

Hunt Evil

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DIGITAL FORENSICS





GCFE





Smartphone Forensic Analysis & Incident Response Analysis In-Depth

INCIDENT RESPONSE & THREAT HUNTING



Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting & Digital Forensics



Enterprise Cloud Forensics & **Incident Response GCFR**

Enterprise-Class Incident

Response & Threat Hunting



Advanced Network Forensics: Ransomware

LINUX Incident

Cyber Threat Intelligence **Response and Threat Hunting** GCTI

Threat Hunting, Analysis & and Cyber **Incident Response Extortion**

REM: Malware Analysis Tools & Techniques GREM



GNFA



Hacker Tools, Techniques Malware: Advanced & Incident Handling **Code Analysis GCIH**

Find Evil – Know Normal

Cybercrime

Intelligence

Knowing what's normal on a Windows host helps cut through the noise to quickly locate potential malware. Use the information below as a reference to know what's normal in Windows and to focus your attention on the outliers.

System

Image Path: N/A for system.exe - Not generated from an executable image **Parent Process: None**

Number of Instances: One User Account: Local System

Start Time: At boot time

Description: The **System** process is responsible for most kernel-mode threads. Modules run under System are primarily drivers (.sys files), but also include several important DLLs as well as the kernel executable, ntoskrnl.exe.

smss.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\smss.exe

Parent Process: System

Number of Instances: One master instance and another child instance per session. Children exit after creating their session.

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time for the master instance

Description: The Session Manager process is responsible for creating new sessions. The first instance creates a child instance for each new session. Once the child instance initializes the new session by starting the Windows subsystem (csrss.exe) and wininit.exe for Session 0 or winlogon.exe for Session 1 and higher, the child instance exits.

wininit.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\wininit.exe

Parent Process: Created by an instance of smss.exe that exits, typically appearing as an orphan process.

Number of Instances: One

User Account: Local System **Start Time:** Within seconds of boot time

Description: wininit.exe starts key background processes within Session O. It starts the Service Control Manager (services.exe), the Local Security Authority process (lsass.exe), and lsaiso.exe for systems with Credential Guard enabled. Note that prior to Windows 10, the Local Session Manager process (1sm.exe) was also started by wininit.exe. As of Windows 10, that functionality has moved to a service DLL (lsm.dll) hosted by svchost.exe.

RuntimeBroker.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe

Parent Process: svchost.exe **Number of Instances:** One or more

User Account: Typically the logged-on user(s)

Start Time: Start times vary greatly

Description: RuntimeBroker.exe acts as a proxy between the constrained Universal Windows Platform (UWP) apps (formerly called Modern or Metro apps) and the full Windows API. UWP apps have limited capability to interface with hardware and the file system. Broker processes such as RuntimeBroker.exe are therefore used to provide the necessary level of access for UWP apps. Generally, there will be one RuntimeBroker.exe for each UWP app. For example, starting Calculator.exe will cause a corresponding RuntimeBroker.exe process to initiate.

taskhostw.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\taskhostw.exe

Parent Process: svchost.exe

Number of Instances: One or more taskhostw.exe processes are normal. **User Account:** Task processes can be owned by logged-on users and/or by local service accounts.

Start Time: Start times vary greatly

Description: The generic host process for Windows Scheduled Tasks. Upon initialization, taskhostw.exe runs a continuous loop listening for trigger events. Example trigger events that can initiate a task include a defined time schedule, user logon, system startup, idle CPU time, a Windows log event, or workstation lock/unlock. There are more than 200 tasks pre-configured on a default installation of Windows 11 Enterprise (though not all are enabled). All executable files (DLLs & EXEs) used by the default Windows 10+ scheduled tasks are signed by Microsoft. This process replaced the older taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes.

winlogon.exe


Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\winlogon.exe Parent Process: Created by an instance of smss.exe that exits, typically appearing as an orphan process.

Number of Instances: One or more

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time for the first instance (for Session 1). Start times for additional instances occur as new sessions are created, typically through Remote Desktop or Fast User Switching logons.

