



# BayMUN Fall 2015

Pinochet's  
Cabinet







Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to the Cabinet of Augusto Pinochet. My name is Lorenzo Ramos and I will be serving as your Head Chair. I am a fourth year student at UC Berkeley majoring in History with a concentration in Latin American Politics. I first joined MUN my second year of college and fell in love immediately, traveling all over the country to debate in a number of general assembly and crisis committees, as well as being an Assistant Crisis Director and Head Chair at our annual UCBMUN conference.

Within this committee, delegates will be responsible for consolidating power of the Chilean government. You will have to deal with Chile's domestic and foreign affairs. In effect, you all will be running the country. While the minute details of government functions require more attention and knowledge than we can feasibly exercise within two committee sessions, expect this body to cover an array of issues, and for crisis to connect various sectors of Chilean society as well as the rest of the international community.

The committee will begin on December 1, 1973, almost three months after the coup. Chile is still undergoing major turmoil, and the new regime has only been recognized by a handful of other countries. Your job is to quickly legitimize Pinochet's regime and avoid sparking a civil war across the entire country. With that, I will leave you to your background guide. Best of luck!

Respectfully,

Lorenzo Ramos





## The Mines of South America

For centuries, the dry and extensive ranges of the Andes have drawn man to its rugged and unforgiving lands for some of the richest deposits of precious metals. Forms of metallurgy were practiced since Pre-Colombian times and the most notable indigenous group in the Andean region, the Incas, were well adapted to the lands that consist of modern day Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. Spanish settlements, motivated by greed, were established for the prospect of finding deposits of gold, silver, copper, and other resources that characterized the world-renowned mines of South America. Such obsession with the land continued well beyond the fierce revolutions of independence that arose in the early nineteenth century.

Battered, bruised, but buoyed up by their newborn independence, the South American republics began to shape themselves in line with the old Spanish administrative divisions. Chile, which was proclaimed an independent republic in 1818, managed to escape the economic black hole suffered by many Latin American countries during this period. Chile achieved relative political stability—the country did not suffer from weakened central authority, and their strong and obedient military maintained order. As the 19<sup>th</sup> century progressed, Chile would experience a development of an export-orientated economy consisting of internationally competitive agricultural and mining sectors that would create a prosperous state.

Foreign companies, most notably British companies that were interested in the South American mines, would invest in significant Chilean infrastructural improvements that propelled an internationally competitive economy. Such projects included the establishment of the first railroad system in Spanish-America. This export boom helped finance a growing urbanization that matched even that of the United States' economy. However, while mining and commerce created vast employment opportunities and an emerging working class, profits were concentrated in the hands of landowners. The vast incoming wealth also gave rise to a commercial bourgeoisie, concentrated in the economic hubs such as Valparaíso and Santiago, which, with time, would amass political power.

In the 1850's, the rising commercial bourgeoisie and the growing urban classes joined forces and began to agitate politically around regulations with a focus on classical economic



liberalism. The oligarchy, powerful due to their business ties to the mining industry, would dominate much of the political positions and push for laissez-faire economics that caused state regulation on the economy to dismantle. Historians continue to argue the effects of such policies since the Chilean motor lost popularity as the country approached the turn of the century; however, the elite would attempt to overcome the crisis in the 1870's through non-economic means. As Chile grew, economically and politically, it waged war against her neighbors, Peru and Bolivia, due to territorial disputes regarding the rich lands that lay upon the sacred Atacama Dessert. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) ended with a Chilean victory and resulted in the annexation of large areas from Peru and Bolivia, which was economically significant. Moreover, Bolivia lost access to the Pacific Ocean and became a landlocked country and Peru lost regions with an abundant of untapped resources that became significant in the proceeding decades. Following the War of the Pacific, Chile's political borders resembled closely to that of today's and it solidified Chile as a powerhouse in the South American continent.

