Malware Analysis

Static n Dynamic Tools

Class

11/12 16:30 - *Malware Analysis*

Class 3.1.2

15/12 16:30 - Anti-Analysis Techniques


Class 3.1.3

18/12 16:30 - Q&A - https://bit.ly/QA ODC 1711

Class 3.1.2

22/12 16:30 - Q&A - https://bit.ly/QA ODC 1711


Class 3.1.3




Malware Analysis

Static n Dynamic Tools

Static vs Dynamic Analysis





Static vs Dynamic Analysis

Static

Pros: high code coverage

Cons: obfuscation, labor-intensive


Dynamic

Pros: no semantic gap to be reversed with human skills

Cons: low code coverage, can be evaded

Static and Dynamic Analysis


The reverse engineering process is a **sequence** of **static** and **dynamic** analysis that slowly **refine** your knowledge about the malware sample.



Static Analysis

Understand the functionalities of a binary looking at its code.

- Disassemble instructions
- Recover CFG
- Recover Functions
- Recover Types
- Decompile
- Fingerprints



High-level and Machine Code

```
< <stdio.h>
Developer
         e <stdlib.h>
      int foo(int a, int b) {
      int c = 14:
      c = (a + b) * c;
       return c;
      int main(int argc, char * argv[]) {
      int avar;
      int bvar;
      int cvar;
       char * str:
       avar = atoi(argv[1]);
       cvar = foo(avar, bvar);
       gets(str);
      printf("foo(%d, %d) = %d\n", avar, bvar, cvar);
       return 0;
Compiler
         .cfi startproc
         pushl %ebp
          .cfi def cfa offset 8
         .cfi offset 5, -8
         movl %esp, %ebp
          .cfi def cfa register 5
         andl $-16, %esp
         subl $32, %esp
             12(%ebp), %eax
             $4, %eax
         addl
             (%eax). %eax
Assembler
        Machine
```

```
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int32 t foo(int32 t a, int32 t b);
// From module: layout.c
// Address range: 0x80484ac - 0x80484cd
// Line range: 5 - 10
int32 t foo(int32 t a, int32 t b) {
   int32 t c = 14 * (b + a); // 0x80484c4
    return c;
// From module: layout.c
// Address range: 0x80484cf - 0x8048559
// Line range: 13 - 30
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    int32 t apple = (int32 t)argv; // 0x80484d8
    int32 t str as i = atoi((int8 t *)*(int32 t *)(apple + 4));
    int32 t str as i2 = atoi((int8 t *)*(int32 t *)(apple + 8));
    int32 t banana = foo(str as i, str as i2); // 0x804850f
    gets(NULL);
    puts (NULL);
    printf("foo(%d, %d) = %d\n", str as i, str as i2, banana);
    return 0;
                                            Decompiler
      %ebp
      %esp,%ebp
      $0xffffffff0,%esp
      $0x20,%esp
      0xc(%ebp), %eax
      $0x4,%eax
      (%eax),%eax
       %eax, (%esp)
      80483b0 <atoi@plt>
                                              Disassembler
      %eax,0x1c(%esp)
      0xc(%ebp),%eax
```

Static Analysis - Disassembler

Linear Sweep

Recursive



Static Analysis - Disassembler Tools

objdump - Disasm

radare2 - Disasm

capstone - Programmable Disasm

Binary Ninja - Disasm + Primitive Decompiler

GHIDRA - Disasm + Decompiler (https://ghidra-sre.org/)

IDA Pro - Disasm + Decompiler (de facto standard)

