

Security Architecture

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Architecture Diagrams

Document Version: 1.0 **Last Updated:** 2025-10-26 **Status:** WARNING: NOT IMPLEMENTED - Planning Only
(Phase 6+) **Priority:** CRITICAL - Required for FDA submission and HIPAA compliance

WARNING: IMPORTANT NOTICE - ENCRYPTION NOT IMPLEMENTED

Current Status (Phase 5): This document describes the **PLANNED** security architecture.

NO ENCRYPTION IS CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED in this version of TOSCA.

- [FAILED] Database is **NOT encrypted** (plaintext SQLite)
- [FAILED] Video files are **NOT encrypted** (plaintext MP4)
- [FAILED] Configuration files are **NOT encrypted**
- [FAILED] Audit trail signatures **NOT implemented** (no HMAC)
- [FAILED] User authentication **NOT implemented**

Implementation Target: Phase 6 (before clinical testing)

This document serves as: - Design specification for future implementation - FDA submission documentation (planned features) - Architecture review for security requirements

DO NOT use current version for: - Clinical trials (encryption required) - Production deployment (HIPAA violation) - PHI/PII storage (unencrypted data)

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Overview

Purpose

This document defines the security architecture for the TOSCA Medical Laser Control System, including encryption strategy, key management, access control, and audit trail integrity.

Classification: Medical Device - FDA Class II/III (TBD)

Compliance Requirements: - **FDA 21 CFR Part 11:** Electronic records and signatures - **HIPAA:** Protected Health Information (PHI) safeguards - **IEC 62304:** Medical device software lifecycle (Enhanced Documentation Level) - **IEC 60601-1:** Medical electrical equipment safety

Security Objectives

1. **Confidentiality:** Protect patient data from unauthorized access
 2. **Integrity:** Prevent tampering with treatment records and audit trails
 3. **Availability:** Ensure system availability for authorized users
 4. **Accountability:** Maintain complete audit trail of all actions
 5. **Non-repudiation:** Prevent denial of treatment actions
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Regulatory Requirements

FDA 21 CFR Part 11

Electronic Records Requirements:

1. **Validation of Systems** (§11.10(a))
 - System validation documentation
 - Security controls validation
 - Encryption implementation testing
2. **Ability to Generate Accurate and Complete Copies** (§11.10(b))
 - Encrypted data must be exportable in human-readable form
 - Complete audit trail export capability
3. **Protection of Records** (§11.10(c))
 - Records protected from unauthorized access
 - Encryption of data at rest
 - Access control mechanisms
4. **Audit Trail** (§11.10(e))
 - Secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trail
 - Protection from modification or deletion
 - HMAC signatures for integrity verification
5. **Device Checks** (§11.10(h))
 - Validation of authority of individuals
 - Checks to ensure only authorized individuals can use/access the system

HIPAA Security Rule

Administrative Safeguards: - Access control (§164.308(a)(4)) - Security awareness and training (§164.308(a)(5)) - Security incident procedures (§164.308(a)(6))

Physical Safeguards: - Workstation use (§164.310(b)) - Workstation security (§164.310(c)) - Device and media controls (§164.310(d))

Technical Safeguards: - Access control (§164.312(a)) - **ENCRYPTION REQUIRED** - Audit controls (§164.312(b)) - Integrity controls (§164.312(c)) - Transmission security (§164.312(e))

Protected Health Information (PHI) in TOSCA: - Patient identifiers (name, ID, DOB, gender) - Treatment parameters and outcomes - Session recordings (video files) - Operator notes and assessments

Encryption Strategy

Data Classification

Data Type	Classification	Encryption Required	Integrity Required
Patient identifiers	PHI	[DONE] AES-256	[DONE] HMAC
Treatment parameters	PHI	[DONE] AES-256	[DONE] HMAC
Session video recordings	PHI	[DONE] AES-256	[FAILED] (file integrity)
Audit trail events	Critical	[DONE] AES-256	[DONE] HMAC
System configuration	Sensitive	[DONE] AES-256	[DONE] HMAC
Calibration data	Sensitive	[DONE] AES-256	[DONE] HMAC
User credentials	Critical	[DONE] Argon2id	[DONE] HMAC
Temporary logs	Low	[FAILED]	[FAILED]

