

Time Travel Analysis VS Debuggers

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
**An illustrated example through
CVE-2024-2815**

Tenda AC15 router web interface

Description

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC15 15.03.20_multi. Affected is the function R7WebsSecurityHandler of the file / gotform/execCommand of the component Cookie Handler. The manipulation of the argument password leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-257670 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.


Reproduce and analyse the vulnerability




Firmware extraction (very hard !!!)

```
wget https://static.tenda.com.cn/....zip
unzip US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01.zip
Binwalk -e firmware.bin
TADA
```

Firmware emulation



Record the emulation for time travel analysis



Vulnerability details

The Tenda AC15 V15.03.05.18 firmware has a stack overflow vulnerability in the `R7WebsSecurityHandler` function. The `src` variable receives the `password` parameter from a POST request and is later assigned to the `v35` variable, which is fixed at 128 bytes. However, since the user can control the input of `password`, the statement `strcpy(v35, src);` can cause a buffer overflow. The user-provided `password` can exceed the capacity of the `v35` array, triggering this security vulnerability.

```
30     int v34; // [sp+308h] [bp-1CCh]
31     char v35[128]; // [sp+30Ch] [bp-1C8h] BYREF
32     char s[256]; // [sp+38Ch] [bp-148h] BYREF
33     int v37; // [sp+48Ch] [bp-48h]
34     char *v38; // [sp+490h] [bp-44h]
35     char *file; // [sp+494h] [bp-40h]
36     char *v40; // [sp+498h] [bp-3Ch]
37     char *src; // [sp+49Ch] [bp-38h]
```

```
123     if ( memcmp(s, "/login/Auth", 0xBu) )
124         goto LABEL_112;
125     src = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "password", &unk_DC7B8),
126     v39 = (char *)sub_2BABC(a1, "username", &unk_DC7B8);
127     if ( !v39 || !src )
128         goto LABEL_112;
129     v40 = 0;
```

```
139         for ( i = 0; i <= 2; ++i )
140     {
141         if ( !*(_BYTE *)&loginUserInfo + 36 * i )
142         {
143             v14 = memcpy((char *)&loginUserInfo + 36 * i, (const void
144             v15 = get_uptime(v14);
145             *((_DWORD *)&loginUserInfo + 9 * i + 8) = v15;
146             v11 = strcpy(v35, src);
147             goto LABEL_113;
148         }
```

Inside of the time travel view

```
0x900a1830 42 30 d5 e5        ldrb r3, [r5, #0x42]
0x900a1834 00 00 53 e3        cmp r3, #0
0x900a1838 70 80 bd 08        popeq {r4, r5, r6, pc}

# 8 240 118 ---- free+0x1ec - libc.so.0
0x90228b30 7f 80 bd e8        pop {r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, pc}

# 8 240 119 ---- websAspWrite+0x7bc - httpd
0x10960 10 00 00 ea          b 0x109a8 ($+0x48)

# 8 240 120 ---- websAspWrite+0x804 - httpd
0x109a8 08 d0 4b e2          sub sp, r11, #8
0x109ac 10 88 bd e8          pop {r4, r11, pc}

# 8 240 122 ---- websAspWrite+0x838 - httpd
0x109dc 04 d0 4b e2          sub sp, r11, #4
0x109e0 00 88 bd e8          pop {r11, pc}

# 8 240 124 ---- websAccept+0x2430 - httpd
0x2bfcc8 08 d0 4b e2          sub sp, r11, #8
0x2bfcc 10 88 bd e8          pop {r4, r11, pc}

# 8 240 126 ---- R7WebsSecurityHandler+0x1834 - httpd
0x309c8 00 30 a0 e3          mov r3, #0
0x309cc 22 00 00 ea          b 0x30a5c ($+0x90)

# 8 240 128 ---- R7WebsSecurityHandler+0x18c8 - httpd
0x30a5c 03 00 a0 e1          mov r0, r3
0x30a5e 14 d0 4b e2          sub sp, r11, #0x14
0x30a64 f0 88 bd e8          pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r11, pc}
```

The screenshot shows a debugger's time travel view with three columns representing different snapshots of the program state:

- Reg:** Registers (r4, r5, r6, r7, r11, sp, pc, cpsr) with their values at snapshot #8240130 and snapshot #8240130.
- Strings:** A table of strings found in memory, showing their first access address, memory address, and string content. The strings are: "/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0\0", "/li\0", and "/lib\0".
- Activations:** A table showing the activation of selected strings across snapshots. It includes columns for First access, Address, and String.

A red arrow points from the assembly code at the bottom left to the cpsr register in the first column of the registers table. A red circle highlights the assembly code for snapshot #8 240 128, and a red line connects this circle to the strings table at the bottom right.

	#8240130	#8240130
r4	0xff3b8	0x41414141
r5	0x1251f0	0x41414141
r6	0x1	0x41414141
r7	0x7ff3cfe4	0x41414141
r11	0x7ff3c414	0x41414141
sp	0x7ff3c400	0x41414141
pc	0x30a64	0x41414140
cpsr	0xCZn	0xCZn

First access	Address	String
#3896	0x8114	/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0\0
#3999	0x90000018	/li\0
#4003	0x90000018	/lib\0

Filter: Filter by string More than 100 results

Activate selected string to display accesses (Double click/press Enter).

