

Trust me,
I'm a shortcut 

New LNK abuse methods

Wietze Beukema

Lead Threat Detection & Response Engineer

- Passion for cyber security research
- Loves open-source, community projects
- Presented at various cyber conferences



Let's Start.Ink

Shortcuts


Access **resources** quickly – on Windows:

- .LNK files
- .URL files

Mainly a **UI concept**

Custom binary format






.LNK Abuse

As old as Windows 95 itself:

- **Exploits:** e.g. Stuxnet (CVE-2010-2568)
- **Initial access:** USB worms, loaders/droppers
- **Persistence:** create/update LNKs
- **Defence Evasion:** masquerading



.LNK format



	Description
TE_DIRECTORY	
TE_ARCHIVE	The file or directory flag to mark files
	A bit that MUST be set
TE_NORMAL	The file or directory other bits in this field
TE_TEMPORARY	The file is being used
TE_SPARSE_FILE	The file is a sparse file
TE_REPARSE_POINT	The file or directory has a reparse point
TE_COMPRESSED	The file or directory all data in the file that compression subdirectories.

BlockSignature		LocalBasePathOffset																																												
BlockSize (structure)		C 4 ≤ value																																												
BlockSignature	CommonNetworkRelativeLinkFlags (4 bytes): Flags that specify the contents of the DeviceNameOffset and NetProviderType fields.	(4 bytes) PathUnc																																												
SpecialFlags	<table border="1"><tr><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>A</td><td>B</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr></table>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	A	B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 5 6 0 0 0 bits are de ndLocalBas
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1																									
A	B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0																									
Offset (4 bytes)	Where the bits are defined as:																																													
child seg	<table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Value</th><th>Description</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A</td><td>If set, the DeviceNameOffset field contains an offset to the device name.</td></tr><tr><td>ValidDevice</td><td>If not set, the DeviceNameOffset field does not contain an offset to the device name, and its value MUST be zero.</td></tr></tbody></table>	Value	Description	A	If set, the DeviceNameOffset field contains an offset to the device name.	ValidDevice	If not set, the DeviceNameOffset field does not contain an offset to the device name, and its value MUST be zero.																																							
Value	Description																																													
A	If set, the DeviceNameOffset field contains an offset to the device name.																																													
ValidDevice	If not set, the DeviceNameOffset field does not contain an offset to the device name, and its value MUST be zero.																																													
link target																																														
2.5.10 Trackers																																														
The Tracker found in its context [MS-DLTW]																																														
field MUST be present if the value of the 00000014; otherwise, this field MUST NOT be present.																																														
ULL-terminated string, as defined by the system share path; for example, "\\server\share".																																														
, NULL-terminated string, as defined by the system for example, the drive letter "D:". This field MUST be wise, this field MUST NOT be present.																																														
, NULL-terminated, Unicode string that is the field MUST be present if the value of the 00000014; otherwise, this field MUST NOT be present.																																														
optional, NULL-terminated, Unicode string that is ing. This field MUST be present if NetNameOffset field is greater than 0x00000014;																																														
key user interface and path identification information. rolled by LinkFlags (section 2.1.1) in the																																														
ng ABNF rules [RFC5234] .																																														
] [WORKING_DIR] ON_LOCATION]																																														
cifies a description of the shortcut that is displayed to link. This structure MUST be present if the HasName flag is set.																																														
cifies the location of the link target relative to the string SHOULD be used when resolving the link . vePath flag is set.																																														
cifies the file system path of the working directory to structure MUST be present if the HasWorkingDir flag is																																														
structure that stores the command-line arguments that structure MUST be present if the HasArguments																																														
	0x00000004	25 / 48																																												

