

MULTINATIONALS, MONOPSONY, AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY

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This paper studies the role of private sector companies in the development of local amenities. We use evidence from one of the largest multinationals of the 20th century: the United Fruit Company (UFCo). The firm was given a large land concession in Costa Rica—one of the so-called “Banana Republics”—from 1899 to 1984. Using administrative census data with census-block geo-references from 1973 to 2011, we implement a geographic regression discontinuity design that exploits a land assignment that is orthogonal to our outcomes of interest. We find that the firm had a positive and persistent effect on living standards. Company documents explain that a key concern at the time was to attract and maintain a sizable workforce, which induced the firm to invest heavily in local amenities—like the development of education and health infrastructure—that can account for our result. Consistent with this mechanism, we show, empirically and through a proposed model, that the firm’s investment efforts increase with worker mobility.

KEYWORDS: Long-run development, monopsony power, local amenities.

1. INTRODUCTION

NOWADAYS, we take it for granted that public goods, such as education and health infrastructure, are to be provided by the government. In fact, historically, what are now high-income countries once relied on private sector companies as providers of these services. For instance, large corporations such as Unilever built villages with schools and hospitals in rural England to keep a stable workforce during the 19th century (Watkins and Dalton (2019)). This paper sheds light on these dynamics as a novel dimension of structural change; workers moved not just from agriculture to industry, but also from family farms to large corporations. For the latter to occur, a large group of workers had to be attracted to the same location. We provide detailed historical evidence on the methods that corporations use to make sure that this happens, and on key determinants of the short- and long-run effects of a large private investment project on local economic development. We also explore the role of monopsony power and of the spatial structure of the labor market in determining the direction and persistence of these effects.

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The study uses evidence from one of the largest multinationals of the 20th century: the United Fruit Company (UFCo), the infamous firm hosted by the so-called “Banana Republics.” This American firm was given a large land concession in Costa Rica, and was the only employer in this region—where it required workers to live—from 1899 to 1984. In this sense, the firm appeared to function as a *local* monopsonist.¹ The concession had a well-defined boundary, and we identify a segment of this boundary that was redrawn, and leads to variation that is orthogonal to our outcomes of interest.² This variation, along with detailed census microdata geo-referenced at the census-block level, allows us to use a geographic regression discontinuity design (RD) to identify the effect of being under the company’s *direct* influence. Specifically, we compare units located within a close distance from, but on different sides of, the UFCo boundary. Our data spans over a decade before the company stops operating, and almost three decades after its closure (1973–2011), which allows us to document how the UFCo’s local impact evolves.

We find that households living within the former UFCo regions have had better economic outcomes (housing, health and sanitation, education, and consumption capacity), and were 33% less likely to be poor than households living outside. This effect is persistent over time: Since 1973 the treated and untreated regions have converged slowly, with only 59% of the income gap closing over the following four decades.³

The results along this redrawn boundary segment are consistent with findings of an RD using the entirety of the concession’s border. In fact, we run the RD along the UFCo’s entire boundary at many different distances from the border.⁴ The results are very similar—and often statistically equal—to those of our main specification where land was randomly allocated, and which is more restricted and well-identified.

Historical data, collected and hand-digitized from primary sources, suggests that investments in local amenities carried out by the UFCo—hospitals, schools, roads—are the main drivers of our results. For instance, we document that investments per student and per patient in UFCo-operated schools and hospitals were significantly larger than in local schools and hospitals run by the government, and sometimes even twice as large. Access to these investments was restricted, for the most part, to UFCo workers who were required to live within the plantation. This might explain the sharp discontinuity in outcomes right at the boundary. We do not find evidence of other channels, such as selective migration or negative spillovers on the control region (just outside the UFCo), being the main mechanisms behind our results. In fact, our analysis—using census microdata dating as far back as 1927—suggests that migrants to the UFCo were consistently *negatively* selected.⁵

Why were these investments in local amenities higher than in the rest of the country? While the company might have invested in hospitals to have healthier workers, it is less clear why it would incur in other investments such as schooling. Evidence from

¹This concession’s extension was 455,800 hectares (ha), approximately 9% of the national territory. For reference, since 2000, over 30 land acquisitions by transnational companies in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America have been *larger* than the UFCo’s concession in Costa Rica, accounting for over 26 million ha (Cotula and Vermeulen (2009)).

²This segment of the boundary was redrawn in 1904 depending on natural landmarks, and led to a border with balanced geographic attributes and uncorrelated with *ex ante* determinants of growth.

³Robustness checks include: a falsification test, in which we draw placebo borders and rerun our analysis; estimations using different bandwidths and considering different subsamples of the population, such as only nonmigrants; and estimations using the entire boundary, among others.

⁴We run the RD regression with bandwidths ranging from 5 km up to spanning the entire interior of the UFCo region (20 km on each side of the border). These 61 regressions per outcome—each with a bandwidth 250 m larger on each side than the previous one—are plotted in Figures 3 and 4.

⁵These and other alternative mechanisms are discussed in depth in Section 5.2.

archival company annual reports suggests that these investments were induced by the need to attract and maintain a sizable workforce, given the initially high levels of worker turnover.⁶ For instance, a 1922 Annual Report highlights the constant overturn of labor and describes that “[the workers’] migratory habits do not permit them to remain on one plantation from year to year, but *as soon as they become physically efficient and acquire a little money they either return to their homes or migrate elsewhere and must be replaced by new laborers* [emphasis added]” (UFCo (1923, p. 74)). As a solution to retain workers, the UFCo increased its investments in local amenities beyond medical measures. A 1925 Annual Report pointed out that “an endeavor should be made to stabilize the population. . . . We must not only build and maintain attractive and comfortable camps, but we must also provide measures for taking care of the families of married men, by furnishing them with *garden facilities, schools and some forms of entertainment. In other words, we must take an interest in our people if we may hope to retain their services indefinitely* [emphasis added]” (UFCo (1926, p. 185)).

Quantitative evidence is consistent with the qualitative evidence from the company reports. Empirically, there is a causal relationship between the intensity of UFCo’s investments in a location and the degree of competition for labor faced by the company. Using suitability to grow coffee (the main outside option for agricultural workers at the time) to instrument for wages, we find that locations where workers had higher outside options in 1973 also experienced more investment in amenities while the UFCo operated, and higher living standards in 2000 and 2011. This is true after controlling for outside options in 2000 and 2011. For instance, a 1% increase in the average outside option of an UFCo region in 1973 is associated with a 3.7% decrease in the number of children per school in this region, and with a 0.72% lower likelihood of households being poor in this location in 2000 and 2011. Moreover, we document that during periods when world coffee prices were higher, the UFCo invested more in amenities; for instance, a 1% increase in coffee prices is associated with 0.4 percentage points higher probability that the UFCo opened a school within its lands. We also find that expenditures in medical care, education, and total amenities are positively correlated with world coffee prices, and that the correlation between coffee prices and expenditures in amenities as a share of total worker compensation is 0.9. This aligns with the idea that it is competition with coffee that explains why UFCo provides schooling and amenities rather than higher wages.

Guided by these results, we build a model to have a better understanding of how the company’s welfare effect changes in scenarios with less worker mobility or with a more competitive labor market. To incorporate the investment patterns that we documented empirically, we assume that the local monopsonist can choose workers’ compensation bundle: a combination of wages and local amenities. We find that despite its market power, the firm’s presence can be beneficial for the country unless labor mobility is too low. The intuition behind this result is that, if workers are less mobile, their outside option decreases, and the company can reduce their compensation. In the extreme case of immobile workers, the company could potentially not pay for the labor input, thereby negatively affecting worker’s welfare.⁷

The evidence on the key role played by labor mobility and outside options allows us to reconcile our results with findings from a growing body of literature that analyzes the long-run impact of colonial and historical institutions on economic development. Most prior

⁶High turnover was a result of the workers’ main outside option: coffee. Unlike bananas, coffee is a seasonal crop, and workers could earn relatively high wages during the coffee harvesting season.

⁷This extreme case with immobile workers is historically relevant, as colonial and quasi-colonial arrangements featuring large firms often had high levels of labor coercion.

literature has considered settings in which labor was coerced and relatively immobile, such as the slave trade (Nunn (2008)), the *mita* system in Peru (Dell (2010)), forced coffee cultivation in Puerto Rico (Bobonis and Morrow (2014)), forced rubber cultivation in what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lowe and Montero (2021a)), or the Dutch Cultivation System (Dell and Olken (2019)). This literature consistently finds that companies tend to underprovide public goods within their concessions and that exposure to these regimes can lead to negative and persistent effects on development.⁸ We thereby complement these studies by shedding light on the importance of workers' outside options in determining the direction of this effect, and the incentives of a private firm to invest in infrastructure.

Our work also contributes to the literature on the consequences of firms exercising market power. We document how local monopsony power affects a firm's incentive to invest in local amenities, and consider a compensation that does not focus only on wages as in Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) and Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2020). Further, we study long-run outcomes and how persistent the effects of such an arrangement can be.

Moreover, our findings relate to the literature on structural transformation.⁹ We provide evidence on how the competing demands for labor and the seasonality of agriculture make it difficult for an industry to have a stable labor force. The former is related to work by Khandker and Mahmud (2012) and Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014), and it sheds light on an advantage of monopsony power in this setting, as it allows the firm to internalize the benefits of making the workforce stable through the provision of local amenities, while firms in a competitive market would not find that individually optimal.

Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the effects and spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI). Our paper contributes to this literature by providing micro-evidence of the local benefits of large-scale FDI through private investments in the development of education and health infrastructure. Empirical studies on the effects of FDI have produced mixed evidence. While some studies find evidence of FDI being beneficial using macro and microdata (e.g., Blomström (1986), Blomström and Wolff (1994), Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), Lipsey (2006), Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010), Alfaro-Ureña, Manelici, and Vasquez (2022)), others are not so optimistic about these benefits, especially for developing countries (e.g., Aitken and Harrison (1999), Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Xu (2000), Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2003), Alfaro and Charlton (2013)). We show how in a context with high labor mobility, FDI can lead to investments in local infrastructure and amenities due to the need to compete for labor.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the historical background. Section 3 includes details of the data used in our analysis. We describe our estimation framework and empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms behind our findings, both empirically and structurally, and Section 6 concludes.

⁸An exception being Dell and Olken (2019), who find that villages forced to grow sugar cane have better long-run outcomes as a result of sugar factories and industrial structures promoting economic activity, with locations close to former factories in the mid-19th century being more industrialized today.

