiry*: 1) What are we doing when we decide ethically? 2) Why is doing this ethical? 3) What actions result from the ethical decision? We follow his lead to extend explicitly this thought into the human being as *moral agent*.

²Keenan (2022)

³This is not a typographical error! The word is from the Greek verb *gennaō* beget, as in parents begetting, generating and producing, even rearing, thus developing, children. The adjective *genetic* actually derives from the Greek middle voice *gignomai*, have become so, take all shapes, recover oneself (the middle voice is reflexive).

⁴A simple example is the replacement of a cut stone masonry retaining wall with a concrete steel rebar structure. Managing the supply chain, that is, the humans who find the stone, cut it out of the earth, transport it to a building site, prepare the site, cut the stone to fit the landscape and purpose (retaining wall), and then admire the beauty of the texture of the resulting sculpture. The craftspeople at the site would erect a pre-fabricated steel form, weave rebar in side the form, mix and pour cement into the form, wait several days for the cement to cure, then hire someone to spray paint a design of cut stone to please, aesthetics is everything, the owner of the site. As Romano Guardini (Guardini 1994) notes: "In all manual work we find the primal phenomenon of culture that is human but close to nature. Now compare the smithy with our factories and their electric machines. And compare carpentry and bricklaying with concrete or prefabricated housing. Compare the work of the cabinetmaker or wheelwright with the division of labor at a Ford factory, which breaks down the products into small parts that are produced in vast numbers daily." *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations on Technology and the Human Race*, pp. 24-25.

⁵See Galenson (1984) for an economic history of the practice in the Americas. We learn that the contract had

to greater excellence? Or is the choice simply one of indifference between two equally good (or not so good) alternatives? For example, male heads of households in certain districts adjacent to, or even on, coal deposits would at the mine mouth be employed to be lidmen. A lidman would be directly in the line of exposure of pulverized coal and its dust going into a coke oven and the plumes of carcinogenic gases and particles emitted through the tops of these ovens. We use coke every day as it is the metallurgical fuel of most steel production world-wide. Such a scenario might envision a chain of decision makers from CEOs, division presidents, facility managers, supervisors, and then the lidmen.⁶ Why indentured? Why a slave? Was there not consent? Were there not other choices? Certainly indentured if the lidman's salary supported a family, with a mortgage on the house, or at least a credit agreement insuring to a lease on a rental property. A slave? Did the lidman have a voice, a choice? Probably not. What is the nature of manager to allow these choices?⁷

This essay proposes to build a picture of a humanistic manager philosophically, not economically, psychologically, sociologically, even cultural anthropologically, and certainly not biologically, chemically, or with quantum physics or algebraic geometry, all important, but not the point. We will take as given, that is, self-evident and thus without proof, or even ability to prove four assumptions, since all arguments, and we will indeed argue here, begin with a set of assumptions. We will not engage in a discussion of the doubtfulness of these assumptions. We can do that later at an appropriate time and place. We will not fall into the skeptical trap which ensnares us into what we, or the objectors, do not believe. We will state what we do believe to be true and ask objectors to do the same. We all believe, upon reflection and discussion with other humans, in some indemonstrable things. Here are four we will enjoin on any reading of this paper.⁸

1. We believe that the world, even the humans in this world are real, not a delusion. I personally cannot prove I am in a dream or even as one movie put it in a dream being dreamt in a dream.
2. As we are not deluded, we also will hold that what happens to us also really matters. It matters that if I hear a car crash into the pylon of an elevated train that I will awaken some gumption in myself at least to investigate and see if anyone is hurt or not. I also hold this as an obligation of the sort that in my decision I will act according and consistently with what I know to be plausibly true. If I see someone is hurt, I will attempt to do something about it to help. Why? Remember this is an assumption.
3. As we hold to things outside of our selves as real, we will also hold to a developing continuity of something we will call a self, or ego perhaps, across time and space. There is a definite I who somehow relates to another I, you, really, and with consequence.⁹

indentations in the text. The two parties to the contract each possessed a copy of the contract. The indentations in the two copies must line up for the contracts to be enforceable.

⁶See the report by Abel (2023)

⁷In some countries the lidmen live to about 45 years old and die a short but agonizing death. Sometimes the surviving family is take care of by the company, warlord, provincial governor. In 1996 the People's Republic of China banned beehive coke ovens. In 1996 I was part of team which match-marked and shipped vintage coke processing plants from a Bethlehem Steel site in Delaware to Shanxi Province. It takes years to disseminate technology like this. See Gitig (2018).

⁸We thus enjoin and suspend with Coleridge any further disbelief, for the duration of this argument.

⁹Keenan (2022) notes that Francesco de Vitoria (1483-1546) seems to have developed, from Thomas Aquinas, the notion of "subjective rights" based on "justice [which] determines the right that is due to another." (p.219) For Vitoria locates this right directly in human nature so that not only the person, but the community of

4. With all of this reality swimming around a continuous self over a life span, we will assume we can choose (something) and that choice will mean responsibility for the choice.¹⁰

Thus my rendering rendering of G.K. Chesterton's four sanities perhaps extends into the communal realm of humanistic management.¹¹

3. Clarify with Definition

Using the four sanities we attempt here to fathom the nature of the beings who, on the one hand humanistically manage, and, on the other hand, are humanistically managed. To fathom such depths is the perennial perview of philosophical anthropology. A definition is in order. By *anthropology* we mean the study of beings, specifically humans, the plural Greek noun *anthropoi*, where study is really the Greek *logos*, as meaning, reason, even word, as in what do we say and mean about humans. By philosophy we mean the friend of wisdom, to directly and literally translate the Greek nouns *philios* and *sophia*, respectively. *Philios* connotes also acquaintance, companion, the "other who is as close to me as my shadow." And *philia* is "love in fellowship," with all the trappings of being with others. While *sophia* is a virtue which encompasses in the Graeco-Roman politeia the culmination of knowledge and understanding. But it is not just knowledge garnered from experimentation, the modern scientific method of objective-hypothetical deduction. It is the knowledge of ultimate causes, virtues, conscience, values, priorities, the order of the world around us. It seems that philosophical anthropology might aid us in our discovery of the meaning of the beings who humanistically manage and are managed. At the least it will help us discover the intelligibilities, the patterns, in ourselves to manage humanistically.

