定向覆盖模糊测试工具的设计与实现 毕业设计中期检查

雷尚远

南京邮电大学计算机学院

2023年4月17日





- 1 Background
- 2 Theory
- **3** Work
- 4 References

南京邮电大学计算机学院

Pre-Knowledge

- 1 Background Pre-Knowledge

南京邮电大学计算机学院

What Fuzzing is?

Defination[1]

- Fuzzing Fuzzing is the execution of the PUT using input(s) sampled from an input space (the "fuzz input space") that protrudes the expected input space of the PUT.
 - PUT: Program Under Test
- Fuzz testing Fuzz testing is the use of fuzzing to test if a PUT violates a correctness policy.
- Fuzzer A fuzzer is a program that performs fuzz testing on a PUT.
- Bug Oracle A bug oracle is a program, perhaps as part of a fuzzer, that
 determines whether a given execution of the PUT violates a specific
 correctness policy.
- Fuzz Configuration A fuzz configuration of a fuzz algorithm comprises the parameter value(s) that control(s) the fuzz algorithm.
- **Seed** A seed is a (commonly well-structured) input to the PUT, used to generate test cases by modifying it.



0000000000

Fuzz Testing

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs
1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset
_{2} \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
          conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
4
          tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
          // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
          \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bu\sigma})
6
          \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
          \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
8
```

9 return B

```
1 Input: C, t<sub>limit</sub>
 2 Output: B // a finite set of bugs
   \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
   while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
             \texttt{conf} \leftarrow \texttt{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, \, t_{\textit{elapsed}}, \, t_{\textit{limit}})
 7
             tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
             // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
             \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bus})
 8
             \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
 9
             \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
11 return B
```

- C:a set of fuzz configurations
- t_{limit}: timeout
- B: a set of discovered bugs

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 4 \text{conf} \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 \text{tcs} \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(\textit{conf}) // O_{bug} is embedded in a fuzzer 6 \mathbb{B}', exectinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(\textit{conf}, \textit{tcs}, O_{bug}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, \textit{conf}, \textit{execinfos}) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

Preprocess $(\mathbb{C}) o \mathbb{C}$

- Instrumentation
 - grey-box and white-box fuzzers
 - static/dynamic(INPUTEVAL)
- Seed Selection
 - weed out potentially redundant configurations
- Seed Trimming
 - reduce the size of seeds
- Preparing a Driver Application
 - library Fuzzing, kernal Fuzzing

9 return B

Stop Condition

- t_{elapsed} < t_{limit}
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False}
 Determine whether a new fuzz
 iteration should occur

Schedule ($\mathbb{C}, t_{\text{elapsed}}, t_{\text{limit}}) \rightarrow \texttt{conf}$

- Function
 - Pick important information(conf)
 - FCS Problem
 - exploration: Spent time on gathering more accurate information on each configuration to inform future decisions
 - exploitation: Spent time on fuzzing the configurations that are currently believed to lead to more favorable outcomes

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs

    B ← Ø

_{2} \mathbb{C}\leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
            conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
           tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
           // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
           \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bug})
6
           \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
7
           \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
9 return B
```

INPUTGEN (conf) \rightarrow tcs

function

- Generate testcases

classification

- Generation-based(Model-based)
- Mutation-based(Model-less)
- White-box Fuzzers: symbolic execution

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs

    B ← Ø

_{2} \mathbb{C}\leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\texttt{elapsed}} < t_{\texttt{limit}} \land \texttt{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
            conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
           tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
           // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
           \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bug})
6
           \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
7
           \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
9 return B
```

```
InputEval (conf, tcs, O_{bug})
      \to \mathbb{B}', execinfos
```

- **Fuzzing PUT**
 - tcs
- ℝ'
- Feedback Information
 - conf, tcs
 - execinfos (tcs,crashes,stack backtrace hash,edge coverage,etc.)

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: B // a finite set of bugs

    B ← Ø

_{2} \mathbb{C}\leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
           conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
           tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
           // Obug is embedded in a fuzzer
           \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bug})
6
           \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
7
           \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

```
    CONFUPDATE (C, conf,

    execinfos) \rightarrow \mathbb{C}
    - Update Fuzz
    Configuration(distinguishablity)
    - Seed Pool Update
• \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}' \to \mathbb{B}
```

- Update Bugs Set

9 return B

stop condition

- t_{elapsed} < t_{limit}
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False}
 Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

Pre-Knowledge

Motivation

Classification

The amount of collected information defines the color of a fuzzer[1].

- program instrumentation
 - static
 - dynamic
- processor traces
- system call usage
- etc.

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 4 conf \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 tcs \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(\textit{conf}) // O_{bug} is embedded in a fuzzer 6 \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(\textit{conf}, \textit{tcs}, O_{bug}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, \textit{conf}, \textit{execinfos}) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}' 9 return \mathbb{B}
```

Program Instrumentation

- Static
 - source code
 - intermediate code
 - binary-level
- Dynamic

Program Instrumentation

- Static
- Dynamic
 - dynamically-linked libraries
 - execution feedback: branch coverage, new path, etc.
 - race condition bugs: thread scheduling


Classification of Fuzzing

- Black-box Fuzzing
 - no program analysis, no feedback
- White-box Fuzzing
 - mostly program analysis
- Grey-box Fuzzing
 - no program analysis, but feedback

• Black-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].