Static Analysis - Decompile

You can go back to pseudo code:

```
%ebp
push
       %esp, %ebp
mov
       $0xfffffff0, %esp
and
       $0x20,%esp
sub
       0xc(%ebp), %eax
mov
       $0x4,%eax
add
       (%eax),%eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
call
       80483b0 <atoi@plt>
       %eax, 0x1c(%esp)
mov
       0xc(%ebp), %eax
mov
```

```
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int32 t foo(int32 t a, int32 t b);
// From module: layout.c
// Address range: 0x80484ac - 0x80484cd
// Line range: 5 - 10
int32 t foo(int32 t a, int32 t b) {
   int32 t c = 14 * (b + a); // 0x80484c4
   return c;
                 layout.c
// From module:
// Address range: 0x80484cf - 0x8048559
// Line range:
                 13 - 30
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
   int32 t apple = (int32 t)argv; // 0x80484d8
   int32 t str as i = atoi((int8 t *)*(int32 t *)(apple + 4));
   int32 t str as i2 = atoi((int8 t *)*(int32 t *)(apple + 8));
   int32 t banana = foo(str as i, str as i2); // 0x804850f
   gets (NULL);
   puts(NULL);
   printf("foo(%d, %d) = %d\n", str as i, str as i2, banana);
   return 0;
```

Static Analysis - Decompile

Binary Ninja - Disasm + Primitive Decompiler

GHIDRA - Disasm + Decompiler (https://ghidra-sre.org/)

IDA Pro - Disasm + Decompiler (de facto standard)

rev.ng - not available yet

Static Analysis - Struct

Building correct types make decompilation more readable.

```
void fastcall sub 1413( int64 al)
 signed int i; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
 signed int v2; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
 void *v3; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
  for ( i = 0; i \le 15; ++i )
   if ( !*( DWORD *)(24LL * i + a1) )
     printf("Size: ");
     v2 = sub 1AD5();
     if (v2 > 0 && v2 <= 88)
       v3 = calloc(v2, 1uLL);
       if (!v3)
         exit(-1);
       *( DWORD *) (24LL * i + a1) = 1;
        *( QWORD *) (a1 + 24LL * i + 8) = v2;
        *( QWORD *) (a1 + 24LL * i + 16) = v3;
       printf("Chunk %d Allocated\n", (unsigned int)i);
     else
        puts("Invalid Size");
```

```
void fastcall allocate(nota *notes)
 signed int i; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
 signed int sz; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
 void *chunk; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
 for ( i = 0; i \le 15; ++i )
   if (!notes[i].state)
     printf("Size: ");
     sz = get long();
     if (sz > 0 \&\& sz \le 0x58)
       chunk = calloc(sz. 1uLL);
       if (!chunk)
       notes[i].state = 1;
       notes[i].size = sz;
       notes[i].data = ( int64)chunk;
       printf("Chunk %d Allocated\n", (unsigned int)i);
     else
       puts("Invalid Size");
```

```
signed int i; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
                                                      signed int i; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
  signed int v2; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
                                                      signed int sz; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
 void *v3; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
                                                      void *chunk; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
  for ( i = 0; i \le 15; ++i )
                                                      for (i = 0; i \le 15; ++i)
   if (!*( DWORD *)(24LL * i + a1) )
                                                        if (!notes[i].state)
     printf("Size: ");
                                                          printf("Size: ");
     v2 = sub 1AD5();
                                                          sz = qet lonq();
      if (v2 > 0 \&\& v2 \le 88)
                                                          if (sz > 0 \&\& sz \le 0x58)
       v3 = calloc(v2, 1uLL);
                                                            chunk = calloc(sz, lull);
        if (!v3)
                                                            if (!chunk)
        * ( DWORD *) (24LL * i + a1) = 1;
                                                            notes[i].state = 1;
        * ( QWORD ^*) (a1 + 24LL * i + 8) = v2;
                                                            notes[i].size = sz;
        *( QWORD *) (a1 + 24LL * i + 16) = v3;
                                                            notes[i].data = ( int64)chunk;
        printf("Chunk %d Allocated\n". (unsigned
                                                            printf("Chunk %d Allocated\n".
int)i);
                                                    (unsigned int)i);
      else
                                                          else
        puts("Invalid Size");
                                                            puts("Invalid Size");
      return;
                                                          return;
```

Static Analysis - Struct IDA (local type)

Building correct types make decompilation more readable.

```
struct __attribute__((aligned(8))) nota
{
  int state;
  int unk1;
   __int64 size;
   __int64 data;
};
```

Static Analysis - Other Tools (Lifter)

You can Lift binary to perform program analysis tasks.

