

# eIDAS-Node Error and Event Logging

Version 2.4

## **Document history**

Version	Date	Modification reason	Modified by
1.0	06/10/2017	Extracted from Installation Manual	DIGIT
2.0	11/04/2018	<ul><li>Editorial improvements</li><li>Update to Error Codes and Error Messages</li></ul>	DIGIT
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## List of abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used within this document.

Abbreviation	Meaning
eIDAS	electronic Identification and Signature. The <u>Regulation (EU) N°910/2014</u> governs electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market to enable secure and seamless electronic interactions between businesses, citizens and public authorities.
IdP	Identity Provider. An institution that verifies the citizen's identity and issues an electronic ID.
MS	Member State
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SP	Service Provider

## List of definitions

The following definitions are used within this document.

Term	Meaning
Audit	A function which seeks to validate that controls are in place, adequate for their purposes, and which reports inadequacies to appropriate levels of management.
Audit log	An audit log is a chronological sequence of audit records, each of which contains evidence directly as a result of the execution of a business process or system function
eIDAS-Node	An eIDAS-Node is an application component that can assume two different roles depending on the origin of a received request. See eIDAS-Node Connector and eIDAS-Node Proxy Service.

#### 1. Introduction

This document is intended for a technical audience consisting of developers, administrators and those requiring detailed technical information on how to configure, build and deploy the eIDAS-Node application.

This document provides information on the eID implementation of error and event logging as a building block for generating an audit trail of activity on the eIDAS Network. It describes the files that are generated, the file format, the components that are monitored and the events that are recorded. It is also presents points that should be considered when planning, implementing and operating an auditing environment.

#### 1.1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to describe the strategy for logging of errors and events in the eIDAS-Node.

#### 1.2. Document Structure

This document is divided into the following sections:

- Chapter 1 *Introduction*: this section.
- Chapter 2 What is an audit trail? Introduces the concept of an audit trail and discusses the forensics and diagnosis of audit trail analysis.
- Chapter 3 Standards, frameworks and best practice provides a brief introduction to industry standards and guidelines that should be considered when implementing a logging and auditing scheme.
- Chapter 4 *Log generation* shows the format and describes the information attributes that are contained in a log record.
- Chapter 5 *Logging configuration settings* discusses log management requirements and recommendations.
- Chapter 6 *Log files* describes the locally stored log files and presents a matrix of which events are logged, in which log file and which response would be triggered.
- Chapter 7 eIDAS-Node messages logging provides information about the information stored in the logs regarding incoming and outgoing messages.
- Chapter 8 *Operational considerations* contains information that should be taken into account when implementing a logging process.
- Chapter 9 References contains a list of reference material with links.
- Appendix A *eIDAS-Node Error Codes and Error Messages* contains a list of error code and associated message properties.

#### 1.3. Other technical reference documentation

We recommend that you also familiarise yourself with the following eID technical reference documents which are available on CEF Digital Home > eID > All eID services > eIDAS Node integration package > View latest version.

- eIDAS-Node Installation, Configuration and Integration Quick Start Guide
  describes how to quickly install a Service Provider, eIDAS-Node Connector,
  eIDAS-Node Proxy Service and IdP from the distributions in the release package.
  The distributions provide preconfigured eIDAS-Node modules for running on each
  of the supported application servers.
- *eIDAS-Node Installation and Configuration Guide* describes the steps involved when implementing a Basic Setup and goes on to provide detailed information required for customisation and deployment.
- eIDAS-Node National IdP and SP Integration Guide provides guidance by recommending one way in which eID can be integrated into your national eID infrastructure.
- *eIDAS-Node Demo Tools Installation and Configuration Guide* describes the installation and configuration settings for Demo Tools (SP and IdP) supplied with the package for basic testing.
- eIDAS-Node and SAML describes the W3C recommendations and how SAML XML encryption is implemented and integrated in eID. Encryption of the sensitive data carried in SAML 2.0 Requests and Assertions is discussed alongside the use of AEAD algorithms as essential building blocks.
- *eIDAS-Node Security Considerations* describes the security considerations that should be taken into account when implementing and operating your eIDAS-Node scheme.
- *eIDAS-Node Error Codes* contains tables showing the error codes that could be generated by components along with a description of the error, specific behaviour and, where relevant, possible operator actions to remedy the error.