BlockSize (4 bytes): A 32-bit, unsigned integer that specifies the size structure. This value MUST be 0x000000060.									
BlockSignature (4 bytes): A 32-bit, unsigned integer that specifies the TrackerDataBlock extra data section . This value MUST be 0xA0000000.									
Length (4 bytes): A 32-bit, unsigned integer that specifies the size of the TrackerDataBlock structure, including this Length field. This value MUST be 0x00000004.									
This value MUST be 0x00000001. It specifies the size of the character string, as defined by the machine where the string is represented.									
representation (IMS-DT) of the tracking service, as described in the Ticket representation that follows.									
Specifies the alternate IDL representation that supports it.									
<table border="1"><tr><td>5</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>2</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td></tr></table>	5	7	8	9	2	0	1	2	3
5	7	8	9	2	0	1	2	3	
size									
Specifies the size of the string. This value MUST be greater than or equal to the length of the string.									
length									
Specifies the size of the string. This value MUST be greater than or equal to the length of the string.									
length									
Specifies the size of the string. This value MUST be greater than or equal to the length of the string.									
length									

Structure Examples

1 Shortcut to a File

This section presents a sample of the Shell Link Binary File Format, consisting of a **shortcut** to a file with the path "C:\test\a.txt".

The following is the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the **shell link**.

	x0	x1	x2	x3	x4	x5	x6	x7	x8	x9	xA	xB	xC	xD	xE	xF
0000	4C	00	00	01	14	02	00	00	00	00	00	C0	00	00	00	00
0010	00	00	46	9B	00	08	00	20	00	00	00	D0	E9	EE	F2	
0020	15	15	C9	01	D0	E9	EE	F2	15	15	C9	01	D0	E9	EE	F2
0030	15	15	C9	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00
0040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	BD	00	14	00	00
0050	1F	50	E0	4F	D0	20	EA	3A	69	10	A2	D8	08	00	2B	30
0060	30	9D	19	00	2F	43	3A	5C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	46	00	31	00	00	00
0080	00	00	00	2C	39	69	A3	10	00	74	65	73	74	00	00	32
0090	00	07	00	04	00	EF	BE	2C	39	65	A3	2C	39	69	A3	26
00A0	00	00	00	03	1E	00	00	00	00	F5	1E	00	00	00	00	00
00B0	00	00	00	00	00	74	00	65	00	73	00	74	00	00	00	14
00C0	00	48	00	32	00	00	00	00	00	2C	39	69	A3	20	00	61
00D0	2E	74	78	74	00	34	00	07	00	04	00	EF	BE	2C	39	69
00E0	A3	2C	39	69	A3	26	00	00	00	2D	6E	00	00	00	00	96
00F0	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	61	00	2E	00	74	
0100	00	78	00	74	00	00	00	14	00	00	00	3C	00	00	00	1C
0110	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	1C	00	00	00	2D	00	00	00	00
0120	00	00	3B	00	00	00	11	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	81
0130	8A	7A	30	10	00	00	00	43	3A	5C	74	65	73	74	5C	
0140	61	2E	74	78	74	00	00	07	00	2E	00	5C	00	61	00	2E
0150	00	74	00	78	00	74	00	07	00	43	00	3A	00	5C	00	74
0160	00	65	00	73	00	74	00	60	00	00	03	00	00	00	A0	58

ICON_LOCATION: An optional structure that specifies the location of the icon to be used when displaying a shell link item in an icon view. This structure MUST be present if the **HasIconLocation** flag is set.

All StringData structures have the following structure.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
CountCharacters										String (variable)											

(MS-SHLLINK) - 0x20250610
Shell Link (LINK) Binary File Format
Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation

location of a string that contains the volume label of the drive that the link target is stored on. This value is an offset, in bytes, from the start of the `VOLUMEINFO` structure to a NULL-terminated string of **Unicode** characters. The volume label string is located in the **Data** field of this structure.

4 Security

None.