We now step further into this maze of definitions.¹² By humanism we mean, taking the dictionary definition: "a doctrine, attitude, or way of life centered on human interests or values."¹³ Thus we take as definitional that *humanistic* is that which pertains to specifically human interests, as in a focus, with other interests as they relate to humanity. Those interests might be precisely what we need to specify as we go along. The International Humanistic Management Association further explains that management involves "the intrinsic value of human beings as humans first and foremost."¹⁴ This seems all in line at first blush with each of the quotes we began with. It might seem that *Gaudium et Spes*, Sen, Nussbaum, and the philosophical tradition would support this claim.¹⁵

persons, has rights inuring to the self. "Herein Vitoria established the fundamental principle that human dignity and, therein, the equality of all persons and peoples, is founded in being created in the image and likeness of God." (p. 219) As individual humans have dignity, so do the communities, including nations and organizations, have dignity.

¹⁰If we take Keenan (2022)'s suggestion with Vitoria that the self we talk about here is by extension the community, not the collective or aggregate, of selves, then the community also has responsibility for the choices that the community makes.

¹¹The sanities appear in his "Philosophy for the Schoolroom" at <https://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/>

¹²Having begun with wonder, we begin to satisfy the Socratic injunction to first define our terms!

¹³The Merriam-Webster Dictionary offers an almost neutral definition.

¹⁴From the website itself: <http://humanisticmanagement.international/what-is-humanistic-management/>.

¹⁵We might take "first and foremost" in one of two senses. In one sense, the "first" is the one first in sequence, as in first in a waiting line at the store. That would imply others, of some sort, preceding the first place sequentially. That would also imply that there are no others ahead of the first and foremost human in this consideration of the focus of management. But in another sense, there is a "first and foremost" evolving from

We might conventionally define *management* generically as the art and science of administering an organization. But that definition might be too narrow if it does not include the manager as object and subject of management, and this manager is human. To administer typically means provide, dispense, take care of, possibly a very narrow view of what management by a manager does. If we view the role of any manager at the least in provision of the goods which an organization promises to markets, then we might further view the manager as the one who envisions what that good is, designs the path to fulfilling the good, catalyzing and enabling collaboration among other managers and their resources to achieve the design goals and fulfill the promise. This sort of manager lives to serve customers, co-workers, investors, the community in which the organization operates.¹⁶ We would then subscribe to a much wider view of administration to that of the unfolding of leadership into administration across the ecosystem within which the manager operates internally and externally. That management is an art or science would to a Greek of 2400 years ago mean *techné*, whence our word technology, the study, reason, meaning (*logos*) of the particular art or science. Here art is the implementation of science, or knowledge.

We consult Aristotle for a way to define comprehensively anything that comes to mind. He labeled this way an analysis of causes, but really he meant not the modern sense of cause rather the Greek notion of the grounds for, reasons for, meaning of something, in the word *aitia*. It is analysis because we will break up our definition into parts, four to be exact: final, the end or good, formal, the design or nature, material, the composition and contents, efficient, the one acting and enabling whatever it is we are talking about. In a nutshell, the humanistic manager has as an end, human selves, as a good; the nature of which manager is to question, frame, design, structure, draw out pros, cons, resolutions, in a word the plan; with materials, the technology, the inputs to the plan, the outcomes of the plan, resources to support the plan; by a mind driven by a will to meet and exceed mission critical objectives to produce the good for the human with all of the constraints, connections, governance, and guidance from a will which motivates, but is guided by mind.

When we expand on the nutshell's view on the four causes we we can glean the following:

The *final cause* is the end or goal or even good of the humanistic manager. The good is that which is desired so that an end or goal seems reasonable. So what good does the manager desire? Already it seems that the good of humanistic management is (necessarily in the adjective) humans "first and foremost." We might want to examine the formulation of this priority. On its face, it might appear humans against all else allowing for a plurality of values some of which are in the domain of an all-consuming and/or all-controlling humanity without regard for the fact that all-consuming, or all-controlling, might annihilate said humanity. For the human decision maker the final cause is good which the person, any person, strives toward using a structure to

a prior state or condition. It would seem that our sanities assume a rationally self-conscious self, a self that can know, in some part, the reasons for the reasons of an action by the self. Well then a rationally conscious being must have preceded and could not supersede the rationally self-conscious being. In turn the intuitively conscious being precedes and could not, since it did not have the capability, let alone the freedom which the capability would help enable, supersede the rationally conscious being. This second sense we might call subsistence, the rationally conscious being subsists in the rationally self-conscious self.

¹⁶Yes, the servant-leader from ancient times may again be at work in management. For an excellent example of this approach recently we have decades of management experience titrated to six mindsets according to McKinsey's Dewar, Keller, and Malhotra (2022). The personal effectiveness mindset in the McKinsey list would owe much to what it means to be a good manager as unfolded with the virtue management approach to business ethics espoused by West (2018).

frame the analysis of decisions, the content of those decisions, and the abilities, will, conscience, skills to organize and deploy decisions in a very active and challenging context of global and local markets for goods and services.¹⁷

Second, the *formal cause* is the structure a person as humanistic manager applies to the *techne* of management. Here we will mean the structure of a decision made by management, one of the originating activities by managers of anything. But we do not want to confuse the context and content of management with the operations and technology of decision making, for example, the content inherent in organizational governance, contracts among and within organizations, markets, regulators, databases, data mining, and the list is quite endless. But the formal cause is also the blueprint of the humans who make the decisions to built tall spires into the sky, roam the planet in search of ore and those to mine, process and transport it, and ultimately decide to employ humans to fabricate products other humans will decide to consume. Some might call the formal cause a taxonomy of capabilities.¹⁸ Others have formulated management structure as a set of opposing but linked propositions in the context of the exchange of goods and services.

All of these, structure, capabilities, functions, contracts, are likely candidates, but here, in a decision making frame of activity these are just the content, resources, inputs and outputs, the matter of humanistic management. Here we will bend to an 1500 year old approach made popular in the medieval universities, the *quaestio disputatae*.¹⁹ The *quaestio* approach raises a question, poses a provisional answer, allows for objections, another, and contrary to the objections, point of view. Then the questioner launches into a response and answers the many objections. The formal structure as natural in the humanistic manager then is:

- What is the relation between some A and some B? (Say, A = advertising and B = buying)
- It seems that A causes B, the provisional answer.
- But A does not cause B for reason one; for reason two; and so on. These are the objections to the provisional answer.
- On the contrary, it seems that A does cause B for yet another reason, perhaps a can-opener is in play.
- I respond that, maybe there is some other action in play for why A causes B which may include some of the terms of the contrary view (to the objectors), and even slyly using some of the very terms used by the objectors, but transcends both.
- I reply to each objector with reasons why they are full of stuffing of some sort or other.

