

# WineRump



# 2024

Recherche de patterns en représentation  
intermédiaire appliquée aux malwares -  
Pezier Pierre-Henri

# Génération “Classique” de signatures

# Repérage de code spécifique

```
mov    rax, 0B1D0B7848570F29h
lea    rdi, [rbp+var_330] ; unsigned __int8 *
mov    [rdi], rax
mov    byte ptr [rdi+0Ah], 4Eh ; 'N'
mov    word ptr [rdi+8], 1F0Eh
mov    esi, 0Bh ; unsigned int
call   __Z8GetTrickPhj ; GetTrick(uchar *,uint)
mov    rax, 0B052930565C0521h
lea    rdi, [rbp+var_340] ; unsigned __int8 *
mov    [rdi], rax
mov    byte ptr [rdi+0Ah], 32h ; '2'
mov    word ptr [rdi+8], 1417h
mov    esi, 0Bh ; unsigned int
call   __Z8GetTrickPhj ; GetTrick(uchar *,uint)
mov    rbx, cs::selRef_stringWithCString_encoding_
mov    rdi, cs::classRef_NSString ; id
lea    rdx, [rbp+var_330]
mov    ecx, 1


starting spotbb1
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100002f25 in function: "sub_100002F16" 4c89c831d248f7f68a04174330040849ffc14c39c975e9
Found suspicious routine at: 0x1000044f6 in function: "sub_10000430F" 89d683e60f8a5c359041301c1648ffc24839d175eb
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100004aef in function: "sub_100004568" be0100000ba000010004c89e74c89e9e81e5f0100488985
Found suspicious routine at: 0x10000518e in function: "sub_100004F84" 89c183e10f8a8c0d20fffff41300c0648ffc04939c475e8
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100005563 in function: "sub_100004F84" 89ca83e20f8a941520fffff30140b48ffc14839c875e9
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100009915 in function: "sub_1000097D0" 48c745a0010000004c89e7488d759c4c89f231c94531c045
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100009a32 in function: "sub_1000097D0" 89c1c1e918884c1dbd48ffc3c1e0084883fb0475eb
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100009ac3 in function: "sub_1000097D0" c1e208488b7580c1e8104803b570fffff884431f489d048
Found suspicious routine at: 0x1000127e9 in function: "sub_1000126BF" 0fb78495c0effff0fb6f0ff84b5d0f7fffffc1e8060d0004
Found suspicious routine at: 0x10001286d in function: "sub_1000126BF" 0fb7049748d3e80fb6c08bb485d0f3ffff8d5e01899c85d0
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100012fd3 in function: "sub_100012FC4" 4c89c831d248f7f1418a04104230040f49ffc14c39ce75e8
Found suspicious routine at: 0x1000130be in function: "sub_100012FED" 89c183e11f8a0c0b41300c0748ffc04939c675ec
Found suspicious routine at: 0x100017a2d in function: "sub_100017940" 89ca83e21f418a141730140b48ffc14839c875ec
Found suspicious routine at: 0x10001906f in function: "sub_100018210" 31d2a8010f94c2c1e21981cafffff0121ca299485f0fdff
Found suspicious routine at: 0x1000199d5 in function: "sub_1000199BF"

33    for segea in idautils.Segments():
34        for funcea in idautils.Functions(segea, idc.get_segm_end(segea)):
35            for bb in idaapi.FlowChart(idaapi.get_func(funcea)):
36
37                last_inst = idc.prev_head(bb.end_ea)
38                first_inst = idc.next_head(bb.start_ea)
39
40                if idc.print_insn_mnem(last_inst).startswith('j') \
41                and idc.print_insn_mnem(last_inst) != 'jmp' \
42                and idc.get_operand_type(last_inst, 1) == idc.o_void \
43                and idc.get_operand_value(last_inst, 0) == bb.start_ea:
44                    while inst != first_inst:
45                        inst = idc.prev_head(inst)
46                        if idc.print_insn_mnem(inst) in {'xor', 'shl', 'shr'} \
47                        and idc.get_operand_type(inst, 0) in {idc.o_phrase, idc.o_displ}:
48                            bytocode = binascii.hexlify(
49                                idaapi.get_bytes(bb.start_ea, bb.end_ea - bb.start_ea)
50                            ).decode('UTF-8')
51                            print(f'Found suspicious routine at: 0x{bb.start_ea:08x} in function: "{idc.get_func_name(funcea)}" {bytocode}
```

