# LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIO DE COLOMBIA EJERCITO DEL PUEBLO

## A BRIEF HISTORY

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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC) is an organization rooted deep in the history of Colombia. Due to its long history, the FARC has played different roles in different time periods, and consequently is viewed by different people in vastly different ways. To some, the FARC is the hero of the commoner, to others a terrorist organization, and to others still, a narcotrafficking ring. In order to understand what the FARC is today, it is necessary to understand its history. The FARC is an organization that was born out of necessity, out of fear, and out of violence and has evolved in response to the ever-changing politics in Columbia. They are an organization that tried to negotiate with the Colombian government several times, only to be slaughtered upon reentry into society. They are an organization that protected villages from the brutal Co

gained the support of the Colombian army. Despite the polarization of its politics, Colombia remained relatively peaceful during the '30s and early '40s. This changed rapidly following the 1946 elections. In 1946, Gaitán ran for president without the support of the liberal party, causing a split that resulted in the victory of the conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Perez. Ospina was elected president of Colombia with only 42% of the vote. In September of 1947, Gaitan disclosed a secret document detailing the Ospina government's plan to import huge qub

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#### The Founding of the FARC

The FARC was born out of the violence during and after La Violencia and the corresponding loss of faith in government. Referring to La Violencia, Pedro Marín, founder of the FARC, wrote, "The police and armed Conservatives would destroy the villages, kill inhabitants, burn their houses, take people prisoner and disappear them, steal livestock and rape the women. The goal of the Conservative groups was to inflict terror on the population". In response to the violence at the hand of the military and paramilitaries, a teenager named Pedro Marín fled the Amazon and went into hiding in the Cordillera Central. There he began to form a guerrilla army of displaced Colombians. Tensions came to a head in 1964 when the Colombian Army set its sights on Marquetalia, a small town that had declared itself an independent republic during La Violencia. The Colombian army attacked the barely armed village of approximately onethousand farmers. This attack sent the members of the community fleeing for the mountains, where a group of about fifty of them would officially unite to form the FARC. Shortly after, founder Pedro Marín adapted the nom de guerre Manuel Marulanda. Colombian historian, Arturo Alape, wrote, "With Operation Marquetalia, the directing class of the country created the FARC movement in Colombia". 10

#### Solidification of Power

Over the course of the politically turbulent 1970's and '80's, the villages of the Amazon came to resemble the wild west of the United States. For example, drinking and fighting became so prominent on the weekly day off, that many villages established a ritual of collecting and counting the dead on Monday mornings. <sup>11</sup> In addition to the violence, the coca plant became the main source of income for the farmers, and the cocaine base became an accepted currency. The Colombian government had essentially abandoned the countryside. In the midst of this chaos, the FARC guerrillas entered the scene and played the role of government and law enforcement. The guerrillas were welcomed in the villages as they gave a sense of order to the mayhem. As a byproduct of this acceptance, the guerrillas cemented their control of the Amazon area and gained even more support from the populous. The guerrillas quickly took advantage of their solidification of control by taxing the growth and sale of coca. This new source of funding allowed the guerrillas to buy more weapons and recruit more soldiers, and rapidly became a key source of income for the FARC. With the capture of the cartel leaders by U.S. and Colombian forces towards the end of the 1990's, the FARC became the only power in southern Colombia and the sole governing force.

#### Recruitment and Training

Recruitment was not a significant challenge for the FARC during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Colombian military and the paramilitary death squads always made it easy for the FARC to recruit members, providing plenty of incentive through their oppression and abuse of the farmers living in the Amazon region. The Colombian military had, and to a certain extent has, a reputation for brutality in the regions controlled by the FARC, and the paramilitaries, frequently

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Bruce, Victoria, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique Botero. *Hostage nation: Colombia's guerrilla army and the failed war on drugs.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. Kindle loc. 394. <sup>10</sup> Ruiz, p 110.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Bruce, Haynes, Botero, Kindle loc 1259.

supported by the military, had an even more brutal reputation. Children and teenagers in the countryside matured in an environment where the military was to be feared for their brutality and the guerrillas respected for their protection. In addition, the guerrillad areas historically have been areas of extreme poverty, which with the exception of military raids, received

overthrew the established government of Gomez and placed General Rojas in power. Sined ghis point, traditional government has been slowly wrenehing power from ghd gilitary, but frequently thd gwo have not been operating as one force. The paramilitary groups further eomplicate thd g relationship between military and government. In thd gatd g, thd glombi an army established thd gramilitary groups as ld gitimatd gpeeial operations groups. Viold gd gas d goura ged in thd gd groups and oversight was minimal at best. The government turned a blind eyd go thd g methods of torturd gnd murdd ged by thd gd groups, hoping thd g22(y)33()-16(w)5(oul)-4(d s)6(uc)-5(c)-5(e)-5 flidiguerrillh yrga kontions ahdiestabliishing pesoer is conthally the koncentrate salvith in the get 9-5(xt)-4 groups werd gng mord ghan good and tha g the tac gic g usd gy thd g werd g only unsuccessful, but providd ghd gARC wi th angry rd grui gs bent on rd genge. In 1989 thd g parailitary groups. The Col ombian Pd gcd gmission found that from 1997 thd gerd g over 20,000 murders eommitted by illd gal orga gzations. Of thosd grailitaries and drug eartels werd gsponsibld ger 80%, whild ghe guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN among othd g) werd gs ponsibod g Parailitarid g would not only attack the guerrillas, but would protec g thd gselves, attac gng any polied gound investigating thd g, journalists reporting on thd g, or lawyd g trying to prosecutd ghd 11(m)-4(. I)16(n a)-5(ddi)-4(t)-4(i)-4(on,tpathd(g))16(lago)1hreisitary groups turn of funding as thd gFARC; kidnapping, extortion, and drug traffic gng. By d goura ging thd g formation of pa gmilitary units in thd Ds, thd gombian government opened the door to thd g formation of a gd groups outsidd ghd -5(i)-4(r di)11(rle)131(d gdlgarphted into orga gzations that g ard g arguably doing mord go Colombia than thd gery orga gzation thd g werd ged to fight.

In eonclusion, thd government eondoned, but frequently did not eontrol ghd -5()17(a)-5(rm)-5(y)33(, a)-5(n)-16 taeitly eondoned, but ultimately did not eontrol ghd -5(p)17(a)-5(ra)gilitary groups. The result of this eomplex situation was tha g thd government was typically not in a position to succd gsfully nd gotiatd gd gcd gny a greemd g for amnesty to which thd g22(y)33(e)-5(a)-5(m)-4(d g)1 md 11(a)-5(nt)-4(v)2 groups.

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