In the wake of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the newly acquired land proved to spark a bonanza of the country's fortunes. Large deposits of nitrate, a significant mineral that served as fertilizer for the agricultural practices of the time, were discovered in the Atacama desert. Chile would earn a monopoly on the world's known nitrate sources, which then drew a considerable amount of foreign investments, again mostly the British. This would give Chile the pivotal boost need to compensate for the war effort and continue with its urban and social development. Nevertheless, Great Britain's influence in the country was potent; in a span of a few decades domestic firms were absorbed and Chile's concurrent economic prosperity came to depend on a mining enclave, which was almost entirely in foreign hands. However, with all economies dependent on commodities and raw resources, Chile's economy experienced an enormous fluctuation that most definitely had rippling effects to its politics.

Most attempts to reverse the mass amount of foreign hold on Chile's mineral fields would prove to be futile due to opposition of the national bourgeoisie, whose sympathy lies with the investors. The political atmosphere throughout the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century would experience a wave of animosity from the working-class because of the concentrated wealth that was in the hands of



a minority that influenced policy. Brief civil wars in the 1830's between the Chilean military and the political-left marked the first wave of disdain towards the ever-increasing authoritarian government. However, the government with close ties to the Chilean military coerced stability and defeated the liberal opposition. The proceeding years saw increasing political power for the conservative elite and administration implemented constitutional reform in 1833 that notably granted increase powers to the presidency and made Roman Catholicism the state religion. The constitution became one of the longest-lived constitutions in Latin American history, and did not undergo amendments until political instability again arose near the turn of the century.

In 1886, the President-elect José Manuel Balmaceda campaigned with critical opposition of the national bourgeoisie and their alignment with “imperialist interest” on economic activity. In a speech in Iquique, the center of the nitrate industry, he stated “We must invest the surplus in productive works so that when the nitrate deposits are exhausted or lose their importance because of discoveries of new deposits or scientific progress, we shall have established a national industry and created with it and the state railways the basis for new investments.” The country would split between those that supported President Balmaceda’s reformist ideals and those of the Junta Revolucionaria that was established by elitists in Congress with the goal of persuading military personnel that Balmaceda was attempting to seize ultimate political power and pursue a dictatorship. Followers of the captains and generals supported the Junta’s endeavors and tore apart the political realm. Most of the population was indifferent to the efforts of either side and were generally uninterested in the conflict. Still, out of this situation arose the Chilean Civil War of 1891 where the Junta would be supported by British nitrate owners and ultimately defeated Balmaceda and his allies. After his defeat, Balmaceda committed suicide and the resistance began to wane.

After the Civil War, the next few decades experienced what is loosely known in Chile as “the parliamentary regime.” There was no Prime Minister and no system of party politics designed to give the executive an automatic parliamentary majority. Congress ruled unchallenged and no cabinet was able to pursue policies opposed to the shifting and largely unprincipled political alliance between members of congress. However, the rising substantial



middle class of white-collar workers and professionals began to secure mass base in the urban areas; in effect, novel and radical political ideologies were to be born.

## Unidad Popular and Salvador Allende

In due time, Balmaceda's prophecy became to come to fruition; with the invention of synthetic nitrates during the First World War, the Chilean economy entered a profound crisis. This crisis was further compounded when the world market collapsed in 1929; Chile consequently lost most of its foreign investment and suffered from the lack of demand of its commodities, massing a critical blow to its economy. The public, furious due to the poor economic conditions, began demanding social reforms and started an upheaval against their politicians, attempting to hold them accountable. There was a rapid increase in the number of strikes and demonstrations, but the politicians of the old regime were unwilling to sacrifice their privileged positions. Despite the rampant corruption, the ruckus did bring about a new constitution that solidified universal suffrage and various measures of state welfare, such as compulsory primary education. Historians argue such reforms served as a small act of appeasement to the population. Yet, the masses continued to endure high inflation and unemployment in both the private and public sector. This resulted in yet another civil war in 1931, setting the stage for a rift in the tainted politics of Chile.

