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2023年4月17日



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What Fuzzing is?

Defination[1]

- Fuzzing Fuzzing is the execution of the PUT using input(s) sampled from an input space (the "fuzz input space") that protrudes the expected input space of the PUT.
 - PUT: Program Under Test
- Fuzz testing Fuzz testing is the use of fuzzing to test if a PUT violates a correctness policy.
- Fuzzer A fuzzer is a program that performs fuzz testing on a PUT.
- **Bug Oracle** A bug oracle is a program, perhaps as part of a fuzzer, that determines whether a given execution of the PUT violates a specific correctness policy.
- Fuzz Configuration A fuzz configuration of a fuzz algorithm comprises the parameter value(s) that control(s) the fuzz algorithm.
- Seed A seed is a (commonly well-structured) input to the PUT, used to generate test cases by modifying it.



What Fuzzing is?

Fuzz Testing

4 D F 4 D F 4 E F 4 E F 4) Q (*

```
Input: C, t<sub>limit</sub>
utuput: B // a finite set of bugs
B ← Ø
C ← Preprocess(C)
while t<sub>elapsed</sub> < t<sub>limit</sub> ∧ Continue(C) do
conf ← Schedule(C, t<sub>elapsed</sub>, t<sub>limit</sub>)
tcs ← InputGen(conf)
// O<sub>bug</sub> is embedded in a fuzzer
B', execinfos ← InputEval(conf, tcs, O<sub>bug</sub>)
C ← ConfUpdate(C, conf, execinfos)
B ← B ∪ B'
### Teturn B
```

- C:a set of fuzz configurations
- t_{limit}: timeout
- B: a set of discovered bugs

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 4 \text{conf} \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 \text{tcs} \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(conf) // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer 6 \mathbb{B}', exectinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(conf, tcs, O_{bug}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

Preprocess $(\mathbb{C}) o \mathbb{C}$

- Instrumentation
 - grey-box and white-box fuzzers
 - static/dynamic(INPUTEVAL)
 - Seed Selection
 - weed out potentially redundant configurations
- Seed Trimming
 - reduce the size of seeds
- Preparing a Driver Application
 - library Fuzzing, kernal Fuzzing

9 return B

定向覆盖模糊测试工具的设计与实现

Stop Condition

- t_{elapsed} < t_{limit}
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False}
 Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 

1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset 
2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C}) 
3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do 

conf \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 
5 tcs \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(conf) 
// O_{bug} is embedded in a fuzzer 

B', execinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(conf, tcs, O_{bug}) 
7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos) 
8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
```

Schedule ($\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}$) ightarrow conf

- Function
 - Pick important information(conf)
 - FCS Problem
 - exploration: Spent time on gathering more accurate information on each configuration to inform future decisions
 - exploitation: Spent time on fuzzing the configurations that are currently believed to lead to more favorable outcomes

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs

1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \varnothing
2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\text{elapsed}} < t_{\text{limit}} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do

4 | conf \leftarrow \text{Schedule}(\mathbb{C}, t_{\text{elapsed}}, t_{\text{limit}})
5 | tcs \leftarrow \text{InputGen}(conf) // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer

6 | \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow \text{InputEval}(conf, tcs, O_{\text{bug}})
7 | \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
8 | \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
9 return \mathbb{B}
```

INPUTGEN (conf) \rightarrow tcs

function

- Generate testcases

classification

- Generation-based(Model-based)
- Mutation-based(Model-less)
- White-box Fuzzers: symbolic execution

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit}
   Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs

    B ← Ø

_{2} \mathbb{C}\leftarrow \mathtt{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\texttt{elapsed}} < t_{\texttt{limit}} \land \texttt{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
            conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
           tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf)
5
           // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
           \mathbb{B}', execinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bug})
6
           \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \texttt{ConfUpdate}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
7
           \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
9 return B
```

```
InputEval (conf, tcs, O_{bug})
     \to \mathbb{B}', execinfos
Fuzzing PUT
- tcs
- ℝ'
Feedback Information
```

- conf, tcs
- execinfos (tcs,crashes,stack backtrace hash,edge coverage,etc.)