⁹See Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014) for a survey of the literature on structural transformation.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. *Historical Overview*

The history of banana plantations in Costa Rica dates back to the construction of a railroad from the capital city to the Caribbean Coast. In 1884, in exchange for completing the railroad, the government gave Minor C. Keith—an American contractor—a large concession of undeveloped land, which was virtually unpopulated at the time.¹⁰ After completing the railroad's construction, Keith experimented with exporting the bananas he had planted along the railroad tracks to feed workers (Bucheli (2005)). The experiment was successful, and the UFCo was founded in 1899.

With its headquarters in Boston, the company eventually had operations in Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Panama (May and Plaza (1958)). According to the UFCo's Annual Reports to the Shareholders, by 1930, the company landholdings in Latin America reached 1,333,912 ha.

The UFCo transformed the acquired lowlands into plantations and towns, where it provided healthcare, housing, schooling, and sanitation to its workers and their families. The UFCo also invested in infrastructure, such as wireless communication systems to coordinate the whole production process, and railroads to carry the bananas from the plantations to the ports where the bananas were shipped to the United States and Europe in company vessels. However, the firm was also infamous for its extractive practices in many of the “Banana Republics” where it operated. In fact, the UFCo was one of the most controversial multinationals in history, and inspired an extensive body of literature, including several fiction masterpieces.¹¹

In Costa Rica, the UFCo significantly transformed the local economy. The UFCo's landholdings in the country represented roughly 8.92% of the national territory (as shown in Figure 1). By 1950, it was responsible for 58% of the country's total exports. Moreover, the UFCo employed approximately 7% of the country's total labor force and 12% of its agricultural labor force, on average, throughout its tenure.

In 1984, the UFCo began a general corporate strategy to stabilize profits that divested in the production process to focus on marketing. The corporate strategy was the consequence of challenges faced by the UFCo during the 1970s, which caused severe losses. These challenges included an export tax on bananas levied by a cartel formed by the host countries, the Hurricane Fifi that destroyed 70% of the company's plantations in Honduras, and scandals of corruption that significantly affected the firm's stock price. As a consequence, the UFCo abandoned banana production in Costa Rica. More historical details are discussed in Appendix A.

¹⁰This was the case for most Costa Rican rural areas at the time, as the expansion of the agricultural frontier outside of the Central Valley began in the late 19th century (León Sáenz (2012)).

¹¹Some examples of novels inspired by the UFCo are: “Mamita Yunai” by Carlos Luis Fallas, the “Banana Republic Trilogy” (“Strong Wind,” “Green Pope,” and “The Eyes of the Interred”) by Miguel Ángel Asturias, and “One Hundred Years of Solitude” by Gabriel García Márquez. In terms of nonfiction and academic work, virtually all studies that rely on quantitative data consider the impact of the UFCo at the aggregate level, analyzing national or local trends in productivity, land use, and export levels (e.g., Casey (1979), Ellis (1983), Viales Hurtado (1998), Royo Aspa (2009)). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first analysis of the legacy of the UFCo using microeconomic data to estimate the firm's causal impact.

2.2. Land Assignment

Understanding why some land was assigned to the company is key in identifying its long-run impact. It is documented that the firm took into consideration geographic characteristics when negotiating which areas were going to be part of their land concession (Casey (1979), Cerdas Albertazzi (1993)). Thus, it is not surprising that geographical features change discretely along many segments of the UFCo boundary, as shown in Figure 1.

One approach followed by the literature on geographic RDs, starting with Dell (2010), would be to focus on boundary segments where geographic characteristics balance. This, however, could be contaminated by unobservable characteristics that might be changing at the boundary. That is, if the land was the same quality on both sides of the border, why the UFCo did not use it as well? Thus, we focus on a border segment where the land assignment was as good as random. Initially, due to ambiguities in the concession's contract, the UFCo and the government had some discrepancies regarding the limits of the concession. In 1904, a legislative decree resolved these differences. The modification declared some land—that the UFCo considered as part of the original concessions—as state property. Officially, this area was called Astúa-Pirie (Soley Güell (1940)), and the decree specified that the property rights over these lands could not be sold back to the company (Viales Hurtado (2001)).¹²

The boundaries of the Astúa-Pirie region were chosen using features of the landscape as a reference. The legislative decree declared that the southern boundary of the Astúa-Pirie region would “follow the Reventazón River, from La Junta to the Caribbean Sea”;




FIGURE 1.—Costa Rica and the UFCo's boundary. *Notes:* The UFCo's land concession appears in black in this map of Costa Rica. Elevation is shown in the background. The concession area represents 8.92% of the national territory, and predominantly consists of flatlands near coastal areas.

¹²This is another benefit of focusing on this border segment: we are certain that it remained constant throughout the 85 years of the UFCo's tenure.

its eastern boundary adjoins the Atlantic Ocean; its northern boundary would “follow an imaginary line drawn from the intersection between Toro Amarillo River with the old railroad up to a point on the coast located five miles northeast from the mouth of Tortuguero River”; finally, the western boundary would “follow the main railroad, from La Junta to the point where the railroad crosses Toro Amarillo River” (ANCR (1904, p. 44)).¹³

This southern boundary—that defines the limit between the Astúa-Pirie region and the UFCo—ended up following the Reventazón River *closely but not exactly*. The reason being that expropriation was a costly process, and preexisting plots of land that overlapped with the river were not broken apart.¹⁴ Instead, plots were allocated either as UFCo property or government property to follow the river as closely as possible. Figure C.4 in Appendix C shows an example of how the boundary follows this natural landmark (the river)—closely but not exactly. Moreover, as the decree forbade to sell the plots within the Astúa-Pirie region to the company, this boundary was kept constant during the company’s tenure.

In terms of preexisting demographic characteristics, note that these are trivially balanced at the start of the company’s tenure, given the area remained unpopulated. This means that migrants’ characteristics might be particularly relevant to understand differences in outcomes. In Section 5.2, we conduct a thorough analysis of how migrants to the UFCo compare to migrants to other similar regions in the country, and find that migrants to the UFCo were consistently negatively selected throughout the firm’s tenure, which points to our estimates being a lower bound of the firm’s effect.

2.3. *Commuting Between Regions*

People who lived in regions near UFCo plantations, in general, did not commute and work for the company or used its services. Unlike other types of agricultural activities with seasonal demand for labor, the UFCo needed a permanent labor supply of around 150 workers per 324-ha farm, and there were several incentives to keep people from commuting in and out of the plantation.

First, due to the extension of the plantations and to reduce transportation costs, the UFCo created camps within its farms for workers (Cerdas Albertazzi (1993)). The typical farm consisted of a campsite, buildings, and pasture land (Jones and Morrison (1952)). Besides houses and administrative buildings, special facilities were also present, such as commissaries, schools, electric plants, sewage systems, and recreational facilities (Wiley (2008)). The services and facilities provided by the company converted plantations into communities that allowed people to live and work full time within them.¹⁵ Second, given concerns about malaria spreading from outside the plantation, only workers were allowed to live within the UFCo, and flows of people were discouraged. Finally, people living in areas around the UFCo had restricted access to services provided by the company. For example, as we describe in Section 5.1.1, data on patients at UFCo hospitals suggests that

¹³La Junta was the point where the railroad from the capital intersected the railroad from Limón. The “old railroad” was the name given to the railroad to Guápiles because it was the remains of an unsuccessful previous attempt to build a railroad to the Central Valley.

¹⁴The expansion of the Costa Rican agricultural frontier started in the late 19th century.

¹⁵For people within the plantation, the company was omnipresent in their lives. Harpelle (2001, p. 67) mentions that typical residents “were likely born in the company hospital, educated in the company school, lived in company housing, obtained household supplies and clothing from the company commissaries, and, if they could afford it, looked forward to being carried to their final resting places in the Northern Railway’s [a subsidiary of the UFCo] funeral car.”

most of them were workers or part of a workers' family. For the few nonworkers in the hospitals' records, we observe average spending per patient was lower relative to workers and their families, suggesting that commuters could not enjoy the amenities the company provided in the same way as locals.

2.4. *Other Historical Examples*

Historically, it has been relatively common for one or a few large companies—often foreign ones—to dominate the local economy in a developing region. In colonial and quasi-colonial arrangements, labor was sometimes coerced into working for a major producer; examples like the *mita* mining system in Peru (Dell (2010)), coffee farms in Puerto Rico (Bobonis and Morrow (2014)), or rubber cultivation in what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lowe and Montero (2021a)) have been studied in detail. Another example is the Dutch East India Company, which used both coerced and paid labor while being a monopsony in many of the regions where it operated (Lucassen (2004)). Other case which involved coerced labor is the 1891 charters from the Portuguese to the Mozambique Company and the British Nyassa Company to administer the southern part of Mozambique for 50 years and the northern part of the country for 35 years, respectively (Vail (1976)). A more current example is the entrance of Firestone into Liberia in 1928, when rubber became crucial to the local economy. For instance, in 1972, Firestone produced 57% of the Liberian agricultural output and 6% of its GDP (McCoskey (2011)).

These arrangements are not limited to the developing world, for instance, in rural England, Unilever built villages with schools and hospitals during the 19th century in order to attract and keep workers near the corporation (Watkins and Dalton (2019)). In the U.S., company towns of Michigan's Upper Peninsula provided a range of services to "attract and maintain workers in remote, resource-rich locations, including housing, medical services, and stores" (Holmes (2015, p. 12)). For example, Holmes (2015) describes how Shell Drake, a town founded by a lumber company in 1895, was provided with a hospital, a school, a boardwalk, and a boardinghouse. Another example, discussed by the same author, is the company town founded by Ford in Pequaming, which also provided services like boardinghouses and subsidized the construction of schools.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that these large investment projects are not only in the past. A recent wave of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries—the so-called "land grabs"—has been a subject of great debate. Driven mostly by concerns over food security and the bio-fuels boom, these projects consist of large leases (of up to 99 years) or purchases of farmland for agricultural investment in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America; some of them involving hundreds of thousands of acres (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, and Keeley (2009), Cotula and Vermeulen (2009)). In fact, since 2006, over 64 million acres of land were assigned to foreigners to develop agricultural activities in developing countries, and more than 30 of these concessions were larger than the UFCo's concession in Costa Rica.

3. DATA

3.1. *Historical Data*

To understand which census-blocks were directly affected by the UFCo, we collected and digitized maps of the company's properties, which were published by the UFCo Engineering Department and are available in the Costa Rican National Archive (*Archivo*

Nacional de Costa Rica).¹⁶ We also collected, digitized and geo-referenced maps of the administrative divisions of Costa Rica in order to geo-reference censuses from 1927–2011.