Database Encryption

Scope: SQLite database file containing all patient data and treatment records

Method: SQLCipher (AES-256-CBC encryption for SQLite)

Implementation:

```
# Example: SQLCipher integration
import sqlcipher3 as sqlite3

# Open encrypted database
conn = sqlite3.connect('treatment_data.db')
conn.execute(f"PRAGMA key = '{derived_key}'")
conn.execute("PRAGMA cipher_compatibility = 4") # Latest version
```

Benefits: - [DONE] Transparent encryption (no schema changes) - [DONE] Industry-standard AES-256 - [DONE] FIPS 140-2 compliant (when using OpenSSL FIPS module) - [DONE] Page-level encryption (entire database encrypted)

Key Derivation:

```
# PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 for key derivation
import hashlib
import secrets

def derive_database_key(master_password: str, salt: bytes, iterations: int = 100000) -> bytes:
    """Derive AES-256 key from master password"""
    return hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
        'sha256',
        master_password.encode('utf-8'),
        salt,
        iterations,
        dklen=32 # 256 bits
    )
```

Salt Storage: Stored in separate configuration file (not in database)

Video File Encryption

Scope: Session recordings (MP4 files containing treatment video)

Method: AES-256-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode for authenticated encryption)

Implementation:

```
# Example: Video file encryption using cryptography library
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
import os

def encrypt_video_file(input_path: str, output_path: str, key: bytes) -> None:
    """Encrypt video file with AES-256-GCM"""
    aesgcm = AESGCM(key) # 32-byte key for AES-256
    nonce = os.urandom(12) # 96-bit nonce

    with open(input_path, 'rb') as f:
        plaintext = f.read()

    ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext, None)

    # Write nonce + ciphertext to output file
    with open(output_path, 'wb') as f:
        f.write(nonce)
        f.write(ciphertext)
```

File Format:

[12-byte nonce][encrypted video data with 16-byte authentication tag]

Benefits: - [DONE] Authenticated encryption (prevents tampering) - [DONE] Built-in integrity verification - [DONE] No padding oracle vulnerabilities (GCM mode)

Configuration File Encryption

Scope: System configuration, calibration data, user credentials

Method: Fernet (symmetric encryption with timestamp)

Implementation:

```
# Example: Configuration encryption using Fernet
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet

# Generate key (one-time, store securely)
key = Fernet.generate_key()
f = Fernet(key)

# Encrypt configuration
config_data = json.dumps(config_dict).encode('utf-8')
encrypted_config = f.encrypt(config_data)

# Decrypt configuration
decrypted_config = f.decrypt(encrypted_config)
config_dict = json.loads(decrypted_config.decode('utf-8'))
```

Benefits: - [DONE] Built-in timestamp (prevents replay attacks) - [DONE] HMAC signature (integrity verification) - [DONE] AES-128-CBC under the hood - [DONE] Simple API (less prone to misuse)

Key Management

Master Key Architecture

Two-Tier Key System:

1. **Master Password:** User-provided passphrase (min 16 characters)
2. **Derived Keys:** Cryptographically derived from master password

```
1. **Master Password (user input)**
2. **PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256    Database Encryption Key (32 bytes)**
3. **PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256    Video Encryption Key (32 bytes)**
4. **PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256    Config Encryption Key (32 bytes)**
```

Key Storage

Security Requirements:

1. NEVER hardcode keys in source code
2. NEVER store master password in plaintext
3. NEVER log encryption keys

Recommended Storage Locations:

Key Type	Storage Location	Protection Method
Master password	User memory only	N/A (never stored)
Salt values	config/security.json	Read-only file permissions
Derived keys	Memory only (runtime)	Zeroed on exit
Key derivation params	config/security.json	Read-only file permissions

Example Security Configuration File:

```
{
  "version": "1.0",
  "database": {
    "salt": "base64_encoded_salt",
    "iterations": 100000,
    "algorithm": "PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256"
```

```

},
"video": {
  "salt": "base64_encoded_salt",
  "iterations": 100000,
  "algorithm": "PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256"
},
"config": {
  "salt": "base64_encoded_salt",
  "iterations": 100000,
  "algorithm": "PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256"
}
}

