### **Lab 3 User Environments**

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#### **Ex.1 Allocating the Environments Array**

In kern/pmap.c:mem\_init(), add those two lines:

```
envs = (struct Env*)boot_alloc(NENV * sizeof(struct Env));
boot_map_region(kern_pgdir, UENVS,
    ROUNDUP(NENV * sizeof(struct Env), PGSIZE),
    PADDR(envs), PTE_U | PTE_P);
```

I actually modified more code in mem\_init():

```
boot_map_region(kern_pgdir, KERNBASE, npages*PGSIZE, 0, PTE_W);
```

to map only available memory, so accessing above 128MB (default RAM size of QEMU) will cause a page fault instead of obscure behaviours. And in check\_kern\_pgdir() to suit the change:

```
// for (i = 0; i < NPDENTRIES; i++)
for (i = 0; i < npages / NPTENTRIES; i++)</pre>
```

Note: from this point, I will try not to quote too much code, for obvious reasons

- Quoting too much code ruins your report! People don't really care about your exact implementation, they want an general description of your design, something you can't steal. Anyone want to see the code, they head for your code directly.
- Isn't it very nice to practice English writing on technical issues?

The report becomes considerably shorter but nevertheless expressive.

## **Ex.2 Creating and Running Environments**

In env\_init(), memory occupied by envs is wiped clean, then all struct Envs are linked.

In env\_setup\_vm(), first a physical page is allocated for the Env 's page directory. Page directory entries for VA above UTOP is copied from kern\_pgdir, the rest is unmapped. Then the reference count is incremented.

As for region\_alloc(), that allocates memory for user ELF image, with user read/write permission. va and len are rounded appropriately.

Moving on to <code>load\_icode()</code> . We must parse the ELF structure, and load appropriate segments into the Env 's VA, and reserve wiped space if necessary. Then we copy the ELF's entry point to <code>eip</code> of the Env 's trap frame. Finally we allocate 1 page for the program's stack. I used <code>lcr3</code> to switch the page directories, so that I can access user VA directly.

Next we have env\_create() to sum up all the preparation.

Finally the env\_run() that fall back to user program.

Now our joe should be able to drop to user program. See my debug session: User program was loaded at 0x800020, call chain is like this (some omitted):

- 0x80002c call libmain<0x800060>
  - 0x80008d call umain<0x800034>
    - 0x800041 call cprintf<0x800171>
      - 0x80018c call vcprintf<0x80010c>
        - 0x800149 call vprintfmt<0x80035a>
          - 0x800fb5 sys\_cputs
            - 800f4c syscall

syscall emitted a instruction int \$T\_SYSCALL at 0x800f69, then our CPU went into 'double fault', without a proper handler, then into 'triple fault' and halts.

#### **Ex.3 Handling Interrupts and Exceptions**

Book reading: done.

In short, how x86 processors handle interrupts is fairly complex. Intel gave interrupt, exceptions, faults and traps a common name 'Protected Control Transfer' when such transfer happened in user mode. Whatever the cause, the processor uses two important data structures namely Interrupt Descriptor Table and Task Segment Selector: when an interrupt occurs(including traps etc.), the CPU locates the interrupt descriptor using interrupt number as a subscript to the *IDT*, checks permissions then saves machine state (SS, ESP, EIP etc.) to the location specified by TSS, and jump to code pointed by the corresponding interrupt descriptor.

When the interrupt occurred in kernel mode or inside an interrupt handler, the processor does pretty much the same (without changing to the stack specified by *TSS*).

### **Ex.4 Setting Up the IDT**

I've written a little python script, to do the messy work automatically:

- 1. generate trap vectors in kern/trapentry. S using kern/trapentry.tmpl as template.
- 2. setup IDT entries in 'kern/trap.c' using kern/trap.c.tmpl as template.

This part of the logic is written in kern/Makefrag. Following instruction on MIT's page, we now have the IDT working.

Later I found a alternative way which is pretty elegant as well. A short description:

- Store the interrupt handlers as an array of function pointers, by mixing .data and .text assembler directives in the handler-generating macro.
- Use the macro to create the handlers, not to leave the unused slots so that the array stays continuous.
- In trap.c, use a for loop to install the IDT.

