Will Thacher

Professor Shedel

World War I

December 7th 2016

World War I in the African Theater

The three primary campaigns in Africa involving German colonies were waged in Cameroon, South-West Africa, and German East Africa. This paper surveys these military campaigns, focusing particularly on the course of battle. It examines how the plans and events of each battle were affected by political and military considerations. This paper is organized by geographical area, and reviews each campaign chronologically.

Although the fighting in each colony was unique, several general trends can be identified. The first is a difference in objectives between commanders in Africa and their counterparts in the mother country, specifically on the Allied side. The second is the difficulty of accomplishing basic military tasks such as transport, communications, and supply due to climate and geography. The third commonality is the enormity of the Allied military advantage that virtually guaranteed their victory. Ultimately I will conclude that, although this theater had little impact on the outcome of the war, the war provided an excuse for another round of colonization that affected the lives of millions of Africans.

**Cameroon**

Although the battle for Cameroon only lasted for a little over a year, it showcased many of the challenges that the Allies would face in all three theaters. French and British forces had different objectives from each other as well as from their mother countries, and had difficulty coordinating movements. This fighting also demonstrated the complication of performing offensive actions with little ability to communicate.

The German colony of Cameroon was in a precarious strategic position on the eve of war, surrounded by Entente powers on all sides. British Nigeria was situated on the northwest border, and French Equatorial Africa encircled Cameroon on all other sides. The borders had been reshuffled slightly in 1911 with the settlement that ended the Agadir Crisis. Germany gained territory from the French Congo in exchange for the establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco.[[1]](#endnote-1) The German plan clearly had to be defensive in nature, and they could not realistically expect to secure the entirety of Cameroon. Their general plan was to “hold as much of the Cameroons for as long as possible” in order to obtain the best possible post-war settlement.[[2]](#endnote-2) This principle meant that Germany planned to abandon its centers of trade and commerce, the port cities of Duala, Buea, and Victoria, for the purpose of protecting the larger territory in the middle of Cameroon.

A significant lack of officers and munitions forced the Germans to resort to guerilla tactics rather than the static defense that might be expected of an army in Germany’s geographic situation. Germany relied on a force known as the *Schutztruppen*, which was composed of German officers, well trained askaris, and eventually local police forces. This force in 1913 numbered less than 2,000 troops, but was increased in size to about 8,000 in an attempt to match the strength of the sizable British and French forces.[[3]](#endnote-3)The *Schutztruppen* also suffered from a lack of communications and intelligence-gathering equipment. The governor of Cameroon, Ebermaier, was able to seize control of the country’s economy, and he increased production to replace the loss of German imports. Through price controls, rationing, and increased cultivation, Ebermaier prevented starvation that had seemed probable with the loss of the port cities.

French and British objectives in Cameroon were not well-defined or coordinated. The French basically wanted to regain control of the territory they had yielded to Germany in 1911, but some, such as the French Equatorial governor M. Merlin, had grander ideas of completely evicting Germany from West Africa. The first priority of the British was to secure the port cites, especially Duala, for purposes of communication and denial to the German navy, but they did not have a plan after that. Merlin hoped by contributing French troops to the British Expeditionary Force he could coordinate the naval attack on Duala with a French offensive on land, but this was never to become a reality.[[4]](#endnote-4)

The fighting began in Cameroon before the Germans were aware that war had even begun, but the Allies lacked enough coherence to press this advantage. The French took the two major cities that extended into their territory, Singa and Bonga, on August 6, and planned an offensive from the south and southeast. The problem with this attack was that it occurred independently of British naval actions, which did not begin for a month afterwards. British offensive actions in the north began in late August, despite the original British intent to just focus on the port cities. This was caused by miscommunication and the absence of the governor-general as well as the physical war plans which he brought home with him on leave. The British attack was repulsed all along the Nigerian frontier due to faulty intelligence and poor planning. However, the British were able to determine that the Germans had moved their forces out of Duala, and they captured that city without battle by late September. They continued to push inland, traveling on rivers, but faced little German resistance.