Angr - Binary Analysis (VEX IR) + Symbolic Execution (http://angr.io/)


rev.ng - Binary analysis with LLVM IR + Binary translationtion


BAP - Binary analysis with BIL IR

FingerPrint Match - YARA Rule

```
rule silent banker : banker
    meta:
         description = "This is just an example"
         thread level = 3
         in the wild = true
    strings:
         a = \{6A \ 40 \ 68 \ 00 \ 30 \ 00 \ 00 \ 6A \ 14 \ 8D \ 91\}
         b = \{8D \ 4D \ B0 \ 2B \ C1 \ 83 \ C0 \ 27 \ 99 \ 6A \ ?? \ ?? \ F7 \ F9\}
         $c = "UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT" nocase wide
         $d = {FE 39 45 [0-8] 89 00}
         re1 = /md5: [0-9a-fA-F]{32}/
    condition:
         a or a and a (a c > 5)
```

FingerPrint Match - Complex fingerprints






Static Analysis Problem

- Obfuscation
 - movfuscator
- Packing
 - Compress/Decompress
 - Encrypt/Decrypt
- Metamorphic components

Intro Dynamic Malware Analysis

Run the malware sample see what it does.





Things you can look at

Memory

Syscall

Network

Disk



Things you can look at: Memory

- Debugger

Run the executable and see/modify process state live.

Memory Forensics:


- Look at Infected Machine Memory.



Debuggers

- Run the executable and see/modify process state live.
- Step by step Debugging
- BreakPoints
 - Hardware breakpoints
- Watchpoints
- syscall catch
- signal catch
- Scriptable





Memory Forensics

- Machine Memory (nGB)
- Process (mkB)
- Kernel Structure to reconstruct process memory (OS Dependant)
- Reconstruct Virtual Memory of processes.
- List Processes (PEB List, or Headers)
- Find CodeInjection, API Hooks, Windows Regs, etc.

Tools:


- rekall (<u>https://github.com/google/rekall</u>)
- volatility(https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility)



Things you can look at: Network

- Syscall

Intercept all network syscall



Network Monitor:

- Watch what is coming from the cable
- Tools:
 - wireshark
 - tcpdump
 - mitmproxy
 - ngrep



Things you can look at: Disk

- Syscall

 Intercept all disk syscall (CreateFile, Read, Write, etc)



Filesystem:

- Watch what is going to the disk
 - MiniFilter
- You can monitor SATA protocol on physical machine (Lo-Phi)


Things you can look at: Syscall/API

- Syscall Monitor

- Linux/MacOSx:
 - Itrace, strace
- Windows:
 - Process Monitor (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/process-utilities)

Syscall/API Hook:

- Patch library Function to log when they are called.
 - cuckoomon, arancino, etc.



Where to look

Process

System

Machine

VM

Bare Metal



Where to look: Process

- Debuggers
- Syscall/API
- Dynamic Binary Instrumentation:
 - Intel Pin
 - DynamoRio (<u>https://www.dynamorio.org/</u>)
 - rev.ng (<u>https://rev.ng/</u>)



Where to look: System

- Instrument the kernel
 - Linux
 - Windows, MacOSX
- Kernel Debug
- Instrumenting Agent
 - cuckoo (<u>https://cuckoosandbox.org/</u>)
- Drivers run into the kernel





Where to look: Machines (VM)


- Monitor Perimeter
 - Network
- Instrumented Emulator
 - PANDA (https://github.com/panda-re/panda) Taint
- Instrumented **HyperVisor**
 - drakvuf (https://drakvuf.com/) Stealth





Where to look: Machines (Bare Metal)


- SATA Monitor
- PCI Monitor (Memory)
- Network
- USB



Run Malware into an Instrumented Sandbox

- You can configure all the tools we just saw to be always available.
- Free Sandboxes for Malware Analysis:
 - Cuckoo (<u>https://cuckoosandbox.org/</u>)
 - drakvuf (<u>https://drakvuf.com/</u>)

Cuckoo Sandbox



Cuckoo Feature

Syscall/API Tracer

Syscall/Filesystem Monitor

- TCPDump

- VMMemoryDump

Syscall

Disk

Network

Memory



Cuckoo VM Support

- VirtualBox
- VMWare
- QEmu
- vsphere
- xen
- bare metal









Questions?