**Disclaimer:** The users of the eIDAS-Node sample implementation remain fully responsible for its integration with back-end systems (Service Providers and Identity Providers), testing, deployment and operation. The support and maintenance of the sample implementation, as well as any other auxiliary services, are provided by the European Commission according to the terms defined in the European Union Public License (EUPL) at

https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/custom-page/attachment/eupl v1.2 en.pdf

#### 2. What is an audit trail?

A log is a record of the events occurring within an organisation's systems and networks. Logs are composed of log entries; each entry contains information related to a specific event that has occurred within a system or network.

An audit trail consists of a number of log records providing documentary evidence of the sequence of activities that have affected at any time a specific operation, procedure or event.

In a stand-alone system, all the security relevant activities in individual components can be isolated. This allows us to maintain a time-ordered list of all actions and events (e.g. audit trail) that happened in the system and enabling us to audit the system by simply following the information trail in a single place, obeying to a defined notation and in a specific timeline.

The number, volume and variety of different systems operating in an eIDAS-Network's distributed architecture has created the need for security log management and safeguards to help protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of service and the data therein. With this in mind, an audit trail must meet two very important requirements:

- The possibility of reconstructing an entire transaction by linking all related request/response identifiers throughout the complete path of the request processing, from Service Provider to eIDAS-Node to Identity Provider and back.
- The association between an incoming request and all subsequently-related outgoing request(s), as well as the corresponding replies

In order to meet these requirements the eIDAS-Node implementation is required to record and retain audit-logging information sufficient to answer the following questions:

- Who performed the logging (the main component or an external module/party)?
- What activity was performed? (e.g. Input, Process, Output)
- Who or what performed the activity, including where or on what system the activity was performed from (subject)?
- What the activity was performed on (object)?
- When was the activity performed?
- What tool(s) was used to perform the activity?
- What was the status (such as success/failure), outcome, or result of the activity?

#### 2.1. Forensics and diagnostics

Analysis of the audit trail will help to identify use and abuse of the eIDAS Network, including the following conditions:

- Sequencing failure
- Excessive use
- Data changes
- Fraud and other criminal activities
- Suspicious, unacceptable or unexpected behaviour
- Modifications to configuration
- Application code file and/or memory changes input validation failures e.g. protocol violations, unacceptable encodings, invalid parameter names and values
- Output validation failures e.g. database record set mismatch, invalid data encoding
- Authentication successes and failures
- Authorisation (access control) failures
- Session management failures e.g. cookie session identification value modification
- Application errors and system events e.g. syntax and runtime errors, connectivity problems, performance issues, third party service error messages, file system errors, file upload virus detection, configuration changes
- Application and related systems start-ups and shut-downs, and logging initialisation (starting, stopping or pausing)
- Use of higher-risk functionality e.g. network connections, addition or deletion of users, changes to privileges, assigning users to tokens, adding or deleting tokens, use of systems administrative privileges, access by application administrators, all actions by users with administrative privileges, access to payment cardholder data, use of data encrypting keys, key changes, creation and deletion of systemlevel objects, data import and export including screen-based reports, submission of user-generated content - especially file uploads
- Legal and other opt-ins e.g. permissions for mobile phone capabilities, terms of use, terms & conditions, personal data usage consent, permission to receive marketing communications

#### 3. Standards, frameworks and best practices

Standards and frameworks like COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) by the Technology IT Governance Institute and the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) provide information on IT governance and auditing. However there is little regulatory guidance on the specific controls, the standard of due care means doing at least what one's peers are doing as well as following security best practices frameworks as proposed by COBIT, BITS, COSO and standards including ISO 17799 and NIST SP 800-53 and ISF Standard of Good Practice, ISO / ISO 27002.

**Note:** The eIDAS-Node logs may contain person identification data, hence these logs should be handled and protected appropriately in accordance with the European privacy regulations [Dir. 95/46/EC] and [Reg. 2016/679].

[Reg. 2016/679] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.

[Dir. 95/46/EC] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

## 4. Log generation

The following table shows the information attributes that are contained in a  $\log$  record.

