

# Cheng Weishi Lun

by Xuanzang<sup>1</sup>

Translated into English by Lewis Wang

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## Book I

### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 Homage and the Purpose of the Treatise

I pay homage to the fact that everything is nothing but representation (*viññapti-mātrata*; Ch: 唯识性)<sup>2</sup> [and] to those who are completely and partially pure.<sup>34</sup> I now explain their views, for the benefit and happiness of all sentient beings.

I now make this treatise<sup>5</sup>, in order to bring the right understanding to those who are confused or wrong about the two kinds of emptiness [i.e., emptiness of the self and of dharmas].<sup>6</sup> The right understanding, in turn, is for the purpose of eliminating the two obstructions (*Avāraṇa*). These two obstructions arise from one's attachment to the self and to dharmas, and if one realizes (*sākṣātkāra*) the two emptiness, then these two obstructions will thereby be eliminated. The elimination of the two obstructions is, in turn, for attaining the two great results: by eliminating the obstruction of defilement (*kleśa*), which causes rebirth, one attains true nirvana, and by

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<sup>1</sup> The official attribution of authorship in the text goes as follows:

“Created by Bodhisattva Dharmapala and others.

Translate by *tripitaka* master (*ācārya*) Xuanzang according to the Emperor's edict”.

According to Kuiji – a scribe, disciple, and perhaps the most famous commentator of Xuanzang – CWSL is Xuanzang's selected compilations of ten different Indian commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Trimsika* that he translated from Sanskrit (but see Lusthaus 2002, ch.15 for doubt about this story). These ten commentators are traditionally believed to be Dharmapala, Gunamati, Sthiramati, Bandhusri, Nanda, Sudhacandra, Citrabhanu, Visessamitra, Jinaputra, Jnanacandra.

<sup>2</sup> This phrase can be more simply translated as “representation-only-ness”. Both *viññapti* and *viññāna* are translated in CWSL as 识. In order to disambiguate this Chinese term, I adopt the policy of translating *viññāna* as representation and *viññāna* as consciousness throughout this translation. For a helpful discussion of the meanings of these two terms, as well as the related Sanskrit terms *citta* and *manas*, see Hall (1986).

<sup>3</sup> According to Kuiji's *Shuji*, the first half of this stanza can be interpreted in four ways. The homage may be read as paid only to dharma *qua* principles of the world that are taught by the Buddha, or as paid only to those beings who are pure, or as paid to both, or as paid to the three jewels (the Buddha, the monks, and the dharma). Here I opt for the third reading, which seems most plausible to me. LVP opts for the second reading, taking seriously Kuiji's claim that *viññapti-mātrata* is locative and “purified” is dative.

<sup>4</sup> “Pure” (Ch: 清淨) means someone who is free from impurities, i.e., from *kleśa* and ignorance. “Completely pure” here refers to the Buddha, while “partially pure” is likely referring to Vasubandhu, to whose *Trimsika* this treatise is a commentary.

<sup>5</sup> Both LVP and BDK interpret this passage as an explanation of why Vasubandhu composes the Thirty Verses. The problem with this reading is that it leaves the “now” (Ch: 今) untranslated. It is clear that the voice speaking here is not Vasubandhu himself but one or many of his commentators, so what is being composed “now” must be the commentary (CWSL or its source commentaries) rather than the Thirty Verses itself.

<sup>6</sup> According to *Shuji* and *Zangyao*, this beginning paragraph is the view of Sthiramati. Cf. Levi (1925), p.1.

eliminating the obstruction of ignorance (*jñeya*), which prevents one from acquiring knowledge, one attains the great enlightenment (*mahābodhi*).<sup>7</sup>

This treatise is also for instructing those who wrongly believe in [the reality of] the self and dharmas and are confused about representation-only, so that they can attain the two emptiness by knowing the truth of the principle (*naya*?; Ch: 理) of representation-only.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, there are those who are confused or wrong about the principle of consciousness-only.<sup>9</sup> Some of them hold that external objects are, like consciousness (*viññana*), not non-existent. Some of them hold that inner consciousness is, like external objects, not existent.<sup>10</sup> Some of them hold that different consciousnesses have different uses but are the same entity (Ch: 体). Some others hold that there is no mental factor (*caitta*) apart from the mind (*citta*).<sup>11</sup> This treatise is therefore written in order to refute all these wrong views, so that people [who held these wrong views] can acquire the understanding of the truth in the profound and brilliant (Ch: 深妙) principle of representation-only.

## 1.2 An Overview of the Error Theory of the Self and Dharmas

[Opponent:] If only representations exist, then how could ordinary people and various scriptures say that the self and dharmas really exist? [Response:] The stanza says:

The self and dharmas, which are [only] metaphorical expressions, *develop* (*pravartate*; Ch: 转) into a variety of forms (Ch: 相); they depend on the transformation (*parinama*; Ch: 变) of consciousness, and this transformation can only occur in three ways: [Verse 1]

Namely, [the transformation of consciousness into] maturation (*vipāka*), thought, and representations of sensory objects. [Verse 2a-b]<sup>12</sup>

The treatise says: when ordinary people and scriptures say that the self and dharmas exist, they must be taken as merely metaphorical expressions, rather than as having substantively real intrinsic nature (*dravyasat-svabhāva*; Ch: 实有性).<sup>13</sup> The self (*Atman*) means the ruling power that is in control; *dharmas* means [things that] follow norms and possess intrinsic nature. Both can develop

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<sup>7</sup> *Mahābodhi* is the kind of enlightenment achieved by the Buddha.

<sup>8</sup> According to *Shuji*, this paragraph contains the view of Citrabhanu and others. According to *Zangyao*, this part contains the second view of Sthiramati.

<sup>9</sup> According to *Shuji*, this paragraph contains the view of Dharmaphala. According to *Zangyao*, this paragraph contains the third view of Sthiramati.

<sup>10</sup> Kuiji reads this as representing the Madhyamaka view.

<sup>11</sup> Kuiji thinks this represents the view of the Sautrantika school and the philosopher Buddhadeva. The Sautrantikas believe that there are three kinds of *caitta*, namely sensation (*vedanā*), perception (*saṃjñā*) and intention (*cetanā*). These three kinds of *caitta* are all acts of the mind rather than intentional objects of mental acts, e.g., the feeling of shame or hatred, which may be argued to be distinct from the mental acts they are grounded upon. For the view of Buddhadeva, see LVP's p.5.

<sup>12</sup> Sanskrit: *ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate / vijñānapariṇāme asau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā / vipāko mananākhyāśca vijñaptir viśayasya ca /*. There are a few places where Xuanzang's Chinese translation of these verses deviates from the Sanskrit original. My translation here stays close to the Chinese rather than the Sanskrit.

<sup>13</sup> Here Xuanzang refers to the distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, or something that is substantively real and something that is merely nominally real through conceptual constructions.

into a variety of forms. The different forms of the self include sentient beings (*sattva*), living beings (*jivā*), etc., and stream-enterers (*srotāpanana*) and once-returners (*sakṛdāgāmin*), etc.<sup>14</sup> The different forms of dharmas are real things (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), *karma*, etc., and aggregates (*skandhas*), sense-spheres (*āyatana*), sensory realms (*dhātu*), etc.<sup>15</sup> “Development” (*pravartate*; Ch: 转) means that [the self and dharmas] are posited (Ch: 施設) differently according to different conditions. ap

[Opponent:] If these different forms [of the self and dharmas] are merely metaphorical expressions, then what are they based on?