The early 20<sup>th</sup> century was characterized by a growing change in consciousness and political thought spawning various political sects: liberalism, anarchism, and socialism. Such a paradigm shift brought upon the various distinctive visions for the future of Chile. The working class was represented by not one, but two Marxist parties with mass followings, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, whose founders include Salvador Allende in 1933. Factions of trade unions usually affiliated with the mining industry sought organization, but the rivalry between factions had significant and detrimental implications. The history of the working class in Chile largely revolves around their divisions and their united fronts; the 1937 elections saw for the first time a Radical president-elect thanks to collective support from the left. Nonetheless, bitter contention between the two leftist parties resulted in aiding the elites to contain leftist political





movements; in 1948 the COMMUNIST Party was outlawed—a law that lasted until 1958. His ban only illuminated the left that a coalition was necessary for progressing their causes.

Soon after the 1948 anticommunism law, the Communists allied themselves with the Socialists through the Popular Action Front and, in 1969, the formation of Popular Unity (Unidad Popular) established a strong consolidation of the left by including the Radical Party. Salvador Allende, who had two previous campaigns for president, was the first presidential candidate of the coalition in 1970.

During his 1958 and 1964 campaigns, Salvador Allende ran under the banner of the Popular Action Front. From his days as a medical student during the global depression, he helped to organize the Socialists and the Communists and was committed to serving the working class and the oppressed. A prominent figure in the left, Allende had to keep in mind the array political and ideological tendencies his coalition contained; but nevertheless, his proposals called for radical reform. He advocated economic restructuring, in particular nationalizing the foreign-owned mines, the banking institutions, and some basic industry, as well as far-reaching agrarian reform involving the distribution of land among the peasantry. In his first presidential campaign in 1958, Allende would narrowly lose the election to the right-wing Jorge Alessandri, this came to a shock to both the Chilean bourgeoisie and their foreign allies, particularly the United States of America.

The US replaced Great Britain as the main investor in Chilean mines in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This fact had enormous implications as the presidency of Alessandri approached its end in 1964. Most political observers expected a sweeping victory for the Left and the Popular Action Front, however, with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the fierce ideological contention of the undergoing Cold War, the United States became uneasy about the region.

## US Sphere of Influence and Allende's Rise

Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the US developed an alliance with the administrations, ensuring cooperation and mutual economic gain. By 1958, American investment accounted for 80% of all foreign investment in Chile, most of it tied to the copper mines. US loans and foreign





investment were intended to be the basis for a painless road to economic development. Between 1958 and 1964, Chile's foreign debt rose dramatically and was forced to enter a dangerous cyclical borrowing spree of American capital. Leaders in Chile were soon entangled with the USA and many key political decisions, especially in the international body, the Organization of American States (OAS), began to depend on an approving nod from Washington.

In addition to economic ties, after the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a shift in US foreign relations with Chile and the rest of Latin America under the Kennedy administration. American concern for the region was clearly affected when Allende had narrowly lost his run for Presidency in 1958. Inherently anchored to its anti-Communist purposes, the State Department was committed to aid Latin American militaries in "counterinsurgency." With the fear of a possible communist overtake of Chilean politics, Subsequent development of US- Chilean relations will experience a different trajectory as the United States aimed to for significant political-economic involvement.

As time near towards the end of Alessandri's Presidency, the US government and US corporations began to intervene during the pre-election period. Executives of the US copper corporations in Chile played an active role in bolstering the campaign of Eduardo Frei Montalva, the candidate for the Christian Democratic Party; and the US's best chance to prevent Allende from becoming President. Indirectly, companies bolstered Frei's positions by accepting his plans for the copper industry as the only viable alternative to nationalization, a significant action that was proposed by Allende if he was elected President. Monetarily, Chile was the largest recipient of any country in Latin America of loans, over \$1.4 billion; the US Agency for International Development (AID) justified the substantial economic assistance on the country's ten year development plan, even though the plan did not set forth definite project plans or an allocated budget. The US Central Intelligence Agency supposedly provided election money, according to a 1975 Senate Intelligence Committee report, for polling, voter registration, and scare campaigns that dubbed the left as "Soviet puppets."

