Problem 1. Home country pegs its currency to the USD. Both Home and US interest rate are 2%. Home output is 1000 when the interest rate is 2%, but Home output falls by 1 every time Home interest rate increases by 1 percentage point. There is no default risk.

- (a) Suppose the peg is credible. For US interest rates $i^* \in \{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}$, determine corresponding Home interest rates and output.
- (b) Suppose the peg is not credible: everyone knows that Home government will allow depreciation of 1% for one year if output falls to 997 or lower. For US interest rates $i^* \in \{2,3,4,5,6,7,8\}$, determine corresponding Home interest rates and output.
- **(c)** Whether (a) or (b) holds depends on whether investors believe that the peg is credible. Regardless of beliefs, which US interest rates will not lead to speculative attack?
- (d) Regardless of beliefs, which US interest rates guarantee speculative attack?
- **(e)** At what US interest rate are there two equilibria?

Problem 2 (Partial Sample Final Question 1). Here, have some short answer questions.

- (a) In a hyperinflation, the rate of inflation exceeds ______% per month.
- **(b)** What is meant by home bias in an investment portfolio?
- **(c)** What is a currency board?
- **(d)** As of now (2022) how many countries are in the Eurozone? Which countries are the most recent to have joined?
- **(e)** Which two EU countries appear unlikely to join the euro?

Problem 3 (Sample Final Question 3). In the years leading up to the Great Depression, a key objective of the federal government was to balance the government budget.

- (a) Suppose that tax revenue collected by the government depends on income. During a recession, what happens to government tax revenues? What does this imply about the government budget?
- **(b)** If the government wants to keep the budget balanced, what type of fiscal policy must the government implement? Illustrate the effects of this policy using the IS-LM-FX diagram, assuming a floating exchange rate regime.
- (c) State how the fiscal policy affects *Y*, *i*, *E*, *C*, *I*, and TB. Is this a stabilization policy?
- (d) The US was part of the gold standard, fixing its exchange rate to the value of gold. Illustrate how the policy described in part (b) affects the economy differently under a fixed exchange rate regime. State how the fiscal policy affects *Y*, *i*, *E*, *C*, *I*, and TB.
- (e) How did the macroeconomic regime affect stabilization policy in this scenario?

Problem 4 (Sample Final Question 2). The foreign country has a fixed price level of $P^* = 1$ and a fixed interest rate of i^* . The home country initially has an interest rate $i = i^* = 8\%$ and a price level of P = 1. There are no changes in monetary policy in the foreign country at any time. Home and foreign output are assumed fixed at Y and Y^* respectively. At present the exchange rate is at its PPP value of E = 1 (home per foreign currency). Home real money demand responds to the interest rate in such a way that a 2 percentage point drop in the home nominal interest rate would cause home real money demand to rise by 10%. The home country contemplates a change in monetary policy to increase the home money supply M by 10%.

- (a) At first, let us suppose the increase in M is temporary, and the price level remains anchored at P = 1 forever. What is the temporary impact of the policy change on the home interest rate?
- **(b)** Suppose that the policy will endure for one year. According to uncovered interest parity, what will be the expected rate of appreciation of the home currency in that year (approximately)?
- (c) In this case, what will be the spot exchange rate *E* today (approximately)?
- (d) Now suppose the policy change is permanent. Assume that prices adjust after one year to their new long-run level. What will be the new long-run (future expected) level of the home price level P^e ? Of the home exchange rate E^e ?
- **(e)** In this case, what will be the spot exchange rate *E* today (approximately)?