[Response:] These forms are fictionally posited based on the transformation of consciousness. “Consciousness” (*viññāna*) means sense-perception (Ch: 了别). Here, the word “consciousness” includes also mental factors (*caitta*), for they must be associated (*samprayukta*; Ch: 相应) [with the consciousness].<sup>16</sup> “Transformation” (*parinama*) means that consciousness itself develops into the appearance of two parts (*bhāga*), [namely the appearance part (*nimitta-bhāga*?; Ch: 相分) and the perception part (*darśana-bhāga*? *dṛṣṭi-bhāga*?; Ch: 见分)]<sup>17</sup>, since both arise from the part that is consciousness itself (*samvitti-bhāga*; Ch: 自证分).<sup>18</sup> The self and dharmas are [fictionally] posited based on these two parts, since they have no basis otherwise.

Alternatively, [one may hold that] it is internal consciousness that develops to appear like external objects due to the power of latent impression (*vāsanā*; Ch: 熏习力)<sup>19</sup> of the conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*; Ch: 分别) of the self and dharmas. When the consciousnesses arise, they assume the appearance of the self and dharmas. These appearances of the self and dharma, although they are in inner consciousness, nevertheless appear as external objects through conceptual constructions. From beginningless time, the sentient beings take these [appearances]

<sup>14</sup> *Srotāpanana* and *sakṛdāgāmin* are the first two of the four stages awakening in early Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism. The other two stages are *anāgāmin* and finally, the fully enlightened *arhat*.

<sup>15</sup> According to *Zangyao*, these two sentences reflect in part Sthiramati's view.

<sup>16</sup> According to the Abhidharmic theory of the mind, every moment of the mind (*citta*) is concomitant with some accompanying momentary mental processes that are called *caittas*. They stand in fact in a reciprocal causal relationship, such that neither can exist without the other. In simple terms, *caittas* characterize the mental moment that they are concomitant with. They provide the content and qualities to momentary mental acts. For more on *caitta*, see Waldron (2003, 57-9); Dhammajoti (2015, ch.9).

<sup>17</sup> For LVP's justification of rendering 分 as *bhāga* as well as his rendering of the Sanskrit original of the different *bhāgas*, see his p.8. Nagao (1982) renders the Sanskrit of 相 and 见 as *nimitta* and *dṛṣṭi* respectively in his work on *Mahayana-saṃgraha* with reference to the Tibetan (“*rgyu mtsban dang lta ba dang*”).

<sup>18</sup> Kuiji thinks this passage encompasses the view of both Dharmapala and Sthiramati. Developing this reading, LVP explains that both of them accept that the nature of consciousness is the *saṃvitti-bhāga*, and it develops into the perception and appearance parts. Their difference lies in the fact that while Dharmapala accepts both perception and appearance parts as at least conventionally real (or have the *paratantra* nature), Sthiramati views both parts as illusory (or have the *parkalpita* nature). Hence the former has a three-part view, while the latter has a one-part view. It seems to me, however, that this passage leans more in the Dharmapala direction, for it does not explain the appearance and perception parts as fictionally posited, but rather as the basis for fictionally positing the self and dharmas. This implies that these two parts are more real than dharmas and *Atman*. Furthermore, *Zangyao* finds no evidence of the appearance and perception parts in Sthiramati's commentary to *Trimsika*.

<sup>19</sup> The word *vāsanā* may more literally be translated as infusing or perfumation. I translate it as latent impression, however, because what it refers to are certain predispositions or inclinations that past impressions leave in us – and more precisely in our *ālaya-viññāna* – as their imprints or residues of some kind.

and believe them to be real self and real dharmas. This is just like when someone has a disease or is dreaming, his mind appears like various external objects due to the power of the disease or the dream, and he takes those appearances to be real external objects.<sup>20</sup>

The real self and real dharmas that ignorant people believe in do not really exist, but rather are merely posited according to false illusions (Ch:妄情). They are thus called fictional (Ch:假). The appearances of the self and dharmas that are transformed from inner consciousness, although they do exist, do not have the nature (*svabhava*) of the self and dharmas, but merely appear like them. They are thus called fictional. The external objects are posited according to illusions, and thus they do not exist in the same way that consciousness does. This is because inner consciousness must arise according to causes and conditions, and thus is not non-existent as external objects are. In this way, we can eliminate the [false] affirmation (*samAropa*) [of real external objects] and the [false] denial (*apavAda*) [of real inner consciousness]. External objects are fictionally posited based on inner consciousness, and thus they are merely conventionally real (*samvRttisat*). Consciousness is what the fictional external objects depend on, and thus they are also ultimately real (*paramArthasat*).<sup>21</sup>

## 2. Against Attachment to the Self (*Atmagraha*)<sup>22</sup>

### 2.1 The First Three-fold Distinction of Theories of *Atman*

[Opponent:] How do we know that there is no real external object, but only internal consciousness, from which the appearance of external objects arises?

[Response:] It is because real self and real dharmas cannot be established (Ch:得).

[Opponent:] How is it that real self cannot be established?

[Response:] There are roughly three kinds of self that are held to exist by various [schools of thought]. On the first view, the self is eternal and universal, and its magnitude (Ch:量) is the same as [infinite] empty space (*AkAza*), because it can act everywhere and experience pain and pleasure everywhere.<sup>23</sup> The second view holds that although the self is eternal, its magnitude could vary, since it can fold or expand according to the magnitude of the body.<sup>24</sup> The third view takes the self

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<sup>20</sup> Kuiji attributes the view in this passage to Nanda and BandhuSrI. LVP further explains that this view is based on a passage in the *Mahayana-Samgraha* (T31.1594.0138b03). They thus both read this passage as expressing a two-part view that makes no mention of the *saMvitti-bhAga*. See Keng (2014, 77-80) for a discussion of this two-part view in the *Samgraha*. I am not certain about this, however, as this passage sounds to me like describing a one-part view similar to Sthiramati's.

<sup>21</sup> According to *Zangyao*, this explanation of the fictional or merely conventionally true nature of the self and dharmas comes from Sthiramati.

<sup>22</sup> According to *Zangyao*, this section against *atma-graha* cannot be found in Sthiramati's commentary, but rather is similar to books II and III of Dharmapala's commentary to Aryadeva's *Caturstataka* (*Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun*, T1571). This fact is also noticed by earlier Chinese commentators such as Ouyi Zhixu. On this ground it is speculated that this section reflects the view of Dharmapala.

<sup>23</sup> This is the view of Samkhyas and Vaisheshikas. We see this kind of self in, for example, the *Bhagavad Gita*.

<sup>24</sup> This, according to *Shuji*, is the Jainist view.

to be eternal and always as small as an indivisible atom, so that it can reside and change in the body to cause actions.<sup>25</sup>

The first view is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] If the self is, as the first view holds, eternal, universal, and of a magnitude that is the same as the entire empty space, then it should not experience pleasure and pain together with the body. Also, if it is eternal and universal, then it should not be able to change or move; if so, how can it cause actions with the body?

Moreover, is the self taken to be real [by the first view] the same for all sentient beings, or distinct for each of them? If the same, then when one sentient being acts, all should act; when one receives an effect (*phala*; Ch: 果) [from an action], all should receive that effect; and when one achieves liberation, all should achieve liberation. That would be a great mistake.

If each sentient being has a distinct self, on the other hand, then since all sentient selves are universal, all of them would co-occupy the same space, and thus they would be intermingled with each other. And since when one being acts or receives an effect, its self occupies the same space as all selves [because all selves are universal], we should say that the action is done by all selves and the effect is received by all selves, [which is clearly mistaken].<sup>26</sup> One might respond here that the actions and the receiving of the effects belong to each self individually, and thus there is no such mistake. This response is also wrong, however. [If the selves are intermingled with each other, then] the actions, effects and bodies belong to all selves, and we have no reason to say that an action or an effect belongs to this self rather than that one. When one sentient being achieves liberation, all should achieve liberation, for the practiced and realized dharmas (Ch: 所修证法) should belong to all selves.