**Table 1: Log record attributes** 

Name	See Figure 1	Description
Date time		The date time of the logging event in Zulu Time, also known as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) format.
Thread	2	Outputs the name of the server processing thread that generated the logging event.
Level	(3)	<ul> <li>ERROR: some type of failure has occurred, users are probably being affected (or will soon be) and the fix probably requires human intervention.</li> <li>WARN: an unexpected technical or business event occurred, users may be affected, but probably no immediate human intervention is required. Support personnel will want to review these issues a soon as possible to understand what the impact is. Basically any issue that needs to be tracked but may not require immediate intervention.</li> <li>INFO: things we want to see at high volume in case we need to forensically analyse an issue. Typical business exceptions can go here (e.g. login failed due to bad credentials).</li> <li>DEBUG: used for entry/exit of most non-trivial methods and detailed information on the flow through the system. This will be written to logs only.</li> <li>TRACE: this would be for extremely detailed and potentially high volume logs that you do not typically want enabled even during normal development.</li> </ul>
ClassName	4	Outputs location information of the caller's (Java) class which generated the logging event.
sessionId	(5)	If available the session Id.
IpAddress	6	If available the Remote IP address.
Event	(7)	If available, the type of logging event.
Message	8	The content of the message
EventNumber	(9)	Sequential increasing number of the event
Hash	10	A hash generated of the line log content guaranteeing integrity

The following is an example of log content showing three log records.




Figure 1: Example of log content

**Notes**: The following shows the attribute delimiters and their meanings:

# is used as a field delimiter

[ ] delimits optional components

**Important:** Additional attributes may be added in future phases of this project.

Figure 2 below show examples of log records on an eIDAS-Node.

```
2015-06-15T13:58:53.469Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.auth.engine.EIDASSAMLEngine SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Get instance: SP-Connector #1#
[MaAG32KHbrOV+ABUawBv4iibuazJltc+Qmk2VDsI1NM=]
2015-06-15T13:59:07.212Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.node.auth.connector.AUCONNECTORSAML SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Connector - Processing SAML Request
with ID a43526c05fc8168879b5789ba0d62744 #3#
[AeRp3ofGkl3gcIEH4QypViREHPB9Kw+hFFpt1DdUKGc=]
2015-06-15T13:59:07.393Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.auth.engine.EIDASSAMLEngine SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Get instance: Connector-Service #15#
[lJCReY/HA7Kcc9HyKuJww2qFRvjSxkQfmw/1sBGnxH8=]
2015-06-15T13:59:07.529Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.node.auth.connector.AUCONNECTORSAML SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Connector - Processing SAML Request
with ID a43526c05fc8168879b5789ba0d62744 #16#
[zsSBlcAwF8Lq1Iq7u2S//OtoklvnnLZnAPcWX6Quci8=]
2015-06-15T13:59:08.445Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.auth.engine.EIDASSAMLEngine SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Get instance: Service #29#
[/K59pCfDIfHDTBiQKc1n5VLKBtdOprWsEumnndh8TIQ=]
2015-06-15T13:59:08.697Z [http-bio-8080-exec-2] INFO
eu.eidas.node.auth.service.AUSERVICESAML SAML EXCHANGE -
9DD4C51374BE635296A7295CA32B7632 -127.0.0.1 -Service - Processing SAML Request with
ID d41ae1dc063c7e4a87f17e57fdbc1329 #31#
[rkLbukPhl+5ia+wzzJyVY2DHHfz2JlXPvpT1CmHRZqw=]
```

Figure 2: Log records on IT-eIDAS-Node

In cases where, the information to be logged is generated by other than an eIDAS-Node, sanitizing can be applied. The string, with information, will be escaped if it contains any of the following characters Carriage Return (ASCII 13, \r) and/or Line Feed (ASCII 10, \n) and CRLF. Furthermore, a suffix will be added to the original string to signal the modification of the original information.

#### 5. Logging configuration settings

The deployer or host of the eIDAS-Node and related specific components should ensure that other jurisdiction or organisation specific, guidelines, and procedures with respect to logging and to incorporate and support these log management requirements and recommendations; also comply with functional and operational requirements. The following table provides examples of the types of logging configuration settings to be specified in policies, which are MS specific.

Table 2: Logging configuration settings

Category	Low Impact Systems	Moderate Impact Systems	High Impact Systems
How long to retain log data	1 to 2 weeks	1 to 3 months	3 to 12 months , in absence of specific legal requirements
How often to rotate logs	Optional (if performed, at least every week or every 25 MB)	Every 6 to 24 hours, or every 2 to 5 MB	Every 15 to 60 minutes, or every 0.5 to 1.0 MB
If the organisation requires the system to transfer log data to the log management infrastructure, how frequently that should be done	Every 3 to 24 hours	Every 15 to 60 minutes	At least every 5 minutes
How often log data needs to be analysed locally (through automated or manual means)	Every 1 to 7 days	Every 12 to 24 hours	At least 6 times a day
Whether log file integrity checking needs to be performed for rotated logs	Optional	Yes	Yes
Whether rotated logs need to be encrypted	Optional	Optional	Yes
Whether log data transfers to the log management infrastructure need to be encrypted or performed on a separate logging network	Optional	Yes is feasible	Yes

#### 6. Log files

Each eIDAS Node is configured to generate four different locally stored log files for tracing activities:

- **The Application System log:** (eIDASNodeSystem) contains all the events occurring at the application level (e.g. server start/stop, change of configuration).
- The Application Security log: (eIDASNodeSecurity) contains all the security related events.
- The Message Exchange log: (eIDASNodeSAMLExchange) contains the details about exchanged messages.
- The Application Detailed log: (eIDASNodeDetail) contains the more detailed information at destination to the technical team for forensics, investigation and debugging purposes.