# Exemple de code de désobfuscation

```
mov     rax, cs:_objc_release_ptr
mov     rbx, rax
call    rax ; _objc_release
mov     rdi, r15
call    rbx
mov     rax, 0B1D0B7848570F29h ← Obfuscated string
lea     rdi, [rbp+var_330] ; unsigned __int8 *
[mrdi], rax
mov     byte ptr [rdi+0Ah], 4Eh ; 'N' ← Key
mov     word ptr [rdi+8], 1F0Eh
mov     esi, 0Bh      ; unsigned int
call    __Z8GetTrickPhj ; GetTrick(uchar *,uint) ← Decryption routine
```

# Exemple de code de désobfuscation



# Génération des règles

The screenshot illustrates the process of generating rules for deobfuscation in the Immunity Debugger. A red arrow points from the 'Plugins' menu in the top-left corner to the 'Quick run plugins' dropdown menu in the center. Another red arrow points from the assembly window at the top right to the generated rule code at the bottom right.

**Plugins** menu:

- Export data
- Shift+E
- Code
- C
- Data
- D
- Struct yar...
- Alt+Q
- Strings
- Numpad+\*
- Array...
- U
- Undefined
- Rename
- N

**Quick run plugins** dropdown:

- <deobfuscation spotter> Alt+F8
- <selection to yara string> Alt+F5
- <Locate PE loader>
- <export labels>
- <decrypt pushed strings> Alt+F3
- Swift
- SVD file management Ctrl+Shift+F11
- Sample plugin
- Rust language helper
- Objective-C
- Jump to next fixup
- Findcrypt Ctrl+Alt+F

**Assembly View (Top Right):**


```
loc_1000047FD:  
    mov    rax, rcx  
    mul    r9  
    shr    rdx, 4  
    lea    rax, [rdx+rdx*2]  
    shl    rax, 3  
    neg    rax  
    mov    al, [rsi+rax]  
    xor    [rdi+rcx], al  
    inc    rcx  
    inc    rsi  
    cmp    r8, rcx  
    jnz    short loc_1000047FD1
```

**Rule Generation (Bottom Right):**


```
rule deobfuscation_bbl {  
    strings:  
        $obj_100019fd1 = {  
            48 89 c8 // mov    rax, rcx  
            49 f7 e0 // mul    r8  
            48 c1 ea 07 // shr    rdx, 4  
            48 6b c2 ?? // imul   rax, rdx, -1Eh  
            4c 01 c8 // add    rax, r9  
            8a 04 01 // mov    al, [rcx+rax]; Obfuscated  
            30 04 0f // xor    [rdi+rcx], al  
            48 ff c1 // inc    rcx  
            48 39 ce // cmp    rsi, rcx  
            75 e1 // jnz    short loc_100019FD1  
        }  
        condition:  
        all of them  
    }
```

# Limits ([rverton/RC4.c](#))

VS code x86\_32



GCC code x86\_64




```
movsxrdx, eax
mov rax, [rbp+arg_0]
add rdx, rax
mov eax, [rbp+var_4]
movsxrdx, rcx, eax
mov rax, [rbp+arg_0]
add rax, rcx
mov rcx, rax
call swap
mov eax, [rbp+var_4]
movsxrdx, rdx, eax
mov rax, [rbp+arg_0]
add rax, rdx
movzx ecx, byte ptr [rax]
mov eax, [rbp+var_8]
movsxrdx, rdx, eax
mov rax, [rbp+arg_0]
add rax, rdx
movzx eax, byte ptr [rax]
add eax, ecx
movzx edx, al
mov rax, [rbp+arg_0]
add rax, rdx
movzx eax, byte ptr [rax]
movzx eax, al
mov [rbp+var_1C], eax
mov rdx, [rbp+str]
mov rax, [rbp+var_10]
add rax, rdx
movzx eax, byte ptr [rax]
mov edx, [rbp+var_1C]
xor eax, edx
mov ecx, eax
mov rdx, [rbp+arg_10]
mov rax, [rbp+var_10]
add rax, rdx
mov edx, ecx
mov [rax], dl
add [rbp+var_10], 1
```