The second view is also contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] If the self is permanent (Ch: 常住), then it should not fold or expand in accordance with the body. If it does fold or expand, then it is not permanent, like the wind from a bellows. Moreover, if the self corresponds to the body, then it should be divisible. How, then, can one take the self to be one unitary entity? So, this view is like childish play.

The third view is also contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] If the magnitude of the self is as small as an indivisible atom, how can it make all the parts of a great body move [at the same time]?<sup>27</sup> If you say that the self, although small, can move around the body rapidly like a fire-brand wheel, so that all the parts of the great body appear to move at the same time, then that self must be neither unitary nor eternal, since whatever comes and goes cannot be unitary or eternal.

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<sup>25</sup> This, according to *Shuji*, is the view of Pasupatas, a school of Saivism, and ParivrAjakas, or the renunciants.

<sup>26</sup> The argument here, roughly, is that if all sentient beings have distinct selves and they are all universal, they would all be spatially co-located, and we would have no way to distinguish them. If so, then we would have to take there to be not many selves, but just one, identical universal self.

<sup>27</sup> The great body, according to *Kuiji*, refers to some God whose height is tens of thousands of miles.

## 2.2 The Second Three-fold Distinction of Theories of *Atman*

Alternatively, we can distinguish [in a different way] three kinds of self: the first kind is identical to the aggregates (*skandhas*), the second kind is distinct from the aggregates, and the third kind is neither identical to nor distinct from the aggregates.<sup>28</sup>

The first kind of self, which is identical to the aggregates, is contrary to reason, because this kind of self is neither eternal nor unitary, just like the aggregates. Also, the inner *rupas*<sup>29</sup> are definitely not the real self, because they are material and resistant (Ch: 有质碍)<sup>30</sup>, just like the external *rupas*. The mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) are also not the real self, for they do not constitute an eternal continuum, but instead depend on other causal conditions [for their existence]. The other conditioned existences (*samskAra*) and *rupas*<sup>31</sup>, e.g., the empty space (*Akasa*), are also not the real self, for they lack the intelligence that is essential [to the self] (*bodha-svarUpa*; Ch: 觉性).

The second kind of self, which is distinct from the aggregates, is also contrary to reason, because this kind of self, just like the empty space, can neither act nor receive the effect [of an action].

The third kind of self, which is neither identical to nor distinct from the *skandhas*, is also contrary to reason. If something's existence depends on the aggregates, but itself is neither identical to nor distinct from the aggregates, then it is not substantively real, just like vases, etc.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, because it cannot be said whether this kind of self is causally efficacious (*samskṛta*) or not (*asamskṛta*), it also cannot be said whether it is the self or not. Thus, the real self proposed by this third view cannot be established.

## 2.3 General Refutation of the Self

Moreover, can the different kinds of self that are taken to be substantively real think or not? If they can think, then they must be non-eternal, because a self cannot think all the time. If they cannot think, then they should be like empty space, in that they can neither act nor receive the effect [of an action]. Thus, we cannot rationally establish any self that is taken to be real.

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<sup>28</sup> According to Kuiji, the first and the second kinds of self here includes the four kinds of self discussed in *Yogacarabhumi*. The previously refuted three kinds of self in the first tri-fold division all belong to the second kind in this second tri-fold division. The third view here is that of the Vatsiputriyas and Sammitiyas, who hold that although there is no *atman*, there does exist real *pudgalas*.

<sup>29</sup> The inner *rupas* are the five sense organs: vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch.

<sup>30</sup> LVP tentatively equates this Chinese term with *sAvaraNa*, although he admit this restoration is doubtful. He also restores 碍 as *pratighAta*. See his p.40. At any rate, it seems clear to me that this term refers to the property of a material thing that excludes or resists other things from occupying the space that it currently occupies.

<sup>31</sup> What are referred to here are *viprayukta-samskAras* and *avijjapti-rupa*. The former are causally efficacious dharmas that are neither mental nor physical. The latter is the karmic imperceivable material force that reveals one's intentions. The argument in this paragraph is a Sarvastivadin one, insofar as it rejects every single kind of dharma in its system of 75 dharmas as being identical to the self.

<sup>32</sup> The idea here seems to be that a vase's existence depends on the clay, but it is neither identical to the clay nor entirely distinct from it. The metaphysical relationship referred to here may be plausibly read as that of supervenience, which entails the principle that anything supervening on something else is not substantively real.

Moreover, can the different kinds of self that are taken to be substantively real cause things to happen or not?<sup>33</sup> If they can, like hands and feet, then they should be non-eternal. If they cannot cause things to happen, like a hare horn, then they are not the substantively real self. Thus, either way, we cannot establish any self that is taken to be real.

Further yet, are the different kinds of self that are taken to be substantively real the object of the self-view (*Atma-dRSTi? satkAyadarzana?*)? If they are not, then how can you all claim to know that there is a substantively real self? If they are the object of the self-view, then there must be a self-view that is not taken to be perverted (*viparyAsa*), as it would count as true knowledge. If so, then how could the religions of those who believe in a real self all denounce any self-view and praise no-self? [These religions] all say that one who does not believe in any self-view can attain *nirvana*, while one who firmly believes in a self-view will forever remain in life and death. But how could a false view leads to *nirvana*, and a true view instead leads one to remain in life and death?

Also, the various self-views do not have the real self as their object, because they have something else as their object, e.g., the mind (*citta*), etc.<sup>34</sup> The object of the self-views cannot be the real self, because [that object] is an object of cognition (*Alambana*; Ch: 所缘), just like other dharmas.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, the object of self-views is not the real self, but rather the aggregates (*skandha*) that appear due to the transformation of inner consciousness. [These aggregates] are thought (*parikalp?* Ch: 计度) in different ways according to one's false illusions [as the self].

## 2.4 Cessation of *Atma-graha*

There are roughly two kinds of attachment to the self (*Atma-graha*): the first is innate (*sahaja*), and the second is conceptual (*vikalpita*; Ch: 分别). Innate attachment to the self arises due to the power of the internal cause of false latent impression since beginningless time. It is always with the individuals, and does not depend on false religions or false concepts to arise, but rather develops spontaneously. Thus, it is called innate. Innate attachment to the self is again of two kinds. The first kind is eternally continuous and belongs to the seventh consciousness [or *manas-vijJana*], which takes to be the real self the image of its own mind (Ch: 自心相) that arises when it takes the eighth consciousness [or *alaya-vijJana*] as its object. The second kind is intermittent and belongs to the sixth consciousness [or *mano-vijJana*], which takes to be the real self the image of its own mind that arises when it cognizes the appearances of the five aggregates of attachment (*upadAna-skandha*; Ch: 取蕴) that are transformed from consciousness. These two kinds of attachment to the self are subtle and therefore hard to eliminate. It can only be eliminated through the repeated

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<sup>33</sup> Ch: 有作用 and 无作用. LVP renders them *sakriya* and *niSkriya*.

<sup>34</sup> Ch: 如缘余心. LVP translates this “just like when the mind takes an object [other than the self], e.g., color, etc.” (p.17). BDK translates this as “no different from any object of the mind”. Both translations seem to be rooted in Kuiji's reading of this sentence as a metaphor to the mind that has rupas other than the self has its object. But it seems to me that a more straightforward reading is just to say that Xuanzang is offering an error theory here, which says the views that take there to be a real self are in fact taking one's mind (and perhaps mental factors and bodies too) as their object, rather than a real, unified self.

