# 定向覆盖模糊测试工具的设计与实现 毕业设计中期检查

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• Theory

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# What Fuzzing is?

### Defination[1]

- Fuzzing Fuzzing is the execution of the PUT using input(s) sampled from an input space (the "fuzz input space") that protrudes the expected input space of the PUT.
  - PUT: Program Under Test
- Fuzz testing Fuzz testing is the use of fuzzing to test if a PUT violates a correctness policy.
- Fuzzer A fuzzer is a program that performs fuzz testing on a PUT.
- Bug Oracle A bug oracle is a program, perhaps as part of a fuzzer, that
  determines whether a given execution of the PUT violates a specific
  correctness policy.
- Fuzz Configuration A fuzz configuration of a fuzz algorithm comprises the parameter value(s) that control(s) the fuzz algorithm.
- **Seed** A seed is a (commonly well-structured) input to the PUT, used to generate test cases by modifying it.



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### **Fuzz Testing**

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs
1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset
_{2} \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
          conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
4
          tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
          // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
          \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bu\sigma})
6
          \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
          \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
8
```

9 return B

```
1 Input: C, t<sub>limit</sub>
   Output: B // a finite set of bugs
   \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
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```

- C:a set of fuzz configurations
- t<sub>limit</sub>: timeout
- B: a set of discovered bugs

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 4 | conf \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 | tcs \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(conf) // O_{bug} is embedded in a fuzzer 6 \mathbb{B}', exectinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(conf, tcs, O_{bug}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

### Preprocess $(\mathbb{C}) \to \mathbb{C}$

- Instrumentation
  - grey-box and white-box fuzzers
  - static/dynamic(INPUTEVAL)
- Seed Selection
  - weed out potentially redundant configurations
- Seed Trimming
  - reduce the size of seeds
- Preparing a Driver Application
  - library Fuzzing, kernal Fuzzing

9 return B

```
 \begin{array}{c|c} \textbf{Input:} \; \mathbb{C}, \, t_{limit} \\ \textbf{Output:} \; \mathbb{B} \; / \; \text{a finite set of bugs} \\ \textbf{1} \; \mathbb{B} \; \leftarrow \; \varnothing \\ \textbf{2} \; \mathbb{C} \; \leftarrow \; \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) \\ \textbf{3} \; & \text{while} \; t_{elapsed} < \; t_{limit} \land \; \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) \; \text{do} \\ \textbf{4} \; & \; \text{conf} \; \leftarrow \; \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, \; t_{elapsed}, \; t_{limit}) \\ \textbf{5} \; & \; \text{tcs} \; \leftarrow \; \text{InputGen}(\textit{conf}) \\ \text{ } \; / \; \; O_{\text{bug}} \; \text{is embedded in a fuzzer} \\ \textbf{6} \; & \; \text{E}', \; \text{execinfos} \; \leftarrow \; \text{InputEval}(\textit{conf}, \; \textit{tcs}, \; O_{\textit{bug}}) \\ \textbf{7} \; & \; \text{C} \; \leftarrow \; \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, \; \textit{conf}, \; \textit{execinfos}) \\ \textbf{8} \; & \; \text{E} \; \mapsto \; \mathbb{B} \; \cup \; \mathbb{B}' \\ \textbf{9} \; \; \text{return} \; \mathbb{B} \\ \end{array}
```

#### Stop Condition

- t<sub>elapsed</sub> < t<sub>limit</sub>
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False}
   Determine whether a new fuzz
   iteration should occur

Schedule ( $\mathbb{C}, t_{\text{elapsed}}, t_{\text{limit}}) \rightarrow \texttt{conf}$ 

- Function
  - Pick important information(conf)
  - FCS Problem
  - exploration: Spent time on gathering more accurate information on each configuration to inform future decisions
  - exploitation: Spent time on fuzzing the configurations that are currently believed to lead to more favorable outcomes

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
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    B ← Ø

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```

INPUTGEN (conf) $\rightarrow$  tcs

- function
  - Generate testcases
- classification
  - Generation-based(Model-based)
  - Mutation-based(Model-less)
- White-box Fuzzers: symbolic execution

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```
InputEval (conf, tcs, O_{bug})
      \to \mathbb{B}', execinfos
```

- **Fuzzing PUT** 
  - -tcs
  - ℝ'
- Feedback Information
  - conf, tcs
  - execinfos (tcs,crashes,stack backtrace hash,edge coverage,etc.)

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Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
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```