For a better understanding of living standards and investments during UFCo's tenure, we collected and digitized documents published by the company. From 1912 to 1931, the Medical Department of the UFCo issued an annual report describing the sanitation and health programs carried out by the company as well as the living conditions within the UFCo plantations. Moreover, the company regularly circulated reports with information about the number of employees, production, and investments in areas such as education, housing, and health. We obtained primary print copies of these documents from collections held by Cornell University, the University of Kansas, and the Center for Central American Historical Studies at the University of Costa Rica (*Centro de Investigaciones Históricas de América Central de la Universidad de Costa Rica*). The print quality of the historical documents makes automatic character recognition difficult, so the data had to be digitized by hand.

We also use data from 1864, 1892, 1927, 1950, and 1963 Costa Rican Population Censuses. While these censuses do not contain enough spatial detail to be considered in our regression discontinuity design, the information allows us to analyze aggregated population patterns, such as migration before and during the UFCo apogee, or the size and occupation of the country's labor force.

We also collected, and hand-digitized, data on expenditures, by municipality and by type, for all localities from 1955 to 1984 from official annual reports of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Costa Rica (*Contraloría General de la República de Costa Rica*). Further, we hand-digitized data from Costa Rican Statistic Yearbooks containing information on the number of patients and health expenses carried out by hospitals in Costa Rica from 1907 to 1917, including the ones ran by the UFCo. We obtained export data from Costa Rican Statistic Yearbooks as well as Export Bulletins. We collected data from 19 agricultural censuses which, between 1900 and 1984, provide information to track changes in land use in the country and agricultural output. Finally, we collected geo-references of all the schools that operated in the country between 1899 and 1984, along with data on their exact opening date from records of the Costa Rican Ministry of Education.

3.2. Outcome Data

We examine the UFCo's long-run impact on economic development by testing whether it affects living standards today. To measure living standards, we obtained restricted-access microdata from Costa Rican Population and Housing Censuses collected by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos*) for years 1973, 1984, 2000, and 2011. As the UFCo stopped operations in 1984, the range covered by these censuses allows us to analyze the outcomes during and after the company's tenure. For ease of exposition, Figure 2 shows how the available data fits into a time line of main events.

The data is recorded at the census-block level, the smallest territorial division of the country. Both the size and borders of a census-block change across censuses. For the 1973,

¹⁶Although the Map Library of the National University of Costa Rica (*Mapoteca Virtual de la Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica*) has digitized part of the collection, collecting all available maps required in-person visits to the archives, taking high-quality pictures of the original maps, and digitizing them. Figure C.5 in Appendix C provides an example of a map showing the UFCo landholdings in the Costa Rican Pacific Coast.




FIGURE 2.—Main Events and Data Availability.

1984, and 2000 censuses, each census-block contains approximately 60 dwellings in urban areas and 40 dwellings in rural areas. They also tend to coincide with one or two city blocks in urban areas (Bonilla and Rosero (2008)). For the 2011 census, in most cases, the census-block coincides with a city-block (Fallas-Paniagua (2013)). For all years, the data include each census-block centroid's coordinates. The level of spatial disaggregation provided by the census-block data allows us to compare observations within close proximity of each other.

Except for the 1973 census, which includes information on wages, later censuses do not contain direct measures of income or consumption.¹⁷ Further, household surveys required to construct measures as in Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) are not available in Costa Rica before 2000. Therefore, we follow the “Unsatisfied Basic Needs” (UBN) method to generate variables that measure economic outcomes. The UBN method was introduced by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, to identify households in poverty without relying on income data (Feres and Mancero (2001)), and has the advantage of generating measures that are comparable across time, as it relies only on questions that are consistent and available across censuses. The method requires specifying a set of basic needs and a threshold to consider those needs as “satisfied” (Armendáriz and Larraín B. (2017)). This methodology defines four dimensions of basic needs: housing, health and sanitation, education, and consumption. Each dimension consists of components selected by their explanatory power for income in Costa Rican household surveys, once these were available in 2000. In this sense, the methodology is similar to that in Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003), but constrained by the availability of data given the setting's historical nature.

Appendix B includes details on the components that constitute each of our dimensions, and the specific variables from the censuses that we use, which as mentioned earlier, were chosen based on their power to predict income based on the available household surveys. A general description of each dimension is the following: (i) housing: refers to the quality of the household dwelling's material and household overcrowding; (ii) health and sanitation: refers to the method for disposal of human excreta that the household uses; (iii)

¹⁷Moreover, as will become clear later, wages alone are not a good proxy for real income within UFCo's landholdings, as a significant share of the workers' compensation package consisted of local amenities.

education: refers to school attendance and academic achievement for household members from 7 to 17 years old; and (iv) consumption: refers to the relationship between the number of income recipients (employed, pensioned, or renter), their years of schooling, and the total number of household members. We construct each dimension as an indicator variable equal to one if the household does not meet the threshold to attain a need in some component, and zero otherwise.

We consider a household as poor if it has at least one unsatisfied need. Moreover, we estimate the severity of poverty through the total number of UBN. Namely, the total number of UBN is an index that ranges from 0 to 4, where each unsatisfied basic need adds one point to the index.

To provide complementary robustness, Appendix G discusses how results with the UBN method are also consistent with findings using nighttime lights data as a proxy for real income. Further, Appendix R shows that our findings using the UBN method align with results under the small area estimation methodology of [Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw \(2003\)](#), using the 2000 and 2011 censuses and the 2000 and 2011 National Household Survey. Finally, Section 5.1.3 discusses how results using the UBN method align well with individual outcomes, like years of schooling.

4. IMPACT OF THE COMPANY

4.1. Empirical Strategy

To estimate the causal effect of the UFCo, we use well-defined boundaries based on historical records, and compare observations located just inside former UFCo plantations to observations located just outside them. Our estimation of the *average* UFCo effect uses the following regression discontinuity specification:

$$y_{igt} = \gamma UFCo_g + f(\text{geographic location}_g) + \mathbf{X}_{igt}\beta + \mathbf{X}_g\Gamma + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{igt}, \quad (1)$$

where y_{igt} is an outcome of individual or household i in census-block g and year t ; and $UFCo_g$ is an indicator variable equal to one if the census-block g 's centroid was inside a UFCo plantation, and equal to zero otherwise. $f(\text{geographic location}_g)$ is a RD polynomial, which is a smooth function on latitude and longitude that controls for the geographic location of census-block g . This multidimensional discontinuity in a longitude–latitude space allows us to compare units, not only on different sides of the boundary, but in a comparable position. Following [Gelman and Imbens \(2019\)](#), and in line with recent work whose estimation framework relies on a geographical RD design ([Dell, Lane, and Querubin \(2018\)](#), [Lowes and Montero \(2021a\)](#), [Dell and Olken \(2019\)](#)), we use a linear polynomial in longitude–latitude and test for robustness to a variety of specifications.¹⁸ \mathbf{X}_{igt} is a vector of covariates for individual or household i . \mathbf{X}_g is a vector of geographic characteristics for census-block g , and α_t is a year fixed effect.¹⁹

Furthermore, to analyze a *time-varying* UFCo effect, we allow for a different UFCo coefficient in every census, by estimating the following RD specification:

$$y_{igt} = \gamma_{1973} UFCo_{g,1973} + \gamma_{1984} UFCo_{g,1984} + \gamma_{2000} UFCo_{g,2000} + \gamma_{2011} UFCo_{g,2011} + f(\text{geographic location}_g) + \mathbf{X}_{igt}\beta + \mathbf{X}_g\Gamma + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{igt}, \quad (2)$$

¹⁸Panel A in Figures 5, D.8, and D.9 shows that our results are robust to alternative specifications of the RD polynomial.

¹⁹Panels B1 and B2 in Figures 5, D.8, and D.9 show that our main message is robust to alternative choices of control variables.

where the indicator variable $UFCo_{g,t}$ is equal to one if at time t individual or household unit i is in census-block g , whose centroid was inside a UFCo plantation; and equal to zero otherwise.

4.2. Naive Approach Considering UFCo's Entire Boundary

As a naive first approach, we run geographic RD designs along the UFCo's *entire* boundary in Costa Rica. To do so in the most general way possible, we run the RD multiple times at different distances from the border, ranging from 5 km to up to 20 km. A bandwidth of 20 km on each side of the border already spans the *entire* interior of the UFCo region. We then plot these 61 regressions per outcome—each with a bandwidth 250 m larger on each side than the previous one—for two cases: the average UFCo effect (equation (1)) and the dynamic UFCo effect by year (equation (2)).

4.2.1. Average Effect Pooling Across Years

Figure 3 explores whether households living in areas that were directly exposed to the UFCo are on average better-off than those living just across the border. The figure includes the results of estimating equation (1), using as dependent variables the probability of being poor, the probability of an unsatisfied basic need (UBN) in each dimension (housing, health and sanitation, education, and consumption), and the total number of UBNS. All regressions include geographic controls, demographic controls for the number of household members aged 0–4 (infants), 5–14 (children), and 15 and older (adults), census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude. Following Conley (1999), we allow for spatial dependence of an unknown form. For comparison, we also report robust standard errors.²⁰ Results are robust to using no controls, only a subset of controls, or different specifications for the polynomial, instead of the proposed baseline.²¹

Figure 3 strongly suggests that the UFCo's effect does not vary significantly depending on how close to the border we run our RD estimation, and that households living in census-blocks within UFCo borders have better living standards, on average, than their counterparts outside the UFCo. For instance panel (a) shows how the probability of being poor is on average 4 percentage points (pp) lower for households within UFCo borders than for households outside. The effect is flat and does not seem to depend on the bandwidth we choose when running our regression, as shown by the horizontal axis of each panel.

4.2.2. Time-Varying Effect

The company stopped operations in 1984, and we examine census data from 1973–2011. Therefore, we can disentangle the differentiated effects of the company's presence during its tenure, and also at different points in time after it stopped operating. Figure 4 shows how the UFCo effect changed over time using this first naive approach. Consistently with the previous figure, this time-varying effect also changes only slightly depending on the distance from the border (horizontal axis) for all outcomes. The figure also documents

²⁰We compute Conley standard errors for all regressions at the cutoff distance of 2 km. We choose 2 km because it is the distance that *maximizes* standard errors for all outcomes, as shown in Figure D.7. Results are robust to alternative cutoffs (up to the maximum one allowed by the plantation's size), and to the placebo tests reported in Table F.6.

²¹Figure 5 shows robustness tests for our main specification. Robustness tests for this naive regression using the entire boundary deliver similar results, and are available upon request.




FIGURE 3.—Average UFCo Effect Considering the Entire Concession's Border. *Notes:* The figure shows how the UFCo effect varies depending on the maximum distance from the border that we allow in each regression (61 regressions per outcome). The effect is robust to varying distances. 95% confidence intervals in gray are based on robust standard errors clustered at the census-block level, while dotted lines denote Conley 95% confidence intervals.

how the gap between UFCo and non-UFCo regions is largest in 1973, and then slowly narrows over time. For instance, panel (a) shows how the probability of being poor was approximately 10 pp lower for households within the UFCo in 1973 (regardless of the bandwidth chosen to run the RD), and that the effect had decreased to approximately 2 pp by 2011.