<sup>35</sup> Xuanzang here seems to be anticipating his refutation of the reality of dharmas by saying that the object of the self-views is just as unreal as the dharmas are.

practice and learning of the emptiness of the person on the path of cultivation (*bhAvana-mArga*; Ch:修道).<sup>36</sup>

Conceptual attachment to the self depends [not only on internal causes, but] also on the power of the presently existing external conditions. It is thus not with the individuals, but rather depends on false religions and false concepts before it could arise. It is thus called conceptual. It belongs only to the sixth consciousness, and it is also of two kinds. Firstly, when [the sixth consciousness] takes the appearances of aggregates according to the false religions as its object, an image of its own mind arises, which is conceptually interpreted and taken to be the real self. Secondly, when [the sixth consciousness] takes the appearances of the self according to the false religions as its object, an image of its own mind arises, which is conceptually interpreted and taken to be the real self. These two kinds of self are crude and thus easily eliminable. It can be eliminated on the first path of seeing (*darzana-mArga*), where one observes that the way things truly are (*tathAta*; Ch:真如) is that all dharmas and the self are empty.

It can thus be said that while the different kinds of attachment to the self may or may not depend on aggregates external to the mind, they all depend on aggregates in the mind. Therefore, [different kinds of] attachment to the self all take the appearances of the impermanent five aggregates of attachment as their object, and falsely regard them as the self. Now, the appearances of aggregates, because they dependently arise, exist as an illusion, but the self that is falsely believed in is definitely non-existent, because it is merely an irrational (Ch:橫) interpretation [of the appearances of the aggregates]. Thus, the Scripture says: “Know, O bhikus, all the views of the self of the ascetics (*zramana*) and Brahmins in the world, they all arise from the five aggregates of attachment”.

## 2.5 Reply to Objections

[Opponent:] if there is no real self, how come that we have memory, awareness, recitation, learning, gratitude and resentment, etc.?

[Response:] Since the real self you believe in are eternal and unchanging, it should be the same later as it was before. [If so, then] such things [such as memory, etc.] do not exist. It should also be the same before as it is later. [If so, then] such things [such as memory, etc.] are not non-existent, because there is no difference to the self itself before and after. [Your view thus results in a contradiction.]<sup>37</sup>

One may say that what changes before and after is not the self itself, but its acts (*kAritra*). But this is contrary to reason, too, since the acts of the self are not separate from the self itself, so they

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<sup>36</sup> In both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, *bhAvana-mArga* is the second of the three stages towards enlightenment (although they differ on whether the goal is *Arhat* or Buddhahood). The other two stages are *darzana-mArga*, the starting stage, and *asaikṣā-mārga*, the destination stage.

<sup>37</sup> All the things mentioned by the opponent rely in some sense on memory. Xuanzang's response to the challenge of accounting for memory here is not to directly explain it, but to turn the argument on the questioner's head. He points out that for those who believe the self to be eternal and unchanging, it must both be true that there never is any memory, because a newborn has no memory; and that there always are memories of everything (including things that have not happened yet), for one has all the memory of his life before his death. That is clearly contradictory.



should exist permanently; and the self itself is no separate from its acts, so they should not exist permanently. [Again, a contradiction arises.]

The truth is that all sentient beings have their own base-consciousness (Ch:本识), [i.e., the *alaya-vijJana*,] which is a homogenous continuum that holds the seeds (*blja*). [These seeds] and all dharmas are mutually the cause of each other. It is due to the power of latent impression (*vAsana*) that things such like memory and awareness exist. Therefore, the problem raised here reveals the fault on your end rather than mine.

[Opponent:] If there is no real self, then who could act and who receives the effect [of an action]?

[Response:] Since the real self you believe has no changes, just like empty space (*AkAza*), how could it act and receives the effect [of an action]? If it has changes, then it must be impermanent, [which is contrary to your view].

The truth is that it is all sentient beings' mind (*citta*) and mental factor (*caitta*) dharmas that act and receive the effects [of actions] in an uninterrupted continuum, due to the power of causes and conditions (Ch:因缘力).<sup>38</sup> This is not contrary to any reason.

[Opponent:] If there is no real self, then who is it that floats between different worlds of existence (*gati*; Ch:趣)<sup>39</sup> in the cycle of life and death (*samsara*)? And who is it that abhors suffering and seeks *nirvana*?

[Response:] The real self you believe in has no arising and destruction (*udayavaya*; Ch:生灭); if so, how could it be said to be in *samsara*? If it is permanent like empty space (*AkAza*), [it must] not be bothered by suffering, so how could it abhor and abandon suffering and seek *nirvana*? Thus, what you say turns against yourself.

The truth, instead, is that it is the continuum (*saMtAna*; Ch:相续) of the [momentary] bodies and minds of the sentient beings that floats between different worlds of existence in *samsara* due to *klesha* and karmic powers, and it is them that seek *nirvana* because they abhor and worry about suffering. For this reason, we know that there must be no real self. Instead, there are only various [momentary] consciousnesses that form a continuum since beginningless time. [In this continuum], the next [momentary consciousness] arises when the previous one disappears, and each previous one causes the next one to arise. Due to the false power of impression (*vAsAna*), an image that seems similar to a self appears [from this continuum], and the ignorant people falsely take this appearance to be the self.

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<sup>38</sup> The Sanskrit original for 因 is typically *betu*, and for 缘 is typically *pratyaya*.

<sup>39</sup> According to Buddhist cosmology, in *samsara*, after one dies, one may be reincarnated into one of the six (or five for Theravada buddhism, since they do not count *asura* as a separate *gati*) worlds, each with its own kind of being. The six worlds are those of gods, asuras, humans, animals, hungry ghosts (*preta*) and hell.

### 3. Against Attachment to Dharmas (*Dharma-graha*)<sup>40</sup>

#### 3.1 Against Non-Buddhist Theories of Dharmas

[Opponent:] Why is it that real dharmas, apart from the consciousness, cannot be established?

[Response:] It is because the external dharmas that are taken to be real by non-Buddhists (*tIrthika*) and non-Mahayana Buddhists (Ch: 余乘; *lit.* other *yAnas*) are non-existent according to reason.

[Opponent:] Why are what the non-Buddhists take to be [real external dharmas] non-existent?

##### 3.1.1 Against the Samkhyas

[Response:] Firstly, the Samkhyas believe in a self that is identical to [pure] thinking. It is affected by (*upabhuḥ*; Ch: 受用) twenty-three dharmas, such as *mahat*, etc., which are composed of [the three *gunas*, namely] *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.<sup>41</sup> They believe that these dharmas that are composed of the three *gunas*, such as *mahat*<sup>42</sup>, etc., are real rather than fictional, because they are known by perception (*pratyakSa*; Ch: 现量).

This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] Dharmas such as *mahat*, etc., are composed of multiple things. They should thus be fictional rather than real, just like armies and forests. So, how can you say that they are known by perception? Furthermore, if dharmas such as *mahat*, etc., really exist, then they should be like [the three *gunas*] themselves and not be composed of the three *gunas*.

Also, since the three *gunas*, such as *sattva*, etc., are identical to [dharmas, such as] *mahat*, etc.<sup>43</sup>, they should also be composed of three things, just like [dharmas, such as] *mahat*, etc., are. Similarly, [because dharmas such as *mahat* can change and thus are impermanent, the three *gunas* must also be] changeable [and thus] impermanent, [which is contrary to Samkhya view].

Moreover, if each of three *gunas* have multiple functions (Ch: 功能), each of them should also consist of multiple entities (*svabhAva*; Ch: 体), since function and entity are identical.<sup>44</sup> Since these

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<sup>40</sup> According to *Zangyao*, similar to the previous section against *atma-graha*, this section against *dharma-graha* cannot be found in Sthiramati's commentary, either. Instead, they find it similar to books VI and VII of Dharmapala's commentary to Aryadeva's *Caturstataka* (*Dasbeng Guangbailun Shibun*, T1571).

<sup>41</sup> The Samkhyas are dualists who believe that the world ultimately consists of two things: *puruSa* and *prakRti*. The former is commonly translated as pure consciousness, the latter refers to the primordial substrate of all material beings. *prakRti* has 23 manifest forms or aspects, and they are all composites of the three constitutive qualities or *gunas*: intelligibility (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*). These 23 aspects, plus *puruSa* and *prakRti*, form the Samkhya's set of 25 *tattvas* or basic elements of the world.