Description: Winlogon handles interactive user logons and logoffs. It launches LogonUI.exe, which uses a credential provider to gather credentials from the user, ultimately passing the credentials to lsass.exe for validation. Once the user is authenticated, winlogon. exe loads the user's NTUSER. DAT into HKCU and starts the user's shell (usually explorer.exe) via userinit.exe. dwm.exe and fontdrvhost.exe are common children of this process and are responsible for display management.



csrss.exe Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\csrss.exe Parent Process: Created by an instance of smss.exe that exits, typically appearing as an orphan process. **Number of Instances:** Two or more **User Account:** Local System **Start Time:** Within seconds of boot time for the first two instances (for Session 0 and 1). Start times for additional instances occur as new sessions are created, although often only Sessions 0 and 1 are created. **Description:** The Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem is the user-mode process for the Windows subsystem. Its duties include managing processes and threads, importing many of the DLLs that provide the Windows API, and facilitating shutdown of the GUI during system shutdown. An instance of csrss.exe will run for each session. Session 0 is for services and Session 1 for the local console session. Additional sessions are created through the use of Remote Desktop and/or Fast User Switching. Each new session results in a new instance of csrss.exe. services.exe Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\services.exe

Parent Process: wininit.exe

Number of Instances: One

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time

Description: Implements the Unified Background Process Manager (UBPM), which is responsible for background activities such as services and scheduled tasks. Services.exe also implements the Service Control Manager (SCM), which specifically handles the loading of services and device drivers marked for auto-start. In addition, once a user has successfully logged on interactively, the SCM (services.exe) considers the boot successful and sets the Last Known Good control set (HKLM\SYSTEM\Select\LastKnownGood) to the value of the CurrentControlSet.

svchost.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe

Parent Process: services.exe (most often)

Number of Instances: Many (generally at least 10 and often more than 50)

User Account: Varies between Local System, Network Service, or Local Service accounts. Windows 10+ also has "peruser services" running under a user account context with Medium integrity level.

Start Time: Typically close to boot time. However, services can be started after boot (e.g., at logon), resulting in new instances of svchost.exe long after boot time.

Description: Generic host process for Windows services. It is used for running service DLLs. Windows differentiates multiple instances of svchost.exe, using the "-k" parameter pointing to Service Host Groups within the registry. Typical "-k" parameters include DcomLaunch, RPCSS, LocalService, netsvcs, NetworkService, UnistackSvcGroup, and more. The "-s" parameter identifies the service, such as LanmanServer, WinRM, or Winmgmt. "-p" signifies policy enforcement. Malware authors often take advantage of the ubiquitous nature of sychost.exe and use it either to

host a malicious DLL as a service, or to blend in using a malicious process named sychost.exe or similar spelling. In Windows 10 version 1703, Microsoft changed the default grouping of similar services for systems with more than 3.5 GB of RAM. In such cases, most services will now run under their own instance of sychost.exe resulting in more than 50 instances of svchost.exe.

Isaiso.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\lsaiso.exe

Parent Process: wininit.exe Number of Instances: Zero or one

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time

Description: When Virtualization-based Security (VBS) is enabled (used with Credential Guard), the functionality of lsass.exe is split between two processes—itself and lsaiso.exe. Most of the functionality stays within lsass.exe, but the important role of safely storing account credentials moves to lsaiso.exe. It provides safe storage by running in a context that is isolated from other processes through hardware virtualization technology. When remote authentication is required, lsass.exe proxies the requests using an RPC channel with lsaiso.exe in order to authenticate the user to the remote service. Note that if VBS is not enabled, lsaiso.exe should not be running on the system.

Isass.exe

Image Path: %SystemRoot%\System32\lsass.exe

Parent Process: wininit.exe **Number of Instances: One**

User Account: Local System **Start Time:** Within seconds of boot time

Description: The Local Security Authentication Subsystem Service process is responsible for authenticating users by

calling an appropriate authentication package specified in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa. Typically, this will be Kerberos for domain accounts or MSV1_0 for local accounts. In addition to authenticating users, lsass.exe is also responsible for implementing the local security policy (such as password policies and audit policies) and for writing events to the security event log. Only one instance of this process should occur and it should rarely have child processes (Encrypting File System is a known exception).