4.3. *Balance of Preexisting Characteristics and Random Land Assignment*


After the previous section's naive RD, we proceed with two more sophisticated approaches. First, we restrict the analysis to areas where characteristics balance before UFCo's arrival. This is in line with the strategy most of the literature on geographic RD designs follows, starting with the seminal paper by Dell (2010), and including more recent work like Lowes and Montero (2021b). The idea behind this approach is to account for preexisting differences that might affect outcomes independently of whether the UFCo was present or not.

In terms of preexisting social and economic characteristics, the study area was close to being uninhabited before the UFCo's arrival. According to the 1864 Costa Rican Census, only 545 people lived in the entire Caribbean Coast—a 0.45% of the Costa Rican population at that time (Oficina Central de Estadística (1864)). Company officials wrote that when they first arrived “with the exception of the little village of Matina, which contained fifty or sixty inhabitants, not one individual was settled anywhere on the line [in 1883, just before the contract with the government was signed (see Figure 2)]” (Keith (1886, pp. 8–9)). This was not “special” about this region, in fact, it was the case for most Costa Rican rural areas at the time, as the expansion of the Costa Rican agricultural frontier did not start until the late 19th century. This means that *demographic* characteristics (trivially) balance on both sides of the concession's border at the start of the firm's tenure. Thus, we begin by examining results in areas where *geographic* characteristics balance on both sides of the UFCo border.²² Estimations corresponding with equations (1) and (2) are shown on Tables D.4 and D.5. Overall, our results are quite similar to those presented in the previous section: we consistently find that households within the UFCo have higher living standards than their neighbors outside, even after limiting the sample to areas with comparable pre-existing observable characteristics.


While this is the standard approach, potentially there could still be unobservable elements changing right at the border, which are not captured by measures of pre-existing characteristics. In other words, if the land right outside the UFCo border was just as good to produce as the one inside the concession, why did not the company try to include this land in the concession as well? Thus, for our preferred specifications, we take a step forward with respect to the standard in the literature, and exploit exogenous variation in the land assignment to address this potential issue.

To do so, we exploit the redrawing of the boundary that was described in Section 2.2, and conduct the RD analysis only in segments of the *redrawn border* where geographic characteristics are balanced. In line with the latter, we test a null hypothesis of no geographical differences on both sides of this segment of the UFCo boundary, and we fail to reject this null in the segment shown in Figure C.3. In this area, two things are true: (i) geographic characteristics on both sides of the border balance, and (ii) the border was redrawn arbitrarily. *This is our preferred specification.*


²²Table D.2 shows the results of the balance test in these areas.




(a) Probability of Being Poor




(b) Total Number of UBN




(c) Housing Dimension



(d) Health Dimension



(e) Education Dimension



(f) Consumption Dimension

FIGURE 4.—Dynamic UFCo Effect Considering the Entire Concession's Border. *Notes:* The figure shows the evolution of the UFCo effect across years for several outcome variables. The absolute effect is decreasing over time in all cases. 95% Confidence intervals (in gray) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the census-block level. While it is unfeasible to show Conley standard errors for all regressions graphically, they are available upon request.

Table D.3 shows that elevation, slope, and temperature do not change discretely across this segment of the UFCo boundary.²³ As in the previous section, we allow for spatial dependence of an unknown form (reported in brackets), and report robust standard errors (in parentheses).²⁴ This table also shows that, as we move away from this segment of the boundary, the differences in elevation, slope, and temperature become significant.

Therefore, exploiting the level of disaggregation of our data—which includes more than 9000 households even within this specific subregion—and not to contaminate the analysis that might be very sensitive to changes in the landscape (most economic activities were related to agriculture), our main results will include only observations whose census-block's centroid is located within 5 km from this segment of the UFCo boundary; where we know the border was arbitrary and observable geographic features are balanced. Consistent with the very stable coefficients that we documented in Section 4.2, results change very little as we increase our bandwidth beyond 5 km. In fact, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, within this redrawn segment, when we rerun the estimates increasing the distance from the border from 5 km to 20 km (250 m at a time) regressions deliver extremely similar coefficients.²⁵ That is, our results are not driven by the fact that we focus on this area, although restricting the analysis to this area allows us to have a clean regression and exploit exogenous variation in the land assignment.

4.3.1. *Average Effect Pooling Across Years*

Table I explores whether households living in areas that were directly exposed to the UFCo are on average better off than those living just across the border. The table includes the results of estimating equation (1) using the probability of having an unsatisfied basic need (UBN) in each dimension (housing, health and sanitation, education, and consumption), the probability of being poor, and the total number of UBNs as dependent variables. All regressions include geographic and demographic controls, census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude. We report standard errors clustered at the census-block level and Conley standard errors.

The estimates suggest that the households located in the former UFCo region are in general better-off. Columns (1) to (4) of Table I show that UFCo households have had higher living standards. Note that, although some coefficients might seem somewhat small, the percentage variation of these probabilities with respect to their sample mean (last row) is sizable. For instance, the first coefficient of column (1) implies that households within former UFCo areas had 10.2 pp lower probability of having an unsatisfied housing need than their neighbors outside UFCo lands between 1973 and 2011; a 60% decrease with respect to the sample's mean. These households also had 2.2 pp, 5.4 pp, and 6.6 pp lower probability of having an unsatisfied need in health, education, and consumption, respectively.

²³The unit of analysis to examine the geographic characteristics is a 1×1 km grid cell. Results are statistically equal if we use census-blocks as the unit of analysis. Elevation and temperature data were obtained from the Global Climate Database created by Hijmans, Cameron, Parra, Jones, and Jarvis (2005). The spatial resolution is 30 arc-seconds. Elevation above sea level is in meters and was constructed using NASA's Shuttle Radar Topography Mission data. From the elevation information, we calculate the slope (in degrees). Hijmans et al. also compiled monthly averages of temperature measured by weather stations from 1960 to 1990. We measure temperature in Celsius and take an annual average.

²⁴Conley standard errors are computed using a cutoff distance of 2 km, and this distance *maximizes* standard errors for all outcomes, as shown in Figure D.7. Results are robust to alternative cutoffs ranging from 2 to 10 km (the maximum allowed by the plantation's size), and to the placebo tests reported in Table F.6.

²⁵We stop at a bandwidth of 20 km on each side of the border, as with this distance the RD already spans the entire interior of the UFCo's concession.

TABLE I
AVERAGE UFCo EFFECT.

	Probability of UBN in				Probability of Being Poor	Total Number of UBN
	Housing (1)	Health (2)	Education (3)	Consumption (4)		
UFCo	−0.102 (0.026) [0.031]	−0.022 (0.017) [0.015]	−0.054 (0.022) [0.016]	−0.066 (0.024) [0.025]	−0.133 (0.030) [0.026]	−0.244 (0.056) [0.054]
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.169	0.238	0.015	0.115	0.198
Observations	9179	9179	9179	9179	9179	9179
Clusters	206	206	206	206	206	206
Mean	0.171	0.058	0.232	0.199	0.475	0.658
% Variation w.r.t. Mean	−60.0	−39.0	−23.2	−33.0	−27.9	−37.1

Note: UBN = Unsatisfied Basic Need. The last row shows the percentage variation in each coefficient with respect to the sample's mean. The unit of observation is the household. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by census block, are in parentheses. Conley standard errors are in brackets. All regressions include geographic controls (slope, elevation, temperature); demographic controls for the number of adults, children, and infants in the household; census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude.

Households in former UFCo areas also had a 13.3 pp lower probability of being poor (column (5)); a 28% variation with respect to the sample's mean. Column (6)—the number of UBN—should be read differently than other columns, as it takes values that range from 0 to 4, and implies that the severity of poverty was lower within former UFCo areas, where the households had, on average, 0.244 fewer unsatisfied needs than the households in the non-UFCo control region.

Figure D.6 in Appendix D summarizes these results in three-dimensional plots. The figure shows the spatial distribution of the centroids of the census-blocks and the study boundary across space. The sharp discontinuity at the UFCo boundary is noticeable for each of our outcomes, with better outcomes coinciding with former UFCo regions in every case.

Importantly, *these results in the border segment where the random assignment happened are very similar—and in many cases statistically equal—to those presented in Section 4.2*, where we considered the entire boundary and different bandwidths. Thus, they do not seem to be specific to this border segment, but valid for the broader UFCo area.

4.3.2. Time-Varying Effect

We now study how the company's effect evolved across time, between 1973 and 2011, both during the firm's tenure (before 1984), and also after it stopped operating (from 1984 onwards). Table II documents how the UFCo effect changed over time. The magnitudes of the UFCo effect are particularly high given the mean probabilities for the entire region (bottom panel). The probability of being poor and the total number of UBN are quite persistent over time. The probability of an unsatisfied housing need is also very persistent across years; column (1) shows how, in 2011, approximately 30 years after the UFCo left, households within UFCo former lands are 8.9 percentage points less likely of having a UBN in housing relative to households outside. The effect on health and sanitation

TABLE II
CONTEMPORARY HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES: DYNAMICS ACROSS YEARS.

	Probability of UBN in				Probability of Being Poor	Total Number of UBN
	Housing (1)	Health (2)	Education (3)	Consumption (4)		
UFCo ₁₉₇₃	−0.224 (0.062) [0.065]	−0.288 (0.079) [0.077]	−0.056 (0.045) [0.035]	−0.135 (0.045) [0.047]	−0.254 (0.067) [0.053]	−0.704 (0.157) [0.145]
UFCo ₁₉₈₄	−0.068 (0.047) [0.033]	0.010 (0.028) [0.013]	−0.084 (0.028) [0.023]	−0.076 (0.035) [0.031]	−0.094 (0.047) [0.034]	−0.218 (0.092) [0.068]
UFCo ₂₀₀₀	−0.089 (0.031) [0.031]	0.017 (0.017) [0.015]	−0.055 (0.022) [0.015]	−0.090 (0.027) [0.026]	−0.143 (0.037) [0.032]	−0.217 (0.059) [0.055]
UFCo ₂₀₁₁	−0.089 (0.031) [0.030]	0.019 (0.016) [0.018]	−0.038 (0.029) [0.029]	−0.019 (0.035) [0.053]	−0.103 (0.038) [0.051]	−0.127 (0.063) [0.092]
Adjusted R^2	0.103	0.198	0.238	0.017	0.117	0.206
Observations	9179	9179	9179	9179	9179	9179
Clusters	206	206	206	206	206	206
Mean ₁₉₇₃	0.462	0.353	0.393	0.208	0.777	1.416
Mean ₁₉₈₄	0.209	0.060	0.362	0.201	0.579	0.832
Mean ₂₀₀₀	0.145	0.031	0.230	0.178	0.452	0.584
Mean ₂₀₁₁	0.118	0.016	0.156	0.211	0.396	0.501

Note: UBN = Unsatisfied Basic Need. The unit of observation is the household. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by census block, are in parentheses. Conley standard errors are in brackets. All regressions include geographic controls (slope, elevation, temperature); demographic controls for the number of adults, children, and infants in the household; census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude.

rapidly vanishes and is insignificant after 1973.²⁶ Finally, education and consumption are always worse outside the UFCo, but the significance of the coefficients disappears after 2000.