<sup>42</sup> In the Samkhya system, *mahat* – often translated as the great element – refers to the universal intellect. It is the first manifest form of *prakRti*, and is the principle of creation for all material beings in the world.

<sup>43</sup> In the sense that dharmas like *mahat* are nothing but the three *gunas* combined in different ways.

<sup>44</sup> For the Buddhists, objects are individuated according to their *svabhAva* or intrinsic nature. Insofar as the function of a thing – i.e. what it can do – depend on its intrinsic nature, here Xuanzang claims that a thing with many different functions should have many different intrinsic natures, and thus must consist of many distinct entities.

three entities are universal, when they change at one place, they should also change everywhere else, for it is the same entities everywhere.

If you grant that the three *gunas* are different entities and have different defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*; Ch: 相), then how could they combine together into something that has one single defining characteristic? They should not change to assume the same characteristic when they are combined, for they are still the same entities as when they are not combined together. If you instead say that the three *gunas* are different entities but have the same defining characteristic, then that contradicts your [i.e., the Samkhyas'] own view that entity and defining characteristics are identical. [Your own view implies that a dharma] should be a single entity as it has one defining characteristic; [but it also implies that a dharma] should have three defining characteristics as it consists of three entities [because it is composed of the three *gunas*]. Therefore, you should not say that a dharma is composed of the three *gunas*.

Furthermore, the three *gunas* are parts (*bhinna*?; Ch: 别), and [dharma]s such as] *Mahat*, etc., are wholes (*saṃanyā*; Ch: 总). Since the wholes and the parts [that constitute the wholes] are identical to each other, it should not be the case that [the whole is a] single [entity but the parts are] three distinct entities.

When these three entities transform [to constitute singular dharma]s, if they do not combine to possess one single defining characteristic, then they should be the same as when they have not transformed. If so, how could they be perceived (Ch: 现见) as singular [dharma]s such as *rupas*, etc.? If these three entities combine to assume one single defining characteristic, then they should lose their own particular defining characteristics. [But if so, then these three] entities would be thereby lost, too.

It cannot be said that the three *gunas* each have two defining characteristics, the first of which is [the characteristic of] the whole and the second is its own particular [characteristic]. Because the whole is nothing but its parts, the whole should also have three [defining characteristics], then how could they appear to have one single [defining characteristic]?

One might say that the three entities each have three defining characteristics<sup>45</sup>, and it is because they are hard to distinguish when they are combined together that they appear with one single defining characteristic. But how could something with three defining characteristics appear as a single entity? Moreover, how could we know that these three things are different? If each one of those [three *gunas*] has three defining characteristics, then each one of them should be able to constitute [dharma]s such as] *rupas*, etc., on its own; so what is missing that requires the combination of three [*gunas*]? And [each *guna*] should also consist of three entities, as an entity is just its defining characteristic. Also, since dharma]s such as] *mahat*, etc., are all constituted by the three *gunas*, [the different dharma]s should have no difference from each other (*paraspara*; Ch: 展转相望<sup>46</sup>). But if so, then there would be no difference between cause and effect, between

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<sup>45</sup> That is, each *guna* has three *lakṣaṇas* of the three *gunas*.

<sup>46</sup> See Xuanzang's translation of Vasubandhu's *Vimsika*, where Xuanzang translates *paraspara-nyatirek*. At as “展转相望不  
过量故” (*Weishi Ershi Lun*, T31.1590, p.76a2).

subtle-elements (*tanmAttra*; Ch:唯量) and the various great-elements (*mahAbhUta*; Ch:大)<sup>47</sup>, and among the different sense faculties (*indriya*; Ch:根). If so, then one sense faculty should be able to perceive all sensible objects, or that there should be one object that is perceived by all sense faculties. And there should be no difference between sentient and non-sentient beings, between pure and impure things, between perception (*pratyakSa*; Ch:现量) and inference (*anumAna*; Ch:比量), [even though] they are perceived as different in the world. That would be a great mistake.

Therefore, the dharmas that the Samkhyas hold to be real cannot be established. Rather, they are merely thought (*parikalp?*; Ch:计度) to be real as a false illusion.

### 3.1.2 Against the Vaisesikas

The Vaisesikas hold that many categories (*padartha*), such as that of substances (*dravya*), have substantively real nature, and that they are known through perception.

This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] Some of the categories are [held by the Vaisesikas to be] permanent. If they can produce effects, however, then they must be impermanent like the effects they produce, for they are causally efficacious (Ch:有作用).<sup>48</sup> If they cannot produce effects, then they should have no substantively real (*dravyasat*) intrinsic nature (*svabhava*) independently of consciousness, just like hare horns, etc.

As for the impermanent categories, if they have resistance (Ch:有质碍), then they must have extension (Ch:方分) and thus must be divisible, just like armies and forests, etc., and thus they cannot have substantively real intrinsic nature. If they do not have resistance, like the mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*), then they should have no real intrinsic nature independently of these, [i.e., the mind and mental factors].

Moreover, [the four elements of] earth, water, fire and wind that the Vaisesikas believe in should not fall under the category of substances (*dravya*), which have resistance.<sup>49</sup> This is because they are that which are touched by faculty of touch (Ch:身根; *kAya-indriya*), just like [the qualities of] solidity (*kakkhaTatva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), heat (*uSNatva*) and movement (*udIraNatva*).<sup>50</sup> Or, alternatively, solidity, fluidity, and heat, etc., which the Vaisesikas believe [to be mind-

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<sup>47</sup> The *mahAbhUtas* refer to elements that make the world such as earth, water, fire and wind, while the *tanmAttras* are the causes of the *mahAbhUtas*.

<sup>48</sup> There are several terms that Xuanzang translates as 作用 in different texts, including *kAritra* (cf. Dhammajoti 2015, 145), *keriA* (cf. *Vimsika* verse 2, T31n1590, 74c4, and *Catuhṣataka*, T30n1570, 183a10), and possibly *karma* (cf. AKB 93:19-20 and T29n1558, 34c10-11). While there may be subtle differences among these terms according to different theories, broadly speaking, they all mean something like actions or activities with causal effect. Hence, throughout this paper I will generally translate 作用 as causal efficacy and 有作用 as causally efficacious.

<sup>49</sup> The Vaisesikas believe that all physical things in the world are ultimately combinations of the atoms of earth, water, fire and wind.

<sup>50</sup> The Sanskrit reconstructions here follow LVP. These four qualities are the defining qualities of earth, water, fire and wind respectively.

independently real qualities], should not fall under the category of qualities (*guna*), which have no resistance. This is because they are that which are touched by faculty of touch, just like [the four elements of] earth, water, fire and wind. The same logic applies to the three [substances] of earth, water, and fire with regard to the colors of blue, etc., because they are all that which are seen by eyes, and the Vaisesikas should be criticized for this.<sup>51</sup> From this it is known that there are no real earth, water, fire and wind with intrinsic natures that are distinct from the natures of solidity, fluidity, etc. It is also known that our eyes do not see real earth, water, and fire.

Furthermore, among the objects that the Vaisesikas regard as falling under the category of substances, those that [the Vaisesikas take to be] resistant and permanent must in fact be impermanent, because they are all resistant, just like large earth (Ch: 粗地), etc. Among all the categories, those dharmas that are [believed to be] non-resistant and cognized by the material sense faculties (Ch: 色根; *rupa-indriya*?) must all have resistance, because it is granted that they are cognized by material sense faculties, just like earth, water, fire and wind are, [which all have resistance].

Further yet, those Vaisesika categories that are not substances (*dravya*), such as qualities (*guna*), etc., should have no distinct intrinsic nature independently of consciousness. This is because they, like a barren woman's child, do not fall under the category of substances. The substances, etc., that are non-existent should have no distinct intrinsic nature independently of consciousness. This is because they, like sky-flowers (Ch: 空花)<sup>52</sup>, do not fall under the concept of existence.