Image Path: %SystemRoot%\explorer.exe

Parent Process: Created by an instance of userinit.exe that exits, typically appearing as an orphan process. Number of Instances: One or more per interactively logged-on user

User Account: Logged-on user(s)

Start Time: First instance starts when the owner's interactive logon begins

Description: At its core, Explorer provides users access to files. Functionally, though, it is both a file browser via Windows Explorer (though still explorer.exe) and a user interface providing features such as the user's Desktop, the Start Menu, the Taskbar, the Control Panel, and application launching via file extension associations and shortcut files. Explorer.exe is the default user interface specified in the Registry value HKLM\SOFTWARE\ Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell, though Windows can alternatively function with another interface such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. Notice that the legitimate explorer.exe resides in the **SystemRoot**% directory rather than **SystemRoot**%\System32. Multiple instances per user can occur, such as when the option "Launch folder windows in a separate process" is enabled.

Process listing from Windows 10 Enterprise

powershell.exe

conhost.exe

Hunt Evil: Lateral Movement

During incident response and threat hunting, it is critical to understand how attackers move around your network. Lateral movement is an inescapable requirement for attackers to stealthily move from system to system and accomplish their objectives. Every adversary, including the most skilled, will use some form of lateral movement technique described here during a breach. Understanding lateral movement tools and techniques allows responders to hunt more efficiently, quickly perform incident response scoping, and better anticipate future attacker activity. Tools and techniques to hunt the artifacts described below are detailed in the SANS DFIR course FOR508: Advanced Digital Forensics, Incident Response, and Threat Hunting

Additional Event Logs

Process-tracking events, Sysmon, and similar logging capabilities are not listed here for the sake of brevity. However, this type of enhanced logging can provide significant visibility of an intruder's lateral movement, given that the logs are not overwritten or otherwise deleted.

Additional FileSystem Artifacts

Deep-dive analysis techniques such as file carving, volume shadow analysis, and NTFS log file analysis can be instrumental in recovering many of these artifacts (including the recovery of registry and event log files and records).

Additional References

SANS DFIR FOR508 course: http://sans.org/FOR508 ATT&CK Lateral Movement: http://for508.com/attck-lm JPCERT Lateral Movement: http://for508.com/jpcert-lm

Artifacts in Memory Analysis

Artifacts in memory provide additional capabilities to track tools used to accomplish lateral movement. Evidence of execution can be identified via running processes like rdpclip.exe, mstsc.exe, and wsmprovhost.exe. Command-line extraction from processes like conhost.exe can provide valuable insight into how tools were used. Network connections and associated ports can be powerful indicators of lateral movement (e.g., port 445 for SMB traffic and port 3389 for RDP). MUP devices and named pipe usage can also be identified via memory forensics.

REGISTRY

■ ShimCache - **SYSTEM**

First Time Executed

•rdpclip.exe

•tstheme.exe

■ AmCache.hve -

•rdpclip.exe

• tstheme.exe

REMOTE ACCESS SOURCE


Remote Desktop **EVENT LOGS** REGISTRY **FILE SYSTEM** ■ Remote desktop destinations ■ UserAssist - NTUSER.DAT ■ Jumplists - C:\Users\<Username>\ ■ Security Event Log security.evtx are tracked per-user AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\ security.evtx • **4648** – Logon specifying alternate • mstsc.exe Remote Recent\AutomaticDestinations\ credentials - if NLA enabled on • NTUSER\Software\ Desktop Client execution • {MSTSC-APPID}destination Microsoft\Terminal • Last Time Executed automaticDestinations-ms - Current logged-on User Name Server Client\Servers Number of Times Executed Tracks remote desktop connection - Alternate User Name ■ ShimCache - SYSTEM ■ RecentApps - NTUSER.DAT destination and times - Destination Host Name/IP •mstsc.exe Remote •mstsc.exe Remote

•mstsc.exe-{hash}.pf ■ Bitmap Cache - C:\Users\<Username>\ • Number of Times Executed AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal • RecentItems subkey tracks Server Client\Cache connection destinations and •bcache##.bmc • cache###.bin

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\

■ Default.rdp file -C:\Users\<Username>\Documents\

DESTINATION **EVENT LOGS**



• 4624 Logon Type 10 - Source IP/Logon User Name • 4778/4779 - IP Address of Source/Source System Name - Logon User Name

Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS%4Operational.evtx • 131 – Connection Attempts - Source IP • 98 – Successful Connections

Services-RemoteConnection Manager%4Operational.evtx Source IP/Logon User Name Blank user name may indicate use of Sticky Keys

■Microsoft-Windows-Terminal

■Microsoft-Windows-Terminal Services-LocalSession Manager%4Operational.evtx • 21, 22, 25 Source IP/Logon User Name • 41

- Logon User Name

FILE SYSTEM ■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •rdpclip.exe-{hash}.pf •tstheme.exe-{hash}.pf

EVENT LOGS

- Destination Host Name

- Destination IP Address

- Process Name

• 1024

• 1102

■Microsoft-Windows-

TerminalServices-

RDPClient%4Operational.evtx

- security.evtx • 4648 - Logon specifying alternate credentials **- Current logged-on User Name** - Alternate User Name Destination Host Name/IP Process Name
- Microsoft-Windows-SmbClient%4Security.evtx
- **31001** Failed logon to
- Destination Host Name User Name for failed logon Reason code for failed destination logon (e.g., bad

EVENT LOGS

Current logged-on User Name

Destination Host Name/IP

password)

security.evtx

4648 – Logon specifying

- Alternate User Name

Process Name

security.evtx

alternate credentials

REGISTRY ■ MountPoints2 - Remotely mapped shares

Desktop Client execution

• Last Time Executed

- NTUSER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2
- Shellbags USRCLASS.DAT • Remote folders accessed inside an interactive session via Explorer by attackers
- ShimCache SYSTEM •net.exe

Desktop Client

Desktop Client

Time Executed

Executed

• mstsc.exe

■ BAM/DAM - SYSTEM - Last

■ AmCache. hve - First Time

•mstsc.exe Remote

- BAM/DAM NTUSER.DAT Last Time Executed
- •net.exe •net1.exe
- AmCache. hve First Time Executed •net.exe
- •net1.exe

FILE SYSTEM

- Prefetch C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •net.exe-{hash}.pf •net1.exe-{hash}.pf
- User Profile Artifacts • Review shortcut files and jumplists for remote files accessed by attackers, if they had interactive access (RDP)

FILE SYSTEM

Possible references to other files accessed

by psexec.exe, such as executables copied to

psexec.exe file downloaded and created on

local host as the file is not native to Windows

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\

target system with the "-c" option

•psexec.exe-{hash}.pf

■ File Creation

Map Network Shares (net.exe) to C\$ or Admin\$



net use z: \\host\c\$ /user:domain\username <password>

EVENT LOGS - Source Host Name/Logon User

- security.evtx • **4624** Logon Type 3 Source IP/Logon User Name
- 4672 Logon User Name Logon by user with

Security Event Log -

- administrative rights Requirement for accessing default shares such as C\$ and ADMINS
- 4776 NTLM if authenticating to Local System Source Host Name/Logon **User Name**

REGISTRY • **4768** – TGT Granted

- Available only on domain controller • 4769 - Service Ticket Granted if authenticating to Domain Controller
- Name - Source IP - Available only on domain controller

- Destination Host Name/Logon User

• 5140 Share Access • 5145

- Auditing of shared files - NOISY!

FILE SYSTEM ■ File Creation

- Attacker's files (malware) copied to destination system · Look for Modified Time before Creation Time
- Creation Time is time of file copy ■ User Access Logging (Servers only)
- •C:\Windows\System32\ LogFiles\Sum

FILE SYSTEM

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\

created unless "-e" option used

FILE SYSTEM

- User Name - Source IP Address First and Last Access Time

SOURCE

REGISTRY

• Software\SysInternals\PsExec\EulaAccepted

■ BAM/DAM - SYSTEM - Last Time Executed

■ AmCache. hve - First Time Executed

REMOTE EXECUTION

psexec.exe \\host -accepteula -d -c c:\temp\evil.exe

DESTINATION

REGISTRY EVENT LOGS ■ New service creation configured in SYSTEM\ • 4648 Logon specifying alternate credentials CurrentControlSet\ Connecting User Name