Take any managerial act of envisioning, coaching, catalyzing, organizing, engaging,

¹⁷Keenan (2015) raises the role of conscience formation especially given societal debilitation through systemic bias. For the humanistic manager we could follow Keenan's lead and would ask the question posed by Longeran (1957): "How is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?" (p. xv) This is the work of the self-conscious being, one who forms reasons for reasons in an onward progress of reversing decline. Put simply, the humanistic manager cannot ignore the plight human beings when they fire them for, say, budgetary reasons, or other managerial failures. We will wander into ethics soon enough.

¹⁸See Nussbaum (2011), Sen (1999)

¹⁹Actually this also mirrors the Platonic dialogue itself. This structure also is similar to governance argumentation by attorneys, the so-called IRAC method of legal analysis (Issue - Rule - Analysis - Conclusion). Managers might recognize this as a table-top exercise structure consonant with knowledge-based decision making (KBDM).

and attending to one's own growth and care, and we will find the *quaestio* structure at work. So where is the rational choice model of modern management decision analysis in all of this? It is simply a component of one, possibly two, unlikely three, objections to a provisional causal explanation of how A might infer B. Or better how if A is good or bad news then B is the decision to be enabled into action.²⁰ Such models are designed to help the decision maker understand the trade-offs evinced in the play among objectors to the provisional answer, conjecture, hypothesis. But to think that these models are expansive enough of the kinds of knowledge needed to guide human decision makers and moral living is to give them roles they cannot possibly fulfill. One of those roles is the visioning process itself wherein given two alternatives, with equal validity in the confines of a rational choice model, which alternative will be preferred. The rational choice model does not frame the vision, it is the other way around. Put differently, this is the role of conscience at work.

The *material cause* is the content, resources, yes, even the capabilities inhering to humanistic management. These of course are art and science of administration, meaning the ministry of serving oneself and one another with the resources, processes, practices, governance, techniques, technology, mines, ships, supply chains, data stewardship governance, algorithms, data storage farms, and so on and on. These multiphasic and -ferious contents are nothing without the guidance of the formal structure of management to its goal, good, or end, the final cause. We might imagine the complex of inputs and outputs as inputs into a linked web of activity whose cause and effect are yet to be determined by the operation of the efficient cause of it all, but the vertices and edges of such a graph as network are the grist for the mill of the efficient cause, the humanistic manager herself. Again as much as the determining guidance of formal cause results in determined material causes, efficient causes indeed make it all happen in operations.

The *efficient cause* is the mind, mentality, will, hutzpah, component of the world-view of humanistic management. In this sector we see the material antecedents and consequents formally structured by our *quaestio* rambling around in a person who is the *quaestioneer*. For material and formal causality we have determined and determining. For material and efficient we have deployed and deploying, transcended and transcending. For efficient and final we have in turn caused and causing. The final cause itself is the source, the ultimate reason for the causation inside of efficiency. On its own as a priority, and given thus an arbitrarily set goal and tolerance, the manager as efficient cause deploys materials and forces in processes which harness and release, unleash and chain, open and close, initiate and shut down or idle, and direct inputs to outputs. On the basis of a known formula, a heuristic, an algorithm the causal process as human decisioner deposits materials and energy into requisite programmed machines. Programmed machines, robots, golems accompany materials to the desired end through time and space, and of course any other efficiently causing humans along the way. Programming requires the storage and retrieval, and communication of information critical to the tolerable, as set by some arbitrary norm or physical constraint, operation of the processed amalgam of materials and energy, from whatever source.²¹

²⁰Thus the Luce and Raiffa two-state (good or bad news) at least two decision alternatives (act or stand pat, at least) Bayesian decision model. Mary L. Hirschfeld, *Aquinas on Markets*, chapter 4. (Hirschfeld (2018)) We must begin to notice that the rational choice model might not be able to answer the ultimate questions of fulfilling the promise of the good, product and or service, to other human beings. This question itself is out of scope for this paper and points us in the direction of asking whether ?'s notion of mindset is sufficient to the task of dynamic leadership and the management of highly complex organizations.

²¹Collins and Pinch (1998) is again apropos of the connection between science and technology.

4. By Chance an Example

We should review an example of the formal constituent of the humanistic manager as person. For example, we might ask, “How much luck can or should we humanly live with, in order to live the life that is most valuable for a human being?”²²

This is a most general question of great practical importance. It speaks to our notions of what is or is not a human being; living life; what is or is not valuable; what is human life; what is self-sufficiency versus external forces at work on our life; what can or potentially will occur; what should occur according to predictions, rules, expectations, obligations, contracts and agreements. We then state an answer to the question, say “Luck has nothing at all to do with the value of human living.” With this answer, we then support it with three or so positions. After the positions we state a contrary position. Upon the contrary position, we state our response, followed by replies to the original positions. Here goes a rendition of this *quaestio disputata*.

Question: *How much luck can or should we humanly live with, in order to live the life that is most valuable for a human being?*

Provisional Answer: *Luck has nothing at all to do with the value of human living.*

Support #1: Moral value is completely distinct from every other value. No matter what happens, the moral value of the good will is thoroughly immune to the onslaught of luck. (Kant inspired)

Support #2: The aim of life is uninterruptible control and activity. You can only trust that which is stable and immutable. Risk is intolerable, should be avoided at all costs, so as to achieve a godlike simplicity, without conflict of value or action. (Plato inspired)

Support #3: A young man must choose between his patriotic commitment to the French resistance and his dying mother. Both are outside of his direct control. From this case of inconsistency systematic ethical principles are inadequate guides for action. Thus, discard principle altogether, freely improvise choice, without regret. (Sartre inspired)

On the Contrary: The world exists such that there is indeed uncontrollable external power. Human values necessarily reside in the mutable and unstable. Thus, living well in such a world entails actively taking risks balanced by receptivity to a limited control over one’s life. (Aristotle inspired)