Table II also shows how, since 1973, the treated and untreated regions have converged slowly, with only 59% of the poverty gap closing over the following four decades. More generally, the *severity* of poverty—measured by the number of UBN—has decreased over time: while in 1973 a household within the UFCo landholdings had 0.704 less UBN than a household outside, in 2011 this difference was, albeit significant, down to 0.127.

The time-varying results along the border segment where the random assignment happened are very similar—and in many cases statistically equal—to those presented in Section 4.2, where we considered both the entire boundary and many different bandwidths. They are also consistent with estimates that, instead of focusing on the segment where the border was redrawn, consider *all* the border segments where geographic characteristics balance. Thus, they do not seem to be specific to this border segment, but valid for the broader UFCo area.

²⁶ After 1980, there was significant investment in sanitation infrastructure throughout the country, which connected most households to the sanitation system both inside and outside UFCo areas. This aligns with the low mean registered in the censuses starting in 1984.

Additional Robustness Checks. While we postpone the discussion on the role of migration and spillovers to Section 5.2, which studies potential mechanisms that could have led to the gap in outcomes between regions that we documented, we discuss additional robustness checks for our RD in Appendix E, including falsification tests, different bandwidth and polynomials, different control variables, and distance to a railroad and the river. We also recompute our RD using alternative income measures (nighttime lights data and the small area estimation methodology of Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003)). Figure 5 summarizes these results.

5. MECHANISMS

The results documented so far can be somewhat surprising. In fact, they go against the narrative that surrounds the UFCo in many Latin American countries. To understand the channels that led to the difference between regions that we found with our empirical strategy, we collected data on a variety of outcomes from primary sources spanning the firm's 85 years of tenure, and digitized it.²⁷ In Section 5.1, we document the mechanism for which we find more evidence: investments in local amenities (such as schools and hospitals) being much larger within the UFCo landholdings than in nearby regions throughout the firm's tenure. What are the economics that led to these investments in the first place? Studying company reports, in Section 5.1.4, we show how the bulk of these investments arose from the need to attract and maintain a sizable workforce. Section 5.2 studies and rules-out, one by one, other plausible mechanisms that might have led to our results, including selective migration and negative spillovers from the company to neighboring regions. Finally, having established what the relevant mechanism is, Section 5.4 proposes a model that incorporates this mechanism, and where we allow the firm to invest in local amenities as a way to attract workers. This framework allows us to have a better understanding of the company's aggregate effect, and to run counterfactual exercises to shed light on how the firm's impact changes in scenarios with dramatically less worker mobility. The latter is a word of warning about how a setting with a larger degree of coercion—like what might have occurred in other Latin American countries—can lead to worse economic outcomes, and highlights the key role of labor mobility in determining local outcomes.

5.1. *Investments in Local Amenities*

5.1.1. *Investment in Healthcare and Sanitation*

Approximately five thousand workers died constructing the railroad to the Caribbean Coast in Costa Rica, due to the unhealthy and dangerous conditions of the tropical forest (Bucheli (2005)). This experience, along with lessons from the Panama Canal's construction, taught managers about the importance of sanitation and healthcare to sustain a large workforce in an environment threatened by tropical diseases. As a consequence, the UFCo invested in sanitation infrastructure, launched health programs, and provided medical attention to its employees.

Infrastructure investments included pipes, drinking water systems, sewage systems, street lighting, macadamized roads, and dikes (Sanou and Quesada (1998)). In 1905 the

²⁷Almost all of this data had to be scanned, was not machine-readable, and had to be imputed by hand and double-checked.




FIGURE 5.—Robustness checks for the Main Specification: Average UFCo Effect. *Notes:* In the bottom panel, black dots indicate the controls added in each regression that is vertically aligned with these dots. Figures D.8 and D.9 show similar checks for the effect **by year** (1973–2011). Individual tables with these regressions are reported in the supplementary Online Appendix for the authors’ websites (Méndez and Van Patten (2022)).

UFCo established a Medical Department in Costa Rica to carry-out sanitation programs and medical research on tropical diseases. By 1942, three company hospitals operated in the country. Their staff included doctors, sanitary inspectors, and nurses from the United States and other Central American countries (Morgan (1993)). Each hospital had up-to-date surgical and X-ray equipment, laboratory, outpatient department, and steam laundry (Deeks).

Employees and their dependents had access to medical and surgical treatment, including medicines in the case of employees, without an additional charge (UFCo (1917)).²⁸ Moreover, neighbors from non-UFCo regions could not commute and get access to the same quality of healthcare. As Figure 6(b) shows, between 1907 and 1917, workers or their families who were classified as payroll and attended a UFCo hospital (dashed line) received more than twice the spending per patient than people who attended UFCo hospitals but were *not* in its the payroll (dotted line). Although a higher level of spending does not necessarily imply a higher quality of health care, UFCo's medical services were known of being among the best in the country (Casey (1979)). For reference, we also show expenditure per patient in the most modern *public* hospital at the time (San Juan de Dios); which suggests a nonworker would have been on average better-off attending this government-run hospital than commuting to the UFCo's hospital.²⁹

Despite the positive impact of the UFCo programs, its benefits were restricted to employees and their immediate families (Kepner (1936), Chomsky (1996)). The general manager of the Medical Department explained that given the size of the UFCo land-holdings, it was impossible from a commercial standpoint to sanitize completely all areas and, therefore, their efforts were “mainly directed to protecting the larger communities and camps where our employees are located” (UFCo (1922, p. 6)). In fact, to increase sanitary benefits, company doctors warned workers against traveling between plantations and surrounding villages, which were unscreened.

5.1.2. *Investments in Housing Infrastructure*

Given the remoteness of the plantations and to reduce transportation costs, the UFCo provided the majority of its workers with free housing *within* the company's land. This was partially motivated by concerns with diseases like malaria and yellow fever, which spread easily if the population is constantly commuting from outside the plantation. Each of the UFCo's divisions consisted of farms, and each farm had a camp where workers lived.

Usually, houses for plantation laborers were laid out around a soccer field. By 1958, the majority of laborers lived in barracks-type structures. Single families occupied the majority of barracks, and there were buildings for unmarried workers (May and Plaza (1958)). These barrack structures exceeded the standards of many surrounding communities (Wiley (2008)).

Related to the sanitary programs impulsed by the UFCo, a squad cleaned the grounds, collected trash, systematically sprayed DDT to control for mosquitos and insects, and scrubbed out public toilets and bathing facilities. Moreover, the water supplied to the taps was safe for drinking. Besides housing, the UFCo provided basic services *for its employees* within each camp, such as schools, commissaries, dispensaries, and recreational facilities. May and Plaza (1958, p. 209) claims that “the places of worship, recreational facilities, and

²⁸To cover healthcare for employees and their dependents, the UFCo deducted a mandatory fee equivalent to 2% from their salary.

²⁹Moreover, although nonemployees could receive medical attention in the UFCo healthcare network, they had to pay fees.

athletic fields and equipment provided for United's workers are upon a scale matched by few, if any, locally owned agricultural enterprises."

5.1.3. Investments in Human Capital

One of the services that the company provided within its camps was primary education to the children of its employees. The curriculum in the schools included vocational training, and before the 1940s, was taught mostly in English. The emphasis on primary education was significant, and child labor became uncommon in the banana regions (Viales Hurtado (1998)). By 1955, the company had constructed 62 primary schools within its landholdings in Costa Rica (May and Plaza (1958)). As shown in Figure 6(a), spending per student in schools operated by the UFCo was consistently higher than public spending in primary education between 1947 and 1963.³⁰ On average, the company's yearly spending was 23% higher than the government's spending during this period.

By the time children completed primary education, they were old enough to work. Although the UFCo did not provide secondary education directly, it subsidized it in some cases.³¹ Despite this subsidy, however, secondary and tertiary education were costly and out of reach for most households.




FIGURE 6.—Differences in Spending UFCo vs. Government. *Notes:* Panel (a) shows data on spending per student (in 2015 Costa Rican Colones) in UFCo schools versus local schools run by the government, between 1947–1963. Data results from authors' calculations based on company reports "*Compañía Bananera de Costa Rica. Algunos datos sobre sus actividades*" and Molina Jiménez (2017). Panel (b) shows data on spending per patient (in Costa Rican Colones), between 1907–1917 in UFCo hospitals, and compares it with spending per patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital; the largest Costa Rican hospital at the time. Data was calculated based on 1907–1917 Costa Rican Statistic Yearbooks.

³⁰In Figure 6(a), the amounts were converted to constant 2015 Costa Rican Colones (CRC) by splicing four price indexes: (i) Cost of Living Index Base 1936 = 100 (*Índice de costo de la vida Base 1936 = 100*); (ii) Consumer Price Index for Middle Income and Low-Income Citizens in the Metropolitan Area Base 1964 = 100 (*Índice de precios al consumidor de ingresos medios y bajos del Área Metropolitana Base 1964 = 100*); (iii) Consumer Price Index Base January 1995 = 100 (*Índice de precios al consumidor Base Enero 1995 = 100*); and (iv) Consumer Price Index Base June 2015 = 100 (*Índice de precios al consumidor Base Junio 2015 = 100*).

³¹If the parents could afford the first 2 years of secondary education of their children in the United States, the UFCo paid for the last 2 years and provided free transportation to and from the United States. Moreover, if the parents organized secondary schools by themselves and paid a private tuition fee for the teachers, the UFCo provided a building and furniture (May and Plaza (1958)).

To assess the impact of UFCo's educational investments on current human capital accumulation, we estimate equation (1) using educational attainment as the outcome variable. Table F.7 finds a positive and statistically significant UFCo effect on human capital accumulation and primary education attainment: we document that individuals within the former UFCo landholdings had 0.223 more years of schooling and were 4.8 pp more likely to have completed primary education, while—consistent with the narrative in the last paragraph—the effect on secondary is not significant.