Inside of the time travel view

*@lin:0x7ff3c400

DWord After

Offset	0	4	8	c	
0x7ff3c220	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
0x7ff3c230	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
0x7ff3c240	00000000	00000000	00000000	41414141 AAAA
0x7ff3c250	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAA.....
0x7ff3c260	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAA.....
0x7ff3c270	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAA.....
0x7ff3c280	41414141	41414141	41414141	41414141	AAAAA.....
0x7ff3c284

Transition	Type	Start address	Size
« #7985765	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
« #7986672	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
« #8032092	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
« #8044723	W	lin:0x7ff3c24c	4
« #8044797	W	lin:0x7ff3c24d	4
« #8044871	W	lin:0x7ff3c24e	4
« #8044945	W	lin:0x7ff3c24f	4

258 results

Inside of the time travel view

*@lin:0x125ab7

Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f	
0x125ab0	43	6f	6f	6b	69	65	3d	70	61	73	73	77	6f	72	64	3d	Cookie=password=
0x125ac0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125ad0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125ae0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125af0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125b00	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125b10	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....
0x125b20	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAA.....

Byte Before After

Reg Before #8034653

Reg	Before	#8034653
r0	0x125ab7	0xdcc60
r1	0x7ff3c24c	0x7ff3c24c
r2	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r3	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r4	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r5	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r6	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r7	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r8	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r9	0x1251f0	0x1251f0
r10	0x1251f0	0x1251f0

Strings

First access	Address	String
#3896	0x8114	/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0!0
#3999	0x90000018	/li\0
#4003	0x90000018	/lib\0

Filter: Filter by string

Activate selected string to display acc

8 results

Show access history of selection

*@lin:0x125ab7 Calltree Backtrace

Search

#8034653 | EL1 | <unknown> | <unknown> | R7WebsSecurityHandler+0x5...

Inside Ghidra

```
0002f718 03 20 a0 e1    cpy      param_3,param_4
0002f71c 37 7f ff eb    bl       <EXTERNAL>::sscanf
0002f720 ea 00 00 ea    b        LAB_0002f750

LAB_0002f724
0002f724 80 34 1b e5    ldr      param_4,[r11,#local_484]
0002f728 b8 30 93 e5    ldr      param_4,[param_4,#0xb8]
0002f72c 03 10 a0 e1    cpy      param_2,param_4
0002f730 74 3a 9f e5    ldr      param_4 [DAT 0002f730a1]
```

XREF[1]:

```
163 if (*int*)(param_1 + 0xb8) != 0) {
164     local_2c = strstr(*(char **)(param_1 + 0xb8),"password=");
165     if (local_2c == (char *)0x0) {
166         sscanf(*(char **)(param_1 + 0xb8),"%*[^=]=%[^;];*",acStack_1cc);
167     }
168     else {
169         sscanf(local_2c,"%*[^=]=%[^;];*",acStack_1cc);
170     }
}
```


```
# 8 034 645 ---- R7WebsSecurityHandler+0x568 - httpd
0x2f6fc 28 10 1b e5          ldr r1, [r11, #-0x28]
0x2f700 a4 3a 9f e5          ldr r3, [pc, #0xaa4]
0x2f704 03 30 84 e0          add r3, r4, r3
0x2f708 03 20 a0 e1          mov r2, r3
0x2f70c 72 3f 4b e2          sub r3, r11, #0x1c8
0x2f710 01 00 a0 e1          mov r0, r1
0x2f714 02 10 a0 e1          mov r1, r2
0x2f718 03 20 a0 e1          mov r2, r3
0x2f71c 37 7f ff eb          bl 0xf400 ($-0x2031c)
```

```
union inline4 local_100;
char acStack_1cc [128];
    . . . . .
```

Quid du strcpy ?????

```
0002fef0 03 20 a0 e1    cpy    param_3=>DAT_000dc7b8,param_4
0002fef4 f0 ee ff eb  bl     FUN_0002babC
0002fef8 38 00 0b e5  str    param_1,[r11,#local_3c]
0002fefc 80 04 1b e5  ldr    param_1,[r11,#local_484]
0002ff00 f0 32 9f e5  ldr    param_4,[DAT_000301f8]
0002ff04 03 30 84 e0  add    param_4,r4,param_4
```

```
370  if (((sVar3 == 1) && (local_14c[0] == '/')) ||
371  (iVar1 = memcmp(local_14c,"/login/Auth",0xb), iVar1 != 0)) goto LAB_000303a4;
372  local_3c = (char *)FUN_0002babC(param_1,"password",&DAT_000dc7b8);
373  local_40 = (char *)FUN_0002babC(param_1,"username",&DAT_000dc7b8);
374  if ((local_40 == (char *)0x0) || (local_3c == (char *)0x0)) goto LAB_000303a4;
375  local_480 = 0;
```



```
123  if ( memcmp(s, "/login/Auth", 0xBu) )
124  goto LABEL_112;
125  src = (char *)sub_2BABc(a1, "password", &unk_DC7B8);
126  v39 = (char *)sub_2BABc(a1, "username", &unk_DC7B8);
127  if ( !v39 || !src )
128  goto LABEL_112;
129  a101 = 0;
```


Quid du /goform/execCommand ????

Description

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC15 15.03.20_multi. Affected is the function R7WebsSecurityHandler of the file /goform/execCommand of the component Cookie Handler. The manipulation of the argument password leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-257670 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

/goform/nimportequoimemelefoot

Fallback route



CVE-2018-5767 ???

Vulnerability details

The Tenda AC15 V15.03.05.18 firmware has a stack overflow vulnerability in the `R7WebsSecurityHandler` function.

~~CVE-2018-5767 Detail~~

~~Description~~

An issue was discovered on Tenda AC15 V15.03.1.16 multi devices. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can gain remote code execution on the device with a crafted password parameter for the COOKIE header.

  <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44253>



Tenda AC15 Router - Remote Code Execution

Time Travel analysis VS Debugger

- We had access to the entire memory post-emulation
- Memory accesses history
- Easy to analyse the trace backward
- Code throughout time paradigm
- With Qiling you can still modify the runtime and record the modified runtime