In 1915 Merlin attempted to alleviate the coordination problem that was leading to losses against inferior German forces. He believed the time was opportune, as by the end of 1914 the French had regained the territory lost in 1911 and were poised to continue their march north. The Germans were relatively content with their position, as they held a large amount of territory and were able to receive supplies through the neutral Spanish colony of Muni, located inside of southern Cameroon. Governor Merlin attempted to coordinate a plan between his own columns and the British force situated on the coast to converge upon Jaunde, the presumed center of German defense. The actual base of German defense was in Nguandere in the north, a fact Merlin became aware of but chose to ignore. Merlin realized that real-time communication between columns was nearly impossible, and so he had to distribute overall plans at a meeting early in 1915 in Brazzaville. Merlin convinced the British general at Duala, Dobell, to attempt an eastward offensive, despite orders from London to establish a defensive position.[[5]](#endnote-5)

The 1915 Allied offensives had mixed results and did not fulfill Merlin’s plans. Dobell’s offensive was a complete failure, and “both his Nigerian battalions were reduced to half their strength.”[[6]](#endnote-6) The French offensive from the south experienced similar losses. Communications between columns took twenty days, ruling out the possibility of coordination, and both groups had a dearth of porters. The French had mild success with the offensive from the east, but they could not achieve Merlin’s ultimate strategic objective due to the failure of the British drive to Jaunde. The underlying cause for these failures was that French, represented by Merlin, wanted to conquer the colony, whereas the British just desired control of the coast.[[7]](#endnote-7) This represented two levels of divergent objectives: between London and Africa, and between armies in Africa.

In the fall and winter of 1915, the Allies began to experience success in forcing the Germans to retreat by executing, more or less accidentally, coordinated actions. During the summer, Brisset, a British commander, chose to attack Nguandere despite the overall plan to focus on Jaunde. This action had the unexpected effect of driving the Germans to Jaunde, which finally allowed Merlin’s plan to come into effect. Over the next several months the Allies forced German retreats, aided by the *Schutztruppen’s* lack of munitions. The only option for Germany was to seek safe haven to the south, in the neutral Spanish colony of Muni. The Allies very nearly cut off this retreat, but failed due to struggles with communication and supply. 15,000 civilians and soldiers, including both Germans and Africans, made the crossing into Spanish Muni, ending German resistance in Cameroon.[[8]](#endnote-8)

The German effort was far more organized than the that of the Allies, partially due to the simplicity of their goal. The Germans had two options; to surrender or to fight, whereas the Allies had difficulty agreeing on basic objectives. Offensive actions required coordination of movement and intelligence-gathering that was not as difficult for a defensive force, who simply had to respond. The main problem the Allies faced was fighting in the right place at the right time, not the combat itself. However, the Allies, especially the French, were willing to endure these problems in order to secure the German colonies for themselves. The South African campaign proved to be much less complicated for the Allies.

**South-West Africa**

The conflict in South-West Africa is the primary example of a trend called “sub-imperialism.” South African leaders used the war as an excuse for expansion; they were willing to “do London’s work for it in Africa, but in doing so were able to set their own agenda.”[[9]](#endnote-9) The conquest of the colony was a South African prerogative, and was not intended to contribute to the Allied effort. The problems that the South Africans faced were due to local, not international, conditions. The fighting in this theater turned out to be relatively tame due to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Allies.

The start of war in South Africa was fraught with difficulty for the British. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Louis Botha, desired to attack the German colony of South-West Africa as soon as the conflict began in Europe. Other officials and generals disagreed, for a range of reasons. Some believed that Afrikaner troops would refuse to fight Germans, with whom they had no qualms and even close connections. Others thought there was no reason at all to attack a peaceful colony because if the British won the war, they would receive that colony regardless. Botha convinced some dissenters by telling them that the British government would send troops from India or Australia if South Africa refused to fight. The movement to invade South-West Africa passed through Parliament by a wide margin, but Botha and his war minister Smuts had alienated several top generals and leaders.[[10]](#endnote-10)

In the fall of 1914, a brief rebellion instigated by leaders opposed to the attack on the German colony caused complications to Botha’s invasion agenda. The primary impetus for the rebellion was the concerns of the Boers against the British, but the plan for the invasion of South-West Africa gave the issue more immediacy. To the surprise of some South Africans, Boer troops responded in large numbers to Botha’s request, and they were able to suppress the rebels with a remarkably low number of casualties on both sides. Although Botha pursued a policy of reconciliation, the Boer on Boer fighting left a divide that persisted throughout the war.[[11]](#endnote-11)