Investment in Human Capital and Persistence of the Effect. The answer to why the impact of the UFCo is so long-lasting may be linked to its investments in human capital. The reason being that individuals who were exposed to company schools may have higher human capital for the rest of their lives, regardless of whether the company is still there or not. That is, this investment in amenities is embodied in the individuals who were exposed to schools as children. To explore this, we leverage information about the place of birth of each individual in the censuses. Then we look at individuals who were born inside the UFCo *while the UFCo was operating*, and were at least 12 years old when the company left in 1984—so that they had a chance to finish primary at a company school—and compare them to their non-UFCo counterparts. Table S.27 shows how individuals who were exposed to UFCo schools as children have higher human capital than their counterparts outside the firm; they have both significantly higher average years of schooling and a higher probability of finishing primary school. Moreover, this gap is statistically equal across censuses. The latter would explain why results are so persistent and decreasing over time: UFCo investment is embodied in people who attended UFCo schools, and while these people represent a smaller share of the population across time, they do exhibit higher human capital throughout their lives.

5.1.4. *Why so Much Investment? Outside Options and Worker Turnover*

While it is easier to conceive the benefits that the company could derive from investing in hospitals and having healthy workers, it is less clear why it would benefit from more educated children or from other local amenities it provided, such as churches and recreational facilities. In general, the UFCo gave prominent consideration to its employee's family life and leisure time. An article describing the activities of the company states:

“The welfare work of the Company in the Tropics has assumed large proportions and has a direct bearing on the health and contentment of the employees. The Company has built and maintains churches and schools . . . , and has erected and equipped club houses and amusement halls to provide entertainment for employees. It has also provided baseball grounds, and tennis courts” (Deeks, p. 1008).

A series of company publications suggest that the firm's welfare program was motivated by the need to attract and maintain a sizable workforce. High turnover was common, given the workers' outside option, which was coffee. While bananas grow year-round, coffee is a seasonal crop and offered high wages during its harvesting season. Around the 1920s, United Fruit Company's Annual Reports consistently recognized worker turnover as being an important problem to address. For instance, the 1923 Annual Report states:

“The greatest difficulty encountered in our work among employees is attributable to the fact that a large percentage of the labor, particularly in new land-cultivations, is migratory. The Superintendent of Agriculture in one of the divisions estimates that a laborer's length of stay in that division averages less than 2 months.” (UFCo (1924, p. 45))

The 1922 Annual Report also states:

“The inhabitants in stable communities can be kept under more strict control, and can be educated to take better care of themselves and to observe more closely the necessary precautions for maintaining health than is possible with the mixed and fluctuating populations on our plantations. ... There is a constant overturn of labor and we are periodically importing new laborers. ... Their innate migratory habits do not permit them to remain on one plantation from year to year, but *as soon as they become physically efficient and acquire a little money they either return to their homes or migrate elsewhere and must be replaced* [emphasis added]” (UFCo (1923, pp. 74–75)).

As a solution to the high turnover rates, the reports recommended to increase investments in local amenities beyond medical measures. According to the 1925 Annual Report:

“An endeavor should be made to stabilize the population... We must not only build and maintain attractive and comfortable camps, but we must also provide measures for taking care of the families of married men, by furnishing them with *garden facilities, schools, and some forms of entertainment. In other words, we must take an interest in our people if we may hope to retain their services indefinitely* [emphasis added]” (UFCo (1926, p. 185)).

Consequently, the company intensified investments in local amenities in the mid-1920s. These investments proved to be successful in decreasing turnover. In 1929, a farm superintendent wrote: “sanitary measures have helped to stabilize labor and increase their ability to perform work [...] during recent years with little or no influx of labor we have not experienced the recurrent shortages of labor that used to occur in previous years” (UFCo (1930, p. 10)). Although the Great Depression temporarily constrained the investments, the UFCo continued them in the late 1930s.

This sheds new light on a potential mechanism behind our positive results: Given the workers’ outside options and initially high levels of turnover, there was a need to retain employees, which led to an increase in investments in “welfare” (local amenities), which could explain the positive effect on development we previously documented. We explore the mechanism described in these reports empirically and quantitatively. Namely, we test the existence of a positive relationship between better long-term outcomes and workers’ outside options during the UFCo times. Intuitively, higher outside options while the UFCo was still operating would have lead to higher UFCo investments to retain workers, and consequently, to more favorable economic outcomes in the long term.³²

To proxy for the outside option of workers *within* an UFCo district j during UFCo times, we propose to use the sum of the average agricultural real wage in each district k *outside* the UFCo region, weighted by the inverse of the distance between j and k . We consider data on real agricultural wages from the population census that dates back to 1973, while the UFCo was still operating. Further, as outside options in 1973 might be correlated with outside options today, we control for *current* real agricultural wages, which are measured using matched employer-employee data from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (*Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social*).³³ Specifically, we consider the following specification:

$$y_{ijt} = \beta \ln \sum_{k \notin \text{UFCo}} \frac{\text{wage}_{k,1973}}{\text{price}_{k,1973}} \frac{(\text{dist}_{jk})^{-1}}{\sum_n (\text{dist}_{jn})^{-1}} + \gamma \ln \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{\text{wage}_{k,t}}{\text{price}_{k,t}} \frac{(\text{dist}_{jk})^{-1}}{\sum_n (\text{dist}_{jn})^{-1}} \\ + f(\text{geographic location}_g) + \mathbf{X}_{igt} \psi + \mathbf{X}_g \Gamma + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad \text{for } j \in \text{UFCo}; \quad (3)$$

³²We take this indirect approach first, but later in this section will compare outside options with investments directly.

³³This data includes the occupation, wage, and location of the universe of formal workers in the country. The earliest year in which this data is available is 2006. Thus, we use 2006 as a proxy of the distribution of wages in 2000. For 2011, we consider 2011 wages. All results hold if we only consider 2011.

where $y_{j,t}^i$ denotes the outcome of household i in district j (within the UFCo region) and t will stand for outcomes years after the UFCo stopped operations; in particular, we will consider $t \in \{2000, 2011\}$. Other controls—in the equation's second row—have the same definitions as in our main specification (equation (1)).

The results of this first approach are reported in Table III. Indeed, we find that areas where UFCo workers had better outside options in 1973, exhibit disproportionately better outcomes in recent years. For instance, from column (5), we see that a 1% increase in the outside option of workers in an UFCo region in 1973 is associated with 2.25 pp lower probability of being poor for households in that region in 2011 and 2000.

A potential endogeneity concern given these results, however, is that UFCo investments might have increased real wages in relatively close regions. To address this, we use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. In our first stage, we propose a region's suitability to grow coffee as an instrument for its real agricultural wages. Along with banana production, coffee was the main economic activity in Costa Rica, and the main alternative source of employment for agricultural workers. Moreover, coffee and bananas grow optimally under different geographic and climatic conditions: While coffee is grown in highlands because higher elevation increases coffee's acidity and its commercial value, bananas slow down their growth rate as the elevation increases (Viales Hurtado and Montero (2015)).

The idea behind this instrument is that regions more suitable to grow coffee in 1973—which grows in a different climate and altitude than bananas—should offer higher wages for agricultural workers. Thus, the closer an UFCo region is to a place suitable to grow coffee, the higher the outside option will be for UFCo workers in this area, which in turn, would have led to more UFCo investments, and hence better outcomes in 2000 and 2011.³⁴

To measure an area's suitability to grow coffee, we regress coffee intensity in district j —defined as the fraction of agricultural land used for cultivating coffee in district j —in 1973, during UFCo times, on geographic characteristics (slope, temperature, elevation) and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude. Data on cultivated area is consistent

TABLE III
OUTSIDE OPTION IN 1973 FOR UFCO WORKERS AND OUTCOMES IN 2000 AND 2011 WITHIN THE UFCO.

	Probability of UBN in				Probability of Being Poor	Total Number of UBN
	Housing (1)	Health (2)	Education (3)	Consumption (4)		
In Outside Option in 1973	−2.388 (0.759) [1.027]	−0.635 (0.218) [0.250]	−1.093 (0.675) [0.893]	−0.318 (0.666) [0.861]	−2.263 (1.135) [1.831]	−4.434 (2.097) [2.826]
Adjusted R ²	0.033	0.011	0.152	0.013	0.055	0.084
Observations	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665
Clusters	114	114	114	114	114	114
Mean	0.151	0.034	0.154	0.178	0.391	0.518

Note: UBN = Unsatisfied Basic Need. The unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by district-year, are in parentheses. All regressions control for current outside options, and controls for contemporaneous outside options; the number of adults, children, and infants in the household; census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude.

³⁴Note that we are already controlling for agricultural wages in non-UFCo coffee-suitable areas in 2000 and 2011.

with FAO's statistics, however, FAO coffee suitability data for Costa Rica is too spatially aggregated and not available for 1973, which led us to create this similar measure ourselves, using yields and area from the agricultural census that is geo-referenced at higher spatial frequencies.³⁵ Data on agricultural wages comes from the 1973 Population Census, while data on coffee production is obtained from the 1973 Agricultural Census. The first panel of Table IV shows the result of this first stage. A 1% increase in the coffee intensity of (distance-weighted) neighboring regions is associated with 0.178 percent higher wages in 1973. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.³⁶

For our second stage, we regress economic outcomes in 2000 and 2011 for household i in region j on our distance-weighted measure of the coffee-intensity of nearby regions in 1973, along with all the controls present in equation (3). The second panel of Table IV displays the results of our IV strategy. All coefficients are consistent with, albeit smaller than, the ones of the OLS regression in Table III. We find that a higher outside option in 1973 is associated with better contemporary outcomes in all cases. For instance, according to the coefficient in column (5), an increase in 1% in the average outside option of an UFCo region in 1973 is associated with a 0.717 pp lower probability of being poor in the long term (2000 and 2011). These results are shown graphically in Figure D.7, in which locations where workers had better outside options during the UFCo's tenure are consistently associated with higher living standards in 2000 and 2011.

TABLE IV

IV STRATEGY: OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN 1973 FOR UFCO WORKERS AND OUTCOMES IN 2000 AND 2011 WITHIN THE UFCO.

First Stage (<i>Dependent Variable: ln 1973 Real Wages</i>)						
In Distance-Weighted	Coefficient	Clustered SE	Clusters	F-Statistic	Adj- R^2	Observations
Coffee Intensity	0.178	(0.071)	356	31.751	0.265	86,946
Second Stage (<i>Dependent Variables: 2000–2011 Outcomes</i>)						
	Probability of UBN in				Probability of Being Poor	Total Number of UBN
	Housing (1)	Health (2)	Education (3)	Consumption (4)		
In Outside Option in 1973	−0.720 (0.191) [0.256]	−0.247 (0.069) [0.082]	−0.277 (0.166) [0.220]	−0.124 (0.176) [0.215]	−0.691 (0.360) [0.481]	−1.368 (0.549) [0.729]
Adjusted R^2	0.033	0.011	0.152	0.013	0.055	0.085
Observations	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665	341,665
Clusters	114	114	114	114	114	114
Mean	0.151	0.034	0.154	0.178	0.391	0.518

Note: First stage: coffee intensity and wages are measured at district level. Second stage: UBN = Unsatisfied Basic Need. The unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by district-year, are in parentheses. All regressions (both stages) include controls for contemporaneous outside options; the number of adults, children, and infants in the household; census fixed effects, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude.