In 1964 Eduardo Frei was elected to the Chilean presidency, with roughly 56% of the vote, by promising to enact far-reaching structural reforms in Chilean society. His "Revolution in Liberty" was a model program aimed to undermine the traditional appeal of the Marxist parties



to the Chilean working class; as such it enjoyed the full support of the US government. Frei claimed that the program offered a third way between capitalism and communism, one that transcended the division between the left and the right. He implemented agrarian and educational reform, as well as promoting social welfare programs that aimed to tackle poverty. Near the end of 1966 the Revolution in Liberty looked like a success story; it reduced inflation, increased production, and redistributed income in favor of middle- and lower-income groups through tax and wage policies. However, 1967 proved to be a turning point for the ambitious administration.

The new year began to show the early signs of the crumbling Frei's presidency. In power politics, the Radicals, who had initially supported Frei, began moving to the left, and had joined with the Socialists and Communists to elect Salvador Allende as the president of the senate. Municipal elections showed support for the left, and socialist politicians began occupying higher political offices. Adding insult to injury, Frei also began to run into economic difficulties; the inflation rate began to rise, and domestic private investment dropped radically nearing the end of the 1960's. However, it would take the election of Richard Nixon in the United States in 1968 to deteriorate the relations between the two American nations, and end support for the Christian Democratic Party.

It became clear that Chile was no longer the darling of US policymakers and Frei government and the United States began to sour. Senators grew disillusion with Frei's administration and felt US funds to Chile were excessive and often misused by Chilean bureaucrats. Nixon had visited Chile in 1967 and seemed to develop an intense dislike for the Christian Democratic Party, both as too closely linked to the Democrats in the United States and as a destabilizing to Chilean politics in its effort to press for radical reform. Nevertheless, as the 1970 election drew closer, Nixon fiercely wanted to prevent the rise of a Socialist government; like the past two US administration, he would directly engage in Latin American politics, but this time, it failed to succeed.

## Allende's Fall and Pinochet's Rise

The Chilean presidential election of 1970 was a contest between three candidates and



their respective parties. The

leftist parties in Chile, united, after an agreement stipulating the sharing of government power, to form the Popular Unity Party and named Salvador Allende as their candidate. The right-leaning party, the National Party, named former president Jorge Alessandri as their candidate and the centrist Christian Democrats supported Radomiro Tomic, a former senator.

With each candidate proposing conflicting paths for Chile, the campaign atmosphere was very polarized, though not violent. Tomic and Allende both campaigned on a largely socialist platform, featuring the nationalization of industry and social program reform. By contrast, Alessandri ran on a much more conservative plan, which was well-liked by the Nixon administration, which aimed to see Alessandri defeat his socialist opponents.

The results of the Sep 4th election would not fulfill these desires. Salvador Allende finished ahead with 36.6% of the popular vote, followed by Alessandri at 34.9%, and Tomic at 27.8%. While Allende finished in first place, his presidency had yet to be finalized. The Chilean constitution stipulates Congress was to decide between the two highest vote getters. While in recent history Congress had simply chosen the candidate with the highest percentage of votes, active campaigns and efforts to prevent Allende from taking office complicated the process. The most notable efforts were those conducted by the CIA under the orders of President Richard Nixon. Having organized two plans - Track One and Track Two - the CIA set out to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency and consolidating power. The latter of the two plans resulted in the attempted kidnapping and consequential death of General Rene Schneider, the army chief commander. Schneider was identified as an obstacle to a potential coup d'etat, for he was a constitutionalist supporter of Allende and would oppose the intervention of the military in the political process. Ironically, the attempted kidnapping and resulting death of Schneider catalyzed public support for the congress and the constitution, resulting in Allende's assumption of the Chilean presidency.

In the first year of his presidency, Allende enacted a series of economic reforms set to put Chile on the path to socialism, which consisted of the nationalization of various parts of the economy (including the Great Copper Mine), the acceleration of land redistribution & reform, and a series of price and wage controls. Within the first year of his Allende's presidency these



policies achieved their goals of economic growth and inflation reduction, while also addressing issues of income and land distribution. However, in 1972, Allende's prescribed socialism would turn for the worst, wiping out the previous year's gains while stirring political and social tensions within Chile.