The South African war effort was virtually guaranteed victory by its numerical and strategic advantages. At the start of war Germany possessed 2,000 troops, divided into 132 local defense units, to South Africa’s 43,000. German’s East Asiatic squadron had been destroyed, leaving Britain’s navy free from threat. In addition, German South-West Africa lacked currency to raise a larger force, and more importantly, enough food to feed the soldiers and civilians. The shortage of food prevented German units from moving efficiently and feeding the work animals that were required for transporting heavy guns. A mixed-race group living in the German colony known as the Bastards rose up against the Germans, and although it was not coordinated with the South African effort, it diverted German troops from their main objective. Thus, the German’s only legitimate option was a fighting retreat that could provide little more than annoyance to Botha and his forces.

Despite their overwhelming advantages, the South Africans still faced difficulties of their own. Their basic plan was to take control of the railways that began at Swapokmund and Lüderitz, which led north and northeast. These railways had to be rebuilt after the retreating Germans had destroyed them, and a lack of water at the coastal areas heavily slowed progress. Tension between Boer and English soldiers led to further inefficiency in this building process. South African advances, such as Botha’s victory at Riet, were delayed by a lack of supplies.

Botha, rather than a British representative, determined Germany’s fate. Germany’s hope of cutting off and encircling the South Africans failed, leaving the Allies free to continue the northward advance to Karibib, which lay at the intersection of the railways from the west and the south. By May 1915 South Africa had realized Britain’s original war aims of capturing the wireless station of Windhoek and controlling the port cities of Swapokmund and Lüderitz. Peace negotiations suggested by the Germans were not satisfactory to Botha, and he assembled a force to pursue the Germans. The key to Botha’s success, which came with the German surrender at the start of July, was speed. German generals surmised that Botha’s advance would be slow due to an extended supply line, and did not allow themselves sufficient time to establish a defensive position. Botha was conciliatory, leaving the German system of governance and society in place.[[12]](#endnote-12)

One notable characteristic of this campaign is its relatively low impact on both sides. The Germans had only 103 soldiers killed to the South African 266.[[13]](#endnote-13) This was mainly a result of the German desire to keep their defense force as united and strong as possible through avoidance of engagement. Another important aspect of this campaign was the uniquely South African, rather than British, effort. Botha directed all aspects of the operation, civilian and military, and did not request help from Britain. His objectives were “patently South African rather than imperial - to complete the conquest of German South-West Africa with Union troops, so reinforcing Pretoria’s claim to the colony.”[[14]](#endnote-14)

The battle for South-West Africa bore some similarities to the campaign for Cameroon. Individual commanders played a large role, making independent decisions that were not necessarily in line with the mother country. In both conflicts the Allied goal was to secure the ports and wireless stations, but generals on the ground took the initiative to pursue complete control of the colony. The German goal was the same in both colonies as well: to hold as much land as possible and to maintain a cohesive defensive force that could provide the basis for a colonial claim after the war.

These objectives are indicative of the colonial policies of each country. Britain’s success as a nation was intertwined with the fate of its colonies, which could potentially remain in British possession or influence regardless of the outcome war in Europe. The degree of autonomy given to British generals in Africa is acknowledgement that these colonies could maintain a degree of independence and still be valuable. The ostensible German view was that colonies would be a bonus after success in Europe. Berlin recognized that it would be a waste of resources to try to engage the Allies fully in Africa, and so left it up to local generals to try to protract the conflict as long as possible. The German army in East Africa outperformed those in Cameroon and South-West Africa in this task by a long stretch.

**East Africa**

Similar to the battles for Cameroon and South-West Africa, the course of war in German East Africa was shaped by the geographic vulnerability of the colony. Germany was surrounded by its enemies Britain, Belgium, and eventually Portugal. However, its defense force was much larger than that of the other two colonies and was commanded by a far superior general, Paul Von Lettow. The fighting in East Africa lasted until Lettow heard of the armistice, more than two years after the war had ended in the other German colonies. The British and the South Africans went to great lengths to conquer all of the territory of the colony in order to retain it as their own after the war ended.