The locations of the audit files are by default configured to use a Java system properties variable called LOG HOME.

A value can be assigned to this variable by using: -DLOG\_HOME="<myDirectoryName>" at server start-up.

If modification of the environment variable is not possible, the value of this variable could also be assigned by adding the following line in the logback.xml file property name="LOG HOME" value ="<myDirectoryName>" />

The following table shows a matrix of which events are logged, in which log file and which response would be triggered.

Table 3: Event log matrix

			Record in log file						esponse ty <sub>l</sub>		
Event	System	Detailed	Security	Message Exchg	Console	Appl. server log	Threshold level (see Table 1)	Immediate	Routine	Forensics - historic	Comment
SAML request processing [EVT-1]		٧		٧	٧		Info		٧		Normal processing of the SAML messages
SAML Response processing [EVT-2]		٧		٧	٧		Info		٧		Normal processing of the SAML messages
OpenSAML Error [EVT-3]		٧		٧	٧		Error	٧			Error occurs in the OpenSAML product library
Configuration change [EVT-4]	٧				V				٧	٧	Configuration change via management console
Configuration reload [EVT-5]	٧				٧				٧	٧	
Application startup [EVT-6]	٧					٧			٧	٧	Start of application filters
Application shutdown [EVT-4]	٧					٧			٧	٧	Start of application filters
Console alerts [EVT-5]	٧	٧			٧			٧		٧	

		Record in log file						Response type			
Event	System	Detailed	Security	Message Exchg	Console	Appl. server log	Threshold level (see Table 1)	Immediate	Routine	Forensics - historic	Comment
Exceptions Application errors and system events e.g. syntax and runtime errors, connectivity problems, performance issues, file system errors [EVT-6]		V			V			V			
Unauthorised access attempt to management console [EVT-7]		٧	٧		٧			V			
Input validation failures [EVT-8]		٧	٧		٧				٧		Could hide an attack
Output validation failures [EVT-9]		٧	٧		٧				٧		Could hide an attack
Session management failures e.g. cookie session identification value modification [EVT-10]		٧	٧		٧			٧			Could hide an attack
Content security violation [EVT-11]		٧	٧		٧			٧			Could hide an attack

				Record i	n log file			R			
Event	System	Detailed	Security	Message Exchg	Console	Appl. server log	Threshold level (see Table 1)	Immediate	Routine	Forensics - historic	Comment
Sequencing failure (like SAML Response without being oreceded by SAML Request) [EVT-12]		٧	٧		٧			٧			Could hide an attack
excessive use (like SAML request imitation exceeded) EVT-13]		٧	V		٧			V			Could hide an attack
Certificate not valid		٧	٧		٧			٧			Could hide an attack
ignature not valid EVT-14]		٧	٧		٧			٧			Could hide an attack

#### 6.1. Event detailed error codes and associated actions

For full information on eIDAS-Node error codes and associated actions, refer to the eIDAS-Node Error Codes document.

#### 7. eIDAS-Node messages logging

The incoming and outgoing Light Requests/Light Responses and eIDAS Requests and Responses to the eIDAS Node are logged in 8 points as depicted in the below Figure 3.




Figure 3: Message Logging diagram

#### 7.1. Enabling of the logging

To enable the logging, the saml.audit entry's value in eidas.xml has to be set to true.

Key	Description
saml.audit	Activated the logging of information regarding incoming outgoing
	LightRequest/LightResponse, eIDAS Request and Response. If true
	logs information about the mentioned incoming requests and
	responses and does not log if false.

#### 7.2. Selection of the logging file

The locations of the audit files are by default configured to use a Java system properties variable called  ${\tt LOG}$   ${\tt HOME}$ .

A value can be assigned to this variable by using:  $-DLOG\_HOME = "<myDirectoryName>"$  at server start-up.

#### 7.3. Description of the logging entries

**Note:** The eIDAS-Node logs may contain person identification data; hence, these logs should be handled and protected appropriately in accordance with the European privacy regulations [Dir. 95/46/EC] and [Reg. 2016/679].