The policies that comprised Allende's path to socialism generated a massive government deficit and rampant inflation. Consequently, goods and services became unattainable to the Chilean public. A black market emerged within the country, where already scarce goods were sold at elevated prices. In response to the crippling market, the people took to the streets. Truck workers began a strike in October 1972, which would expand to include small businessmen, professional unions, doctors, and educational staff among its ranks. This would have significant implications for the forthcoming coup, as Allende, in response to the protests, invited military officers into his cabinet, including the Army Commander in Chief, General Carlos Prat, who would serve as Minister of the Interior. The formal involvement of the military in the Allende government increased its authority over policy. Whereas before its power lied in traditional spheres such as directing military aid and dealing with disputes, now its purview extended to areas of law and order. With General Prats appointment, the head of the oldest and largest military service was now also responsible for all domestic policy issues. General Prats appointment may have relieved short term political conflict, but over the long run it set the ground for the military's increased involvement and control in domestic policy. While General Prats was largely considered an ally of the Allende presidency, there were those within his ranks who would see General Prat's ascendancy as an opportunity to capitalize on political unrest. General Prat himself acknowledged this sentiment after a 1973 Council of Generals meeting, where the possibility of restoring order through a coup was discussed and ultimately rejected by General Prats.

On the cusp of the aforementioned socio-economic turmoil, parliamentary elections were held in 1973. In spite of the turmoil resulting from their party's president, the Popular Unity party was able to increase its parliamentary representation to 43.2%. However, despite this victory, the political landscape became more hostile towards Popular Unity. The Christian Democrats, who had run a candidate in the 1970 elections with a similar platform and had largely



been an ally of Popular Unity, strengthened ties with the right wing National Party, effectively polarizing and deadlocking the government for the coming months.

## **The US's Undermining of the Allende Administration**

The influence of the United States during the conflict years of Allende's presidency should not go forgotten. Nixon's Administration was vehemently opposed to the election of Allende, and had done what it could to hamper his presidency. President Allende expressed no explicit ill will towards the United States following his election but his policies were perceived by the Nixon Administration as a threat to the United States' position in South America. Perhaps the most direct affront to the United States' stance in Chile was the nationalization of its copper mines, which was accomplished via a constitutional amendment on July 11, 1971 with unanimous support in the Chilean congress. The amendment sought to fairly compensate foreign firms for the expropriation of the mines, though deductions withheld from compensation due to excess profits, as defined by the Allende administration, drastically reduced the final payment amount. Shortly after the nationalization of the copper mines, the Nixon administration sought to block future aid and credit extensions to Chile by the World Banks and other international institutions, while also ensuring that domestic banks and companies would reduce/eliminate their business with Chile.

While the Nixon Administration sought to stifle Chile's economy, it did maintain its support for the Chilean armed services through a series of arms deals. These deals worked in tandem with the aforementioned efforts to undermine the Chilean economy, as they would communicate that the armed services could benefit only from working with the United States.

Chilean political groups opposed to the Allende Administration also received support from the United States. In the fall of 1972, with the 1973 parliamentary elections approaching, the CIA provided funding to numerous groups in hopes that they would, together, gain a congressional majority capable of checking Allende's policies. As previously noted, the 1973 results would be in favor of Allende's Popular Unity party. Nonetheless, the CIA continued to allocate funds to groups it thought would destabilize the Allende Administration and create an



atmosphere lending to the overthrowing of Allende. The redistributive policies of the Allende administration left many middle class and professionals displeased with the Chilean Path of Socialism. These groups expressed their frustration through numerous strikes during Allende's presidency. To illustrate the degree of political unrest, a contrast is necessary. In 1969, in the last year of Frei's presidency, the marked experienced 977 strikes. While large in its own right, it pales to the 3287 strikes sustained in 1972. Upper and middle class youth also expressed their discontent with Allende through more violent means. The group Patria y Libertad, which called for armed opposition to the Allende government, was another way these sectors mobilized themselves. Members of Patria y Libertad organized into small neighborhood style militias and repeatedly called for the armed services to do their duty to restore order. The foul to this group would be the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), an extremist leftist group formed in the 1960's which drew support from student organizations, trade unions, and other leftist sympathizers. In the late 1960's the MIR conducted a series of violent acts, calling for a new leftist government. While having been formerly banned in 1969, the group and offshoots of it continued to operate on the fringe of Chilean politics. While these two groups and others similar to it didn't engage each other violently to a great extent, they contributed substantially to the polarization of the Chilean population.