ShellLinkHeader


LinkTargetIDList

LinkInfo

StringData

***ExtraData**





Example: header

4c	00	00	00	00	01	14	02	00	00	00	00	00	c0	00	00	00
00	00	00	46	01	00	00	00	80	00	00	00	00	f4	b9	14	
04	5b	dc	01	00	f4	b9	14	04	5b	dc	01	00	f4	b9	14	
04	5b	dc	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	07	00	00	00	
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

HeaderSize	0x4c (=76)
LinkCLSID	00021401-0000-0000-C000-00000000046
LinkFlags	0x01 (HasLinkTargetIDList) 25 flags ≈ 33.5M possibilities
FileAttributes	0x80 (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL) 13 flags = 8,192 possibilities
CreationTime	2025-11-21 16:30:00 UTC
AccessTime	2025-11-21 16:30:00 UTC
WriteTime	2025-11-21 16:30:00 UTC
FileSize	0x00 (=0)
IconIndex	0x01 (=1)
ShowCommand	0x07 (SW_SHOWMINNOACTIVE)
HotKey	0x00 (=0)

Investigate.Ink

Getting into the attacker's mindset

.LNK format is archaic and **full of surprises**


Goal

We want such surprises that help our goals:

- Creating trust
- Deception
- Stay under the radar

Means

- Unlikely combination of flags
- Unusual values
- Overflowing fields
- Mismatch



@Wietze
BLACK ALPS 2025



Example 1: Spoofed program

Displayed:

"your-invoice.pdf"

Executed:

c:\Windows\System32\calc.exe




Surprise: main target can be spoofed



Downside: arguments still visible

Optionally "obfuscate" with Right-to-Left (RTL) character



Example 1: Spoofed program

ShellLinkHeader

LinkFlags 0x00000221

HasLinkTargetIDList, HasExpString

LinkTargetIDList

C:\windows\system32\calc.exe

LinkInfo

StringData

*ExtraData

"your-invoice.pdf"

Example 1: Spoofed program

The image displays two side-by-side windows showing the properties of a file named "your-invoice.pdf". Both windows have the same title bar: "your-invoice Properties" and the same tabs: General, Shortcut, Digital Signatures, Security, Details, and Previous Versions.

Left Window (Normal File):

- Target:** "your-invoice.pdf"
- Start in:** [Empty field]
- Shortcut key:** None
- Run:** Minimised
- Comment:** [Empty field]

Right Window (Spoofed File):

- Target:** "your-invoice.pdf" /c ping 127.0.0.1
- Start in:** [Empty field]
- Shortcut key:** None
- Run:** Minimised
- Comment:** [Empty field]

Both windows include standard buttons at the bottom: Open File Location, Change Icon..., and Advanced... .



Recycle

Command Prompt

X + ▾

HAHA TRICKED YOU

```
Pinging 127.0.0.1 with 32 bytes of data:  
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128  
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128  
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128  
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128
```

Example 2: Hidden arguments

Displayed:


```
c:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
```

Executed:

```
c:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c echo  
HAHA TRICKED YOU; ping 127.0.0.1
```

🚀 **Surprise:** arguments can be hidden,
path can be disabled

🚧 **Downside:** main program still visible



Example 2: Hidden arguments

ShellLinkHeader

LinkFlags 0x00000221: HasLinkTargetIDList,
HasArguments, HasExpString

LinkTargetIDList

C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe

LinkInfo

StringData

/c HAHA TRICKED YOU; ping 127.0.0.1

*ExtraData

(null)

Example 2: Hidden arguments

The image shows two side-by-side Windows Properties dialog boxes. The left dialog is titled "Command Prompt Properties" and the right one is titled "Order-112353.pdf Properties". Both dialogs have tabs at the top: General, Shortcut, Digital Signatures, Security, Details, and Previous Versions. The "General" tab is selected for both.

Command Prompt Properties:

- Icon: Command Prompt
- Target type: c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
- Target location: system32
- Target: c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
- Start in: (empty)
- Shortcut key: None
- Run: Normal window
- Comment: (empty)
- Buttons: Open File Location, Change Icon..., Advanced...