Response: Life, and tragic literature, shows good people being “ruined” all of the time because of “circumstances beyond their control,” otherwise known as luck. We often lack clarity of sight about our own lives, and those of people around us. We are blinded by our own bias and faults and often revise our positions to suit our bias. At the extreme you may simply give up any hope of amending your own or anyone else’s ways, everything is luck. Aristotle notes that “it is easier for us to look at someone else than at ourselves” (Nicomachian Ethics 1169b33-4). We can use models, persons, especially friends (*philoï*) to help us determine what a good person would do in a situation like this. Ethical knowledge consists in the intuitive perception of concrete particulars. Perception is both cognitive and affective. It consists in the single ability to discern the ethical (what is valuable for human living) features from a particular situation. According to Bernard Lonergan, human knowledge proceeds from experience of data, feelings, senses, driven by insight to an understanding that describes and explains the data, further driven by reflection to a judging that affirms

²²This example follows Nussbaum (2001) in the question, the objectors, contrarian, and some of the analytical response and content.

or denies the existence what is true or false, finally leading through deliberation to a choice that becomes an action. Luck occurs at each step of the way if only because of the complexity of all data, understanding, judging and choosing. It also occurs because each concrete situation is unique, although an understanding of it may be recurrent and probable, but not determinant. Correct perception cannot be learned by rote or precept, but by guided experience. This is a lifelong process that risks vulnerability and reversal. The goal is not somnolent contentment, but rather a rich, vital life of value. The job to be done is to take on the world, make it and create it as a platform for more virtuous living. Conflict of values is not to be avoided, it is to be embraced. “The person who elevates simplicity to a supreme value is like the architect who uses a straight-edge against a fluted column: his calculations won’t build a sound building, and he will leave out much of the beauty and value of what is there before him” (Nussbaum (2001), p. 372).

Reply to #1: The primary moral imperative is that we will to act consistently with what we know. In a sense, through the interdependence of experience, understanding, judgment and decision, data, theory, affirmations, and choices are bound up in a hierarchy of values: the good of desire and the satisfaction of desire is the end of the level of experiencing; the good of order and the harmonization of satisfactions is the end of the level of understanding; the good of reason and the affirmation of one order over the other is the end of judgment; the good of value and the choice of one action plan over another is the end of decision. These values are all moral since they all relate to ways in which we can live as humans. Each of these values occurs in concrete situations in which luck is a given component. Each of these values and their realization in any situation I find myself, builds on the development of my life and character up to this point in my life and in anticipation of any future life I might have, with luck. Thus there are a plurality of moral values that operate in my life in which luck is a factor.

Reply to #2: On the contrary, achievement of any human excellence requires both external resources and necessary conditions, as well as receptive objects to receive the excellent activity. Thus excellence requires relationships. Those relationships will exist in a developmental context and will thus be subject to bias, misapprehension, reversal. The person or persons in a relationship will need to develop together in order to meet their particular excellences in the concrete of the here and now of living. Although they might converge in some aspects, they will always be personal principles of plural value insofar as each is uniquely different from the other. Thus it is impossible to attain excellence through a solitary, simple attainment of a supreme value.

Reply to #3: Conflicting general principles in particular situations will need to be revised according to the practical terms of the unique situation. By making relevant changes to general rules in particular circumstances, we can make the rules as practical norms more precise and come to future particular situations better prepared. But if we change the rules to rationalize a new particular situation, no matter how justifiable it may seem, we can still lose something essential and human. To let his mother die without care, or refuse to enter the resistance: neither case is palatable for Sartre, or us.

There is no “solution” in the scientific sense for the young man. The problem is richer than geometry. Whatever the actual choice, there will be grief, and this is appropriate. If we could dissociate ourselves, we would be less good. Good deliberation here may involve a yielding to flexibility and the renunciation of self-centered stubbornness. So Sartre is partly right: improvise. But regret is not bad, it helps us to remember the humanness of the problems we face, the difficulty in deliberating about what we judge

to be true, given our understanding of heart-felt experiences. Civic virtues are good guides; but they are built from familial love. They represent an ordering that has oppositions and tensions. We cannot wish away the tension, and instead must live it from situation to situation.

This lengthy example serves as an example of the formal constituent of humanistic management where we construct a dialectical study of a question. But the study does not end here. Dialectic may be neatly defined as a “concrete unfolding of linked of opposed principles of change” (Longeran (1957), p. 217). In our exercise of humanistic management we will consciously put ourselves into concrete situations with studies of vignettes and cases, as well as actual ethical situations. These will develop, unfold over the duration of making the initial decision through the implementation of the decision in the concrete particulars of the decision and back to re-considering, re-deliberating, and re-modeling the decision as circumstances change for the organization. There will be conflicting goals, aims, principles, and means to “solving” problems and answering questions.

But the terms of the practical principles in each situation will always be linked, and our knowledge will evolve and thus change and a viewpoint on the move. While we learned in the natural sciences that the aim of empirical method is complete explanation of the available facts, here the aim is similar: a comprehensive viewpoint of the array of seemingly opposed principles of change.²³

5. Good and the Intention

In framing our discussions about *moral agent* and the *moral inquiry* performed by the human manager we will necessarily be using intentional operations (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding) performed by a specific person and persons (you, me, our business) in a process that itself is objective. We will be encountering most, if not all, the main problems of philosophy, science, common sense, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Our organizations themselves in analogy with the human beings constituting the organizations will communally develop awareness across experience, understanding, rational judgment, responsible action. Some will label the will of the organization as the drive to be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible, all directed to the common good of one another. In pursuit of this discussion we will encounter four levels of intentional consciousness:

- Empirical consciousness with operations that attend and select data that give rise to questions for consideration.
- Intelligent consciousness with operations of representation, inquiry, expression, working out of implications, hypothesizing, theorizing, proposing, in a word understanding that give rise to questions for reflection.
- Rational consciousness with operations of reflection, marshalling and weighing evidence, and passing judgment on the certitude or probability of occurrence of facts, that give rise to questions for further deliberation and potential action.
- Responsible consciousness with operations of empirical, intellectual, and rational self-awareness, deliberation about proposed actions, evaluation, decision and execution or implementation, all of which yield results that are effectively new

²³MacIntyre (1990) describes the growth and use of the *quaestio disputate* and notes that “the dialectical conclusion is always open to further discussion.” (p. 89) While managers would want to be decisive, they must continue to be aware of change from all directions.

data to be experienced at the first level of intentional consciousness.