It was within this popular turmoil that the Nixon Administration increased its efforts to remove Allende through the Chilean Armed forces. The loyalty of General Prats to Allende, however, was a major impediment to the employment of a coup, which was gaining increasing popularity amongst his rank and file generals. On June 29<sup>th</sup>, 1973, Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Souper attempted a coup in which he led a column of armored vehicles into the Chilean capital of Santiago. General Prats ultimately quelled the rebellion, which, although unsuccessful in its larger goals, was a turning point of the political crisis. The Allende administration was forced to move towards compromise with the allied National Party and Christian Democrats, conspirators were able to check the loyalties of officers within their ranks, and the perception of General Prat as an obstacle to a future coup was cemented. Curiously, shortly after the failed "Tanquetazo" coup, General Prats would step down after an altercation with a group protesting his inactivity. Upon resignation, Allende appointed his second in command, Augusto Pinochet, as





commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army.

General Pinochet's rise would coincide with the passage of a resolution by the Chamber of Deputies explicitly attacking the Allende administration, citing the administration's disregard of judicial orders and other constitutional breaches. More importantly, the resolution tacitly advocated for the removal of Allende by calling upon cabinet members who represented the heads of the armed forces "to put and immediate end to all the de facto situations listed above which violate the constitution and the law". This blatant attack on the President Allende was met with a critical response, as Allende attributed responsibility for the country's turmoil to an obstructionist congress, and that he himself had acted within the confines of the constitution. Despite his defense, Allende was not ignorant to the conspiring taking place within the Chilean armed forces and the fragility of his presidency. On September 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>, leaders within the Popular Unity Party met with President Allende to develop a plebiscite on the continuation of his presidency. They hoped that his electoral outlet would provide the administration time to deal with various political and economic issues, while legitimizing his presidency. Allende's decision would never come, as the coup would take place in three days' time.

## The Coup

The ranks of the Chilean Armed Forces had expressed discontent towards President Allende a number of times, having even already staged a coup in June 1973. The increased politicization of the military during Allende's presidency removed the neutrality of the Chilean armed forces during political conflict, and allowed them to become viable candidates to look to for the destabilization of Chile. While some officials remained loyal, those who thought the military could restore order found themselves at the heads of the armed forces, most notably Augusto Pinochet. The formal decision to stage the coup was made on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 1973, when a joint declaration was signed by the three armed services and General Cesar, the head of the carbineros.

The coup, staged on September 11, 1973, was executed with surprising speed and relative ease. The first orders were issued at 4 a.m. The port city of Valparaiso was occupied by





the military before 7 a.m. Concepción, Chile's third largest city, was taken by 8am. At 8:30 a.m. Radio Agricultura disrupted its programming to announce the beginning the coup and demand that Allende resign. Allende, residing in his presidential palace at the center of Santiago, obstinately refused to step down. After Radio Agricultura's transmission, Allende issued his own radio broadcast, which would be his last statement to the Chilean people. Allende would soon see his presidential palace surrounded by tanks, with the standing officers demanding an immediate surrender lest they commence to bombard the palace. Having extended the time Allende had to consider this offer twice, the officers began to bomb the palace at noon. In slightly over an hour the politicians within the palace would emerge in surrender, all except President Allende, who had allegedly committed suicide.

