# 定向覆盖模糊测试工具的设计与实现 毕业设计中期检查

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- 1 Background
- 2 Theory
- **3** Work
- 4 References

Pre-Knowledge

### Defination[1]

- Fuzzing Fuzzing is the execution of the PUT using input(s) sampled from an input space (the "fuzz input space") that protrudes the expected input space of the PUT.
  - PUT: Program Under Test
- Fuzz testing Fuzz testing is the use of fuzzing to test if a PUT violates a correctness policy.
- Fuzzer A fuzzer is a program that performs fuzz testing on a PUT.
- **Bug Oracle** A bug oracle is a program, perhaps as part of a fuzzer, that determines whether a given execution of the PUT violates a specific correctness policy.
- Fuzz Configuration A fuzz configuration of a fuzz algorithm comprises the parameter value(s) that control(s) the fuzz algorithm.
- Seed A seed is a (commonly well-structured) input to the PUT, used to generate test cases by modifying it.



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### **Fuzz Testing**

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs
1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset
_{2} \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
          conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
4
          tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
          // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
          \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bu\sigma})
6
          \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
          \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
8
```

9 return B

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```
1 Input: C, t<sub>limit</sub>
   Output: B // a finite set of bugs
   \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
   while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
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             \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
11 return B
```

- C:a set of fuzz configurations
- t<sub>limit</sub>: timeout
- B: a set of discovered bugs

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```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 4 \text{conf} \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 \text{tcs} \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(\textit{conf}) // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer 6 \mathbb{B}', exectinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(\textit{conf}, \textit{tcs}, O_{\textit{bug}}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, \textit{conf}, \textit{execinfos}) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

#### Preprocess $(\mathbb{C}) \to \mathbb{C}$

- Instrumentation
  - grey-box and white-box fuzzers
  - static/dynamic(INPUTEVAL)
- Seed Selection
- weed out potentially redundant configurations
- Seed Trimming
  - reduce the size of seeds
- Preparing a Driver Application
  - library Fuzzing, kernal Fuzzing

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Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs

    B ← Ø

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```

#### Stop Condition

- t<sub>elapsed</sub> < t<sub>limit</sub>
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False} - Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

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Schedule ( $\mathbb{C}, t_{\text{elapsed}}, t_{\text{limit}}) \rightarrow \texttt{conf}$ 

- Function
  - Pick important information(conf)
  - FCS Problem
  - exploration: Spent time on gathering more accurate information on each configuration to inform future decisions
  - exploitation: Spent time on fuzzing the configurations that are currently believed to lead to more favorable outcomes

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INPUTGEN (conf) $\rightarrow$  tcs

#### function

- Generate testcases

#### classification

- Generation-based(Model-based)
- Mutation-based(Model-less)
- White-box Fuzzers: symbolic execution

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```

```
InputEval (conf, tcs, O_{bug})
      \to \mathbb{B}', execinfos
```

- **Fuzzing PUT** 
  - tcs
  - ℝ'
- Feedback Information
  - conf, tcs
  - execinfos (tcs,crashes,stack backtrace hash,edge coverage,etc.)

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Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: B // a finite set of bugs

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```

```
    CONFUPDATE (C, conf,

    execinfos) \rightarrow \mathbb{C}
    - Update Fuzz
    Configuration(distinguishablity)
    - Seed Pool Update
• \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}' \to \mathbb{B}
    - Update Bugs Set
```