The trained, educated, and seasoned will of the *moral agent* penetrates each level of consciousness and even more so the move from one level to another. Without the will to experience, move from experience to understanding, to understand, then to move from understanding to reason, then reason, finally and laboriously, move to and stay at responsible consciousness requires resources outside the capability of any individual, family, community, the world.

Corresponding to these levels of awareness are four levels of the human good and four concrete instances of human community. Here we mean by good, the specific end of a set of activities, the final cause. In the case of the activities of responsible consciousness, the human good will be comprised of the specific end of some compound of experiential, intellectual, rational and responsible levels of intentional operations. Our job is to unpack these implications for the human good in specific cases, and concrete situations as they arise in humanistic management. By community is meant not simply the sum of all participants, but the overarching culture of a tradition, the handing down, the *traderens*, which allows participants and the community to overcome immanent declines in favor of transcending progress. Here are the four levels of the human good: the good of desire reaches to the good of order, in turn both supporting the good of reason, finally reaching the transcending good of value, of what is worthwhile or not.

The *good of desire* relates to the empirical or experiential level of consciousness. Realizing this good yields satisfaction of our various desires and appetites. It is at the base of the Mills/Bentham claim that all human action is consequential to the maximization of utility. This paradigm, along with appropriate constraints, is the dominant economic method of today. Corresponding to the spontaneous grasp of experiences and the good of desire is interpersonal community. The movement from this level to the next is prompted by questions for understanding that include questions for description and explanation. This movement is discerned by noticing the occurrence of insights.

The *good of order* relates to the intellectual level of consciousness insofar as we understand the unities of things to ourselves and among themselves, the correlations that explain the operations of things. It is at the base of our grasping (experiential consciousness) and formulating (intellectual consciousness) technological development, economic and business systems, governance, and political structures, all of which fall into the order of *techne*.²⁴ These are instances of the good of order since they stand as higher syntheses that harmonize, that is, bring to order, as well as maximize the satisfactions of individual desires. Harmonization proposes rules, norms and guides for otherwise hedonistic and egoistic actions that solely maximize individual satisfactions.

Here we have begun to recognize that individual satisfactions of any kind subsist in the relationality of the individual with others, but in a wider context of the community. Far from a mere aggregation of individuals, otherwise known as a collective, the community at one and the same time centripetally directs its intentionality to each individual and centrifugally directs it intentionality to the unity and harmony of individuals living and working together. As individuals find meaning in self through one another, the community of individuals finds meaning in supporting subsistently the actions of all individuals.

²⁴The phrase *order of* followed by some object, such as technology, persons, intellect, will, will refer to the relative importance of the object within the manifold of other objects. In this way we have a precedence and a subsistence. Whoever is first in line precedes whoever is second. But each person grows through learning so that the immature apprentice subsists in the mature master.

Business contracts, customs, laws and structures of enforcement and encouragement are concrete instances of the good of order, of the harmonious subsisting of individual deliberations in the overarching manifold of the community. Corresponding to the good of order and intellectual insights is civil community which supports and protects the will's movement to the good of order. The movement from this level to the next is prompted by questions for reflection that include questions for judgments of fact. This movement is discerned by noticing the occurrence of reflective affirmations or denials.

The good of reason relates to the rational level of consciousness where theoretical formulation, based on experiential grasp of concrete situations, is cut short by judgments of fact. These judgments ask the simple question is it or is it not so? The will of the individual for the other, and thus some sense of the will of the community, enters here as well to vitally penetrate the reason to continue until all relevant questions are sufficiently asked and answered. At this point we recognize the formal aspect of the humanistic manager as a nexus of formulating the structure of dialectic, the *quaestio* framework itself. These judgments are instances of the good of reason since they stand as syntheses that create a virtual conditioned (a result with its conditions fulfilled) built on harmonization and maximization of the satisfactions of individual desires.

The good of reason criticizes the various goods of order by proposing those orders that are probably true and correct given the circumstance, and disposing of those orders that are probably false and incorrect in concrete situations. Again the will, especially the trained seasoned will of conscience, floods the moral agent with a persistence and a courage to judge what is and is not true. This criticism is a source of restraint and constraint in decisions. Corresponding to the good of reason and rational consciousness is a discriminating cultural community. The movement from this level to the next is prompted by questions for deliberation that include questions for the acceptance or rejection of concrete proposals. This movement is discerned by noticing the occurrence of choices and decisions. Some becoming more, some less, acceptable to individuals and communally the culture in which individuals abide, and quite dynamically. Questions of priority embed deeper questions of the reasonable worth of decision alternatives, where worth is tied to the final *aitia* of the humanistic manager, namely persons "first and foremost."

The good of value relates to the responsible level of intentional consciousness in judgments of value. This final level asks the question: is it worthwhile? That the level is *final* reflects the end, good, and purpose to which the judgment strives, willfully. Judgments of value set the good of order above private advantage, subordinate technology to economics, economics to social welfare. The good of value appreciates the various goods of reason and provides the criterion for advancing valuable proposals to their ultimate execution in a decision and implementation, and simultaneously rejects bad proposals. This appreciation is the source of action. Corresponding to this appreciation and judgment of value is moral community. In this way the good of value is objective truth, the first of Chesterton's sanities, not mere subjective satisfaction of desires without necessary regard for others.

This good works on and through the will to act on what is known and not known plausibly to result in discernment. The virtue which then drives the good of value, yes faith and hope as leading up to but not sufficiently, is really charity. And charity's fruit is love as willing the good (all of the goods) of the other. Sin, error, ignorance result from, as Keenan (2022) explains through our millenia of shared traditions, "not bothering to love." The virtues supporting charity are then those imperatives of consciousness, namely, be aware, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible.

There are two confusions that occur when knowledge, the good, and community are

not appropriately distinguished when we talk about “who is the *moral agent*,” or about “what I/we ought to do as a *moral agent*,” or about “what is and how do I/we live the good life, the *moral life*?” The moral agent who exhibits the symptoms of *naive realism* says that there is indeed knowing and the good and community, but really means only experiencing sensation, the good of desire and interpersonal community. This person bases all knowledge on the mistaken notion that knowing is still simply taking a look and retreats into a skeptical empiricism in which if the discussion does not get down to the brass tacks of the material causality, reduce to a determined result, then there is nothing more to say, let alone do.