```

Key Rotation Strategy

Database Key Rotation: Not supported by SQLCipher (requires re-encryption)

Video Key Rotation: New key for each session (unique per recording)

Config Key Rotation: Manual rotation on password change

Rotation Triggers: - Suspected compromise - Employee departure - Annual security review - Password change

Access Control

User Authentication

Planned Implementation: Username + Password (Phase 6)

Future Enhancement: Hardware token or biometric (Phase 7+)

Password Requirements: - Minimum 16 characters - Must include uppercase, lowercase, number, special character - Cannot reuse last 5 passwords - Expires after 90 days (configurable)

Password Hashing:

```

# Use Argon2id (winner of Password Hashing Competition)
import argon2

ph = argon2.PasswordHasher(
    time_cost=3,          # Number of iterations
    memory_cost=65536,    # 64 MB memory
    parallelism=4,        # 4 parallel threads
    hash_len=32,          # 256-bit hash
    salt_len=16           # 128-bit salt
)

# Hash password
hash = ph.hash(password)

# Verify password
try:
    ph.verify(hash, password)
    # Authentication successful
except argon2.exceptions.VerifyMismatchError:
    # Authentication failed

```

Role-Based Access Control (Future)

Planned Roles:

Role	Permissions	Encryption Key Access
Operator	Perform treatments [DONE] (full access)	

Administrator	Configure system	[DONE] (full access)
Auditor	View audit logs	[DONE] (read-only)
Technician	Calibration only	[FAILED] (no PHI access)

Audit Trail Integrity

HMAC Signatures

Purpose: Prevent tampering with audit trail records

Method: HMAC-SHA256 signatures for each audit event

Implementation:

```
import hmac
import hashlib

def sign_audit_event(event_data: dict, secret_key: bytes) -> str:
    """Generate HMAC signature for audit event"""
    # Serialize event to canonical form
    canonical = json.dumps(event_data, sort_keys=True)

    # Generate HMAC signature
    signature = hmac.new(
        secret_key,
        canonical.encode('utf-8'),
        hashlib.sha256
    ).hexdigest()

    return signature

def verify_audit_event(event_data: dict, signature: str, secret_key: bytes) -> bool:
    """Verify HMAC signature for audit event"""
    expected_signature = sign_audit_event(event_data, secret_key)
    return hmac.compare_digest(expected_signature, signature)
```

Database Schema Enhancement

Add signature column to treatment_events table:

```
ALTER TABLE treatment_events ADD COLUMN signature TEXT;
```

Signing Process: 1. Generate canonical JSON representation of event 2. Compute HMAC-SHA256 signature using audit key 3. Store signature in signature column 4. On verification, recompute signature and compare

Benefits: - [DONE] Tamper-evident audit trail (required by FDA 21 CFR Part 11) - [DONE] Cryptographic proof of integrity - [DONE] Detect unauthorized modifications

Implementation Roadmap

Phase 1: Foundation (Before Phase 6)

Priority: CRITICAL

Tasks: 1. [DONE] Document security architecture (this file) 2. [PENDING] Select cryptography library (cryptography + argon2-cffi + sqlcipher3) 3. [PENDING] Implement key derivation functions 4. [PENDING] Create secure configuration file format 5. [PENDING] Add dependencies to requirements.txt

Dependencies:

```
# requirements.txt additions
```

```
cryptography>=41.0.0      # AES-GCM, Fernet, key derivation
argon2-cffi>=23.1.0       # Password hashing
sqlcipher3>=0.5.0        # SQLite encryption
```

Phase 2: Database Encryption (Before Clinical Testing)

Priority: CRITICAL

Tasks: 1. [PENDING] Integrate SQLCipher for database encryption 2. [PENDING] Implement key derivation from master password 3. [PENDING] Update DatabaseManager to use encrypted database 4. [PENDING] Add database encryption tests 5. [PENDING] Document key management procedures

Testing: - Verify encrypted database cannot be opened without key - Test key derivation with various passwords - Validate FIPS 140-2 compliance (if required)

Phase 3: Video Encryption (Before Clinical Testing)