Something that the Vaisesikas take to exist should have no distinct intrinsic nature independently of substances (*dravya*), etc., because it is granted that it, like substances and qualities, etc., is not non-existent. If it [exists] independently of substances, etc., then it should have no nature of existence (Ch: 有性; *sattā*), because it is granted that it is distinct from substances, etc., just like something that absolutely does not exist (*atyanta-abhava*; Ch: 毕竟无).<sup>53</sup> If something that exists is not non-existent and has no nature of existence that is distinct [from itself], how come that

<sup>51</sup> The argument paraphrased here, which has the same structure as the argument mentioned earlier in this paragraph, goes something like this: because both the elements of earth, water and fire and their color-qualities are objects of the eye-faculty, the Vaisesikas must either admit that that earth, water and fire are non-resistant like their color-qualities are, and thus are not substances; or they must admit that colors are resistant just like the elements are, and thus are not qualities. Wind is not mentioned here because wind has no color. Blue, it is noteworthy, is only a possible color of earth for the Vaisesikas. The color of water is pale white and the color of fire is bright white.

<sup>52</sup> While "sky-flower" is the common translation of this term, the 空 here seems to stand for 虚空 or *Ākāśa*, which is more often translated as empty space or ether. This is suggested by the Chinese translations of Bhaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (T30n1566) and by *Dasheng Zhangzhen Lun* (T30n1578), which is also attributed to Bhaviveka. According to the latter text, the compound "*Ākāśa*-flower" in Sanskrit is a genitive tatpuruṣa, and thus is translatable of "flower of the empty space" or "flower of ether" (p274a10-14).

<sup>53</sup> Something absolutely does not exist is something that no cause that can give rise to. The common examples here, according to Kuiji, are Tortoise's hair and hare horn. According to Kuiji, this is one of the five kinds of non-existence (无) that the Vaisesikas believe in. The others are the non-existence of something that has ceased to exist (已灭无; *pradhvaṃsa-abhava*), the non-existence of something that has not yet arisen (未生无; *praga-abhava*), non-existence due to mutual negation (更互无; *anyonya-abhava*), non-existence because different substances or sentient beings are not combined together with each other (不会无). This list of five non-existences can be found in Maticandra's *Shengzong Shijuyi Lun* (T54.n2138; *Vaiśeṣika-dāśa-padārtha-prakaraṇa*?). See also Hakuju Ui's *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy According to the Dāśapadārtha-śāstra* (1917).

substances, etc., [which are also not non-existent], have a nature of existence that is distinct [from themselves]? If there is a distinct nature of existence that is independent from existing dharmas, then there should be a distinct nature of non-existence that is independent from non-existing dharmas. If this is not the case, then how could [the former] be the case? Therefore, what [the Vaisesikas call] the nature of existence is nothing but a false thought. Moreover, the Vaisesikas believe that the natures of substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guna*), actions (*karma*), etc., are distinct from substances, qualities, actions, etc. This cannot be so according to reason. **It is also not the case that there are real natures of non-substances, non-qualities, and non-actions, since they are distinct from substances, etc., just like qualities and actions, etc.**

From this we know that [the same goes] if we examine and inquire (Ch: 徵詰) about the various natures of earth, etc., vis-à-vis the objects of earth, etc. Just like the nature of a particular substance, etc., has no distinct nature of substances, etc., no substance, etc., should have a distinct nature of this particular substance, etc.<sup>54</sup> If there is a nature of substance, etc., that is independent of substances, etc., then there should be a nature of non-substance, etc., that is independent of non-substances, etc. If this is not the case, then how could [the former] be the case? Therefore, universals (*samanya*) and individuator (*viśesa*) are merely fictionally posited.

Moreover, the category of inherence (*samavAya*) that the Vaisesikas hold [to be mind-independently real] is definitely not substantively real, because it does not fall under [the category of] existing dharmas or substances, etc., just like something that absolutely does not exist (*atyanta-abhava*; Ch: 毕竟无). [The Vaisesikas] grant that substances, etc., can be apprehended by perception, yet even these are not substantively real when examined with reason, let alone the category of inherence, which [the Vaisesikas] themselves take to be substantively real even if it cannot be apprehended by perception. Suppose one believes that inherence is an object of perception, then by what we have mentioned above, it is also not substantively real.

Now, all those substances, etc.<sup>55</sup>, are not apprehended by perception of some conscious-independent substantively real entities, because it is granted that they are objects of knowledge (Ch: 所知), like tortoise's hair. Also, the knowledge (*jñāna*) that takes substances as objects (Ch: 缘实) is not a kind of knowledge of perception (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*; Ch: 现量智) that takes conscious-independent entities in the category (*padartha*) of substances (*dravya*) as its object. This is because it arises from the conjunction of fictional causes, just like the knowledge of qualities. We can apply this reasoning more widely to even knowledge that takes inherence (*samavAya*) as its object: it is not a kind of knowledge of perception that takes conscious-independent entities in the category (*padartha*) of inherence (*samavAya*) as its object, because it arises from the conjunction of fictional causes, just like knowledge of substances (*dravya*). Therefore, the Vaisesikas' categories of substances, etc., are also falsely posited based on mere illusions.

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<sup>54</sup> The "etc." all refer to qualities and actions. For better clarity, we can explain the content of this sentence as follows. Consider a particular substance S. If we grant that there is not a universal substance-ness that is distinct from S-ness, then we have no reason to hold that there is an S-ness that is distinct from S itself.

For better clarity, this can be alternatively translated as that the nature of a substance contains no distinct substance-ness.

<sup>55</sup> LVP read the term "substances, etc." as referring to the Vaisesikas' nine kinds of substances.

### 3.1.3 Against Followers of *MaheSvara*

Some believe there to be a *MaheSvara* (Ch: 大自在天) that is real, omnipresent, permanent, and can create all dharmas.

This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] This is because if it can create dharmas, then it cannot be permanent.<sup>56</sup> Everything that is not permanent cannot be omnipresent. And everything that is not omnipresent cannot be the real [creator-God].<sup>57</sup>

Since *MaheSvara* is a permanent and omnipresent entity and has all causal functions [Ch: 诸功能], it should instantaneously create all dharmas everywhere at every moment. If there are things that can only be created in dependence upon certain desires or conditions, then that contradicts the [*MaheSvara* followers'] doctrine of single cause.<sup>58</sup> Or, alternatively, [all] desires and conditions should also arise instantaneously [at every moment], since their cause, [i.e., *MaheSvara*], exist permanently.<sup>59</sup>

Those others who believe in a great *brahma*, time, space, a starting point (Ch: 本际), nature, empty space (*Akaza*), or a self (*Atman*) as something that is permanent and substantively real, something that has all causal functions and can create all dharmas – they can all be refuted in the same way.

### 3.1.4 Against the Mimamsikas

Some others believe the unjustified belief that the sound of the Veda (Ch: 明论) is permanent, and that it is the determinate norm of all dharmas and can denote and explicate (Ch: 表诠) dharmas. Some believe that all sounds are permanent, but it is only when they are manifested or produced (Ch: 显发) in dependence of certain conditions that they can explicate and denote (Ch: 诠表) [any dharma].

Both are contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

[Response:] Since it is granted that the sound of the Veda can explicate [dharmas] (Ch: 能诠), it cannot be permanent, just like any other sound. Other sounds should also be non-permanent

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<sup>56</sup> As Gold (2021) notes, this principle goes back Vasubandhu's argument against God or *Mahesvara* in AKB.