9 return B

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```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
    Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs
  \mathbb{R} \leftarrow \emptyset
   \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
   while t_{\tt elapsed} < t_{\tt limit} \land {\tt Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
            conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
            tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
            // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
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            \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
9 return B
```

#### stop condition

- t<sub>elapsed</sub> < t<sub>limit</sub>
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False} - Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

Background

- Pre-Knowledge
- Motivation

Research Status

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### Classification

Background

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*The amount of collected information defines the color of a fuzzer[1].* 

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Input: C, t<sub>limit</sub>
    Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs
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- program instrumentation
  - static
  - dynamic
- processor traces
- system call usage
- etc.

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#### **Program Instrumentation**

- Static
  - source code
  - intermediate code
  - binary-level
- Dynamic

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```

#### **Program Instrumentation**

- Static
- Dynamic
  - dynamically-linked libraries
  - execution feedback: branch coverage, new path, etc.
  - race condition bugs: thread scheduling

#### Classification of Fuzzing

- Black-box Fuzzing
  - no program analysis, no feedback
- White-box Fuzzing
  - mostly program analysis
- Grey-box Fuzzing
  - no program analysis, but feedback




# Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

### • Black-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].

-No program analysis, no feedback






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
- You have no view of the PUT,but have some view of the input/output domain
- Fuzzing congfigurations are not changed according to some feedback - some fuzzer may add the testcases to seed pool
- Not effective

### Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

#### White-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.




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White-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving. Test cases




- You have the view of the PUT state(CFG,CG)
- Heavy-weight Program analysis (effective but not efficient!)

# Why Grey-box Fuzzing?

#### Grey-box Fuzzing

**Defination:** techniques that can obtain *some* information internal to the PUT and/or its executions to generates test cases[1].

- Uses only lightweight instrumentation to glean some program structure
- And coverage feedback





Background <u>೧೧೧00000</u>000

#### **Grey-box Fuzzing is frequently used**

- State-of-the-art in automated vulnerability detection
- Extremely efficient coverage-based input generation
  - All program analysis before/at instrumentation time.
  - Start with a seed corpus, choose a seed file, fuzz it.
  - Add to corpus only if new input increases coverage.



### **Directed Fuzzing has many applications**

- Patch Testing: reach changed statements
- Crash Reproduction: exercise stack trace
- SA Report Verification: reach "dangerous" location
- **Information Flow Detection**: exercise source-sink pairs



# Why Directed Grey-box Fuzzing?

# **Directed Fuzzing**

- Goal:reach a specific target
  - Target Locations: the line number in the source code or the virtual memory address at the binary level[2].
  - Target Bugs: use-after-free vulnerabilities, etc.

#### **DSE:**classical constraint satisfaction problem

- uses program analysis and constraint solving to generate inputs that systematically and effectively explore the state space of feasible paths[3].
- Program analysis to identify program paths that reach given program locations.
- Symbolic Execution to derive path conditions for any of the identified paths.
- Constraint Solving to find an input



 $(x>y) \land (x+y>10)$ 


 $= \neg (x>v) \land (x+v>10)$ 

- Effectiveness comes at the cost of efficiency
- Heavy-weight program analysis



- Pre-Knowledge
- Research Status

### Genealogy tracing significant fuzzers' lineage<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>paper[1]-Figure1



#### **Representative Work**

Background

- AFLGo(2017)[4]
- Hawkeye(2018)[5]

Theory ●○○○○○

- Background
- 2 Theory
  AFLGo
- **3** Work
- 4 References

- Background
- 2 Theory AFLGo
- 3 Work
- 4 References



#### **Directed Fuzzing as optimisation problem!**

Theory

- Instrumentation Time
  - 1 Extract call graph (CG) and control-flow graphs (CFGs).
  - 2 For each BB, compute distance to target locations.
  - 3 Instrument program to aggregate distance values.
- Runtime
  - 1 collect coverage and distance information, and
  - 2 decide how long to be fuzzed based on distance.
    - If input is closer to the targets, it is fuzzed for longer.
    - If input is further away from the targets, it is fuzzed for shorter.



Theory

### OverView

#### **AFLGo Architecture**



### Algorithm

### Directed Grey-box Fuzzing