- 4624 Logon Type 3 (and Type 2 if "-u" Alternate Credentials are used) Source IP/Logon User Name Logon User Name
- Logon by a user with administrative rights - Requirement for access default shares such as C\$ and ADMIN\$ 5140 – Share Access **- ADMIN\$** share used by PsExec
- system.evtx • 7045 - Service Install

security.evtx

• 4624 Logon Type 3

•psexesvc.exe-{hash}.pf •evil.exe-{hash}.pf Services\PSEXESVC ■ File Creation • "-r" option can allow • User profile directory structure attacker to rename service

- ShimCache **SYSTEM** • psexesvc.exe will be placed in ADMIN\$ (\Windows) by default, as •psexesvc.exe well as other executables (evil.exe) ■ AmCache.hve pushed by PsExec First Time Executed ■ User Access Logging (Servers only) •psexesvc.exe
 - C:\Windows\System32\ LogFiles\Sum User Name - Source IP Address - First and Last Access Time

• 4648 – Logon specifying alternate credentials - Current logged-on User Name - Alternate User Name - Destination Host Name/IP Process Name

EVENT LOGS

■ ShimCache - SYSTEM •at.exe • schtasks.exe ■ BAM/DAM - SYSTEM - Last Time Executed

schtasks.exe

at \\host 13:00 "c:\temp\evil.exe"

■ ShimCache - SYSTEM

• psexec.exe

• psexec.exe

- REGISTRY ■ AmCache.hve -First Time Executed at.exe schtasks.exe
- Prefetch C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •at.exe-{hash}.pf • schtasks.exe-{hash}.pf

FILE SYSTEM

FILE SYSTEM

FILE SYSTEM

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\

•wmic.exe-{hash}.pf

•sc.exe-{hash}.pf

Scheduled Tasks

schtasks /CREATE /TN taskname /TR c:\temp\evil.exe /SC once /RU "SYSTEM" /ST 13:00 /S host /U username

EVENT LOGS

- Source IP/Logon User Name 4672 - Logon User Name
- Logon by a user with administrative rights - Requirement for accessing default shares such as C\$ and

• 4698 – Scheduled task created • 4702 - Scheduled task updated • 4699 - Scheduled task deleted • 4700/4701 - Scheduled task enabled/disabled

■Microsoft-Windows-Task • 106 - Scheduled task created • 140 – Scheduled task updated

• 200/201 - Scheduled task

executed/completed

- Scheduler%4Operational.evtx • 141 – Scheduled task deleted
 - ShimCache **SYSTEM** •evil.exe ■ AmCache.hve -

•evil.exe

■ SYSTEM

REGISTRY

REGISTRY

REGISTRY

■ ShimCache - **SYSTEM**

■ File Creation ■ SOFTWARE •Microsoft\Windows •evil.exe NT\CurrentVersion\ Job files created in Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks C:\Windows\Tasks

- Microsoft\Windows XML task files created in NT\CurrentVersion\ C:\Windows\System32\Tasks Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\ C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks - Author tag can identify:
- Source system name Creator username First Time Executed ■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •evil.exe-{hash}.pf

EVENT LOGS

REGISTRY ■ ShimCache - SYSTEM

- BAM/DAM SYSTEM Last Time Executed
- •sc.exe ■ AmCache. hve - First Time Executed •sc.exe

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\

sc \\host create servicename binpath= "c:\temp\evil.exe" sc \\host start servicename



if enabled

- security.evtx • 4624 Logon Type 3 Source IP/Logon User Name
- Security records service install, Enabling non-default Security events such as ID 4697 are particularly useful if only the Security logs are forwarded to a

EVENT LOGS svstem.evtx

EVENT LOGS

- **7034** Service crashed unexpectedly
 - 7035 Service sent a Start/Stop control • 7036 - Service started or stopped
- \CurrentControlSet\ Services\ • New service creation ■ ShimCache – **SYSTEM**
 - •evil.exe • 7040 - Start type changed (Boot ShimCache records | On Request | Disabled) existence of malicious • **7045** – A service was installed on service executable, unless the system implemented as a service DLL
 - AmCache.hve -First Time Executed •evil.exe