On the other hand, the *idealist* asserts that the realist is only partly correct, in that it is by perceiving or formulating that we know what we are looking at. Knowing is not only taking a look, it is perceiving and formulating a look. The only good is the good of order, with a corresponding civil community of appropriate social agreements and arrangements. This person is mistaken too, since the idealist forgets that knowledge is completed in a judgment of reasonable fact and responsible value. On top of that issue, the idealist might even fail to notice the data of consciousness itself, and the motive force of a will to act on what is known.

However, the *critical realist* knows that experiencing the world spontaneously is not knowledge. Further this person, this community, realizes that intellectual formulating and hypothesizing relations among what is sensed is not knowledge, yet. The critical realist contends that the world of the naive realist and the idealist is a picture world based on taking or hypothesizing a look at data. The critical realist knows that knowledge is a compound of experiencing, understanding and judging. Rational operations cannot be reduced to intellectual operations. Similarly intellectual operations cannot be reduced to experiential operations. Each set of operations is included and presupposed in the other. The good is the good of rational judgment and responsible choice, and community is ultimately moral, where moral means both for the other person and consistency of knowing and doing, community. But the good of rational and responsible choice include hard fought for goods of order that in turn harmonize goods of desire. In the same way the moral community is built on intellectual and cultural communities that flesh out the common funds of meaning as understanding and rational judgments. These common funds compound themselves into traditional systems of beliefs about the description, explanation and the affirmation of experiences in the community. The common funds are the root of culture.

Still human knowing is not authentic human living. There can be no authentic human living and thus no answers to the question “is this worthwhile?” if knowing is not objective. We know personally and in community objectively insofar as we are not inattentive, not stupid about our perceiving, hypothesizing and model making, not unreasonable about what we think is true, and not irresponsible about what we finally choose to do. There is thus a distinction between managing people and treating them as authentic persons. To manage people we need only confront them with their inattention to data, unintelligent hypotheses, and unreasonable judgments of fact. To treat people as authentic persons we need to confront, perhaps for awareness raising, but more importantly, enable their achievement of the goods of desire, order, reason, and value in the context of organization, community, and culture.

To treat people as persons we must work to invite them to full knowledge of themselves as valuable for themselves and others. It is in this reflecting on our living in common that we come to know ourselves as valuable. Persons make themselves and their communities ever transcending previously held positions, extending the moral universe itself. This making is never finished and there are pitfalls as well as triumphs

since it is a process still and always in progress. Management remains merely with technical confrontation. Human nature itself as transcending being in relation with other transcendent beings further draws us to reflect in common on our interdependent values as persons in process, responsible for our common making of meaning.

6. An Emerging Humanism?

Is a purely secular humanism, one which excludes any reality of a supernatural influence or force, sufficient to realize humanistic management, one aspect of which is the sometimes terrifying transcendence of progress? Charles Taylor notes in his interview with Kearney (2016) a reduction to materialism when we as managers embrace only the purely immanent frame of the already-out-there-now-real (Longeran (1957)). The notion of anything beyond this frame, and its narrative, at least as long ago by Callicles' response to Socrates in the *Gorgias* dialogue (481b - 491d),²⁵ will be a secular humanism excluding any so-called supernatural source, in effect a "meaning of meaning."

For a busy manager, such questions are typically left at the threshold of the meeting room or hop as fast as possible through the transom. But the meaning of meaning, reasons for reasons, a going beyond the status quo are indeed the purview of an entrepreneurial spur in management.²⁶ The meaning of meaning points toward, often inexorably, to something more, and is a seeking of something beyond, the object of which might not yet be identified in its particularity. Martha Nussbaum will locate this aspiration in Aristotle's *orexis*, which elucidates her reading of Aristotle's notion of a power within all living things to something more, as inclusive of the "beyond" the current shackles of current existence.²⁷ This power within is oriented outward into the *moral universe* by inquiring *moral agents* bent on achieving the good.²⁸

What Taylor and Kearney refer to as "transcendent humanism," might be read of a transcendence drawing up the person into another level of reality, with or without the *techne* to get there. There are inclusive, and exclusive versions of secular humanism. In his conversation with Kearney, Taylor uses "transcendent humanism" as a synonym for a "Christian humanism," so we might consider a religiously oriented, if not absolute finality for the transcending person and community.

We otherwise can say, perhaps with the positivists, at least efficient, unadulterated

²⁵The *Gorgias* dialogue sets up the orator Callicles as one who would use whatever words would be needed to produce the immanent result, the seeming good of the nano-second in our social media culture. Socrates catches Callicles in a favorite contradiction of the very words Callicles would employ to project his power over others. For him the job of the rhetor, the visionary, the leader is not to use words to represent reality, to ask and answer whatever *the Good* might be, but rather to conform to whatever *the good* of his client might be in the myopic context of the here and now. Sophists use big words and vacuous phrasing to, basically, say not much at all. But everyone is still entertained with whatever kernel of truth they proclaim.

²⁶Dewar, Keller, and Malhotra (2022) quotes former American Express Chair and CEO Ken Chennault: "My leadership mantra . . . is that the role of a leader is to define reality and give hope. Defining reality is very challenging. It requires a level of transparency and courage to articulate what is the truth, what are the facts. But that isn't enough. What are the tactics? What are the strategies? What are the reasons why people should be hopeful? That focus on defining reality and giving hope is something that I've used to guide me as a leader." (p. 271)

²⁷See Nussbaum (2001). She notes, p. 273, that the "medio-passive" verb *oregesthamai*, the root of the movement called *orexis* preserves the notion of "grasping for," "reach for," and "stretch (oneself) for," with metaphors of "long for" and "yearn for."

²⁸The entrepreneurial manager, for example Teehankee (2008), launches new products to grasp at a new market for the purpose of more profit, perhaps something more interesting to do, but clearly beyond the current context, the status quo, business as usual.

cause-to-effect causality, as well as perhaps some material causality with ropes and hands and eyes and someone, a resource, on the shore who efficiently causes the rope to land at the drowning person. Certainly the designers of a production process have put thought into the cause and effect of material inputs resulting in material outputs, we might call products. But final causality needs an end that is also a good. Is the motive good, the good of desire? We say yes, as a life may be preserved. Is the product a good, the good of order? We again would agree, reasonably, if the product does no intentional harm to its user, then yes again. So if the end to which the *orexis*, the desire, the longing, is good, or the terminus of a process, is good, then we have final causality.