```
    CONFUPDATE (C, conf,

    execinfos) \rightarrow \mathbb{C}
    - Update Fuzz
    Configuration(distinguishablity)
    - Seed Pool Update
• \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}' \to \mathbb{B}
```

- Update Bugs Set

9 return B

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#### stop condition

- t<sub>elapsed</sub> < t<sub>limit</sub>
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False} - Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

Pre-Knowledge

Motivation

### *The amount of collected information defines the color of a fuzzer[1].*

```
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- program instrumentation
  - static
  - dynamic
- processor traces
- system call usage
- etc.

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```

### **Program Instrumentation**

- Static
  - source code
  - intermediate code
  - binary-level
- Dynamic

### **Program Instrumentation**

- Static
- Dynamic
  - dynamically-linked libraries
  - execution feedback: branch coverage, new path, etc.
  - race condition bugs: thread scheduling

### Classification of Fuzzing

- Black-box Fuzzing
  - no program analysis, no feedback
- White-box Fuzzing
  - mostly program analysis
- Grey-box Fuzzing
  - no program analysis, but feedback


# Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

Background

### • Black-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].

-No program analysis, no feedback






# Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

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
- You have no view of the PUT,but have some view of the input/output domain
- Fuzzing congfigurations are not changed according to some feedback - some fuzzer may add the testcases to seed pool
- Not effective

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### White-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.




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White-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving. Test cases




- You have the view of the PUT state(CFG,CG)
- Heavy-weight Program analysis (effective but not efficient!)

# Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

#### Grey-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that can obtain *some* information internal to the PUT and/or its executions to generates test cases[1].

- Uses only lightweight instrumentation to glean some program structure
- And coverage feedback





### **Grey-box Fuzzing is frequently used**

- State-of-the-art in automated vulnerability detection
- Extremely efficient coverage-based input generation
  - All program analysis before/at instrumentation time.
  - Start with a seed corpus, choose a seed file, fuzz it.
  - Add to corpus only if new input increases coverage.



### **Directed Fuzzing has many applications**

- Patch Testing: reach changed statements
- Crash Reproduction: exercise stack trace
- SA Report Verification: reach "dangerous" location
- Information Flow Detection: exercise source-sink pairs



Background

# Why Directed Grey-box Fuzzing?

## **Directed Fuzzing**

- Goal:reach a specific target
  - Target Locations: the line number in the source code or the virtual memory address at the binary level[2].
  - Target Bugs: use-after-free vulnerabilities, etc.

#### **DSE:**classical constraint satisfaction problem

- uses program analysis and constraint solving to generate inputs that systematically and effectively explore the state space of feasible paths[3].
- Program analysis to identify program paths that reach given program locations.
- Symbolic Execution to derive path conditions for any of the identified paths.
- Constraint Solving to find an input



 $(x>y) \land (x+y>10)$ 

 $= \neg (x>v) \land (x+v>10)$ 

- Effectiveness comes at the cost of efficiency
- Heavy-weight program analysis




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Pre-Knowledge

Research Status



### Genealogy tracing significant fuzzers' lineage<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>paper[1]-Figure1

Background 00000000000

#### Representative Work

- AFLGo(2017)[4]
- Hawkeye(2018)[5]
- Github Repository:awesome-directed-fuzzing https://github.com/strongcourage/awesome-directed-fuzzing

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- [2] WANG P, ZHOU X, LU K, et al. The Progress, Challenges, and Perspectives of Directed Greybox Fuzzing[EB]. arXiv, 2022.
- [3] MA K-K, YIT PHANG K, FOSTER J S, et al. Directed symbolic execution[C] // Static Analysis: 18th International Symposium, SAS 2011, Venice, Italy, September 14-16, 2011. Proceedings 18. 2011: 95 - 111.
- [4] BÖHME M, PHAM V-T, NGUYEN M-D, et al. Directed Greybox Fuzzing[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Dallas Texas USA: ACM,  $2017 \cdot 2329 - 2344$ 
  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134020.

[5] CHEN H, XUE Y, LI Y, et al. Hawkeye: Towards a Desired Directed Grey-Box Fuzzer[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Toronto Canada: ACM, 2018: 2095-2108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243849.

Background

# Thanks!