• evil.exe Or evil.dll malicious service executable or service DLL

■ File Creation

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •evil.exe-{hash}.pf

FILE SYSTEM

• evil.mof - .mof files can be used

to manage the WMI Repository

■ Unauthorized changes to the

WMI Repository in C:\Windows\


System32\wbem\Repository

FILE SYSTEM

EVENT LOGS security.evtx

- ShimCache SYSTEM
- 4648 Logon specifying alternate • wmic.exe credentials ■ BAM/DAM - **SYSTEM** - Last Time Executed - Current logged-on User Name
- Alternate User Name ■ AmCache.hve - First Time Executed - Destination Host Name/IP • wmic.exe Process Name

Invoke-WmiMethod -Computer host -Class Win32 Process -Name create -Argument "c:\temp\evil.exe"



WMI/WMIC

security.evtx • **4624** Logon Type 3 Source IP/Logon User Name

centralized log server

- Logon User Name - Logon by an a user with administrative rights
- Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity%40perational.evtx • 5857 Indicates time of wmiprvse execution and path to provider DLL – attackers
 - sometimes install malicious WMI provider DLLs • 5860, 5861
 - Registration of Temporary (5860) and Permanent (5861) Event Consumers. Typically used for persistence, but can be used for remote execution.
- •scrcons.exe • mofcomp.exe •wmiprvse.exe •evil.exe
- AmCache.hve -First Time Executed • scrcons.exe • mofcomp.exe

• wmiprvse.exe

PowerShell\

ExecutionPolicy

•wsmprovhost.exe

•evil.exe

• evil.exe

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •scrcons.exe-{hash}.pf • mofcomp.exe-{hash}.pf •wmiprvse.exe-{hash}.pf •evil.exe-{hash}.pf

■ File Creation

•evil.exe

security.evtx • 4648 - Logon specifying alternate credentials

Destination Host Name/IP Process Name Microsoft-Windows-

- Alternate User Name

WinRM%4Operational.evtx • **161** – Remote Authentication Error • **6** – WSMan Session initialize Session created Destination Host Name or IP

- Current logged-on User Name

- Current logged-on User Name

EVENT LOGS • **8**. **15**. **16**. **33** – WSMan Session Closing of WSMan session **-** Current logged-on User Name ■ Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx

associated user account

· 8193 & 8194

Session created

Session closed

• **8197** – Connect

■ BAM/DAM - SYSTEM Last Time Executed •powershell.exe ■ AmCache.hve - First • 40961, 40962 Time Executed - Records the local initiation •powershell.exe of powershell.exe and

wmic /node:host process call create "C:\temp\evil.exe"

REGISTRY

•powershell.exe

REGISTRY

■ ShimCache - **SYSTEM** ■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ •powershell.exe-{hash}.pf • PowerShell scripts (.ps1 files) that run within 10 seconds of powershell.exe launching will be tracked in powershell.exe prefetch file ■ Command history

Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\

commands is maintained per user

FILE SYSTEM

C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\

PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

Invoke-Command -ComputerName host -ScriptBlock {Start-Process c:\temp\evil.exe}

• With PS v5+, a history file with previous 4096



PowerShell Remoting

EVENT LOGS security.evtx • **4624** – Logon Type 3 - Source IP/Logon User Name

- Logon by an a user with administrative rights Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx

default in PS v5

• **53504** – Records the

authenticating user

• 4103, 4104 - Script Block logging

Logs all scripts if configured

Logs suspicious scripts by

- 800 Includes partial script code Logon User Name ■ Microsoft-Windows-
- ■Windows PowerShell.evtx 400/403 "ServerRemoteHost" indicates start/end of Remoting session
 - WinRM%4Operational.evtx • 91 - Session creation • 142 - WSMan Operation Failure • 169 - Records the authenticating user
- ShimCache **SYSTEM** •wsmprovhost.exe evil.exe SOFTWARE •Microsoft\PowerShell\1 \ShellIds\Microsoft.
- Attacker may change execution policy to a less restrictive setting, such as "bypass" ■ AmCache.hve -First Time Executed