Helpful here as we sketch some thoughts about transcendence is the discussion by Taylor (1988) about Nussbaum (2001) (updated edition) and by Nussbaum (1992) literally beginning an exploration of transcendence with what Lonergan (2005) coined *vertical finality*. It now behooves us to lay out Lonergan's scheme of finalities. There are three: absolute, horizontal, and vertical. What is any finality in general? It is simply something accomplished, and thus finished, and on to the next process, satisfaction, judgment, milestone, whatever!

It does seem we can divide a finality into at the least into two aspects. Aspect number one is the completion of a process from input through activities ending in the output. At that point the process terminates. Chains of processes can join up into intermediate components, but in the end, there is an end, a terminus. In this aspect an input and process orient to an output. This definitely seems the core of supply and value chain analysis any manager would be aware of. Aspect number two is finality viewed from a motive, a reason, which activates a longing for, a desire, a stretching of oneself out, known as *appetition*, and in Aristotle's *orexis*, as we noted already. The finality here is when desire meets up with, perhaps finds its goal, end, good.²⁹ Is it when we manufacture our own goals that we go awry? Perhaps. But if we manufacture the goal, we nominally call the good, we invent the good we should be discovering. In this case we divert the possibility in ourselves of finding the good. We replace the good with some palimpsest, some facsimile, some replica, of the good.³⁰

Simply observing a very strong desire to catch a rope tossed to a drowning person does not mean finality in and of itself. This is just an observation, and at that, just a first step to knowledge, let alone action. We might construct an argument out of antecedent probability that the end, the good, sought by such striving is to grab quite securely the rope, for dear life! We might practically replace the argument with an intuition born of very strong desire to live and correlated with previous experiences analogous to drowning. Whatever the process, now we have plausible finality, in some statistical sense perhaps. Beyond correlations and associations, a sane motive to live grounds and causes a desire to reach for the rope and, finally, grab it at which point the desire has been fulfilled. This seems so much common sense. A pure, and avowed, posi-

²⁹The beloved moved by desire meets the loved. But *dioper aneu orexeos vous ho nomos estin*, (law is mind without desire). Aristotle, *Politics*, 3, 14, 1287a20 (my translation). <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-grc1>.

³⁰Many years ago, the sardonic comic Steven Wright poses this use case. He goes to work leaving his home, his belongings, what we know as the real in his life. He returns, and finds the home seemingly exactly the way he found it. But there is a discernible difference. Not one he would discover by a statistical analysis of differences in the distribution of what he perceived to be true when he left his home relative to what he now perceives as he returns. Statistics, even Bayesian analysis, oh my, fails him. He realizes, partly to his horror, now abated by his emotionally calloused and jaundiced view of the so-called hard-boiled Genus species: Neo-Eborensis manhattanis, . . . , yes he realizes that everything is just a replica of his home from 12 hours ago. I heard this recently from a discussion by David C. Schindler on the notion of the diabolical - as opposed to the symbolical - in the flight from freedom of John Locke.

tivist like Milton Friedman (Friedman 1970) whose titular statement that “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,” might not see, or understand, and might even try to refute, the finality in our grabbing the rope on correlational grounds.

What about the formal part of the story? The end, the goal itself is the final cause. The formal cause is the good as a cause, a fine point with two prongs, the good as cause (preserve life for the motive as cause, safe product for the process output as cause enough) and the way by which the cause operates. For creatures with motives and process, God is not and cannot be another being, rather being itself, the other other of Nicholas of Cusa (Hopkins 1985). The *moral universe* as creature and limited being, that is essence, desires God (appetition, *orexis*) and intends God (oriented to the process terminus). Thus God is motive and terminus all in one and so absolute finality itself. In a way then absolute finality is the ground of all finality in the *moral universe*, remembering that finality simply means accomplishing the good and the good is that which we desire, strive to order, reason about, value, ultimately then find worthwhile. And so we can also say that God, with absolute finality, is the highest good, *summum bonum*, to which we would strive (again appetition, *orexis*) and intend (the order of process from input to output).

But taking this one step further we have strata of beings in the *moral universe*. We retrieve the title of this essay for an example of such strata, as if rungs on a ladder. Empty space is a being, not much to talk about, but created with a more limiting essence than particles in space, than atoms, molecules, compounds, minerals, liquids, gases, amoeba, dandelions, bees and birds, my cats, me, angels. This is the *analogia entis*, the analogy of being. The principle of analogy is that between a lower level and a higher level, the lower level must be more dissimilar to the higher level, than similar. This decisively distinguishes a lower from a higher level. We might think of a master guild cabinet maker and high school student in carpentry class as a fairly clear illustration. Both master and student work in wood. But the differences in experience, talent, knowledge, ability are vastly dissimilar and the master is definitely and no longer a student. One can design and make a useful and beautiful sculpture of a cabinet, while the other is just learning how to saw wood under the strict supervision and orders of an instructor. There is a hierarchy at work in the *moral universe*. The limitations of the student are not those of the master. The goods that the master intends and is desirous of attaining are far and away different from the student. Both as creatures somehow, perhaps in yet to be known ways, are desirous and are oriented to the absolute ground of being, but again in different ways. The student can develop into an apprentice, journeyman, eventually, perhaps into a guild master. This is a vertical finality from a good (getting a A for the course) at a student level to a good (designing and crafting a bespoke wooden spiral staircase with no nails) at a guild master level. At the guild and student levels of the hierarchy there are, again, analogous, but horizontal versions of that level’s limitations. By horizontal finality we would then mean the orientation to ends, and goods, the motive which causes the desire to excel at a level. There might be some vertical movement at the level, but one does not get promoted from grade 5 to grade 6 unless can perform the work required at grade 6 in elementary school.

7. Manager as Transcendent

We might even call our sketch of vertical finality transcendence, where the verb *transcendere* means to “step over, across” and “surpass.” It is vertical in the sense that our person moves from a lower level (more limitation) to a higher level (less limitation). In this sense we might define development to the opening of persons, communities, organizations, cultures, globally, to the greater good. We might even glean a notion of freedom, not so much of choice or indifference, but of exceeding, openness, and, with Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, capability.

