GCTF 2023 Writeups

Team : \$ /bin/cat

Members: k07_ & latt3

Forensics


Wireshark #1




Attachment: challenge.pcap


Solution:

At first, I use Wireshark to randomly scrolled and clicked to search for the flag. Luckily, I found it here:




Afterward, I realized that we could also export the TXT file by clicking "File", "Export Objects", and then "HTTP".





Click on packet 2879, and then click "Preview". We can see the flag in the secret.txt file.



Tool: Wireshark

Flag: GCTF2023{fl4g_in_tcpdump_ez}

Broken




Attachment: Challenge.pdf

Solution:

The provided PDF file is broken, and we can't open it.

Use the online tool https://www.ilovepdf.com/repair-pdf to fix the PDF file.



Now, we can open the PDF file successfully, and the flag is in the repaired PDF file.

GCTF2023{M3_4nd_my_Br0k3n_h3art}

Tool: iLovePDF - https://www.ilovepdf.com/repair-pdf

Flag: GCTF2023{M3_4nd_my_Br0k3n_h3art}

KB



Attachment: challenge.pcapng

Solution:

Based on the image above, this challenge is with a PCAP file which means that requires to use of Wireshark or TShark.

• PCAP which means packet capture and this kind of file used to store the captured packet of data into a readable file.

First, open the PCAP file with wireshark *\$ wireshark challenge.pcapng* and determine the information in the file.

As you can see, this PCAP file contains the communication through the USB. In the Info column noticed that there are two different info. The relevant packet of the info that you should looking for were "URB_INTERRUPT in" packet.

Noted:

- Is it the Protocol is USB
- The Source and Destination which is different and is using the two-way communication

The info with "URB_INTERRUPT in" packet consists of two type of packets which different in Source, Destination and the length. From the length column you could notice that two different types of packets which have the range of 8 bytes. Those packets that with extra 8 bytes will have the "Leftover Capture Data" field.




Table	12: Keyb	oard/Keypad Page					
Usage ID (Dec)	Usage ID (Hex)	Usage Name	Ref: Typical AT-101 Position	PC- AT	Мас	UNI X	Boot
0	00	Reserved (no event indicated)9	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
1	01	Keyboard ErrorRollOver ⁹	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
2	02	Keyboard POSTFail ⁹	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
3	03	Keyboard ErrorUndefined ⁹	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
4	04	Keyboard a and A ⁴	31	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
5	05	Keyboard b and B	50	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
6	06	Keyboard c and C ⁴	48	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
7	07	Keyboard d and D	33	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
8	08	Keyboard e and E	19	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
9	09	Keyboard f and F	34	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	4/101/104
10	0A	Keyboard g and G	35	\checkmark		\checkmark	4/101/104

From the data length that found in the "**Leftover Capture Data**" field can defined that it is keyboard packet as it consists of 8 bytes. Besides, for the keystroke is at the 3 bytes. Can determine the value by referring the table of key codes for the USB keyboard. The table can be found in https://www.usb.org/sites/default/files/documents/hut1_12v2.pdf.

```
020002000000000000
020000000000000000
02000600000000000
02000000000000000
02001700000000000
02000000000000000
02000900000000000
020000000000000000
000000000000000000
00001f00000000000
00000000000000000
00002700000000000
00000000000000000
00001f00000000000
00000000000000000
00002000000000000
00000000000000000
02000000000000000
```

To view all the "Leftover Capture Data" field, can use the command \$ tshark -r filename.pcap -V | grep "Leftover Capture Data" in Kali Linux terminal which can filter out all the data.

```
__$ ./decode.py ../challenge.pcapng
gctf2023[1nt3rc3pt1ng-keystr0k3] 36
```

To decode it in an easier and faster way, we found a pcap decode packages to be used. It can be found from here https://github.com/natesinger/KeyBD-PCAP-Decoder. After download this packages, you can used the command of /decode.py ../filename.pcap to decode the key code and find out the flag.

By following the format of the flag set, the flag that decode should be changed as

- "gctf" to "GCTF"
- "[]" to "{}"
- "-" to " "

Tool: Wireshark

Flag: GCTF2023{1nt3rc3pt1ng_keystr0k3}

MISC


Frequency




Attachment: challenge.wav

Solution:

Open the audio file in Sonic Visualiser. Then, add a spectrogram.




The flag is displayed.



Tool: Sonic Visualiser

Flag: GCTF2023{this_fl4g_sounds_weirdddddd}}


Office




Attachment: Challenge.xlsx

Solution:


Unhide the sheets in the Excel workbook.



This tab name is not the correct flag.




The correct flag is not on this "Hidden 1" tab either.




Click on the "Hidden3" tab.