From the outbreak of war in Europe, General Von Lettow and governor Schnee disagreed about the course of action that the German colony should take. Lettow always viewed the war in the context of the conflict in Europe, and wished to divert Allied troops from the western front. Schnee had made considerable economic and societal progress in East Africa, and vainly attempted in the early months to maintain that progress through a declaration of neutrality.[[15]](#endnote-15) Lettow, recognizing “that he was powerless to reduce the odds against him, began to evolve a strategic plan aimed at increasing them.”[[16]](#endnote-16) He sought to force the British to deploy a high number of troops against him, specifically by taking early offensive action. He planned to do this parallel to the Uganda Railway, basing troops at the town of Moshi. However, Schnee resisted this plan in hopes of preserving neutrality until the British shelled the port city of Dar es Salaam, dashing his hopes. It took Lettow a full month to fully assemble his force at Moshi, which was situated directly south of Mount Kilimanjaro. However, he was able during this time to capture the British town of Taveta before the British could assemble a sizable defense force.[[17]](#endnote-17)

The fighting at Tanga in 1914 was indicative of successful German resistance against far larger forces that came characterize this theater. The basic British plan was to use Indian Expeditionary troops to constrict the German force by executing movements from the east and the north. They also believed, incorrectly, that natives would revolt if German troops abandoned their policing activities. The force of 8,000 from the east was to land at the port city of Tanga and push inland and north. They quickly encountered unexpected difficulty. When the port city refused to surrender, the British disembarked at a nearby beach to prepare for the assault. The initial attack on November 2nd was repulsed, allowing Lettow time to send three companies by train to Tanga. The bulk of the fighting occurred on November 4th. Lettow outfought and outmaneuvered the British through the streets of the town and repulsed them back to the beach. The British gunship *Fox* failed to deliver any effective fire. The British general, Aitken, decided to evacuate Tanga and left much war material behind, to the dismay of some of his subordinates. This material, including weapons, phones and uniforms was a boon to the Germans, and only added to the immense moral defeat that the British had suffered. In the north of the colony, badly organized and thinly spread British troops were again defeated by a far smaller German force. Lettow’s plans were working out exactly as he had imagined.[[18]](#endnote-18)

1914 brought few successes for the Allies. British generals had lost faith in the Indian troops, who fought poorly and were vulnerable to malaria. Lord Kitchener ordered defensive warfare, compounding the already low morale. Although the British desired to defeat the Germans as quickly as possible, they did not go so far as to request explicit help from their allies in 1915 for fear of French or Belgian expansion in the region. The losses at Tanga and Moshi resulted in a major reorganization of leadership and objectives for the British, and they did not have the will or ability to coordinate an offensive that the Belgians suggested. The only significant British success in the first year of battle was the sinking of the German ship *Konigsberg*, which signaled the end of German naval threat in East Africa. This ship had evaded the British until late 1914, and from that point she hid in the massive Rufiji delta, blockaded until her sinking in July of 1915. It distracted 25 British ships and allowed the *Rubens* to deliver much needed supplies to Lettow’s troops. However, the British blockade on the East African coast did cut off trade and forced the colony to produce a large majority of its supplies internally.[[19]](#endnote-19)

While the year 1915 did not see many major engagements, both sides continued to battle on whatever levels they could. One of the ablest British captains, Meinertzhagen, flooded the German colony with millions of German counterfeit notes to contribute to the discrediting of the currency. However, Schnee was able to impose sufficient rationing and increased production to sustain Lettow’s army, and issued metal coins to introduce sound currency into circulation.[[20]](#endnote-20) The German army also began raids on the British railway, easily destroying defenseless cars and sections of line. These raids had the effect of giving further training to Germans in the field and forging a tighter bond between the whites and the askaris.[[21]](#endnote-21) In typically German fashion, Lettow envisioned a decisive battle, and planned for one in 1915 at Mazeras, situated just west of Mombasa. The time was opportune, as the British floundered at Gallipoli and revolution seemed imminent in Sudan. His plans were ruined, however, when German South-West Africa was defeated, diverting Smuts’ South African army of 25,000 to the East African campaign.[[22]](#endnote-22) In addition, the British force in Nairobi was tripled in size, and Lettow prepared his forces for defensive warfare.[[23]](#endnote-23)