This is the humanistic manager operating in the various goods of desire, order, reason, and value. But how does development in the sense of vertical finality, the seeking of, the orientation of the good? This is what virtue is about. It too has absolute finality in the ground of all being; horizontal finality at various levels in the development with vertical finality of the human child into the human adult in community. Communities and their traditions of vertical finality, the culture of organizations, the growing up of generations in communities across the various goods of desire, order, reason, value, carry virtue with them. The highest vertical rungs are those of charity, a discerning, compassionate, merciful charity, willing the good for the other. The accumulation of strengths, not for the will to power, as power in itself is not a deprivation of the good as good, but to grow *orexis*, awareness, intelligence, rationality (especially self-rationality), responsibility centrifugally from the self of the manager, the maker, the *transcender*, out to others, exceeding one another in helping one another to the good. This guides the will to the good and uses power to help others attain the good. Utopian? Definitely! But plausible with agents striving for the good together in the universe and crafting a developing, liberating *moral life*.

We move far from the *homo faber* of a technology-led world where thought conforms being. We have begun to extend our manager into the species *homo transcendens* where instead being conforms thought and responsible action. The distinction is essential. When we start with truth, facts, the data of our own experience including what we value and prize. When we conform what is in us to the reality of those around us as managers we can join Romano Guardini in his notion of managers who master the conforming of thought, design, decision, and action with reality and being.³¹

Guardini realizes there are two ways in which the moral agent, our humanistic manager, knows and can inquire. One way “sinks into a thing and its context.” The goal, the good, the end of this first kind of knowledge “is to penetrate, to move within, to live with.” In a word, this knowledge tends to The second style of knowing which “unpacks, tears apart, arranges in compartments, takes over and rules.” (p. 45) He labels the first “inspection” and second “analysis.” (p. 46) Mastery with inspection and examination of the whole wherefrom the parts derive their good, their truth and reason for existence, is by “service, creation out of natural possibilities, which did not fail to transgress set limits or observe final directions.” Processes, their inputs and outputs, are discovered, invented in the sense of the origin meaning of the word, put to use to serve a higher good. On the other hand, mastery of the moral universe by the humanistic manager with analysis invents formulae, programs them into machines, to produce the desired results. “[Formulas] are detached from their organic links and arbitrarily pressed into service. The new desire for mastery does not in any sense follow natural courses or observe natural proportions. Indeed, it treats these with complete indifference.” (p. 47) This new approach builds rational and arbitrary grounds where,

³¹Guardini (1994), Letter 6, “Mastery”

once the machine with its tools and contrivances is unleashed, managers can now use the machines independent of whatever rationality might have been deployed to make the thing in the first place. “No inner relations are manifested. And since a formulation of natural forces is at work, obedience can be arbitrarily enforced.” (p. 47) If we imagine obedience as a one-sided compliance with rules and regulations, or even the instructions implied by technology, then is this a fitting end, a good, for the humanistic manager? Or is there another side to obedience?

The machine as *techne* might be technology as another “Golem of Prague” or the “*roboti*” of Karel Capek’s play *R.U.R.*³² manifested in the material technology ranging from cell phones with their Golem apps to the cultural technology of we call regulations and laws devoid of feeling³³ embedded in a global governance structure. Such rules, duties, and their enabling technology might seem to be devoid of the original intention of the creator of the technology. Other rules and compliance with those rules might preserve life, promote progress. But other rules and compliance with those rules might lead to a degradation of the human good. How might we choose? This is core of an ethics. The notion of conscience, as in the second and third Chestertonian sanities with which we began this exploration, might be the path by which we transcend, not simply make, our decisions, actions, current states of experience, understanding and judgement.

We conclude with the Sophoclean ending from the *Trachineai* 1264-1269, the *Trachinean Women*, about the “fellow-feeling-knowing” (*suggnomosunen*) of humans versus the gods and their simple lack of bother to know or feel for or on behalf of another (*agnomosunen*), with which Nussbaum (1992) is about to finish her concluding essay on “Transcendence.” (p. 375)

airet’, opadoi, megalen men emoi touton themenoi suggnomosunen, megalen de theon agnomosunen eidotes ergon ton prassomenon, oi phusantes kai kleizomenoi pateres toiaut’ ephorosi pathe.

(Raise [him], [you who] accompany [me], for showing me [more] great fellow-feeling-judgment than the complete lack of recognition of the gods those who cunningly begat us, such celebrated blow-hard fathers who allowed such suffering.)³⁴

Hulios is the son of Heracles, who dies, we think, in the previous verse. His mother Daethia had sent him in search of his father after so many years of absence doing the seemingly required bidding of the “celebrated” (*kleizomenoi*) gods, whom I depict as “blow-hards” (*phusantes*) which follows one very visual rendering of *phuseo*, “blow up a bladder.”

We are all on pilgrimage, a journey, buffeted by all too many storms and absences of loved-ones, often caused by agents like government leaders who war on other government leaders, transnational actors, including corporations, who dominate markets not just preserve wealth, but to seek wealth, whether in monetary or cultural forms, and the power wealth endows, as the end, the good. Unlike natural events like tsunamis and fire-storms which have no conscience, demagogues and so-called leaders up and down the social and cultural strata do. We all have some inkling of the *suggnomosunen* as “fellow-thought-and-feeling”³⁵ and in ourselves, and others of the opposite, often

³²See Collins and Pinch (1998) and Capek (n.d.). The Golem is an organic, unthinking animated clay artifact programmed by the instructions of its creator.

³³Recalling Aristotle, *op. cit.*, *dioper aneu orexeos nomos ho nous estin*.

³⁴This is not a literal rendering, but one which paraphrases the author’s many musings on this tragedy. I follow Martha Nussbaum’s lead with my peregrinations.

³⁵As Nussbaum renders it so, with *Liddell-Scott* (?)

depositive and intentional “lack-of-thought-and-feeling,” *agnomosunen*, which some of us possess to the point of acting like the notorious wind-bag gods, who are just humans, these that pose as gods, or who act as if unwitting beasts. This is the location of the conscience of the humanistic manager, formed in cauldrons of successes and failures, always in community with others.

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