Select all cells and choose the number format as "General".



We can notice that there are many cells with the number "1".



Fill the cells containing "1" with black color to reveal a QR Code.




GCTF2023{Writeups}

\$ /bin/cat


Scan the QR Code to retrieve the flag.

https://me-qr.com/text/4448197/show



Flag: GCTF2023{F0rmatt1ng_c311s_t0_h1d3_inf0rm4t10n}

Master Hidden Within The Slides




Attachment: challenge.pptx


Solution:

The clue is within the challenge title, which is "Master".

Open the PowerPoint file and enter "Slide Master" view.



The encoded flag is in one of the slides in the Slide Master view.




Decode the flag from Base64.



Tool: CyberChef - https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/

Flag: GCTF{Sl1d3sss_M4staaaaaaaa}


I Love PNG!



Attachment: Challenge.png

Solution:

Upload the PNG file to the FotoForensics website. Click on "Hidden Pixels" under Analysis, and the flag will be revealed.



GCTF2023{Writeups}	\$ /bin/cat
Tool: FotoForensics - https://fotoforensics.com	
Flag: GCTF2023{Why_cant_y0u_make_the_flag_any	y_long3r_To_let_m3_c0py_1t}

Splitter



Attachment: Images.rar

Solution:

Extract the RAR file. In the 'Images' folder, I found 120 JPG files. These pictures are parts of a larger image. As I combine them in Canva, the flag will be revealed in red words.




Tool: Canva - https://www.canva.com

Flag: GCTF2023{JJK_SHIBUYA_ARK_IS_INSANE}

Web

Secret





Solution:

As the question mentioned that hidden pages. To determine that can use the nikto which is an open-source web server scanner. It functions as examines a website and reports back vulnerabilities. By using the command # nikto -h \$webserverurl, the output provided the page that is hidden.


```
5 nikto -h http://167.172.74.195:8016/
- Nikto v2.5.0
+ Target IP:
                        167.172.74.195
+ Target Hostname:
                        167.172.74.195
+ Target Port:
                        8016
                        2023-12-16 15:10:39 (GMT8)
+ Start Time:
+ Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
+ /: The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. See: https://developer.mozill
Headers/X-Frame-Options
+ /: The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render th
different fashion to the MIME type. See: https://www.netsparker.com/web-vulnerability-scanner/
ntent-type-header/
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ /noOneG0nnaF1ndOut/: Directory indexing found.
+ /robots.txt: Entry '/noOneG0nnaF1ndOut/' is returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (2)
ger.net/kb/issues/00600600_robots-txt-file
+ /robots.txt: contains 1 entry which should be manually viewed. See: https://developer.mozilla
obots.txt
+ /: Server may leak inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 29af, size: 60c250d67a7
://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2003-1418
+ Multiple index files found: /index.html, /index.php.
+ Apache/2.4.52 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.54). Apache 2.2.34 is the
+ OPTIONS: Allowed HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, HEAD, GET, POST .
```

From the above image, you can determine that there are multiple index files which are/index.html and /index.php. The /index.php is the hidden page. Added /index.php at the end of the link. Besides that, there is also a robots.txt which is probably next page that looking for.






The page with /robots.txt will show all the page that does not allow someone to see it. In the picture, we know that the page that disallows to see is /noOneG0nnaF1ndOut and that page might have the flag.




We found a hidden page named the flag and it is probably the last page of the website to find out.



Here you go for the flag.

Flag: GCTF2023{d0_n0t_forg3t_t0_ch3ck_robOt5_txt}

Include



Solution:

```
Click HERE if you want hint. (I swear is not phishing:))
```

After clicking "HERE" on the given link, it will direct us to another link that shows the flag is not there.



I'm not familiar with web challenges, but I think it involves Local File Inclusion (LFI) because the challenge title mentions "Include". The description also states that "flag at /flag". So, I added the path to /flag. I tried to navigate to the correct directory by adding a few "../" in front of "flag" in the link until I reached the correct location.


The link that displays the flag is http://167.172.74.195:8012/?file=../../../flag.



Flag: GCTF2023{LFI_1nclud3_1s_d4ng3rous}

PWN

Level 1




Solution:

Type command "nc 167.172.74.195 8001" in terminal. Then, enter command "__import__('os').system('cat /flag')". The flag is displayed.

Flag: GCTF2023{Ready_P14y3r_0n3 !! }


Crypto

Layers Of Bases



Solution:

I randomly inputting several recipes in CyberChef for a while and managed to obtain the flag. The flag is decoded using Base45 twice, followed by Base64 and Base32.



Tool: CyberChef - https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/

Flag: GCTF2023{L4y3rs_0f_3ncrypt10n}