[Reg. 2016/679] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the

processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.

At each of these points, information regarding the message is logged with different entries. The following table describes the logging entries:

Entry	Description	Remarks
Timestamp	Current time.	UTC (Zulu)
OpType	Operation type can be receives or sends.	
NodeId	The Id of the node from which this message was received (in case of OpType receives) or to which it will be sent (in case of OpType sends).	For elDAS Requests and elDAS Responses to the EntityId.
Origin	The origin of the incoming message. (e.g., HTTP referer header.)	N/A for OpType sends
Destination	The destination of the message	
flowId	The Id of the eIDAS flow. Used to relate messages from the same eIDAS authentication process.	The same eIDAS authentication flow will have 2 different flowlds one for Connector and another for Proxy-Service.
msgId	Id of the message	
msgHash	Hash of the message	Uses SHA512.
bltHash	Hash of the Binary Light Token	Uses Sha512. Only logged for Light Request and Light Responses.
inResponseTo	Id of request to which the response is related.	Only logged for Responses.
statusCode	Status code of the response.	Only logged for Responses.

The correlation of requests and responses can be done using the entries: *msgId*, *flowId*, and *inResponseTo*.

One example of the values logged for all the 8 points is as follows. Note that the line hashes were not included for more readability as you would find in eIDASNodeDetail or in eIDASNodeSAMLExchange files.

```
Point 1
--
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:36:30.269Z,
OpType eIDAS Connector receives request from Specific Connector,
NodeId specificConnector,
Origin http://localhost:8080/SpecificConnector/ServiceProvider,
Destination http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/SpecificConnectorRequest,
flowId _teeF25P50axuRHOk5uP1K_678N9D5oP1j_khKNqjuV59yOeHFqmocWSJoIZACjD,
msgId 87cclae7-10df-4237-acf2-ac4957c4f899,
msgHash
ENshi09fT2f6Z5hwUj8DCF9SQmdkOJ7wiZVS9yJNskV+Obrs2kMoe3S1GokcaffUOCVOhOIw4dsT8a94pLT
TMw==,
bltHash
6MA9YGjgD22SYyoLqJJDxD4y1xiTMOrA8Azv9RYLCpyL6LaSqwOZx9mAvIPZCfTxMVn/7vCycFjjExTPn8G
```

```
Point 2
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:36:30.840Z,
OpType eIDAS Connector sends request to eIDAS Proxy Service,
NodeId http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/ServiceMetadata,
Origin N/A,
Destination http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/ColleagueReguest,
flowId teeF25P50axuRHOk5uP1K 678N9D5oP1j khKNqjuV59yOeHFqmocWSJoIZACjD,
msqId Oat.n7PwAPBqTvJd0pV1X-DV.NxNtwHWIpSiAYi2hpqiPWxfwEJLvTqwzGEHJ9N,
0oFuUvWD9FNGhIvltp2LrOEPQLoRnYNhhDksaDmqObipFoTVet6cytx1658Mjb4ub9mwam4ctK7L2Jvvcni
PnO==
Point 3
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:36:31.490Z,
OpType eIDAS Proxy Service receives request from eIDAS Connector,
NodeId http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/ConnectorMetadata,
Origin http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/SpecificConnectorRequest,
Destination http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/ColleagueReguest,
flowId dKIqa0LWWcAzxNR67B4vh5r0.Cv-28vRyOH.B3VV5sTLt3Pn.ViOVmoJaxqQOff,
msgId 0at.n7PwAPBqTvJd0pV1X-DV.NxNtwHWIpSiAYi2hpqiPWxfwEJLvTgwzGEHJ9N,
msqHash
OoFuUvWD9FNGhIvltp2LrOEPQLoRnYNhhDksaDmqObipFoTVet6cytx1658Mjb4ub9mwam4ctK7L2Jvvcni
PnQ==
Point 4
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:36:31.635Z,
OpType eIDAS Proxy Service sends request to Specific Proxy Service,
NodeId specificProxyService,
Origin N/A,
Destination http://localhost:8081/SpecificProxyService/ProxyServiceRequest,
