
Lessons from a decade of bug hunting

Atlantic Security Conference 2019

xen1thLabs

A DARKMATTER COMPANY

SMART AND SAFE DIGITAL

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`whoami`



Eldar Marcussen
Lead security researcher

Proven history of performing security research that result in 0day vulnerabilities, conference presentation and security tools. I have written a source code scanner and auditing source code is often part of my security research process. My past research and security tools have also featured in industry related cyber security text books.

A former

Developer

System administrator

Penetration tester

Currently

Husband and Father

Security researcher

Trainer

01

BUG HUNTING

Bughunting




Identifying weaknesses



- Read the documentation
- Learn to recognize weakness patterns in source code
- Learn to recognize weakness patterns in design/process
- Anticipate poor decision making
- Implement short test cases to verify behavior if unsure
- Take breaks from complex/difficult code


Simplifying bug hunting

- AVOID FALSE POSITIVES
- THIS MIGHT MEAN MISSING VULNERABILITIES (false negatives)
 - You can always take another look later
- SHORTLIST OF VULNERABILITY CLASSES
 - Easy to analyse
 - Avoids drowning in XSS



Reporting vulnerabilities

Vulnerability enthusiasm




Reporting vulnerabilities



02

DISCLOSURE

"Types" of disclosure



COORDINATED, NOT
RESPONSIBLE

Problems with the disclosure debate



Vulnerability tourism



Assumptions



Strawman arguments



Lack of empirical data



Shallow arguments



Disclosure policy compliance

Don't be that guy



Follow




Replying to



I do hope this tweet is a last resort and you've at least attempted responsible disclosure...

Personal stories


Disclosure experiences



DEALING WITH VENDORS

- This is a placeholder text.
- This text can be replaced with your own text.


Disclosure experiences




OR



Cacti superlinks plugin



phpMoAdmin




Public disclosure stories


Shell shock (bashdoor)

- Initial report: 12 September 2014
- Initial patch: 24 September 2014
- Wide spread abuse: Within hours of disclosure
- Additional patches: 25-30 September 2014
- Abuse slowly died off

Attackers exploited Shellshock within hours of the initial disclosure by creating botnets of compromised computers to perform distributed denial-of-service attacks and vulnerability scanning. Security companies recorded millions of attacks and probes related to the bug in the days following the disclosure.




Heartbleed



* All numbers in thousands

Eternal blue



Other disclosure stories

- <https://www.csoononline.com/article/3338112/vendor-allegedly-assaults-security-researcher-who-disclosed-massive-vulnerability.html>
- <https://beyondbinary.io/articles/seagate-nas-rce/>
- <https://www.ring0.lol/posts/2014/07/27/coindrawer-bug-bounty-finale/>
- https://twitter.com/Agarri_FR/status/1112401090023170049
- <https://medsec.com/entries/stj-lawsuit-response.html>
- <https://threatpost.com/the-vulnerability-disclosure-process-still-broken/137180/>
- <https://www.wired.com/2015/09/fireeye-enrw-injunction-bizarre-twist-in-the-debate-over-vulnerability-disclosures/>

03

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION



Vulnerability discovery doesn't have to be advanced

Disclosure isn't binary

Ormandy's Law?

Can we fix patch adoption and poor development practices?