REGISTRY FILE SYSTEM ■ File Creation

•evil.exe

■ Prefetch - C:\Windows\Prefetch\ • evil.exe-{hash].pf • wsmprovhost.exe-{hash].pf

• With Enter-PSSession, a user

profile directory may be created

Evidence of Program **Execution**

UserAssist

Description: JserAssist records metadata on GUI-based rogram executions. Location: NTUSER.DAT HIVE NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\ {GUID}\Count

Interpretation:

GUIDs identify type of execution (Win7+) **CEBFF5CD** Executable File Execution F4E57C4B Shortcut File Execution /alues are ROT-13 Encoded Application path, last run time, run count, focus time and focus count

BAM/DAM

ws Background/Desktop Activity Moderator BAM/DAM) is maintained by the Windows power gement sub-system. (Available in Win10+)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bam\

"State" key used in Win10 1809+

JserSettings\{SID}

Enter-PSSession -ComputerName host

- SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dam\ serSettings\{SID} nterpretation: Provides full path of file executed and last execution date/time Typically up to one week of data available
- **System Resource** Usage Monitor (SRUM) **Description:**
- SRUM records 30 to 60 days of historical stem performance including applications n, user accounts responsible, network nections, and bytes sent/received per oplication per hour. ocation: Win8+ C:\Windows\System32\SRU\SRUDB.dat

Interpretation:

Three tables in SRUDB.dat are particularly {973F5D5C-1D90-4944-BE8E-24B94231A174} Network Data Usage {d10ca2fe-6fcf-4f6d-848e-b2e99266fa89} = Application Resource Usage {DD6636C4-8929-4683-974E-22C046A43763} Network Connectivity Usage

SRUDB.dat is an Extensible Storage Engine

ShimCache

e Windows Application Compatibility Database used by Windows to identify possible application npatibility challenges with executables. It tracks the executable file path and binary last modified time. XP: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session

Manager\AppCompatibility

Full path of executable

(96 entries in WinXP)

Manager\AppCompatCache Interpretation: Any executable present in the file system could be bund in this key. Data can be particularly useful to dentify the presence of malware on devices where ther application execution data is missing (such as Windows servers).

Windows 7+ contains up to 1,024 entries

Post-WinXP no execution time is available

Executables can be preemptively added to the

database prior to execution. The existence of an

executable in this key does not prove actual execution.

Jump Lists Description: ndows Jump Lists allow user access frequently or recently used items

USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\ Win7+: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ AutomaticDestinations nterpretation: Each jump list file is named according to an application identifier (AppID).

uickly via the task bar. First introduced in

ndows 7, they can identify applications in

use and a wealth of metadata about items

accessed via those applications.

List of Jump List IDs https://dfir.to/EZJumpList Automatic Jump List Creation Time = First time an item added to the jump ist. Typically, the first time an object was ppened by the application. Automatic Jump List Modification Time Last time item added to the jump list. Typically, the last time the application

opened an object.

Prefetch Description:

<mark>efetch increases performance of a system by pre-loading</mark> de pages of commonly used applications. It monitors files and directories referenced for each application or rocess and maps them into a .pf file. It provides evidence nat an application was executed. Limited to 128 files on XP and Win7 Up to 1024 files on Win8+

Naming format: (exename) - (hash).pf SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ Memory Management\PrefetchParameters EnablePrefetcher value (0 = disabled; 3 = application launch and boot enabled)

Location:

:\Windows\Prefetch

Date/Time file by that name and path was first executed Creation date of .pf file (~-10 seconds) Date/Time file by that name and path was last executed Last modification date of .pf file (~-10 seconds) Each .pf file includes embedded data, including the last ight execution times (only one time available pre-Win8), cotal number of times executed, and device and file andles used by the program

Description: mcache tracks installed plications, programs executed (or

Amcache.hve

esent), drivers loaded, and more.

and drivers. (Available in Win7+)

<mark>/hat sets this artifact apart is it also</mark>

racks the SHA1 hash for executables

Location: :\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\ ncache.hve Interpretation: · A complete registry hive, with multiple sub-keys Full path, file size, file modification time, compilation time, and

SHA1 hash of executables and Amcache should be used as an indication of executable and driver presence on the system, but not to prove actual execution

publisher metadata