

Time Travel Analysis VS Debuggers

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**An illustrated example through
CVE-2024-2815**

Tenda AC15 router web interface

Description

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC15 15.03.20_multi. Affected is the function R7WebsSecurityHandler of the file /goform/execCommand of the component Cookie Handler. The manipulation of the argument password leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-257670 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Reproduce and analyse the vulnerability

ARM 32 bits Linux based firmware
Publicly available firmware


Emulate the web interface




Firmware extraction (very hard !!!)

```
wget https://static.tenda.com.cn/....zip  
unzip US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01.zip  
Binwalk -e firmware.bin  
TADA
```

Firmware emulation



Record the emulation for time travel analysis



Vulnerability details

The Tenda AC15 V15.03.05.18 firmware has a stack overflow vulnerability in the `R7websSecurityHandler` function. The `src` variable receives the `password` parameter from a POST request and is later assigned to the `v35` variable, which is fixed at 128 bytes. However, since the user can control the input of `password`, the statement `strcpy(v35, src);` can cause a buffer overflow. The user-provided `password` can exceed the capacity of the `v35` array, triggering this security vulnerability.

```
30 int v34; // [sp+308h] [bp-1CCh]
31 char v35[128]; // [sp+30Ch] [bp-1C8h] BYREF
32 char s[256]; // [sp+38Ch] [bp-148h] BYREF
33 int v37; // [sp+48Ch] [bp-48h]
34 char *v38; // [sp+490h] [bp-44h]
35 char *file; // [sp+494h] [bp-40h]
36 char *v40; // [sp+498h] [bp-3Ch]
37 char *src; // [sp+49Ch] [bp-38h]
```

```
123 if ( memcmp(s, "/login/Auth", 0xBu) )
124     goto LABEL_112;
125 src = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "password", &unk_DC7B8);
126 v39 = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "username", &unk_DC7B8);
127 if ( !v39 || !src )
128     goto LABEL_112;
```

```
139 for ( i = 0; i <= 2; ++i )
140 {
141     if ( !*((_BYTE *)&loginUserInfo + 36 * i) )
142     {
143         v14 = memcpy((char *)&loginUserInfo + 36 * i, (const void *)v39, v39[0]);
144         v15 = get_uptime(v14);
145         *((_DWORD *)&loginUserInfo + 9 * i + 8) = v15;
146         v11 = strcpy(v35, src);
147         goto LABEL_113;
148     }
```

Inside of the time travel view

```
0x900a1830 42 30 d5 e5      ldrb r3, [r5, #0x42]
0x900a1834 00 00 53 e3      cmp r3, #0
0x900a1838 70 80 bd 08      popeq {r4, r5, r6, pc}

# 8 240 118 ---- free+0x1ec - libc.so.0
0x90228b30 7f 80 bd e8      pop {r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, pc}

# 8 240 119 ---- websAspWrite+0x7bc - httpd
0x10960 10 00 00 ea      b 0x109a8 ($+0x48)

# 8 240 120 ---- websAspWrite+0x804 - httpd
0x109a8 08 d0 4b e2      sub sp, r11, #8
0x109ac 10 88 bd e8      pop {r4, r11, pc}




# 8 240 122 ---- websAspWrite+0x838 - httpd
0x109dc 04 d0 4b e2      sub sp, r11, #4
0x109e0 00 88 bd e8      pop {r11, pc}

# 8 240 124 ---- websAccept+0x2430 - httpd
0x2bfc8 08 d0 4b e2      sub sp, r11, #8
0x2bfcc 10 88 bd e8      pop {r4, r11, pc}

# 8 240 126 ---- R7WebSecurityHandler+0x1834 - httpd
0x309c8 00 30 a0 e3      mov r3, #0
0x309cc 22 00 00 ea      b 0x30a5c ($+0x90)

# 8 240 128 ---- R7WebSecurityHandler+0x18c8 - httpd
0x30a5c 03 00 a0 e1      mov r0, r3
0x30a60 14 d0 4b e2      sub sp, r11, #0x14
0x30a64 f0 88 bd e8      pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r11, pc}
```

Reg	#8240130	#8240130
r4	0xff3b8	0x41414141
r5	0x1251f0	0x41414141
r6	0x1	0x41414141
r7	0x7ff3cfe4	0x41414141
r11	0x7ff3c414	0x41414141
sp	0x7ff3c400	0x7ff3c418
pc	0x30a64	0x41414140
cpsr	tvCZn	TvCZn

First access	Address	String
	#3896	0x8114 /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0\0
	#3999	0x90000018 /i\0
	#4003	0x90000018 /lib\0

Filter: More than 100 results

Activate selected string to display accesses (Double click/press Enter).

