

Mandate Divide in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

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Actual Motivation

While studying electoral systems is a passion of mine, and this thesis could very well get into how electoral incentives shape legislators' behavior, I still feel obligated to be honest to you and to myself by disclosing another important consideration for choosing this thesis, which is the ease of applying a method that has been already used. Essentially, I am hoping to apply the methods employed by Schürmann and Stier (2022), who test the hypothesis by scouring social media posts, and apply it to Taiwan to test the same hypothesis, hoping for a different result. It may reek of laziness and lack of originality, which is why I am keeping this research proposal as a back-up plan while looking for some more interesting and feasible thesis topics. In the meantime, I do hope my own modification of the existing theories would make this thesis a significant contribution to the field.

Introduction

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems give each voter two votes, one for electing the legislator representing the local constituency, another for the party list. Consequently, it has been hypothesized that legislators owe their position to different electoral mechanisms, thus creating a *mandate divide* among the them which cause them to behave differently. Whether this mandate divide hypothesis holds true is a subject of lively debate that rages to this day.

Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) versus Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP)

Methodology

Schürmann, Lennart, and Sebastian Stier. 2022. "Who Represents the Constituency? Online Political Communication by Members of Parliament in the German Mixed-Member Electoral System." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* n/a(n/a). <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/lsq.12379>.