# Passage en représentation intermédiaire

# Retargetable decompiler

Retargetable  
Decompiler



# Représentation intermédiaire

```
retdec-decompiler.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\winerump\test_cross_platform\RC4_gcc_win64.exe --select-ranges 0x01400014E0-0x01400015B7 > NUL 2>&1  
retdec-decompiler.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\winerump\test_cross_platform\RC4_VS_win32.exe --select-ranges 0x04010E0-0x04011B7 > NUL 2>&1
```

```
11  async def bin_to_ir(file_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:  
12      dst_file = BDD / (str(file_path.parent).replace("/", "_") + "_" + file_path.stem + ".ll.zlib")  
13      if dst_file.exists():  
14          return  
15      print("processing:", file_path)  
16      try:  
17          with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(dir="/dev/shm") as _tmp:  
18              tmp = pathlib.Path(_tmp)  
19              proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(RETDEC_DECOMPILER_PATH,  
20                                              "-o",  
21                                              tmp / file_path.stem,  
22                                              file_path,  
23                                              stdout=asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL,  
24                                              stderr=asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL,  
25                                              )  
26          await proc.communicate()  
27          ll_file = tmp / f"{file_path.stem}.ll"  
28          if ll_file.exists():  
29              dst_file.write_bytes(zlib.compress(ll_file.read_bytes()))  
30      except OSError:  
31          return  
32  
33  async def crawl() -> None:  
34      async with asyncio.Semaphore(10):  
35          await asyncio.gather(*map(bin_to_ir, MALWARE_SAMPLE_PATH.glob("*/*.exe")))
```

# Similarités (PRGA RC4)

VS code x86\_32

```
dec_label_pc_401154: ; preds = %dec_label_pc_40114c, %
%edx.0.reload = load i32, i32* %edx.0.reg2mem
%26 = add i32 %edx.0.reload, %3, !insn.addr !18
store i32 %26, i32* %6, align 4, !insn.addr !5
store i32 %15, i32* %8, align 4, !insn.addr !6
%27 = call i32 @function_401000(i32 %edx.0.reload, i32 %eax.0), !insn.addr !19
%28 = load i8, i8* %16, align 1, !insn.addr !20
%29 = zext i8 %28 to i32, !insn.addr !20
%30 = inttoptr i32 %26 to i8*, !insn.addr !21
%31 = load i8, i8* %30, align 1, !insn.addr !21
%32 = zext i8 %31 to i32, !insn.addr !21
%33 = add nuw nsw i32 %32, %29, !insn.addr !22
%34 = and i32 %33, 255, !insn.addr !23
%35 = add i32 %34, %3, !insn.addr !24
%36 = inttoptr i32 %35 to i8*, !insn.addr !24
%37 = load i8, i8* %36, align 1, !insn.addr !24
%38 = zext i8 %37 to i32, !insn.addr !24
store i32 %38, i32* %stack_var_-24, align 4, !insn.addr !25
%39 = add i32 %stack_var_-12.01.reload, %arg2, !insn.addr !26
%40 = inttoptr i32 %39 to i8*, !insn.addr !27
%41 = load i8, i8* %40, align 1, !insn.addr !27
%42 = add i32 %stack_var_-12.01.reload, %arg3, !insn.addr !28
%43 = xor i8 %41, %37, !insn.addr !29
%44 = inttoptr i32 %42 to i8*, !insn.addr !29
store i8 %43, i8* %44, align 1, !insn.addr !29
%45 = add i32 %stack_var_-12.01.reload, 1, !insn.addr !30
%46 = icmp ult i32 %45, %0, !insn.addr !2
%47 = icmp eq i1 %46, false, !insn.addr !3
store i32 %eax.0, i32* %stack_var_-8.03.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
store i32 %edx.0.reload, i32* %stack_var_-16.02.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
store i32 %45, i32* %stack_var_-12.01.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
br i1 %47, label %dec_label_pc_4011b2, label %dec_label_pc_401121, !insn.addr !3
```