## **Aftermath of the Coup and Pinochet's Consolidation of Power**

Prior to the coup, there was discussion as to whether the military, if it did take power, would call for new elections to be held. Others speculated that the military would take a long-standing position of internal oversight. The decision on the political outlook of Chile occurred shortly after the coup when the heads of the armed forces shared their intentions. At 10 p.m. on September 11 the members of the junta addressed the nation through a television broadcast, excusing the necessary actions taken to restore order, expressing their intent to combat the Marxism, which had deteriorated public order, and, most notably, announcing a congressional "recess." The last announcement was formalized through Decree Law no. 27, issued Sept 27, 1973, which declared the dissolution of the Congressional Court. Taking their assault on potentially oppositional institutions and groups even further, Decree Law no. 77, issued October 8, 1972, declared parties associated with Popular Unity and "all those entities or groups...that uphold a Marxist doctrine..." illegal.

Congress was not the only democratic institution attacked by the Junta during their consolidation of power. In the aforementioned declarations made on the day of the coup, the



Junta guaranteed the full operation of the Judicial Authority and respect for the constitution. While the judiciary would remain in full operation, the ongoing state of emergency neutralized legal abilities and allowed the new regime to circumvent normal court procedures and defendant rights. In turn, the declaration of a “state of siege,” made on September 22, 1973, was renewed until 1978, when it was replaced by a formal “state of emergency”.

Through the weeks immediately following the coup, the Junta would continue to expand their control over the governing apparatuses of Chile through decree laws. On September 19th the mayors and city councilors of the country were suspended under the auspicious of harmonizing organization. This was achieved through junta appointed mayors pulled from military ranks. All state-administered personnel were labeled temporary, allowing for the arbitrary removal of staff.

## Final Thoughts

Today the period of time in which Chile was governed by Pinochet and the Junta is still a source of conflict in Chile. What was the overall effect on the developmental trajectory of Chile? For some, this period is known as one of miraculous redirection. Today, the Chilean economy is ranked amongst the freest and fastest developing, while the centralized government of the Junta was ultimately replaced by a democratic system. Do these present-day facts vindicate the Junta? Were they a necessary stabilizing force in the Chilean political and economic arena? Others have argued that the policies of the Junta were ultimately a destructive force in Chilean history. The Junta exercised strict control of Chilean politics and social life in order to implement unpopular economic policies forwarded by foreign policy circles. The present debate surrounding the net results of the military Junta capture the conflicts faced by the Junta while directing Chile on what they believed to be the optimal path towards prosperity. As you continue your research into Pinochet’s Chile, I encourage you all to keep these perspectives in mind. Use them to analyze the positions of your characters and the larger importance of this time period to present political/economic realities.



## Questions to Consider

1. What can be done with the mining industry and the elites interest wishing to continue drawing in international investment?
2. How do you deal with the international criticism of human rights violations occurring throughout the country?
3. How can we continue or further our neoliberal trajectory? What policies might further ensconce our power?
4. How do our internal and international policies effect our relationships with our neighbors?
5. What policies should we consider “too far” or “too extreme” when dealing with our opponents?
6. What is the future role of Chilean citizens in government?
7. What are the limits of popular repression? At what point might the actions of institutions hinder national development?
8. To what extent is liberalization appropriate for the Chilean economy?



## Committee Characters

1. Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz- Public Figure/Founder of Gremialista Movement
2. Admiral José Menino Castro – Head of the Navy
3. Gustavo Leigh Guzmán – Head of the Air Force
4. César Mendoza Durán – Head of the Carabineros (National Police)
5. Eduardo Frei Montalva – Leader of the Christian Democratic Party
6. Ismael Huerta Díaz - Minister of Foreign Affairs
7. Patricio Carvajal Prado - Minister of National Defense
8. Gonzalo Prieto Gándara – Minister of Justice
9. Óscar Bonilla Bradánovich - Minister of the Interior
10. Colonel Manuel Contreras – Head of the DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional)
11. Fernando Léniz Cerda- Minister of Economy
12. Lorenzo Gotuzzo Borlando - Minister of Finance
13. Alberto Spoerer Covarrubias - Minister of Health
14. Roberto Kelly - Minister of Social Development
15. Mario Mackay Jaraquemada - Minister of Labor and Social Security
16. Hugo Castro Jiménez - Minister of Education
17. Pedro Ewing Hodar - Minister General Secretariat of Government



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