[ELY-2147] Harden ScramServer against timing attacks #1549
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Hello, Syquel. I'm waiting for one of the admins to verify this patch with /ok-to-test in a comment. |
fjuma
approved these changes
Jul 13, 2021
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Thanks for the PR, @Syquel. |
Skyllarr
approved these changes
Jul 14, 2021
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Currently org.wildfly.security.mechanism.scram.ScramServer uses simple byte comparison to verify the message nonce and client proof.
Simple byte comparison returns on the first mismatch and is therefore susceptible to timing attacks.
MessageDigest#isEqual(byte[],byte[]) should be used to compare message nonces and client proofs in constant time.