


Ransomware

Liu hai and Ryan

How Does Ransomware Work?



Ransomware Example



WARNING!

Your personal files are encrypted!

11:58:26

Your documents, photos, databases and other important files have been encrypted with strongest encryption and unique key, generated for this computer. Private decryption key is stored on a secret Internet server and nobody can decrypt your files until you pay and obtain the private key. The server will eliminate the key after a time period specified in this window.

Open <http://maktubuyatq4rfyo.onion.link>

or <http://maktubuyatq4rfyo.torstorm.org>

or <http://maktubuyatq4rfyo.tor2web.org>

What is Ransomware Detection?

Ransomware detection notifies user(s) when:

1. Ransomware is present on their system
2. Their files are already being encrypted,
3. Guides users through recovery steps in the event of Ransomware

These methods can be implemented through tools like

1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
2. Endpoint Detection
3. Response (EDR) solutions
4. Threat intelligence platforms

How to Detect Ransomware?

Signature Based Detection


Behavior Based Detection

Traffic Based Detection

Signature Based Detection

An attack signature can be generated based on characteristics of the payload
Compares known signature against files or network traffic


Detection tool: Corelight or Fidelis Network




Behavior Based Detection

Identifying suspicious patterns of activity rather than relying on known malware signatures

Detection tool: Cynet360 or CrowdStrike Falcon



Traffic Based Detection



Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns and behaviors that might indicate a ransomware attack

Detection tool: Corelight Suricata

Suricata IDS on Corelight

EveBox [Inbox](#) [Escalated](#) [Alerts](#) [Events](#) ▾ [Reports](#) ▾

All Help 0

Refresh Select All Filter... Apply Clear

Showing 1-16 of 16.

Newest Newer Older Oldest ▾

#	Timestamp ▾	Source / Dest	Signature	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 2 2021-05-28 10:31:12	S: 64.235.158.26	ET POLICY Signed TLS Certificate with md5WithRSAEncryption ts	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:31:11	S: 10.16.1.11	ET INFO DYNAMIC_DNS Query to a Suspicious no-ip Domain dns	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:31:11	S: 10.16.1.11	ET DNS Query for .su TLD (Soviet Union) Often Malware Related dns	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:31:11	S: 8.8.8.8	ET DNS Reply Sinkhole - sinkhole.cert.pl 148.81.111.111 dns	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:31:11	S: 10.16.1.11	ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 4 2021-05-28 10:30:59	S: 10.16.1.11	ET POLICY curl User-Agent Outbound http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:59	S: 54.192.58.109	ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:59	S: 54.192.58.109	ET INFO Packed Executable Download http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:59	S: 54.192.58.109	ET POLICY Executable served from Amazon S3 http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:58	S: 178.17.174.32	ET TOR Known Tor Relay/Router (Not Exit) Node Traffic group 234	Archive	⋮
▶	■ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:54	S: 85.214.18.225	ET TOR Known Tor Relay/Router (Not Exit) Node Traffic group 740	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:49	S: 10.16.1.11	ET MALWARE Cryptowall .onion Proxy Domain dns	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:49	S: 10.16.1.11	ET POLICY DNS Query for TOR Hidden Domain .onion Accessible Via TOR dns	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:49	S: 10.16.1.11	ET MALWARE Delphi Trojan Downloader User-Agent (JEDI-VCL) http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:49	S: 10.16.1.11	ET USER_AGENTS Suspicious User-Agent (HttpDownload) http	Archive	⋮
■	☆ 1 2021-05-28 10:30:49	S: 10.16.1.11	ET USER_AGENTS Suspicious User Agent (BlackSun) http	Archive	⋮



Cynet

Analyzing Ransomware

Unusual Outbound Traffic

Sudden spikes in data leaving network

Unusual C2 (command and control) server communications

Connections to Malicious or Blacklisted Domains

Contact occurs with a known ransomware infrastructure

Suspicious SMB and RDP activity



Increased file sharing or remote desktop use

Lateral Movements within network

Rapid File Rename or Encryption Events

Bulk renaming/encrypting over SMB

Case Study: Ryuk



Challenges in Detection

Larger attack surface with today's networks




Difficulty distinguishing malicious vs. normal file access at scale



Low user awareness leading to phishing



Rise of Ransomware as a Service (RAAS)




Future Trends

AI and ML models for **detecting abnormal patterns** and **faster automated forensic analysis tools**

Improved **threat intelligence sharing between organizations**

Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) will make attacks more frequent and harder to track





QUESTIONS?