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Education

Harvard University

Ph.D., Business Economics, 2019 to 2025 (expected)

Victoria University of Wellington

Master of Commerce, Economics, 2016

Bachelor of Arts, Economics and Philosophy, 2015

Bachelor of Science, Mathematics, 2015

Fields

Labor economics; applied econometrics

References

Professor Jesse Shapiro
jshapiro@hbs.edu

Professor Zoe Cullen
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Professor Raj Chetty
chetty@opportunityinsights.org

Professor Lawrence Katz
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Fellowships & Awards

Graduate fellowship, James N. Bailey Fellowship Fund

Jan Whitwell Prize, New Zealand Association of Economists

Best political writer, Aotearoa Student Press Association

Sir Frank Holmes Prize, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research

Teaching

Designing Real-World Experiments to Improve Firm Decision-Making and Public Policy, Harvard College, teaching fellow for Professor Amanda Pallais, 2024

Mid-career MPA summer program, Harvard Kennedy School, Economics Instructor, 2023

Research Assistantships

Research assistant for professors Jesse Shapiro and Zoe Cullen, 2023

Predocutorial Fellow, Opportunity Insights, 2017–19

Research Analyst, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, 2016–17

Job Market Paper

How Restricting Migrants' Job Options Affects Both Migrants and Residents (with Corey Allan)

Governments often restrict migrants' job options. This paper shows that these restrictions can hurt not only migrants but also the existing residents whom they aim to protect. We study New Zealand's 'Essential Skills' work visa, which was New Zealand's main work visa between 2008 and 2022. Essential Skills migrants could only work for firms which could not find New Zealanders. Loosening restrictions for a single individual has no impact on their wages: migrants who win an unrestricted resident visa through a lottery switch jobs more frequently, but experience no gain in wages. However, when the restrictions were loosened for all migrants in an occupation, the wages of both migrants and residents typically grew. These results are consistent with a wage-posting model in which each firm pays migrants and residents equally; in such a model, the wage received by each worker will not depend directly on her own outside option but rather on the distribution of outside options among her colleagues. We estimate such a model, and compare

equilibrium wages to a counterfactual simulation in which migrants' job options are unrestricted. The Essential Skills job restrictions decreased migrants' average wage by 8%. While most residents were unaffected by the restrictions, 2.1% had their wage decreased by more than 2%. The restrictions also increased profits, especially among those firms which employed many migrants. The restrictions decreased annual welfare by \$292.m NZD — largely because they prevented migrants from moving to firms which they preferred for non-wage reasons

Working Papers *Job Matching without Price Discrimination* (with Jesse Silbert)

In many labor markets, firms do not price discriminate among their workers. In this paper, we study how a labor market with uniform salaries matches workers to jobs. To do so, we construct a job matching model in which each firm views workers as interchangeable and must pay all its workers the same salary. While an efficient stable outcome always exists, inefficient outcomes can be stable as well. Workers' preferred stable outcome is efficient. In contrast, firms prefer inefficient stable outcomes in which they pay lower salaries. Though a strategyproof mechanism that implements an efficient stable outcome can elicit how workers value employment, it cannot elicit firms' production technologies.

Papers in Progress *Why Some Workers Earn More Than Others* (with Jesse Silbert)

In this paper, we first document substantial earnings inequality between workers employed in the same narrow occupation. In the median occupation, roughly half of the variance in log earnings can be explained by a worker's hours of work, their age, their qualifications, their location and their firm; in every occupation, substantial *residual* inequality remains between observably similar workers. We then ask whether this residual wage inequality reflects variation in firms' willingness to pay for workers --- or whether it instead reflects variation in workers' bargaining power. We estimate firms' willingness to pay for long-term workers by asking how a firm's profits are affected by a worker's separation. Though firms have greater willingness to pay for better-paid workers, we find no relationship between *residual* wages and value-add. A 10% increase in residual wages is associated with at most a 1% increase in firms' willingness to pay. This result is inconsistent with wage-posting models, but corroborates models in which wages are negotiated between workers and firms.

Can Market Power Explain the Gender Wage Gap? (with Savannah Noray)

Women tend to earn less than men in the same occupation. Women also tend to work in lower-paying occupations. This paper presents a unified model of both the within-occupation and the between-occupation gender wage gaps. In a calibration exercise, employers' market power explains 90% of the within-occupation wage gap and all of the between-occupation wage gap.

Publications *Social Capital I: Measurement and Associations with Economic Mobility* (with Raj Chetty, Matthew O. Jackson, Theresa Kuchler, Johannes Stroebe et al.), *Nature*, 608(7921), 2022.

Social Capital II: Determinants of Economic Connectedness (with Raj Chetty, Matthew O. Jackson, Theresa Kuchler, Johannes Stroebe et al.), *Nature*, 608(7921), 2022.

Earnings Dynamics and Measurement Error in Matched Survey and Administrative Data (with Dean Hyslop), *Journal of Business & Economics Statistics*, 138(2), 2020.

Joint Culpability: The Impact of Medical Marijuana Laws on Crime (with Luke Chu), *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 159, 2019.

Effects of (Ultra-Fast) Fibre Broadband on Student Achievement (with Arthur Grimes), *Information Economics and Policy*, 44, 2018.

Ethnic and Economic Determinants of Migrant Location Choice (with Arthur Grimes and Cindy Smart), in *New Frontiers in Inter-Regional Migration Research* (eds.: Biagi, B., Faggian, A. & Rajbhandari, I), 2018.

The Longer Term Impacts of Job Displacement on Labour Market Outcomes (with Dean Hyslop), *The Australian Economic Review*, 2018.

Employment Misclassification in Survey and Administrative Reports (with Dean Hyslop), *Economics Letters*, 155, 2017.

Academic Service Referee, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*
Organizer, Harvard Graduate Student Workshop in Labor Economics and Public Economics

Research Grants Graduate research grant, Michael S. Chae Macroeconomic Policy Fund
Graduate Sabbatical Grant, Institute for Humane Studies