```
Input: S // a finite set of seeds
   Input: \mathbb{T}// a finite set of targer sits
   Output: \mathbb{S}' // a finite set of buggy seeds
1 S' \leftarrow \emptyset
2 SeedQueue \leftarrow \mathbb{S}
3 Graphs ← GraphExt (Code)
  BBdistance \leftarrow \mathtt{DisCalcu}(\mathbb{T}, Graphs)
5 while !siganl do
        s \leftarrow Dequeue(SeedQueue)
        e \leftarrow \texttt{AssinEnergy}(s, t_{elapsed}, \textit{BBdistance})
7
        for i \leftarrow 1 to e do
8
              s' \leftarrow Mutation(s)
9
              trace \leftarrow Execution(s')
10
              if s' crashes then \mathbb{S}' \leftarrow \mathbb{S}' \cup \mathbf{s}'
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              if IsIntersting(s') then
12
                    distance \leftarrow SeedEva(trace, BBdistance)
13
                    SeedQueue \leftarrow SortInser(distance,s',SeedQueue)
14
```

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15 return S'

Background


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• Function-level target distance<sup>2</sup>:using call graph (CG)


Theory

$$d_f(n,T_f) = \begin{cases} \text{undefined}, & \text{if } R(n,T_f) = \varnothing \\ [\sum_{t_f \in R(n,T_f)} d_f(n,t_f)^{-1}]^{-1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


- Function-level target distance:using call graph (CG)
- 1 Identify target functions in CG




- Function-level target distance: using call graph (CG)
- 1 Identify target functions in CG
- 2 For each function, compute the harmonic mean of the length of the shortest path to targets



(a)arithmetic mean





Background


- Function-level target distance:using call graph (CG)
- BB-level target distance <sup>2</sup>:using control-flow graphs (CFG)

$$d_b(m,T_b) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } m \in T_b \\ c \cdot \underset{n \in N(m)}{min} (d_f(n,T_f)), & \text{if } m \in T \\ [\sum_{t \in T} (d_b(m,t) + d_b(t,T_b))^{-1}]^{-1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


2


- N (m) is the set of functions called by basic block m
- T is the set of basic blocks in control-flow graph

- Function-level target distance:using call graph (CG)
- BB-level target distance : using control-flow graphs (CFG)
- Identify **target BBs** and assign distance 0 (none in function b)




- Function-level target distance: using call graph (CG)
- BB-level target distance : using control-flow graphs (CFG)
- 1 Identify target BBs and assign distance 0
- 2 Identify BBs that call function and assign 10\*FLTD






CFG for function b

- Function-level target distance: using call graph (CG)
- BB-level target distance : using control-flow graphs (CFG)
- 1 Identify target BBs and assign distance 0
- 2 Identify BBs that call function and assign 10\*FLTD
- 3 For each BB, compute harmonic mean of (length of shortest path to any function-calling BB + 10\*FLTD).



- Function-level target distance: using call graph (CG)
- BB-level target distance : using control-flow graphs (CFG)
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- 3 For each BB, compute harmonic mean of (length of shortest path to any function-calling BB + 10\*FLTD).



## Runtime

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- 1 Background
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- [2] WANG P, ZHOU X, LU K, et al. The Progress, Challenges, and Perspectives of Directed Greybox Fuzzing[EB]. arXiv, 2022.
- [3] MA K-K, YIT PHANG K, FOSTER J S, et al. Directed symbolic execution[C] // Static Analysis: 18th International Symposium, SAS 2011, Venice, Italy, September 14-16, 2011. Proceedings 18. 2011: 95 - 111.
- [4] BÖHME M, PHAM V-T, NGUYEN M-D, et al. Directed Greybox Fuzzing[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Dallas Texas USA: ACM,  $2017 \cdot 2329 - 2344$ http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134020.

Background

[5] CHEN H, XUE Y, LI Y, et al. Hawkeye: Towards a Desired Directed Grey-Box Fuzzer[C/OL] // Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Toronto Canada: ACM, 2018: 2095-2108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243849.

Background

# Thanks!