Inside of the time travel view

*@lin:0x7ff3c400

< > DWord ☐ Before ☒ After

Offset	0	4	8	c	
0x7ff3c220	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
0x7ff3c230	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
0x7ff3c240	00000000	00000000	00000000	41414141 AAAA
0x7ff3c250	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x7ff3c260	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x7ff3c270	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x7ff3c280	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Transition	Type	Start address	Size
⏮ #7985765	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
⏮ #7986672	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
⏮ #8032092	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
⏮ #8044723	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
⏮ #8044797	W	lin:0x7ff3c24d	4
⏮ #8044871	W	lin:0x7ff3c24e	4
⏮ #8044945	W	lin:0x7ff3c24f	4

258 results

Inside of the time travel view

The screenshot displays the Immunity Debugger interface. At the top, the address bar shows '@lin:0x125ab7'. Below it, a memory dump is visible, showing a string 'Cookie=password=' in a red box. The memory dump is organized into columns for offset, hex values, and ASCII values. Below the memory dump, a list of transitions is shown, including addresses like #7897246, #7990178, #7990182, #7990186, #7990190, #7990194, #7990198, and #7990202, all marked as 'W' (write) operations. The bottom status bar indicates '8 results'.

Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f	
0x125ab0	43	6f	6f	6b	69	65	3d	70	61	73	73	77	6f	72	64	3d	Cookie=password=
0x125ac0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125ad0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125ae0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125af0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125b00	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125b10	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0x125b20	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Transition	Type	Start address	Size
#7897246	W	lin:0x125ab4	4
#7990178	W	lin:0x125ab4	4
#7990182	W	lin:0x125ab5	4
#7990186	W	lin:0x125ab6	4
#7990190	W	lin:0x125ab7	4
#7990194	W	lin:0x125ab8	4
#7990198	W	lin:0x125ab9	4
#7990202	W	lin:0x125aba	4

8 results

✓ Show access history of selection

*@lin:0x125ab7 Calltree Backtrace

```
# 8034 641 ---- R7WebSecurityHandler+0x558 - httpd
0x2f6ec 28 00 0b e5      str r0, [r11, #-0x28]
0x2f6f0 28 30 1b e5      ldr r3, [r11, #-0x28]
0x2f6f4 00 00 53 e3      cmp r3, #0
0x2f6f8 09 00 00 0a      beq 0x2f724 ($+0x2c)

# 8034 645 ---- R7WebSecurityHandler+0x568 - httpd
0x2f6fc 28 10 1b e5      ldr r1, [r11, #-0x28]
0x2f700 a4 3a 9f e5      ldr r3, [pc, #0xaa4]
0x2f704 03 30 84 e0      add r3, r4, r3
0x2f708 03 20 a0 e1      mov r2, r3
0x2f70c 72 3f 4b e2      sub r3, r11, #0x1c8
0x2f710 01 00 a0 e1      mov r0, r1
0x2f714 02 10 a0 e1      mov r1, r2
0x2f718 03 20 a0 e1      mov r2, r3
0x2f71c 37 7f ff eb      bl 0xf400 ($-0x2031c)

# 8034 654 ---- _init+0x7b0 - httpd
0xf400 00 c6 8f e2      add r12, pc, #0, #12
0xf404 f0 ca 8c e2      add r12, r12, #240, #20
0xf408 40 f2 bc e5      ldr pc, [r12, #0x240]!

# 8034 657 ---- _init+0x10 - httpd
0xec60 04 e0 2d e5      str lr, [sp, #-4]!
0xec64 04 e0 9f e5      ldr lr, [pc, #4]
0xec68 0e e0 8f e0      add lr, pc, lr
0xec6c 08 f0 be e5      ldr pc, [lr, #8]!

# 8034 661 ---- _dl_linux_resolve - ld-uClibc.so.0
0x47bde70 1f 00 2d e9      push {r0, r1, r2, r3, r4}
0x47bde74 04 00 1e e5      ldr r0, [lr, #-4]
0x47bde78 0c 10 4e e0      sub r1, lr, r12
0x47bde7c 41 11 e0 e1      mvn r1, r1, asr #2
0x47bde80 d9 f6 ff eb      bl 0x47bb9ec ($-0x2494)

#8034653 | EL1 | <unknown> | <unknown> | R7WebSecurityHandler+0x558
```

CPU		Only modified	
Reg	Before		
r0	0x125ab7		
r1	0xdc60		
r2	0x7ff3c24c		
r3	0x7ff3c24c		
r4	0xff3b8		
r5	0x1251f0		
r6	0x1		
r7	0x7ff3cfe4		
r8	0xec50		
r9	0x2e450		
r10	0x7ff3ce78		