flowId dKIqa0LWWcAzxNR67B4vh5r0.Cv-28vRyOH.B3VV5sTLt3Pn.ViOVmoJaxqQOff,
msgId GfAaa-Kz2X.gdywQuGMwd133hYM3TdgC6nrZ1r6qCr2elzRxFagueLd8VYTnGWR,
msgHash
utu1Z4sHax2W/0mZd4jx44TGpdKuJj7HKv7VlJ/PHL7fx5joUFUl7u0+mcEdE9BDPRk672VlLxhAgOgwMTw
pGg==,
bltHash
uU8WCpZQejNKFXjiSHoRQnZPe19VcB1YsR7D5MiSNZ1EZCy1/6rmanPs7rx8zZ2/O4IzI8ub74vSi34m9FZ
Point 5
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:37:18.970Z,
OpType eIDAS Proxy Service receives response from Specific Proxy Service,
NodeId specificProxyService,
Origin http://localhost:8081/SpecificProxyService/AfterCitizenConsentResponse,
Destination http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/SpecificProxyServiceResponse,
flowId dKIqa0LWWcAzxNR67B4vh5r0.Cv-28vRyOH.B3VV5sTLt3Pn.ViOVmoJaxqQOff,
msgId 3e1b6aee-fa0b-44a3-add0-09d81826cd66,
msgHash
DkO == .
bltHash
LCb+tPt+fSlggc9l3KRbiRljLkaXnlRiNFj1WyBLSh6g4Cb2N8LETdtdKuOk9yLhUcGRk/wxRKMAPJyzA+2
inResponseTo GfAaa-Kz2X.gdywQuGMwd133hYM3TdgC6nrZ1r6qCr2elzRxFagueLd8VYTnGWR,
statusCode urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success
Point 6
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:37:21.168Z,
OpType eIDAS Proxy Service sends response to eIDAS Connector,
NodeId http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/ConnectorMetadata,
Origin N/A,
```

```
Destination http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/ColleagueResponse.
flowId dKIqa0LWWcAzxNR67B4vh5r0.Cv-28vRyOH.B3VV5sTLt3Pn.ViOVmoJaxqQOff,
msgId elhSsKlpJ.OW-wCEzbgnbGc2lhd1PTKXwYgtz8Id9.UCpWlmUBt.jAFtWRAAckd,
msqHash
9drKEZ8ixvQ8ycKCMV16t5xwE8QiI7sZuQYrHqFXLZJuDAH1FYwCM6dQiEWxUE8yHzHrYNWxf1v4/7vr+dX
inResponseTo 0at.n7PwAPBqTvJd0pV1X-DV.NxNtwHWIpSiAYi2hpqiPWxfwEJLvTqwzGEHJ9N,
statusCode urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:37:21.896Z,
OpType eIDAS Connector receives response from eIDAS Proxy Service,
NodeId http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/ServiceMetadata,
Origin http://localhost:8081/EidasNode/SpecificProxyServiceResponse,
Destination http://localhost:8080/EidasNode/ColleagueResponse,
flowId teeF25P50axuRHOk5uP1K 678N9D5oP1j khKNqjuV59yOeHFqmocWSJoIZACjD,
msqId elhSsKlpJ.OW-wCEzbgnbGc2lhd1PTKXwYqtz8Id9.UCpWlmUBt.jAFtWRAAckd,
msgHash
9drKEZ8ixvQ8ycKCMV16t5xwE8QiI7sZuQYrHqFXLZJuDAH1FYwCM6dQiEWxUE8yHzHrYNWxf1v4/7vr+dX
inResponseTo 0at.n7PwAPBqTvJd0pV1X-DV.NxNtwHWIpSiAYi2hpqiPWxfwEJLvTgwzGEHJ9N,
statusCode urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success
Point 8
Timestamp 2019-06-17T13:37:23.241Z,
OpType eIDAS Connector sends response to Specific Connector,
NodeId specificConnector,
Origin N/A,
Destination http://localhost:8080/SpecificConnector/ConnectorResponse,
flowId teeF25P50axuRHOk5uP1K 678N9D5oP1j khKNqjuV59yOeHFqmocWSJoIZACjD,
msqId Ji1R-U ikNrfdI7PrWm6hITG6NcKz3ltC61-IOE.qs9rU6HA7VnKGr058.4KbBO,
msqHash
FEM2e5zTV77egP5wQRcREeOwoAmLwjx26hGtC+alhkUThcSot+O5KPceYKuvNhjEsOI8QfUOHp5kmkSo/sF
G0w==.
bltHash
pRdaV0JKhp+gPofrwBHWbpX8PE31Widr/pVOTd0UD0oXtmNJBvM56FdJhF5HoP+C0ok94gUDQYXLf1B6uT8
inResponseTo 87cclae7-10df-4237-acf2-ac4957c4f899,
statusCode urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success
```

For more details on the logging points and an example of an end-to-end logging trail eIDAS Connector (country A)  $\leftrightarrow$  eIDAS ProxyService (country B) for the messages, please refer to Message logging improvements in eIDAS-Node v2.3  $\rightarrow$  https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/x/hCUIBQ 1

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<sup>1</sup> The URLs with ec.europa.eu domain in this document are only accessible to the experts registered with the eIDAS eID Implementation community.

