

CMSC 28100

Introduction to Complexity Theory

Autumn 2025
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The complexity class coNP



- Let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$
- **Definition:** $Y \in \text{coNP}$ if there exists a randomized polynomial-time Turing machine M such that for every $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$:
 - If $w \in Y$, then $\Pr[M \text{ rejects } w] = 0$
 - If $w \notin Y$, then $\Pr[M \text{ rejects } w] \neq 0$

The complexity class coNP

- Let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ and let $\bar{Y} = \{0, 1\}^* \setminus Y$
- **Fact:** $Y \in \text{NP}$ if and only if $\bar{Y} \in \text{coNP}$
- coNP is the set of complements of languages in NP


The complexity class $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$

- We have shown that $\text{FACTOR} \in \text{NP}$ and $\text{FACTOR} \in \text{coNP}$
- $\text{FACTOR} \in \text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$
- $Y \in \text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$ means that for every instance, there is a certificate
 - A certificate of membership for YES instances
 - A certificate of non-membership for NO instances

The NP vs. coNP problem


Conjecture: $\text{NP} \neq \text{coNP}$

- “ $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$ ” would mean that for every unsatisfiable circuit, there is some short [certificate](#) I could present to prove to you that a circuit is [unsatisfiable](#)
- That sounds counterintuitive! But we don’t really know



NP-completeness and $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$

- Assume $\text{NP} \neq \text{coNP}$
- Under this assumption, we will prove that there are no NP-complete languages in $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$
- This will provide evidence that FACTOR is not NP-complete



coNP is closed under reductions

- Let $Y_1, Y_2 \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$

Lemma: If $Y_1 \leq_P Y_2$ and $Y_2 \in \text{coNP}$, then $Y_1 \in \text{coNP}$

- **Proof:** Since $Y_2 \in \text{coNP}$, there is a polynomial-time “co-nondeterministic” Turing machine M that decides Y_2
- Given $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$, compute $w' = \Psi(w)$, then run M on w'

NP-completeness and $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$


- Let $Y \in \text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$

Claim: If Y is NP-complete, then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$

- **Proof:** For any $Z \in \text{NP}$, we have $Z \leq_P Y$ and $Y \in \text{coNP}$
- By the lemma, $Z \in \text{coNP}$, so $\text{NP} \subseteq \text{coNP}$
- By symmetry, we also have $\text{coNP} \subseteq \text{NP}$

Quantum computing is not a panacea

- FACTOR \in BQP, but FACTOR is probably **not** NP-complete
- In fact, it is conjectured that $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{BQP}$
- In this case, even a fully-functional quantum computer would **not** be able to solve NP-complete problems in polynomial time
- Even quantum computers have limitations



Limitations of quantum computers

- We have developed several techniques for identifying hardness
 - Undecidability
 - EXP-completeness
 - NP-completeness
- Those techniques are **all still applicable** even in a world with fully-functional quantum computers!
- Complexity theory is intended to be “future-proof” / “timeless”

Which problems
can be solved
through computation?


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
Intractability

- **Main topic of this course:** How to **identify** intractability
- **Previous few days:** How to **cope** with intractability
- **Up next:** How to **exploit** intractability

Cryptography

Public-key encryption

- How can Alice send a **private** message to Bob?




Public-key encryption scheme

- **Definition:** A simplified public-key encryption scheme is a triple (K, E, D) ,

where:

- $K \subseteq \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$ and $E, D: \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$
- For every $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and every $(k_{\text{pub}}, k_{\text{priv}}) \in K$, we have $D(k_{\text{priv}}, E(k_{\text{pub}}, w)) = w$
- E and D can be computed in polynomial time
- For every $(k_{\text{pub}}, k_{\text{priv}}) \in K$, we have $|k_{\text{pub}}| = |k_{\text{priv}}|$
 - Intuition: Bigger keys \Rightarrow better security but slower encryption / decryption



Decrypting without k_{priv}



- Let (K, E, D) be a simplified public-key encryption scheme
- **Claim:** There exists $D_{\text{Eve}}: \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ such that for every $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and every $(k_{\text{pub}}, k_{\text{priv}}) \in K$, we have

$$D_{\text{Eve}}(k_{\text{pub}}, E(k_{\text{pub}}, w)) = w$$

- **Proof:** If $E(k_{\text{pub}}, w) = E(k_{\text{pub}}, w') = y$, then $w = D(k_{\text{priv}}, y) = w'$ ✓

Complexity theory to the rescue?



- Decrypting without k_{priv} is always possible 😕
- 1970s discovery: There are public-key encryption schemes such that decrypting without k_{priv} seems to be **intractable!** 😊
 - E.g., “RSA”
- Foundational technology for internet age
- Can we **prove** that these public-key encryption schemes are secure?

Cryptography and P vs. NP



- Let (K, E, D) be a simplified public-key encryption scheme
- There is a function D_{Eve} such that $D_{\text{Eve}}(k_{\text{pub}}, E(k_{\text{pub}}, w)) = w$

Theorem: If $P = NP$, then D_{Eve} can be computed in polynomial time 😠

Cryptography and P vs. NP



Theorem: If $P = NP$, then D_{Eve} can be computed in polynomial time 😠

- **Proof:** Let $Y = \{\langle k_{\text{pub}}, y, w \rangle : \text{there exists } z \text{ such that } E(k_{\text{pub}}, wz) = y\}$
- $Y \in NP$: the plaintext is the certificate
- We are assuming $P = NP$, so therefore $Y \in P$
- Therefore, Eve can construct the plaintext **bit-by-bit** in polynomial time

Cryptography and P vs. NP

- Disclaimer: The preceding discussion of public-key encryption is **simplified**
 - E.g., where do the keys come from?
- Nevertheless, the main message is accurate:
- If $P = NP$, then secure public-key encryption is **impossible!**

Cryptography and P vs. NP

- Almost all theoretical cryptography assumes $P \neq NP$ and more!
- This might make you feel **concerned** about the uncertain foundations of computer security... 
- Or, it might make you feel more **confident** that $P \neq NP$, considering how hard people try to break cryptosystems 