The British plan for 1916 involved attacking the heart of the German defense, and again demonstrated Lettow’s ability to outsmart Smuts. The attack was to take place at a narrow mountain pass between Mount Kilimanjaro and the Pare hills called the Taveta gap. Their force was composed of Indians, South Africans, and Baluchis from Afghanistan. This army was only somewhat successful in their first attempt to fight through the Taveta gap against well-entrenched German positions in February of 1916. Although Lettow was forced to retreat to the rail station of Kahe, he had lost few troops and had an open route of evacuation. General Smuts revised the strategy slightly after this loss by adding a second division that would swing in from the northwest, cutting off Lettow’s retreat on the northern railroad. Smuts understood Lettow’s basic strategy, and knew the only way he could force Lettow into a decisive battle or a surrender was to deny him retreat routes.[[24]](#endnote-24) In March, Smuts again tried to extricate Lettow from his position, this time with slightly more success. Although the German troops held Kahe effectively against the British First Division, Lettow received a message that the further south station of Kisangire was threatened and ordered a retreat. This message turned out to be incorrect, but the Germans still accomplished the basic elements of their plan: inflicting high casualties at a low price and diverting Allied resources.[[25]](#endnote-25) However, this retreat marked the end of German hopes for an offensive; for the rest of the war they were limited to a fighting retreat.

The heavy and late rains significantly slowed, but did not halt, the pace of warfare in 1916. Smuts figured that he had to take action despite the difficulty of moving during the rains, or else the Belgians would be given the chance to take charge of the operation by moving in from the west. Lettow, meanwhile, planned for defensive warfare and worked to ease his supply deficiencies. The Allies anticipated this move and General Deventer engaged Lettow at Kondoa Irangi, a German outpost located 75 miles north of the central railway where supplies were being gathered. The two armies were of equal strength and fought to a stalemate by June. Lettow left the remainder of his troops with General Kraut in the Pare mountains, which lay adjacent to the northern railway. Beginning in May, Smuts pursued Kraut 400 kilometers south along the railway to the Lukigura river with few engagements. Smuts faced communications and supply difficulties that forced him to halt his advance. Deventer was facing similar difficulties and was unable to gain ground at Kondoa Irangi until Lettow decided to retreat in August.[[26]](#endnote-26)

Smuts still believed at this point that he could force Lettow into a decisive battle, but Lettow continued to be elusive. Deventer and Smuts’ armies converged around the Uluguru mountains and knocked the Germans back to the Mgeta river. Lettow spread out his troops at this position and successfully held off the attackers, again avoiding a decisive battle. The health of the South African army was in a dangerous state due to a lack of rations and malaria medication, as well as a high rate of dysentery. In addition, work animals were dying at an appalling rate: only 600 of *54,000* survived the tsetse fly in the summer of 1916.[[27]](#endnote-27)

A mixed force of Belgian and British troops pursued the Germans under the command of General Wahle on the western edge of the colony in the summer of 1916. German forces were repulsed from Lake Victoria in the north and Lake Tanganyika in the west. Wahle’s base of operations, Tabora, was occupied by the Belgians by September, and he retreated south to rendezvous with Lettow’s forces. During his retreat he made minimal contact with a British force from Northern Rhodesia which had pushed east all the way through Nyasaland. The Northern Rhodesian force struggled to balance the needs of recruiting porters and leaving enough men to cultivate the land, and used boats as well as land transport to bring food from further west. Wahle met up with German forces under Kraut who had retreated south to Mahenge.