Order-112353.pdf Properties:

- Icon: PDF file icon
- File name: Order-112353.pdf
- Target type: c:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
- Target location: system32
- Target: c:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
- Start in: (empty)
- Shortcut key: None
- Run: Normal window
- Comment: (empty)
- Buttons: Open File Location, Change Icon..., Advanced...



Recycle Bin



README



HTML Application



Hello audience! This is MSHTA.exe, I hope you are liking the talk so far

OK

Example 3: Spoofed program

Displayed:

```
c:\README.txt
```

Executed:

```
c:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe  
javascript:alert("Hello audience! ...")
```




Surprise: entire path can be spoofed



Side effect: .LNK is “updated”



Downside: double click required



Example 3: Spoofed program

ShellLinkHeader

LinkFlags 0x00000221: HasLinkTargetIDList,
HasLinkInfo, HasArguments, HasExpString

LinkTargetIDList

X:\

LinkInfo

C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe

StringData

javascript:alert("Hello conference!"); ...

*ExtraData

C:\README.txt

Example 3: Spoofed program

The image shows two side-by-side windows of the Windows File Explorer 'Properties' dialog for a file named 'README'. Both windows have the same title bar: 'README Properties'.

The tabs at the top of both windows are: General, Shortcut, Digital Signatures, Security, Details, and Previous Versions. The 'General' tab is selected in both.

Left Window (Original):

- Name:** README
- Target type:** File
- Target location:** C:\
- Target:** C:\README.txt
- Start in:** (empty)
- Shortcut key:** None
- Run:** Normal window
- Comment:** (empty)

Right Window (Spoofed):

- Name:** README
- Target type:** File
- Target location:** C:\
- Target:** w ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell');s.Run('calc');close()
- Start in:** (empty)
- Shortcut key:** None
- Run:** Normal window
- Comment:** (empty)



USB Drive



Rec

Hello from @Wietze!



Example 4: Spoof & Disable

Displayed:

F:\USB Drive

Executed:

```
powershell.exe /ec
```

```
SABlAGwAbABvACAAZgByAG8AbQAgAEAAVwBpAGL
```




Surprise: everything can be spoofed



Side effect: .LNK is “updated”



Downside: none?



Example 4: Spoof & Disable

ShellLinkHeader

LinkFlags 0x00000221: HasLinkTargetIDList,
HasArguments, HasExpString

LinkTargetIDList

C:\README.txt

LinkInfo

StringData


/c ping 127.0.0.1

***ExtraData**

%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe | (null)

wietze/lnk-it-up

LNK generator (*Python*)
Testing framework (*C*)



C:\Windows\System32\cmd.e

```
c:\temp>lnk-tester.exe Invoice-1215213.lnk -v
[+] created
[+] queried
[+] loaded
[+] resolved
[+] parsed
[+] provided target (length=27): [./this_is_very_innocent.pdf]
[+] expected target (length=27): [./this_is_very_innocent.pdf]
[+] resolved target (length=27): [C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe]
[!] WARNING: unexpected target resolution occurred
[+] arguments (length=24): [/c ping /n 100 127.0.0.1]
```

```
c:\temp>
```

Implications: Defence

- Don't take any .LNK at face value
- Beware of **frustrated forensics**
- **.LNK analysis tools can be fooled/broken**
They are not as resilient as Windows itself
- Opportunities to detect “suspicious” .LNK files
 - lnk-it-up/lnk-tester
 - YARA

Conclusions



.LNK files **remain** a **popular** target in the initial access toolset



Windows' resilient handling of .LNK files gives **scope for abuse**



Malicious .LNK use **will continue in the foreseeable future**

X @wietze

🦋 @wietzebeukema.nl

Ⓜ️ @wietze@infosec.exchange

in /in/wjbbeukema

Thank you