```
    CONFUPDATE (C, conf, execinfos) → C
    Update Fuzz
    Configuration(distinguishablity)
    Seed Pool Update
    B∪B'→B
    Update Bues Set
```

9 return B

stop condition

- t_{elapsed} < t_{limit}
- CONTINUE (ℂ) → {True, False}
 Determine whether a new fuzz iteration should occur

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The amount of collected information defines the color of a fuzzer[1].

- program instrumentation
 - static
 - dynamic
- processor traces
- system call usage
- etc.

Program Instrumentation

- Static
 - source code
 - intermediate code
 - binary-level
 - Dynamic

```
Input: \mathbb{C}, t_{limit} Output: \mathbb{B} // a finite set of bugs 1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset 2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow Preprocess(\mathbb{C}) 3 while t_{elapsed} < t_{limit} \land Continue(\mathbb{C}) do 4 conf \leftarrow Schedule(\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit}) 5 tcs \leftarrow InputGen(conf) // O_{bug} is embedded in a fuzzer \mathbb{B}', exectinfos \leftarrow InputEval(conf, tcs, O_{bug}) 7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow ConfUpdate(\mathbb{C}, conf, exectinfos) 8 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}' 9 return \mathbb{B}
```

Program Instrumentation

- Static
- Dynamic
 - dynamically-linked libraries
 - execution feedback: branch coverage, new path, etc.
 - race condition bugs: thread scheduling


Classification of Fuzzing

- Black-box Fuzzing
 - no program analysis, no feedback
- White-box Fuzzing
 - mostly program analysis
- Grey-box Fuzzing
 - no program analysis, but feedback

Black-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].


-No program analysis, no feedback



Black-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that do not see the internals of the PUT, and can observe only the input/output behavior of the PUT, treating it as a black-box[1].

- No program analysis, no feedback




- You have no view of the PUT,but have some view of the input/output domain
- Fuzzing congfigurations are not changed according to some feedback - some fuzzer may add the testcases to seed pool
- Not effective

White-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.






White-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that generates test cases by analyzing the internals of the PUT and the information gathered when executing the PUT[1].

- Requires heavy-weight program analysis and constraint solving.




- You have the view of the PUT state(CFG,CG)
- Program analysis (effective but not efficient!)



Grey-box Fuzzing

Defination: techniques that can obtain *some* information internal to the PUT and/or its executions to generates test cases[1].

- Uses only lightweight instrumentation to glean some program structure
- And coverage feedback



Grey-box Fuzzing is frequently used

- State-of-the-art in automated vulnerability detection
- Extremely efficient coverage-based input generation
 - All program analysis before/at instrumentation time.
 - Start with a seed corpus, choose a seed file, fuzz it.
 - Add to corpus only if new input increases coverage.



Why Directed Grey-box Fuzzing?

Directed Fuzzing has many applications

- Patch Testing: reach changed statements
- Crash Reproduction: exercise stack trace
- SA Report Verification: reach "dangerous" location
- Information Flow Detection: exercise source-sink pairs




Why Directed Grey-box Fuzzing?

Directed Fuzzing

- Goal:reach a specific target
 - Target Locations: the line number in the source code or the virtual memory address at the binary level[2].
 - Target Bugs: use-after-free vulnerabilities, etc.

DSE:classical constraint satisfaction problem

- uses program analysis and constraint solving to generate inputs that systematically and effectively explore the state space of feasible paths[3].
- Program analysis to identify program paths that reach given program locations.
- Symbolic Execution to derive path conditions for any of the identified paths.
- Constraint Solving to find an input



 $\varphi_1 = (x>y) \wedge (x+y>10)$ $\varphi_2 = \neg (x>y) \wedge (x+y>10)$ 1 Background

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Why Directed Grey-Box Fuzz?

• 大家都会 LATFX, 好多学校都有自己的 Beamer 主题

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Why Directed Grey-Box Fuzz?

- 大家都会 IATEX, 好多学校都有自己的 Beamer 主题
- 中文支持请选择 XelATFX 编译选项



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- [1] MANÈS V J, HAN H, HAN C, et al. The art, science, and engineering of fuzzing: A survey[J]. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019, 47(11): 2312–2331.
- [2] WANG P, ZHOU X, LU K, et al. The Progress, Challenges, and Perspectives of Directed Greybox Fuzzing[EB]. arXiv, 2022.
- [3] MA K-K, YIT PHANG K, FOSTER J S, et al. Directed symbolic execution[C] // Static Analysis: 18th International Symposium, SAS 2011, Venice, Italy, September 14-16, 2011. Proceedings 18. 2011: 95-111.

Thanks!