By the end of 1916, the Allies had achieved large portion of their territorial aims, but had not completely eliminated the threat of the German forces. It is important to note that Germans were only causing trouble by fighting engagements in retreat, so the Allies could have consolidated their gains and established a defensive line rather than expending energy to eliminate every last German soldier. Portugal decided to enter the war in 1916 to solidify their territorial claims in the post-war settlement and were instructed by Smuts to move north toward Liwale. The Germans drove the Portuguese back across the border in the fall and held a large, resource-rich area in the south. Smuts attempted another offensive and enveloping movement in December on German positions at Mgeta and Kilwa, but it was checked by steadfast German defenses and heavy rains.[[28]](#endnote-28) Smuts at this point recognized that black troops maintained far better health in Africa than whites, although did not admit this publicly in order to preserve South African prestige. The British began a process of “Africanizing” their forces with the addition of a Nigerian force and an augmentation of the King’s African Rifles. Smuts was sent to Europe to join the War Cabinet and Hoskins, and later Deventer, assumed control.[[29]](#endnote-29)

Deventer, like Smuts, would never achieve the decisive battle that finally could force a German surrender. Deventer planned to encircle the Germans from all sides and cut off their retreat into Portuguese East Africa with the use of Rhodesian and Belgian troops from the west and Nigerian troops from the north. The three major areas of battle were Kilwa, Mahenge, and Mahiwa. Deventer managed to push the Germans back from Kilwa, and both sides suffered heavy losses at Mahiwa. The Belgians occupied Mahenge in October, and some German forces began moving south toward the Portuguese colony. One German commander, Tafel, and almost 6,000 men surrendered, but the remainder of the Germans escaped south, hoping to find resources that were lacking to the north. Although all German territory had been conquered, Lettow and Schnee agreed to continue the war effort to maintain a presence in the region.

British and Portuguese troops failed to defeat Lettow before the armistice due to local conditions and German persistence. Natives were resistant to Portuguese rule, but Lettow did not take full advantage of this fact to incite revolution. The Germans had a series of small victories at Portuguese bases which provided the supplies necessary for them to continue their effort. Lettow dragged his troops as far south as Namirrue, all the way north back to the border, and finally west into Northern Rhodesia, following supplies that were keeping them alive. Lettow finally surrendered in November of 1918 after hearing of the armistice, bringing to an end the mad chase that had gone on four years.[[30]](#endnote-30)

The most decisive factor in determining how these battles played out was not the objectives of England or France, but of the Allied commanders in Africa who had their own goals. German generals did not have the ability to do more than to respond to Allied plans due their numerical inferiority, but regardless were in line with Berlin’s objectives. In all three campaigns the initial goal of the Allies was to destroy German communication abilities and take control of their ports. In all cases, generals and governors chose to go further and conquer the full territory of the German colony. In East Africa and South-West Africa, this was largely the desire of Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, who together wielded an enormous amount of power to further South African interests. The difficulty of waging warfare in the African climate with a lack of military necessities speaks to how intent these nations were on colonization. If they had wanted to simply defend themselves against the Germans, this would have been an easy task indeed.

The First World War in Africa can be viewed as another round of colonization that was permitted by the conflict in Europe. In the past, Africans had been relatively helpless to influence the course of the European struggle on their continent. However, this round involved a new player, South Africa, which allowed at least some Africans much greater influence in the war. The war wrought destruction and death on an unprecedented scale on the continent, and shaped the opinions of Africans about Europeans for years to follow.

Works Cited

Miller, Charles. Battle for the Bundu: The First World War in East Africa. New York: Macmillan, 1974. Print.

"Moroccan crises". Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2016. Web. 06 Nov. 2016 <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Moroccan-crises>.

Samson, Anne. World War I in Africa: The Forgotten Conflict among the European Powers. London, England: I.B. Tauris, 2013. Print.

Strachan, Hew. The First World War in Africa. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. Print.

1. Moroccan Crises [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Strahan 24 [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Strachan 22 [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Strachan 21-32 [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Strachan 34-43 [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Strachan 44 [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Strachan 44-45 [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Strachan 55 [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Strachan vii [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Samson 70-71 [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Strachan 69-74 [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Strahan 81-91 [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Strachan 91 [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Strachan 89 [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Strachan 99-100 [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Miller 40 [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Miller 40-44 [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Miller 64-72 [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Strachan 111-120 [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Strachan 120-122 [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Miller 97-100 [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Strachan 127-129 [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Miller 138-139 [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Miller 143-148 [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Miller 156-161 [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Strachan 140-146 [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Strachan 146-150 [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Strachan 150-164 [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Strachan 166-170 [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Strachan 170-182 [↑](#endnote-ref-30)