-No program analysis, no feedback




<u>೧೧೧00000</u>000

Black-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].

- No program analysis, no feedback




- You have no view of the PUT,but have some view of the input/output domain
- Fuzzing congfigurations are not changed according to some feedback - some fuzzer may add the testcases to seed pool
- Not effective

00000000000

White-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.




Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

• White-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.




- You have the view of the PUT state(CFG,CG)
- Heavy-weight Program analysis (effective but not efficient!)

Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

Grey-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that can obtain *some* information internal to the PUT and/or its executions to generates test cases[1].

- Uses only lightweight instrumentation to glean some program structure
- And coverage feedback



Grey-box Fuzzing is frequently used

- **State-of-the-art** in automated vulnerability detection
- Extremely efficient coverage-based input generation
 - All program analysis before/at instrumentation time.
 - Start with a seed corpus, choose a seed file, fuzz it.
 - Add to corpus only if new input increases coverage.



Directed Fuzzing has many applications

- Patch Testing: reach changed statements
- Crash Reproduction: exercise stack trace
- SA Report Verification: reach "dangerous" location
- Information Flow Detection: exercise source-sink pairs



Background


Why Directed Grey-box Fuzzing?

Directed Fuzzing

- Goal:reach a specific target
 - Target Locations: the line number in the source code or the virtual memory address at the binary level[2].
 - Target Bugs: use-after-free vulnerabilities, etc.

DSE:classical constraint satisfaction problem

- uses program analysis and constraint solving to generate inputs that systematically and effectively explore the state space of feasible paths[3].
- Program analysis to identify program paths that reach given program locations.
- Symbolic Execution to derive path conditions for any of the identified paths.
- Constraint Solving to find an input



 $\varphi_1 = (x>y) \wedge (x+y>10)$ $\varphi_2 = \neg (x>y) \wedge (x+y>10)$

- Effectiveness comes at the cost of efficiency
- Heavy-weight program analysis



00000000000

Background


Pre-Knowledge

Research Status



南京邮电大学计算机学院

Genealogy tracing significant fuzzers' lineage¹



¹paper[1]-Figure1

Background 00000000000

Representative Work

- AFLGo(2017)[4]
- Hawkeye(2018)[5]
- Github Repository:awesome-directed-fuzzing https://github.com/strongcourage/awesome-directed-fuzzing



Background 0000000000

- 1 Background
- 2 Theory AFLGo
- **3** Work
- 4 References

- 1 Background
- 2 Theory AFLGo
- **3** Work
- 4 References

OverView

Directed Grey-box Fuzzing

```
Input: S// a finite set of seeds
   Input: \mathbb{T}// a finite set of targer sits
   Output: S' // a finite set of buggy seeds
1 S' \leftarrow \emptyset
2 SeedQueue ← S
3 Graphs ← GraphExt (Code)
4 BBdistance \leftarrow DisCalcu(\mathbb{T}, Graphs)
5 while true do
        s \leftarrow Dequeue(SeedQueue)
        e \leftarrow \texttt{AssinEnergy}(s, t_{\textit{elapsed}}, \textit{BBdistance})
        for i \leftarrow 1 to e do
 8
              s' \leftarrow Mutation(s)
              trace \leftarrow Execution(s')
10
              if s' crashes then \mathbb{S}' \leftarrow \mathbb{S}' \cup \mathbf{s}'
11
              if IsIntersting(s') then
12
                   distance \leftarrow SeedEva(trace, BBdistance)
13
                   SeedQueue \leftarrow SortInser(distance,s',SeedQueue)
14
        if Siganl then break
15
```

16 return S'

- Background
- 2 Theory
- **3** Work
- 4 References

南京邮电大学计算机学院

- 1 Background
- **3** Work
- 4 References

南京邮电大学计算机学院

- [1] MANÈS V J, HAN H, HAN C, et al. The art, science, and engineering of fuzzing: A survey[J]. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019, 47(11): 2312-2331.
- [2] WANG P, ZHOU X, LU K, et al. The Progress, Challenges, and Perspectives of Directed Greybox Fuzzing[EB]. arXiv, 2022.
- [3] MA K-K, YIT PHANG K, FOSTER J S, et al. Directed symbolic execution[C] // Static Analysis: 18th International Symposium, SAS 2011, Venice, Italy, September 14-16, 2011. Proceedings 18. 2011: 95 - 111.
- [4] BÖHME M, PHAM V-T, NGUYEN M-D, et al. Directed Greybox Fuzzing[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Dallas Texas USA: ACM, $2017 \cdot 2329 - 2344$

http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134020.

Background

[5] CHEN H, XUE Y, LI Y, et al. Hawkeye: Towards a Desired Directed Grey-Box Fuzzer[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Toronto Canada: ACM, 2018: 2095-2108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243849.

Background

Thanks!