<sup>57</sup> Literally, the sentence here reads that "everything that is not omnipresent cannot be real". But this claim, understood literally, is quite absurd as a Buddhist premise. Instead, it seems more plausible to read it as a limited response to the *MaheSvara* believers regarding what counts as a creator-God. So understood, the argument implied here is that since *MaheSvara* is supposed to be the creator of every single thing at every single place in the world, it must be present at every single place in the world.

<sup>58</sup> That is, the doctrine that everything in the world is caused by a single cause, namely *MaheSvara*.

<sup>59</sup> The point here seems to be that the *MaheSvara* believers can allow that some things are created in dependence of desires and conditions only by claiming that all desires and conditions, just like all dharmas, are also created instantaneously by *MaheSvara* at every moment in time. This claim, the author seems to imply here, is absurd.

entities of sound (Ch: 非常声体), since they, like bottles and clothes, etc., depend on many conditions [for their existence].

### 3.1.5 Against the Carvakas/Lokayatikas

Some non-Buddhists believe that earth, water, fire and wind are indivisible atoms (*paramanu*; Ch: 极微), they are real and permanent, and they can give rise to large rupas (Ch: 粗色). The large rupas these atoms give rise to do not exceed the magnitude (Ch: 量; *parimAna*) of their causes, and although these large rupas are impermanent, they are substantively real entities.

This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that?

If the indivisible atoms that these non-Buddhists believe in are extended, like a row of ants (*pipIlikApaGkti*; Ch: 蚁行)<sup>60</sup>, then they are not real entities.

If they are not extended, like mind and mental factors, then they cannot join together to give rise to large rupas, [which are extended], as their effects. And if they can give rise to effects, then they are just like what they produce; how, then, could one say that indivisible atoms are permanent?

Moreover, since the effects produced by [indivisible atoms] do not exceed the magnitude of their causes, [they] should be like indivisible atoms and cannot be called large rupas.<sup>61</sup> If so, then these effect-rupas (Ch: 果色) cannot be apprehended (Ch: 取) by material sense faculties (Ch: 色根) such as the eyes, etc., and that contradicts [the Carvakas'] own view.

[The opponents] may say that the effect-rupas are conjoined (*samavAya*; Ch: 合)<sup>62</sup> with the quality (*guna*; Ch: 德) of magnitude (Ch: 量; *parimAna*), and for that reason they appear to be large even if they are not large, and they can be apprehended by material sense faculties. [Response:] Since the effect-rupas [the Carvakas] posit are of the same magnitude as their causes, they should not be conjoined with the quality of largeness (*sthaulya*; Ch: 粗德), just like indivisible atoms [are not]. Or otherwise [the Carvakas] must say that the indivisible atoms are also conjoined with the quality of largeness, just like large effect-rupas do, as their locations are not different.

[The opponents] may also say an effect-rupa pervades its own causes, and it can be called large because it has more than one causes. [But] if so, then this effect-rupa must not be a singular entity, just like the causes it co-locates with, as [these causes] have different locations. From this it follows that this effect would still not be large, and thus it also cannot be apprehended by material sense faculties.

If [the opponents] say that the effect is a conjunction of multiple parts and thus becomes large: the multiple causes are [themselves] conjunctions of indivisible atoms and [by their own account]

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. AKB III, 159:18.

<sup>61</sup> The fact that *paramanus* are indivisible implies that they are in fact extension-less. But if so, then whatever consists of *paramanus* must also be extension-less. Rupas, however, are by definition extended, or else we cannot perceive them with our eyes.

<sup>62</sup> *SamavAya* expresses the relationship of inherence between a substance and its qualities.



should not be minute (*sUkSma*; Ch: 细). [If so, then they themselves] are sufficient to be the objects of sense faculties, so what use do they have of the effects? [Moreover,] since [the effect-rupa] is constituted by multiple parts, it should not be substantively real, which means that their earlier and later claims contradict each other.

Furthermore, since both the effects and the causes have resistance, they must be at different locations, just like two indivisible atoms. The opponents may claim that the effects and the causes absorb and enter (Ch: 受入) each other, just like the sand absorbs (Ch: 受) water and the flux (Ch: 药<sup>63</sup>) enter (Ch: 入) into melted copper [without adding to their sizes]. [Response:] but who accepts that the sand and [melted] copper absorbs water and the flux? Or, [if one accepts this, one must say that the atoms] are separated and transformed, [which means that] they are neither unified nor eternal.<sup>64</sup> Also, if the large effect-rupa is a singular entity, then when one apprehends one part of it, one should apprehend all [parts] of it. This is because this [part that one apprehends] and that [part which one does not apprehend] are one (Ch: 一), so this [part] should be the same as that [part]. If [the opponents] do not grant this, then they are contradicting reason, and if they do grant this, then they are contradicting facts (Ch: 事). Therefore, what they hold leads to a dilemma and is thus unjustifiable. Instead, it is nothing but a false view based on mere illusions.

### 3.1.6 General Refutation of Non-Buddhist Theories of Dharma

Now, although there are many different non-Buddhist schools, the dharmas that they take to exist are of only four kinds.<sup>65</sup> According to the first view, existing dharmas (*sad-dharma*; Ch: 有法) and the intrinsic nature (*svabhava*) of existence, etc., are one (Ch: 一).<sup>66</sup> This is the view of the Samkhyas and others. This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that? [Response:] It is not the case that all dharmas are nothing but the intrinsic nature of existence. If [all dharmas] are identical to the nature of existence, then they would not be distinct entities. That contradicts [the Samkhya view that] the three *gunas*, the self and other things are distinct entities. It also contradicts the ordinary distinction of different dharmas. Furthermore, if *rupas*, etc., are nothing but the nature of *rupas*, etc., then there should be no difference between blue and yellow *rupas*, etc.

<sup>63</sup> Here 药 refers to the flux added when extracting copper from 鑰石, a kind of yellow copper ores imported in to China from Persia. See Kuiji's *Shuji*: 鑰石之藥入於鑄銅, T43n1830, p.264c17-8.

<sup>64</sup> When sand absorbs water, the water seeps into the gaps between sand atoms and thereby separate the sand atoms from each other, such that those sand atoms are no longer united and cannot together be called a pile of sand. When the flux enters into melted copper ores, it helps extract purer copper from the ores, and in that sense transforms the atoms that make up the copper ores. Carvakas believe, however, that atoms are permanent, and they unite to form larger objects. They thus cannot accept either the proposition that the sand absorbs water or the proposition that the flux enters into the melted copper.

<sup>65</sup> The following tetralemma argument seems to come from Dharmāpla's commentary to *Catuhśataka*, *Dasheng Guangbai Lun Shilun*. Cf. T30n1571, 234c20-8; 249c23-250a2.

<sup>66</sup> Ch: 有等性. I agree with LVP's restoration of 有性 as *sattā*. The 等 or "etc." here refers to other less general or secondary universals (as LVP calls it) of matter, color, etc. To say existing dharmas and the nature of existence "are one" is to say that the former are "just" or "nothing but" (Ch: 即) the latter, i.e., that existing objects are identical to the nature of existence. For Buddhists, an object or dharma is defined by its intrinsic nature (*svabhava*), or equivalently, by its own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). To say that all existing objects are identical to the nature of existence is thus to say that the property of being an existent is the own characteristic of all existing objects. Similarly, to say that a *rupa* and the nature of *rupa* is just to say that the former is identical to the latter. That implies, as Xuanzang goes to note, that all existing dharmas are identical, and all *rupas* are identical, etc.

According to the second view, existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are distinct. This is the view of the Vaisesikas, among others. This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that? [Response:] It is not the case that all dharmas are not of the intrinsic nature of existence. [If they are, then they would all be] like something that has ceased to exist (*pradhvaMsa-abhAva*; Ch: 已灭无), which cannot be apprehended (Ch: 得) by us. That would contradict [the Vaisesika view that] that substances (*dravya*), etc., are not non-existent. It would also contradict the ordinary perception of real things. Furthermore, if *rupas*, etc., are not of the nature of *rupas*, etc., then they would be like sounds, etc., in that they cannot be perceived by eyes, etc.