³⁵FAO data is *only* available as a 30-year average, that considers many years after the UFCo stopped operations.

³⁶Moreover, the first-stage F-statistic is in the order of 32, reducing concerns that coffee suitability is a weak instrument at predicting variation in agricultural wages (Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)).

TABLE V
STUDENTS PER SCHOOL, NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN A LOCATION, AND ITS OUTSIDE OPTION.

	In Students per school (1)	Number of schools per census block (2)
In Outside Option in 1973	-3.702 (0.473)	5.720 (1.332)
Adjusted R^2	0.507	—
Observations	380	380

Note: Column (1) shows results using an OLS model on the number of students per school within the UFCo (in logs), while column (2) uses a PPML on the number of schools within the census block. The independent variable is UFCo workers' outside options instrumented with coffee suitability by district. We approximate the number of students with the number of primary school-aged children. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by census-block. The regression includes geographic controls (slope, elevation, temperature); the census block area; the number of people living in the census block, and a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude.

We can use a similar approach to the one above, but this time with *investment in local amenities during UFCo times* as our dependent variable. To do so, we geo-referenced the location of every school in the country and collected data on the date when each of them was founded. This allowed us to identify the exact location of UFCo schools and their opening date. Again, using the suitability to grow coffee as an IV, we run equation (3) by census block. This time, our dependent variable is the *number of primary school-aged children per school in an UFCo census block*.³⁷ We document that a higher outside option leads to more schools in a given location. In particular, we find that a 1% increase in the outside option of an UFCo region reduces the number of students per school in that location by 3.7% (see Table V).³⁸ An alternative measure using density of schools by census-block as a dependent variable delivers qualitatively the same results.

Why Local Amenities Instead of Simply Higher Wages? As described above, turnover was seasonal, and workers dropped out during the coffee harvest season because there were short-term opportunities to earn more. As bananas need to be attended all year round, the seasonal disappearance of workers was very costly. This problem is particularly serious for coffee, whose prices are determined in the world market. This relates to why UFCo provides schooling and amenities rather than higher wages: short of matching the peak season coffee wage, which would be disastrously expensive and hard to guess, a way to prevent workers from leaving during the peak season is to provide amenities for them and their families. To explore this idea further, we use the data we collected on the foundation date of schools located within UFCo landholdings. With this information, we then use variation of the world coffee price across time. We document that during periods when coffee prices were higher, the UFCo invested more in amenities. In particular, as shown in column (1) of Table VI, a 1% increase in coffee prices is associated with an increase in the probability that the UFCo opened a school within its lands of 0.413 pp. The result is consistent with estimates that use the number of schools opened as the dependent variable, as shown in column (2) of Table VI.³⁹

Further, we leverage newly digitized special reports that, between 1946 and 1956, include detailed breakdowns of UFCo's expenditures in amenities and payroll (LaBarge

³⁷If a given census-block has no school, we assigned the children living in that location to the closest school.

³⁸The first stage of this table corresponds with the top panel of Table IV.

³⁹This result holds regardless of whether we use OLS, a negative binomial regression model, or PPML.

TABLE VI
SCHOOLS OPENED PER YEAR AND COFFEE PRICES (1899–1984).

	Prob(Opening a school) (1)	Number of schools opened (2)
In World Coffee Prices	0.413 (0.111)	1.636 (0.328)
Adjusted R^2	0.077	–
Observations	86	86

Note: Column (1) shows results using an OLS model on the probability that a school opened within UFCo lands as the dependent variable, while column (2) uses a negative binomial regression model for the number of schools opened in a given year. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by year.

(1959)). We find that expenditures in medical care, education, and total amenities are positively correlated with world coffee prices (with correlations of 0.88, 0.93, and 0.91, respectively). Moreover, the correlation between coffee prices and expenditures in amenities *as a share of total worker compensation* is 0.87. This aligns with the idea that it is competition with coffee that explains why UFCo provides schooling and amenities rather than higher wages.

The Caribbean Coast, the Pacific Coast, and the Role of Race. In the previous section, we causally documented how locations within the UFCo where workers had better outside options while the company was operating—that is, locations where workers were closer to areas that were highly suitable to grow coffee—are associated with higher living standards in 2000 and 2011. We can also ask whether outside options differ for workers near the Costa Rican Caribbean Coast and the Pacific Coast. Table K.14 documents how, indeed, UFCo households near the Pacific Coast have better living standards than their neighbors. Although these differences are not significant for all outcomes, the size of the interacted coefficients is not negligible when compared to the sign of the UFCo dummy, and differences are significant for housing and health. There are a few reasons why differences between households living on both coasts might emerge. First, consistent with Table IV, households near the Pacific are relatively closer to areas that are highly suitable to grow coffee, which increases their outside option and would lead to better living standards through the lens of our mechanism. In fact, on average UFCo households in the Pacific had a 7.42% higher outside option than their Caribbean counterparts and this difference is significant at 1% (10%) when clustering standard errors by census block (when using Conley standard errors).⁴⁰ Second, Afro-Costa Rican communities resided mainly near the Caribbean area, and faced mobility restrictions that prevented them to work at UFCo plantations on the Pacific Coast between 1934 and 1949.⁴¹ Although Afro-Cost Ricans represented a minority in the area—12% of company workers on the Caribbean Coast

⁴⁰We measure the outside option of an UFCo region depending on how close this region was to areas that grew coffee. In particular, for region $j \in \text{UFCo}$, we calculate the $\sum_{k \notin \text{UFCo}} \frac{(\text{dist}_{jk})^{-1}}{\sum_n (\text{dist}_{jn})^{-1}} \text{CoffeeIntensity}_k$, that is, the (distance-weighted) coffee suitability of non-UFCo regions near region j .

⁴¹Article 5 of a contract signed in 1934 between the Costa Rican government and the UFCo prohibited the company from employing “colored people” on the Pacific Coast between 1934 and 1949. This law was seen as a “legitimate means of protecting the racial composition of the country.” Several authors have confused this regulation with a law that prohibited people of African descent from going into the Central Valley. The latter is a misunderstanding, as such a law did not exist (Harpelle (2001)).

in 1940 (ANCR (1940))—this lower mobility might affect their outcomes.⁴² Indeed, Table K.15 shows that the gap between UFCo and non-UFCo regions is smaller conditional on the household members being classified as black or of African descent in the censuses.

Institutions and Labor Mobility. Why the UFCo did not take the approach of destroying workers' outside options? Work by Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) on labor coercion suggests an alternative approach to retain workers: preventing them from leaving or reducing their mobility. Several reasons prevented this from happening in our setting. First, throughout the 20th century, democratic institutions in Costa Rica were much stronger than in other developing countries, which possibly played a role in protecting workers' rights.⁴³ Second, the Costa Rican elite included many coffee producers who needed labor during the coffee harvesting season, which gave them an incentive to protect workers' mobility. Third, given the larger political competition in Costa Rica, there was an effort by particular political groups to enlarge their winning coalition by protecting UFCo workers (Bucheli and Kim (2012)). These circumstances were not present in other Latin American countries where the UFCo operated, like Colombia, where armed forces prevented workers from forming unions and leaving the plantations in Santa Marta and Ciénaga.⁴⁴ Today, these cities are among the poorest in the country, which does not contradict our findings: as our mechanism—labor market dynamics as an incentive for the company to invest—did not seem to be present in these cases. Finally, as discussed in more detail in Appendix L, it is worth mentioning that unions did not play a major role for most of our sample period.

This section analyzed both qualitative and quantitative evidence on the key role of labor mobility, market power, and investments in explaining the better short- and long-run outcomes within the UFCo. Later on, in Section 5.4—after ruling out other potential mechanisms in the next section—we will assess the potential of this mechanism to generate our results on economic outcomes through the lens of a model, and examine its implications via a counterfactual analysis.

5.2. Ruling-out Other Plausible Mechanisms as Main Drivers

Positively Selected Migration During UFCo's Tenure. It might have been the case that outcomes are better within the UFCo because it attracted positively selected migrants. To consider if selective migration is generating the differences in living standards between the two regions, we take four different approaches. In our first approach, we reestimate equations (1) and (2) using a restricted sample, in which we drop all migrant households. We classify a household as nonmigrant in two alternative ways: (i) if all members lived in the same location 5 years before the census took place, and (ii) if the head of household lived in the same location 5 years before the census took place. Panels C3 and C4 in Figures D.8 and D.9 show that our results remain statistically equal in all cases, and in particular, for year 1973—while the UFCo is still operating.

⁴²In terms of more recent statistics, according to the 2011 census, 8.7% of households in former UFCo plantations on the Caribbean identify themselves as of African descent, while the percentage of such households in former Pacific UFCo landholdings is 2.4%.

⁴³See Bucheli and Kim (2012) for a detailed comparison of political institutions between countries in Central America.

⁴⁴See Bucheli (2005) for more details on this coercion and the "Banana Massacre." Bucheli refers to the Colombian authorities as a "business-friendly government." The Costa Rican army, on its part, was abolished in 1948.

In our second approach, we look at observables of migrants to the UFCo sub-region where we ran our regressions, and compare them to observables of migrants to our control region in 1973 (while the UFCo was still operating). That is, we are looking exactly at migrants on both sides of the border segment where we run all our main results. As documented in Table F.8, we find that, on average, migrants to the UFCo have lower years of schooling and a lower probability of completing primary school than migrants to the control group.

The previous results suggest that, if anything, migrants to the UFCo were negatively selected, which would make our estimates a lower bound of the overall effect. There could be, however, other unobservables that differ between the types of people attracted to areas with and without the UFCo. In this sense, our estimate is akin to a LATE, because it measures the effect of, for instance, offering amenities on the people that are attracted by such amenities.

