Problem 1. Find all Nash equilibria, as well as their payoffs, of the (cardinal) game

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
 & C & D \\
\hline
 A & 4,8 & 2,0 \\
\hline
 B & 6,2 & 0,8 \\
\end{array}$$

Problem 2. Find all rationalizable pure strategies, for each player, of the (cardinal) game

	L	M	R
\overline{A}	3, 5	2,0	2, 2
В	5, 2	1,2	2, 1
C	9,0	1,5	3, 2

Problem 3. There are five basic outcomes. Jane has a vNM ranking that can be represented by both utility function U and V, given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} o_1 & o_2 & o_3 & o_4 & o_5 \\ U : & 44 & 170 & -10 & 26 & 98 \\ V : & 32 & 95 & 5 & 23 & 59 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Normalize both U and V and verify that you get the same normalized utility function. Also transform U into V via positive affine transformation of form V = aU + b with a > 0.

Problem 4. Find the simple lottery corresponding to the compound lottery

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 \begin{pmatrix}
 o_1 & o_2 & o_3 & o_4 \\
 \frac{2}{5} & \frac{1}{10} & \frac{3}{10} & \frac{1}{5}
 \end{pmatrix} & o_2 & \begin{pmatrix}
 o_1 & o_3 & o_4 \\
 \frac{1}{5} & \frac{1}{5} & \frac{3}{5}
 \end{pmatrix} & \begin{pmatrix}
 o_2 & o_3 \\
 \frac{1}{3} & \frac{2}{3}
 \end{pmatrix}
\end{bmatrix}$$

Problem 5. Consider the two lotteries

$$L_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \$28 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad L_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \$10 & \$50 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Ann has vNM utility function $U_A(\$m) = \sqrt{m}$, whereas Bob has vNM utility function $U_B(\$m) = 2m - m^4/100^3$. Rank the two lotteries for both Ann and Bob, and show that they are both risk averse.