#### 8. Operational considerations

- Audit facilities should be designed with their specific use(s) in mind, not simply adapted from existing system logs.
- Member States should create and maintain an audit log management structure, including policy, procedures, rules and tools.
- Audit log files should be periodically saved and moved to another storage space.
   The periodicity may be influenced by the classification of the data, but should be defined either according to a fixed size (e.g. every time the log reaches 1Mb) and / or according to a fixed period of time (e.g. per day, per week).
- Attacks on systems should be prevented by the use of technical preventive controls. These controls should be preferred above procedural preventive controls if possible. Both measures should be used in conjunction with examination of the audit data.
- Member States should consider the use of a Security Event management system due to the large volume of security events.
- Member States should not solely rely on unauthorised events or breaches of policy, but should additionally consider proactive monitoring.
- Member States should consider the use of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) technology to help the automation and collection of auditable events.
- Audit records should contain a time stamp. Ensure that each system's clock is synchronised to a common time source so that its timestamp will match those generated by other systems.
- The privacy of personal data must be protected.
- Measures should be implemented in order that deleting or modifying logs of own activities should be detected and alerted immediately.
- Administrators should not be able to erase or de-activate logs of activities.
- Audit events should be protected from modification by using digital signatures to sign audit records.
- Audit events should be archived to 'write-once 'media to protect the archive from modification or deletion.
- Where audit records are subject to cryptographic authentication the input data to the authentication computation should include an accurate timestamp.
- Archived audit log files should be protected by appropriate logical and physical security mechanisms.
- The capture of customer sensitive data in audit logs should be avoided. If necessary sensitive data should be anonymised, tokenised or encrypted to avoid data breaches.
- Where audit data are encrypted, the appropriate decryption software and keys
  must be available and properly maintained, under appropriate access control, for
  the whole of the lifetime of the encrypted data. Proper maintenance should
  include periodic testing and adequate back-up to cater for loss of stored
  encryption keys.
- Audit records should be created in a simple standard format.

- Where audit data are compressed, the appropriate decompression software must be available and properly maintained for the whole of the lifetime of the compressed data. Proper maintenance should include periodic testing.
- The audit trails must be stored in a long-term support and a tamper evident format, such that illicit addition, modification or deletion of any audit trail can be detected.

#### 8.1. Retention period

- MS should ensure that audit retention is part of the organisation's overall retention policy.
- Where the execution of sensitive security-related actions cannot be made subject to dual control, then that execution should be monitored in a timely fashion.
- MS should determine which data is classified as audit data and should protect and preserve this data appropriately.
- Personal notes should be kept by incident investigators throughout the whole course of an investigation and those notes should themselves be protected and preserved in the same manner as audit data.
- Audit records used during an investigation must be preserved at least until the end of the investigation and for any subsequent prosecution irrespective of their normal retention period.
- Follow the organisation's incident response policy to investigate an audit log incident.
- System configuration information should be modified, if necessary, to prevent an event from overwhelming the system.

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# **Appendix A.**eIDAS-Node Error Codes and Error Messages

The following table provides a list of eIDAS-Node errors and related error messages.

**Table 4: Error Codes and Error Messages** 

Key	Description
sProviderAction.invalidCountry.code	Invalid Country selected by the Citizen error
	message on the ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.invalidCountry.message	Invalid SP Domain error message on the
	ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.invalidSaml.code	Invalid SP Saml request error code on the
	ServiceProviderinterface.
sProviderAction.invalidSaml.message	Invalid SP Saml request error message on the
	ServiceProviderinterface.
sProviderAction.invalidSPProviderName.code	Invalid SP Provider Name error code on the
	ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.invalidSPProviderName.message	Invalid SP Provider Name error message on the
	ServiceProviderinterface.
sProviderAction.invalidRelayState.code	Invalid SP Relay State parameter error code on the
	ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.invalidRelayState.message	Invalid SP Relay State parameter error message on
	the ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.invalidAttr.code	Invalid SP personal attribute list error code on the
	ServiceProviderinterface.
sProviderAction.invalidAttr.message	Invalid SP personal attribute list error message on
	the ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.errorCreatingSAML.code	Generating SAML Token error code on the
	ServiceProvider interface.
sProviderAction.errorCreatingSAML.message	Generating SAML Token error message on the
	ServiceProvider interface.
internalError.code	Generic error code.
internalError.message	Generic error message.
attrList.code	Invalid attribute list error code on Specific code.
attrList.message	Invalid attribute list error message on Specific code.
invalid.sessionId.code	Invalid session id error code.
invalid.sessionId.message	Invalid session id error code.
invalid.session.code	Invalid session error code.
invalid.session.message	Invalid session error code.
callback.code	Invalid eIDAS-Node Proxy Service callback URL error
	code on CitizenConsent interface.
callback.message	Invalid eIDAS-Node Proxy Service callback URL error
	message on CitizenConsent interface.
idp.url.code	Invalid IdP redirect URL error code.