GCC code x86\_64

```
dec_label_pc_1400015f7: ; preds = %dec_label_pc_1400015b8, %dec_
%stack_var_-12.01.reload = load i32, i32* %stack_var_-12.01.reg2mem
%stack_var_-16.02.reload = load i32, i32* %stack_var_-16.02.reg2mem
%stack_var_-24.03.reload = load i64, i64* %stack_var_-24.03.reg2mem
%5 = add nsw i32 %stack_var_-12.01.reload, 1, !insn.addr !4
%6 = srem i32 %5, 256, !insn.addr !5
%7 = sext i32 %6 to i64, !insn.addr !6
%8 = add i64 %7, %0, !insn.addr !7
%9 = inttoptr i64 %8 to i8*, !insn.addr !8
%10 = load i8, i8* %9, align 1, !insn.addr !8
%11 = zext i8 %10 to i32, !insn.addr !9
%12 = add nsw i32 %stack_var_-16.02.reload, %11, !insn.addr !9
%13 = srem i32 %12, 256, !insn.addr !10
%14 = sext i32 %13 to i64, !insn.addr !11
%15 = add i64 %14, %0, !insn.addr !12
%16 = call i64 @swap(i64 %8, i64 %15), !insn.addr !13
%17 = load i8, i8* %9, align 1, !insn.addr !14
%18 = inttoptr i64 %15 to i8*, !insn.addr !15
%19 = load i8, i8* %18, align 1, !insn.addr !15
%20 = add i8 %19, %17, !insn.addr !16
%21 = zext i8 %20 to i64, !insn.addr !17
%22 = add i64 %21, %0, !insn.addr !18
%23 = inttoptr i64 %22 to i8*, !insn.addr !19
%24 = load i8, i8* %23, align 1, !insn.addr !19
%25 = add i64 %stack_var_-24.03.reload, %arg2, !insn.addr !20
%26 = inttoptr i64 %25 to i8*, !insn.addr !21
%27 = load i8, i8* %26, align 1, !insn.addr !21
%28 = xor i8 %27, %24
%29 = add i64 %stack_var_-24.03.reload, %arg3, !insn.addr !22
%30 = inttoptr i64 %29 to i8*, !insn.addr !23
store i8 %28, i8* %30, align 1, !insn.addr !23
%31 = add nuw i64 %stack_var_-24.03.reload, 1, !insn.addr !24
%32 = icmp ult i64 %31, %3, !insn.addr !2
store i64 %31, i64* %stack_var_-24.03.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
store i32 %13, i32* %stack_var_-16.02.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
store i32 %6, i32* %stack_var_-12.01.reg2mem, !insn.addr !3
br i1 %32, label %dec_label_pc_1400015f7, label %dec_label_pc_1400016c7, !insn.addr !3
```


# Signature

- POC de détection rc4

```
bbi.count("call") < 2
and bbl.count("load") < 20
and not any(x in bbl for x in ("sub", "shl", "shr", "mul", "and", "div", "trunc", "select"))
and all(len(re.findall(x, bbl)) == 1 for x in [r"br i1 \%[a-z\d]+, label",
                                                r"xor\si8\s\%\d+, \s\%\d+",
                                                ])
```

- Amélioration avec llvmlite (beaucoup de refactor)

# Win!



# Réultats pour RC4


- Fonctions vues par le script et pas par:
  - [polymorf/findcrypt-yara](#)
  - [shellcromancer/alg\\_crypto\\_rc4.yara](#)
- Détection sur Netwire, Emotet, Macoute, MysticStealer, Samples de ref (GCC, VS)...
- Aucun FP sur 15 000 samples

# Success?

- Performances médiocres
  - Retdec sur thanos (916500065fb0037de6e95bdbeafaa69a8d3932af10e81acb02f88c6a65cb577e)  
**real 0m12.826s**  
**user 0m12.667s**  
**sys 0m0.071s**
  - 1 signature sur 15 000 samples goodware/malware mix (python script)  
**real 9m43.781s**  
**user 9m19.179s**  
**sys 0m7.150s**

# BDD n-gram

# VT like architecture



# URSADB

- Python script:
  - real 9m43.781s
  - user 9m19.179s
  - sys 0m7.150s
- CERT-Polska/ursadb
  - real 0m0.222s
  - user 0m0.044s
  - sys 0m0.041s
  - Limites dans les types de query

# Limites

# Limites

- Résultats encourageants mais:
  - Resultats ARM décevants
  - Multiples bugs en cas d'obfuscations
  - Besoin de tester davantage de lifters

Fin