Strings			
First access	Address	String	
⏮ #3896	0x8114	/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0\0	
⏮ #3999	0x90000018	/li\0	
⏮ #4003	0x90000018	/lib\0	

Filter:

Activate selected string to display acc

Inside Ghidra

```
0002f718 03 20 a0 e1    cpy      param_3,param_4
0002f71c 37 7f ff eb    bl       <EXTERNAL>::sscanf
0002f720 ea 00 00 ea    b        LAB_0002f750

LAB_0002f724
0002f724 80 34 1b e5    ldr      param_4,[r11,#local_484]
0002f728 b8 30 93 e5    ldr      param_4,[param_4,#0xb8]
0002f72c 03 10 a0 e1    cpy      param_2,param_4
0002f730 74 3a 9f e5    ldr      param_4,[DAT_000301a1]
```

XREF[1]:

```
# 8 034 645 ---- R7WebSecurityHandler+0x568 - httpd
0x2f6fc 28 10 1b e5    ldr      r1, [r11, #-0x28]
0x2f700 a4 3a 9f e5    ldr      r3, [pc, #0xaa4]
0x2f704 03 30 84 e0    add      r3, r4, r3
0x2f708 03 20 a0 e1    mov      r2, r3
0x2f70c 72 3f 4b e2    sub      r3, r11, #0x1c8
0x2f710 01 00 a0 e1    mov      r0, r1
0x2f714 02 10 a0 e1    mov      r1, r2
0x2f718 03 20 a0 e1    mov      r2, r3
0x2f71c 37 7f ff eb    bl       0xf400 ($-0x2031c)
```

```
163 if (*(int *)(param_1 + 0xb8) != 0) {
164     local_2c = strstr(*(char **)(param_1 + 0xb8), "password=");
165     if (local_2c == (char *)0x0) {
166         sscanf(*(char **)(param_1 + 0xb8), "%*[^]=%[^\n];*", acStack_1cc);
167     }
168     else {
169         sscanf(local_2c, "%*[^]=%[^\n];*", acStack_1cc);
170     }
}
```

undefined4 local_100;
char acStack_1cc [128];

Quid du strcpy ?????

```
0002fef0 03 20 a0 e1 cpy param_3=>DAT_000dc7b8,param_4
0002fef4 f0 ee ff eb bl FUN_0002babc
0002fef8 38 00 0b e5 str param_1,[r11,#local_3c]
0002fefe 80 04 1b e5 ldr param_1,[r11,#local_484]
0002ff00 f0 32 9f e5 ldr param_4,[DAT_000301f8]
0002ff04 03 30 84 e0 add param_4,r4,param_4
```

```
370 if (((sVar3 == 1) && (local_14c[0] == '/')) ||
371     (iVar1 = memcmp(local_14c,"/login/Auth",0xb), iVar1 != 0)) goto LAB_000303a4;
372 local_3c = (char *)FUN_0002babc(param_1,"password",&DAT_000dc7b8);
373 local_40 = (char *)FUN_0002babc(param_1,"username",&DAT_000dc7b8);
374 if ((local_40 == (char *)0x0) || (local_3c == (char *)0x0)) goto LAB_000303a4;
375 local_480 = 0;
```

Search

Address

Match

2fef4

Search

Search complete: 0 results found.

```
123 if ( memcmp(s, "/login/Auth", 0xbu) )
124     goto LABEL_112;
125 src = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "password", &unk_DC7B8);
126 v39 = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "username", &unk_DC7B8);
127 if ( !v39 || !src )
128     goto LABEL_112;
```

Quid du /goform/execCommand ????


Description

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC15 15.03.20_multi. Affected is the function R7WebSecurityHandler of the file /goform/execCommand of the component Cookie Handler. The manipulation of the argument password leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-257670 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

[illegible]

/goform/nimportequoimemelefoot

Fallback route



CVE-2018-5767 ???

Vulnerability details

The Tenda AC15 V15.03.05.18 firmware has a stack overflow vulnerability in the `R7WebSecurityHandler` function.

🚩 CVE-2018-5767 Detail

Description

An issue was discovered on Tenda AC15 V15.03.1.16 multi devices. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can gain remote code execution on the device with a crafted password parameter for the COOKIE header.



<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44253>



Tenda AC15 Router - Remote Code Execution

Time Travel analysis VS Debugger

- We had access to the entire memory post-emulation
- Memory accesses history
- Easy to analyse the trace backward
- Code throughout time paradigm
- With Qiling you can still modify the runtime and record the modified runtime