bpfbox: Simple Precise Process Confinement in eBPF

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Outline of Talk

What is eBPF?

Motivation

Architecture

Policy

Performance

Conclusion

What is eBPF?

eBPF in the Beginning

eBPF ≡ **E**xtended **B**erkley **P**acket **F**ilter...

- But it has little to do with Berkley, packets, or filtering nowadays

So then **what is eBPF?**

- A major re-write of the Linux BPF engine
  - Alexei Starovoitov and Daniel Borkman
- Merged into the Linux kernel in 2014
- The point was fine-grained, cross-layer **system introspection**

eBPF in 2020

-

Motivation

The Status Quo

- Existing process confinement mechanisms are **complex**



- Existing process confinement mechanisms are **difficult to use**



- Can we do any better?

Stakeholders as Policy Authors

- **Security experts** define the policy



- **Application authors** and **packagers** define the policy



- **End users** define the policy

???

eBPF Changes the Game

TODO

Architecture

bpfbox Architecture

- TODO: Python3 bcc
- TODO: KRSI
- TODO: Lines of userspace code
- TODO: Lines of kernelspace code
- TODO: Compare w/ SELinux, AppArmor

bpfbox Architecture



Policy

Policy at the Function Call Level

```
#![profile /sbin/mylogin]

#[func check_password]
#[func add_user]
#[allow] {
    read("/etc/passwd")
    read("/etc/shadow")
}

#[func add_user]
#[allow] {
    append("/etc/passwd")
    append("/etc/shadow")
}
```

Performance

Performance

TODO

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

TODO

Contributions

- First full policy enforcement engine written in eBPF
- Integration of **userspace** and **kernelspace** state with **LSM layer enforcement**