Modeling Formal Languages in Grammatical Framework

On the Grammar of Proof

Warrick Macmillan

7th August 2021

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
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
- Explore abstract relationships between math, CS, Type Theory, and Linguistics
- Practical and brief intro to MLTT and Agda
- Grammars elaborating the abstractions above




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Abstraction Ladders





Computational Trinitarianism




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
Interpretation Language

Observation 1.1


We acknowledge this is only semantic interpretations in these domains. One may decide on syntactic, pragmatic, or other ways in which to treat linguistics via these fields




Trinitarian Linguistics



Trinitarian Grammars



Models of GF





Remarks

- Trinitarian doctrine is in the "formal" space
- Trinitarian + Linguistics is partially formal, and very underexplored
- Introduces many philosophical concerns, perhaps a rereading of Wittgenstein should take place in this context

- Frege: Formal Proof, Predicate Logic
- Russel: Type Theory to resolve his paradox
- Brouwer : Constructivism

Mathematical logic and the relation between logic and mathematics have been interpreted in at least three different ways:


- i. mathematical logic as symbolic logic, or logic using mathematical symbolism;
- ii. mathematical logic as foundations (or philosophy) of mathematics;
- iii. mathematical logic as logic studied by mathematical methods, as a branch of mathematics.

We shall here mainly be interested in mathematical logic in the second sense. What we shall do is also mathematical logic in the first sense, but certainly not in the third.

(Per Martin-Löf, Padua Italy, June 1980)

Syntactic Comparisons

First Order Logic \(\rightarrow\) ■ ∃) A V _____ =



Sets

- N
- \bullet $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$
- \bullet $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$
- $\bullet \{x|P(x)\}$
- Ø
- ?
- U
- ?

More Sets

- 1
- **(1,0)**

Types

- Nat
- $Nat \times Nat$
- $Nat \rightarrow Nat$
- $\Sigma x : _.P(x)$
- _____
- T
- ?
- ullet U_1

Programs

- suc zero
- (suc zero, zero)

Judgments

Type Theoretic Judgments

- T is a type
- T and T' are equal types
- t is a term of type T
- t and t' are equal terms of type T

Mathematical Judgments

- P is a proposition
- P is true

- Notice that judgmental equality is uniquely type theoretic
- Judgments in type theory are decidable
- Truth (inhabitation) is not decidable
- More exotic judgments are available in TT, i.e. P is possible.

Important Differences

- The rules of the types make explicit that they are not equivalent to those of classical FOL
- An existential assertion in type theory requires data
- Excluded middle and double negation are not admitted in MLTT
- To be not unhappy is clearly of a different meaning than to be happy.
- This makes our approach to general translation of non-constructive mathematics impossible (at least such that it type-checks)

- One doesn't define logics, type systems in mathematics (e.g. metamathemeatics)
- Encoding things like rational and real numbers in type theory are
- already, category theorists and set theorists are at odds, (small and large categories), higher categories, which skeletons of categories are canonical, etc. incredibly difficult
- Additionally, intensional type theory comes with two distinct notions of equality, judgmental/definitional/computational and propositional equality

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Example Donkey Anaphora

Interpret the sentence "every man who owns a donkey beats it" in MLTT via the following judgment :

```
\Pi z: (\Sigma x : man. \Sigma y : donkey. owns(x, y)). beats(<math>\pi_1 z, \pi_1(\pi_2 z))
```

We judge \vdash man :type and \vdash donkey :type. type really denotes a universe

What is Agda?

- Implementation of MLTT
- Logical Framework
- Interactive proof development environment
- Inductive Types, Modules, Pattern Matching, more



Mathematical Declarations

- Theorem
- Proof
- Lemma
- Axiom
- Definition
- Example

Twin Prime Conjecture

Definition

A *twin prime* is a prime number that is either 2 less or 2 more than another prime number

Alternatively, we may state it as follows:

Definition

A twin prime is a prime that has a prime gap of two.

Definition

A *prime gap* is the difference between two successive prime numbers.

Theorem

There are infinitely many twin primes.



Twin Prime Conjecture in Agda



What is a Proof?

A proof is what makes a judgment evident

(Per Martin-Löf)

...there is a considerable gap between what mathematicians claim is true and what they believe, and this mismatch causes a number of serious linguistic problems.

(Mohan Ganesalingam)

Comparsion	Formal Proof	Informal Proof
Audience	Agda (and Human)	Human
Translation	Compiler	Human
Objectivity	Objective	Subjective
Historical	20th Century	<= Euclid
Orientation	Syntax	Semantics
Inferability	Complete	Domain Expertise Necessary
Verification	PL Designer	Human
Ambiguity	Unambiguous	Ambiguous

- One missed comparison from above : formal proof is an implementation, an informal proof is a specification
- Why? Historically, we think of semantics preceding (the abstract notion of a circle preceded its geometric understanding)
- although syntax oriented thinking may now be dominating the CS tradition)
- syntax oriented approach in Agda program,
- Both are necessary in the end, especially for big proofs.
- Propositions or theorem statements are intentionally unambiguous

...when it comes to understanding the power of mathematical language to guide our thought and help us reason well, formal mathematical languages like the ones used by interactive proof assistants provide informative models of informal mathematical language. The formal languages underlying foundational frameworks such as set theory and type theory were designed to provide an account of the correct rules of mathematical reasoning, and, as Gödel observed, they do a remarkably good job. But correctness isn't everything: we want our mathematical languages to enable us to reason efficiently and effectively as well. To that end, we need not just accounts as to what makes a mathematical argument correct, but also accounts of the structural features of our theorizing that help us manage mathematical complexity.

(Avigad)

Syntactic Completeness


Given an utterance or natural language expression that a mathematician might understand, does the GF grammar emit a well-formed, syntactically complete expression in the target logic or programming language?

- The intended meaning manifests differently for different people - there may be no absolute intention
- Many possible syntax's beyond just alpha conversion (think) Cog) Perhaps the details will have to change depending on the tools available

Semantic Adequacy

Given a well formed syntactic expression in, for instance, Agda, one can ask if the resulting NL expression generated by GF is semantically adequate, and coherent to a "fluent speaker"

- In dispute among mathematicians
- Kind of like a "Turing test for our approach"
- depends historical developments as our language develops, both internally (cite gangaselem) and more interestingly, as a society. so the things all mathematicians take for granted (and therefore, have implicitly more intuition for). think of technology as well



Concrete vs. Abstract perspective

Comparison of concrete vs. abstract perspective when designing a GF Grammar

Abstract: Capture more semantic content (from a NL perspective) more "freedom of expression" simpler makes easier to work with in Haskell (where tactics would come into play in Cog)

Concrete: Simpler semantic space, easier for designing PL for it eliminates ambiguity. focus on this may mean more feasibility for real implementation

As will be seen, a smaller abstract syntax leans towards syntactic completeness with a larger linearization syntax (in terms of the complexity of the lincats effects the complexity of the entire linearization space)

Logic '14



Hott '14

This project '14