#### Q&A

- 1. What is the purpose of having an individual handler function for each exception/interrupt? (i.e., if all exceptions/interrupts were delivered to the same handler, what feature that exists in the current implementation could not be provided?)
  - if all interrupts were first handled in the same place, there will be no way of telling them part. In the current implementation we relied on the first level handler \_alltraps to store the interrupt number on stack, then call the generic handler trap.
  - Isn't it nice to have all interrupts be dispatched in a same place? So that the design becomes very clear and your code less messy.
- 2. Did you have to do anything to make the user/softint program behave correctly? The grade script expects it to produce a general protection fault (trap 13), but softint's code says int \$14. Why should this produce interrupt vector 13? What happens if the kernel actually allows softint's int \$14 instruction to invoke the kernel's page fault handler (which is interrupt vector 14)?
  - Nope, it happened just like that. Initiating a interrupt requires the 'Current Privilege Level' be less or equal to the interrupt gate's 'Descriptor Privilege Level'. In kern/trap.c we defined the all interrupt gates' DPL to be 0 (only accessible in kernel mode, by int instruction), except for the breakpoint gate. So issuing int \$14 will cause general protection fault instead of the requested page fault.
  - If the kernel allows arbitrary use of interrupt gates and trap gates, regardless
    of CPL, it would be very easy for user programs to disturb the kernel (for
    example, by repeatedly issuing divide by zero exception through int \$0).
     The kernel must forbid such actions.

#### **Ex.5 Handling Page Faults**

In kern/trap.c trap\_dispatch() I used switch-case to dispatch traps. Trap number is stored in tf->tf\_trapno, for the case T\_PGFLT we just need to call page\_fault\_handler(tf).

The privilege level that the trap's initiator was in, is stored in the last 2 bits of CS segment selector. If the page fault was from the kernel (privilege level 0), we will print the trap-frame then panic. Otherwise the fault must be from user (privilege level 3), we handle this by printing the trap-frame then destroy the current environment.

### **Ex.6 The Breakpoint Exception**

This one is dead simple: add a case in  $trap\_dispatch()$  for  $T\_BRKPT$ , then invoke monitor(tf).

#### Q&A

- 1. The break point test case will either generate a break point exception or a general protection fault depending on how you initialized the break point entry in the IDT (i.e., your call to SETGATE from trap\_init). Why? How do you need to set it up in order to get the breakpoint exception to work as specified above and what incorrect setup would cause it to trigger a general protection fault?
  - see the answer for question 1, ex. 4. Currently T\_BRKPT and T\_SYSCALL are
    the only two interrupts that can be invoked by int instruction in user mode,
    for their DPL being 3. If the DPL is 0, then int \$T\_BRKPT will cause a general
    protection interrupt.
- 2. What do you think is the point of these mechanisms, particularly in light of what the user/softint test program does?
  - I believe my answer for question 2, ex.4 is good for this one as well. The kernel
    must punish those user programs who abuse the int software interrupt
    instruction to create inconsistencies, by killing them right away without mercy.

#### Challenge

# Break/Continue/Single-Stepping, and a general debugger for user programs

later.

#### **Ex.7 System Calls**

In function syscall() in kern/syscall.c, another switch-case is used to dispatch

the system calls according to syscallno. For every case we convert and pass required arguments, then delegate return values if any. -E\_INVAL is returned if a non-existing system call is requested.

### Challenge

Fast system call by sysenter/sysexit instructions.

later.

## Ex.8 User-mode startup

When we don't know where to add code, better search // LAB 3: Your code here. So convenient!

First we figure out our env\_id by calling user mode helper sys\_getenvid(), then modify thisenv accordingly.

## **Ex.9/10 Memory Protection**

First part: kernel mode page fault is already handled in Ex.5. Second part: sanity checking of user's arguments.

In kern/pmap.c, we must implement user\_mem\_check() to verify the existence and permission of a range of memory in user space. user\_mem\_assert() will destroy the user Env if memory access violates. debuginfo\_eip and various system calls use the sanity checks as well.