Priority: HIGH

Tasks: 1. [PENDING] Implement AES-256-GCM video encryption 2. [PENDING] Update RecordingManager to encrypt videos on save 3. [PENDING] Add video decryption for playback 4. [PENDING] Test large file encryption performance 5. [PENDING] Validate authenticated encryption

Testing: - Encrypt/decrypt 1 GB video files (performance) - Verify tampering detection (authentication tag) - Test edge cases (corrupted files, wrong key)

Phase 4: Audit Trail Integrity (Before FDA Submission)

Priority: HIGH

Tasks: 1. [PENDING] Implement HMAC-SHA256 signing for audit events 2. [PENDING] Update database schema (add signature column) 3. [PENDING] Add signature verification on audit export 4. [PENDING] Create audit integrity validation tool 5. [PENDING] Document signature verification procedures

Testing: - Verify all audit events are signed - Test tamper detection (modify event, verify fails) - Validate signature chain integrity

Phase 5: Access Control (Phase 6+)

Priority: MEDIUM

Tasks: 1. [PENDING] Implement user authentication system 2. [PENDING] Add Argon2id password hashing 3. [PENDING] Create user management interface 4. [PENDING] Implement password policy enforcement 5. [PENDING] Add session management

Testing: - Brute-force resistance testing - Password policy validation - Session timeout testing

Testing & Validation

Security Testing Requirements

Unit Tests: - [DONE] Key derivation (various passwords, salts) - [DONE] Encryption/decryption round-trip (database, video, config) - [DONE] HMAC signature generation/verification - [DONE] Password hashing (Argon2id)

Integration Tests: - [DONE] Encrypted database operations (CRUD) - [DONE] Video recording with encryption - [DONE] Audit event signing during treatment - [DONE] Key management workflows

Security Tests: - [DONE] Tamper detection (modify encrypted data) - [DONE] Wrong key handling (graceful failure) - [DONE] Brute-force resistance (password hashing) - [DONE] Memory safety (key zeroing on exit)

Compliance Validation: - [DONE] FDA 21 CFR Part 11 compliance checklist - [DONE] HIPAA Security Rule compliance checklist - [DONE] IEC 62304 security requirements

Penetration Testing

Recommended Before Clinical Deployment:

1. **Static Analysis:**
 - Bandit (Python security linter)
 - Safety (dependency vulnerability scanner)
 2. **Dynamic Analysis:**
 - Attempt to extract data without key
 - Modify audit trail (should fail verification)
 - SQL injection testing (prepared statements)
 3. **Third-Party Audit:**
 - HIPAA security assessment
 - FDA pre-submission security review
 - Independent penetration testing
-

Security Best Practices

Development Guidelines

1. **Never log sensitive data** (passwords, keys, PHI)
2. **Use parameterized queries** (prevent SQL injection)
3. **Zero keys in memory** after use (prevent memory dumps)
4. **Validate all inputs** (prevent injection attacks)
5. **Use secure random** (secrets module, not random)
6. **Keep dependencies updated** (security patches)

Operational Guidelines

1. **Restrict file permissions** (database, config files)
 2. **Regular security audits** (quarterly recommended)
 3. **Incident response plan** (documented procedures)
 4. **Security training** (all operators and administrators)
 5. **Backup encryption keys** (secure off-site storage)
-

References

Standards & Regulations

- **FDA 21 CFR Part 11:** Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures
- **HIPAA Security Rule:** 45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C
- **IEC 62304:** Medical device software - Software life cycle processes
- **IEC 60601-1:** Medical electrical equipment - General requirements for basic safety
- **NIST SP 800-57:** Recommendation for Key Management
- **NIST SP 800-132:** Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation

Cryptography Resources

- **OWASP Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet**
- **NIST FIPS 197:** Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- **NIST FIPS 180-4:** Secure Hash Standard (SHA-256)
- **RFC 5869:** HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
- **RFC 9106:** Argon2 Memory-Hard Function

Libraries

- **cryptography:** <https://cryptography.io/>
 - **argon2-cffi:** <https://argon2-cffi.readthedocs.io/>
 - **SQLCipher:** <https://www.zetetic.net/sqlcipher/>
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implementation **Status:** Planning complete - Ready for implementation