While the 1973 Population Census data is detailed and geo-referenced at the census-block level, it captures migrant patterns many years after the company began operations. To explore earlier waves of migration, our third approach resorts to earlier census data. Namely, we compare observable characteristics of migrants to UFCo regions with those of migrants to other Costa Rican regions in 1927, the earliest census for which microdata is available.⁴⁵ Consistent with the results from 1973, we find that migrants to the UFCo were negatively selected in terms of schooling. Compared to migrants to other Costa Rican regions, migrants to the UFCo were on average 6.8 pp less likely of having primary education, 1.6 pp less likely of having secondary education, and 4.7 pp less likely of being able to read and write. Moreover, the results from the 1927 Population Census also show that migrants to the UFCo regions were on average 10.3 pp less likely to own real estate than migrants that moved to other Costa Rican regions. This negative selection aligns with more recent findings like those of [Lagakos, Mobarak, and Waugh \(2018\)](#), and is robust to restricting our sample and comparing migrants to UFCo cantons with migrants to neighboring cantons around UFCo plantations only. The results of this analysis are available in Appendix H.

Our fourth approach complements the second and third ones by ruling-out that, maybe, although migrants to the UFCo accumulated less human capital than other migrants at the time, they might have been exceptional farmers (a measure that is not captured by education attainment). To explore this, we compare the UFCo effect for households engaged in the agricultural sector versus other economic sectors.⁴⁶ If ability in agricultural production is highly inheritable and selection in these abilities is driving our results, then the UFCo effect should be stronger for households engaged in the agricultural sector relative to households in other economic activities. Nevertheless, Panels D6, D7, D8, and D9 in Figure 5 show that this is not the case: For each outcome we consider, we cannot reject at the 10% level that the estimates are the same across both groups (further, the coefficients themselves are extremely similar).⁴⁷

In summary, all four approaches suggest that selective migration is unlikely to generate the observed differences between regions, and if anything, it appears that migrants to the UFCo were negatively selected.

⁴⁵For 1927, the census microdata is a representative sample geo-referenced at the canton level.

⁴⁶We consider a household as an agricultural household if any of its members works in agriculture. Our results remain unchanged if we instead consider a household as an agricultural household if its head works in agriculture.

⁴⁷Individual tables with details about each regression are available in the supplementary Online Appendix for the authors' websites.

Positively Selected Migration at the Time of Each Census. Each census contains information about individuals' place of residence 5 years before the census took place. Table N.18 shows that the migration rates in census blocks in the UFCo and the control region (just outside) are statistically equal at every point in time. Further, panels D4 and D5 in Figure 5, and panels C3 and C4 in Figures D.8 and D.9 show that all our results remain unchanged when considering only households that are not composed by migrants. This holds regardless of how we define migration: whether we consider only households where no member is a migrant, or where only the head of household is not a migrant.

Negative Spillovers From the UFCo to Neighboring Regions. Another possible concern is that negative spillovers from the UFCo to our control group generate the gap in outcomes between the regions. However, it is unlikely to be the case. First, in Appendix I, we document that in 1973, while the company was still operating, the economic outcomes for the control region (right outside the UFCo) were better than in other rural Costa Rican regions outside the UFCo. As Table I.11 shows, households in the counterfactual region had a lower probability of a UBN in housing, health, education, and consumption; and a lower probability of being poor.

Second, in the right panel of Table I.12, we show that in 1973, the accumulation of human capital was higher for individuals in the control group than in individuals in other nearby regions outside the UFCo. Individuals in the counterfactual region had 1.453 more years of schooling, were 25.9 pp more likely of completing primary education, and 2.9 pp more likely of completing secondary education. Further, the left panel of the same table documents that migrants to the control region—right outside the UFCo—were *positively* selected in terms of human capital with respect to migrants to other non-UFCo rural regions. If anything, this selection would work *against* our findings.

Third, in Appendix J, we document how public investment per capita in the region outside the UFCo boundary during the company's tenure was not significantly different from that on average Costa Rican rural areas. In particular, we gathered data on government spending per municipality from annual reports from the Comptroller General of the Republic of Costa Rica, and we compare the spending per capita between UFCo municipalities and other rural municipalities.

Thus, our control region seems like an average location—if anything, a relatively strong one within the country. Finally, Costa Rica was considered a poster child of good governance at the time and income per capita was among the highest in the area, so in this sense, the control region is particularly strong within Latin America.

5.3. Discussion

In summary, levels of investment in local amenities inside the UFCo, such as hospitals and schools, were significantly higher than public investments undertaken by the government in comparable regions. Company reports suggest that these strong investments were at least partially driven by the need to attract and maintain a sizable workforce. The latter is supported by a positive relationship between the intensity of company investments and the levels of outside options for workers in regions near the UFCo. We also document that amenities represent a larger share of a worker's compensation whenever the worker's outside option is higher. We show that these investments are likely to be the main drivers behind the gaps in living standards that we documented empirically. It is worth mentioning that this mechanism would allow us to reconcile our results with findings on the effects of colonial concessions, like Nunn (2008), Dell (2010), and Lowes and Montero (2021a).

In these cases, labor was coerced, highly immobile, and with a very low outside option. Thus, potentially, the producer extracting resources had little or no incentive to invest in local amenities or “public goods” to retain workers, and this under-provision might be partially explaining the persistent negative effects found by these studies. We also find no evidence in support of selective migration or negative spillovers from the company to neighboring regions being the main channels behind the observed differences in outcomes.

Importantly, although we document the positive effects of the UFCo in Costa Rica, one must be cautious and not overly optimistic. Given the company’s welfare effect is increasing in worker mobility, it may be *negative* if worker mobility and outside options are too low. The latter is a word of warning about how even the same company in a different setting—for instance, one with a larger degree of coercion, like what might have occurred in other Latin American countries—can lead to worse economic outcomes, and highlights how labor mobility is key in determining local outcomes.

5.4. Model

The evidence on the mechanism behind our results suggests a relationship between labor mobility, monopsony, and investments that was crucial in determining the firm’s effect. In light of this evidence, Appendix T lays out the framework and estimation of a model that incorporates these new channels, and in which labor market power relates to worker mobility. In the model, the company is a local monopsony in one location, while workers are mobile across locations.⁴⁸ Thus, *the less mobile workers are, the more inelastic the labor supply that the firm faces is*. In other words, the degree of monopsony power of the firm *within* its region depends on how mobile workers are *across* locations. To incorporate the investment patterns that we documented empirically, we assume that the local monopsonist can choose workers’ compensation bundle: a combination of wages and local amenities. These local amenities are costly for the firm, but increase workers’ utility and make them more productive.

The model is consistent with local estimates from our empirical analysis and moments of the historical data, and captures observable spatial frictions. We also use a migration gravity equation, along with an instrumental variables strategy, to obtain an estimate of the migration elasticity.

In our empirical analysis, we determined the UFCo’s effect on several local economic outcomes. One of the most useful exercises that our proposed model allows us to do is to estimate the firm’s aggregate impact on welfare, where we account for general equilibrium effects, and to conduct a counterfactual exercise to understand how this aggregate welfare effect depends on workers’ outside options and the firm’s degree of monopsony power.

Under our baseline calibration, we find that the UFCo increases aggregate welfare by 3.77%, as compared with a scenario where the UFCo region looks exactly like any other location.⁴⁹ We find it informative to compare steady states, as otherwise, our results would depend crucially on the initial labor allocation.⁵⁰

⁴⁸By local monopsonist, we mean that the UFCo is a profit maximizer and the sole employer within its location. Thus, our model departs from standard spatial models where firms are price-takers.

⁴⁹It produces a domestic good using the same technology as the locals, and the government is the provider of amenities. Note that this means we have a conservative estimate as (i) the UFCo’s land required a lot of investment before becoming productive (initially swampy and prone to mosquitoes and diseases), but we assume it is as productive as coffee regions, and (ii) in the scenario where the UFCo’s region starts producing a local good, there is a new variety entering the CES utility function.

⁵⁰This is possible given the model’s structure, which is similar in spirit to an OLG model.

In line with the mechanism we documented in Section IV, and in particular in Figure D.7, in our model, the UFCo's effect on welfare is increasing in labor mobility, which in turn is directly related to workers' outside options. If the elasticity of labor mobility is low (high), workers are relatively insensitive (sensitive) to differences in utility across regions, perceiving their outside option as relatively low (high). In fact, Section T.3 shows how the UFCo's effect can, in theory, be negative if labor is sufficiently immobile. As discussed in Section 5.1.4, this might have been the case in other Latin American countries where the company operated that are very poor today and where mobility seems to have been extremely low, or in cases documented by the literature where labor was coerced (e.g., Nunn (2008), Dell (2010), Lowes and Montero (2021a)).⁵¹ This exercise highlights the importance of the local labor market dynamics in determining how much the domestic economy might benefit (or be hurt) by large investment projects like this one.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper provides new evidence on the role of private sector companies in the development of education and health infrastructure. Understanding the implications of these large-scale projects is particularly relevant today. In the last 20 years, private investors have acquired more than 64 million acres of land in over 80 countries of Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America via leases (of up to 99 years) or purchases of farmland for agricultural investment (Cotula et al. (2009), Cotula and Vermeulen (2009)). More than 30 of these concessions have been *larger* than the UFCo's concession in Costa Rica.⁵²

We study the impact of large private investment projects on local economic development, while analyzing how these effects interact with conditions in the local economy, using evidence from the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica. In particular, we use a regression discontinuity design and find a positive and persistent effect on economic outcomes in areas where the company operated. Households in the former UFCo areas have a better satisfaction of basic needs (housing, sanitation, education, and consumption capacity) and are less likely to be poor than households in comparable locations that were not under the firm's direct influence.

Data that we collected from primary sources allowed us to test different potential mechanisms, and to find evidence that investments in physical and human capital carried out by the UFCo were likely the drivers of the positive "UFCo effect." Studying company reports, we documented that these high levels of investment were motivated by the need to attract and maintain a sizable workforce. An estimated general equilibrium model highlights how labor mobility is key in determining the sign and magnitude of the company's effect. Indeed, for relatively low elasticities, the aggregate effect of the company becomes negative, which is in line with the negative effects found by the literature studying arrangements where labor was coerced (and relatively immobile).

The economic forces we study apply to a broader set of arrangements beyond multinational corporations. There are examples of local firms, like Unilever in Britain or Ford in the U.S., using strategies similar to the ones of the UFCo (Watkins and Dalton (2019), Holmes (2015)), and examples of multinationals that do not use the same strategy, like

⁵¹In line with this narrative, as workers' outside option increases (i.e., with larger values of the labor mobility elasticity), their compensation represents a larger share of the UFCo's total profits.

⁵²This recent wave of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries—known as "land grabs"—is devoted to growing food crops and mainly driven by concerns about food security and by the biofuels boom.

Chinese multinationals in Africa that do not rely on locals and, therefore, do not need to provide them with incentives to stay in the region (Fei (2020)). This has important policy implications. For instance, policies that require multinationals to hire local workers will have the benefit of incentivizing the firms to provide local amenities. In contrast, policies that prevent or penalize large firms reduce this incentive to invest, as each individual small firm may free-ride on the others.

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