Key	Description
idp.url.message	Invalid IdP redirect URL error message.
IdPSAMLResponse.code	Invalid IdP's SAML Response error code.
IdPSAMLResponse.message	Invalid IdP's SAML Response error message.
serviceSAMLResponse.code	Invalid Proxy Service's SAML Response error code.
serviceSAMLResponse.message	Invalid Draw Camina's CAMI Danness array
servicesAminesponse.message	Invalid Proxy Service's SAML Response error
authenticationFailed.code	message.  Authentication Failed error code on IdPResponse
auchenticutioni arrea. coae	Interface.
authenticationFailed.message	Authentication Failed error message on
authenticution affect.message	IdPResponse Interface.
username.code	Authentication Failed error code on specific code.
45021141110,0040	Authentication Falled error code on specific code.
username.message	Authentication Failed error message on specific
,	code.
invalidAttributeList.code	Invalid Attribute List error code on Specific Code or
	IdP Response.
invalidAttributeList.message	Invalid Attribute List error message on Specific Code
	or IdP Response.
invalidAttributeValue.code	Invalid Attribute Value error code on Specific Code.
	·
invalidAttributeValue.message	Invalid Attribute Value error message on Specific
	Code.
attVerification.mandatory.code	No consent given error code on the
	CitizenConsent interface.
attVerification.mandatory.message	No consent given to mandatory error message on
	the CitizenConsent interface.
hash.error.code	Hash generation error code.
hash.error.message	Hash generation error message.
gaal aval gada	
qaaLevel.code	Invalid QAALevel error code on Specific Code or IdP
gaalowal magaaga	Response.
qaaLevel.message	Invalid QAALevel error message on Specific Code or
colleagueRequest.invalidSAML.code	IdP Response.  Invalid SAML Token error code on the
correaguerequest.invariusAMI.code	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleaqueRequest.invalidSAML.message	
correaguenequese.rnvarrusamb.message	Invalid SAML Token error message on the ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.invalidCountry.code	Invalid Citizen Country error code on the
correaguencequese. rinvarracountery. code	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.invalidCountry.message	Invalid Citizen Country error code on the
our sagueroques e invariacouner y incosage	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.errorCreatingSAML.code	Generating SAML Response error code on the
our sayachequest. Crrororeactings aris. Code	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.errorCreatingSAML.message	Generating SAML Response error code on the
correaguencequese.crrorereactingsamm.message	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.attrNull.code	Invalid personal attribute list error code on the
our out of the state of the sta	ColleagueRequest interface.
	COTTEAGREEVERSE III.E. IACE.

Key	Description
colleagueRequest.attrNull.message	Invalid personal attribute list error message on the
	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.invalidDestUrl.code	Invalid Citizen Consent URL error code on the
	ColleagueRequest interface.
colleagueRequest.invalidDestUrl.message	Invalid Citizen Consent URL error code on the
	ColleagueRequest interface.
serviceRedirectUrl.code	Invalid Proxy Service Redirect configuration URL
	error code on the ServiceProvider interface.
serviceRedirectUrl.message	Invalid Proxy Service Redirect configuration URL
	error message on the ServiceProvider
	interface
colleagueResponse.invalidSAML.code	Invalid SAML Token error code on the
	ColleagueResponse interface.
colleagueResponse.invalidSAML.message	Invalid SAML Token error message on the
	ColleagueResponse interface.
auRequestIdError.code	The SAML Response Id is either null or not valid
	error code.
auRequestIdError.message	The SAML Response Id is either null or not valid
	error message.
audienceRestrictionError.code	SAML Conditions are not compliant error code.
audienceRestrictionError.message	SAML Conditions are not compliant error message.