According to the third view, existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are both one and distinct. This is the view of the Nirgranthas<sup>67</sup>, among others. This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that? [Response:] [Firstly,] the view that [existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are] both one and distinct makes the same mistakes as the previous views, [which take existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc.,] as one and as distinct respectively. [Secondly,] if something has two mutually contradictory defining characteristics (*lakSana*), then it should consist of two entities. [Thirdly,] if one says of the same entity that it is both identical to and distinct from [the intrinsic nature of existence, etc.,], then neither can be established.<sup>68</sup> It is not the case that all dharmas are the same entity. Or alternatively, the dharmas that [the Jainists take to be] both identical to and distinct from [the intrinsic nature of existence, etc.,], are only nominally real (*prajnapti-sat*; Ch: 假) but not substantively real (*dravya-sat*, Ch: 实), but the Jainists take them to be substantively real. It is thus certain this view is not rationally justifiable.

According to the fourth view, existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are neither one nor distinct. This is the view of the Ajivikas, among others. This is contrary to reason. [Opponent:] Why is that? [Response:] it is because the belief that [existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are] neither one nor distinct is the same as the view that [existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are] both distinct and one. [Moreover,] is the claim that [existing dharmas and the intrinsic nature of existence, etc., are] neither one nor distinct a negation or an affirmation? If it is only an affirmation, then it should not make a double negation.<sup>69</sup> If it is merely a negation, then you are not making any positive claim (Ch: 无所执).<sup>70</sup> If it is both affirmative and negative, then it would be self-contradictory. If it is neither affirmative nor negative, then this claim is sophistry (*papaJca*; Ch: 戏论). Furthermore, if dharmas are neither identical to nor distinct from [the intrinsic nature of existence], then that contradicts the common, ordinary knowledge that there are identical things and that there are distinct things. It also contradicts the [Ajivikas'] own view that existing dharmas such as *rupas*, etc., are definitely substantively real. Therefore, this view is nothing but [an unsuccessful attempt to] correct and avoid the mistakes [of other schools], and wise people must not wrongly approve it.

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<sup>67</sup> That is, the Jainists.

<sup>68</sup> Since, presumably, that it is logically contradictory.

<sup>69</sup> If a claim says S is neither p nor not p, then it affirms nothing.

<sup>70</sup> The idea here seems to be that in order to be attached to something X (*X-graha*), i.e., to take X to be something ultimately real, one needs to believe in some positive claims about the nature of X. So if one's beliefs about dharmas consist only in negative claims about what dharmas are not, then one does not count as being attached to dharmas as something real.

### 3.2 Against Non-Mahayana (Hinayana) Buddhist Theories of Dharmas

The dharmas, such as rupas, etc., that the other vehicles (Ch: 余乘)<sup>71</sup> believe to be substantively real independently of consciousness – why are they unreal? It is because the rupas, unassociated formations (*viprayukta-samskara*; Ch: 不相应行), and various unconditioned beings (*asamskṛta*; Ch: 无为) that they believe [to be mind-independently real] are non-existent according to reason.<sup>72</sup>

#### 3.2.1 Against *Rupas*

Now, the rupas that they take to be real are of two kinds in total: the first kind is resistant (*sapratigha*; Ch: 有对), which they are formed by indivisible atoms (*paramanu*); the second is non-resistant (*apratigha*; Ch: 无对), which are not formed by indivisible atoms.

##### 3.2.1.1 Against Resistant *Rupas*

Those resistant rupas are definitely not substantively real. This is because the indivisible atoms that they consist of are not substantively real. If indivisible atoms have resistance, then they should be fictional (Ch: 假) rather than substantively real, just like bottles, etc. If they have no resistance, they should be just like non-rupas. But if so, how could they join together to form bottles and clothes, etc.? Moreover, if indivisible atoms are extended, then they can be divided (Ch: 分析) [into parts], which means they are not substantively real. If they are not extended, then they are just like non-rupas. But if so, how could one say that a conjunction (*saMhata*; Ch: 和合) of them receive light and cast shadow? When the sun first rises and shines upon a pillar, etc., light and shadow appear on two [different] sides [of the pillar respectively], namely its east and west sides. Since the place where [the pillar] receives light is distinct from the place where it casts shadow, the indivisible atoms that [these non-Mahayana Buddhists] believe in must be extended.<sup>73</sup> Also, when one sees or touches objects like a wall, etc., one only apprehends this side but not other parts [of it]. Since the conjoined object (Ch: 和合物) is nothing but various indivisible atoms, these indivisible atoms must be extended.

Moreover, all indivisible atoms, wherever they are, must admit of the difference among its top, its bottom, and its four sides. If not, then they cannot conjoin together (*saMhata*; Ch: 和集).<sup>74</sup> Or

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<sup>71</sup> That is, any Buddhist school that is not a *Mahayana* (“Great Vehicle”) school.

<sup>72</sup> This section is against different Abhidharma theories of mind-independent existence. There are five kinds of dharmas that are taken to be real by at least some Abhidharmikas: 1. physical or material beings (*rūpa*), 2. mind (*citta*), 3. mental factors (*caitta*), 4. mentally unassociated formations (*citta-viprayukta-samskara*), and 5. unconditioned beings (*asamskṛta*). By ruling out the reality of 1, 4, and 5, the argument here purports to show that the only real dharmas are the mind and mental factors, and hence nothing is mind-independently real.

<sup>73</sup> The previous two sentences is a direct paraphrase of Dharmapala’s *Dasheṅ Guangbailun Shilun*, T30n1571, p.191a17-9. It has its source in Vasubandhu’s *Vimsika*, T31n1590, p.76a18-9.

<sup>74</sup> Xuanzang uses both 和合 and 和集 to translate *sambhata*. According to Kuiji, Xuanzang uses these two terms to distinguish between two kinds of Sarvastivadin views. The former term represents the so-called “old-Sarvastivadin” (Ch: 古萨婆多) view, i.e., the Vaibhasika view represented in the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā*. The latter represents the “new-Sarvastivadin” (Ch: 新萨婆多) view, i.e., the view of Samghabhadra and his followers, as it is detailed in his *Nyāyanusara*. Kuiji further claims that in this current sentence, 和 stands for 和合, which represents the old-Sarvastivadin view, and 集

alternatively, if one says that they penetrate into each other (Ch: 相涉入). But if so, then they cannot form something large. It is thus certain that indivisible atoms are extended.

[Some] hold that resistant rupas are nothing but the indivisible atoms. But if they are not extended, then they should cause no obstruction or separation (Ch: 障隔); if so, then they are non-obstructive and non-resistant. Therefore, the indivisible atoms you hold to be real must be extended, and since they are extended, they can be divided [into parts], and thus they are definitely not substantively real. Thus, [the claim that] resistant rupas are substantively real is unjustified.

**[To Be Continued]**

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stands for 和集, representing the new-Sarvastivadin view; see *Shuji*, T43n1830, p. 267c19-20. Kuiji makes a similar claim about Xuanzang's translation of *saMbhata* as both 和合 and 和集 in *Vimsika* (T31n1590, p.75c18-25); see *Weishi Ersbilun Shuji*, T43n1834, 992c08-993a10. LVP's translation of this sentence follows Kuiji's comments. Since Xuanzang's translations of *saMbhata* as both 和合 and 和集 represents his own interpretation of the texts rather than what is in the original Sanskrit texts, however, throughout out this translation I will translate *saMbhata* uniformly as "conjunction" and append the Chinese term Xuanzang uses on the side. As for this sentence in particular, I shall translate 和集 simply as one word instead of following Kuiji's comment and treating it as two terms that correspond to two Sarvastivadin views.