ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 12 Key Establishment with Symmetric Cryptography

Professor Jia Wang
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Illinois Institute of Technology

September 24, 2025

Outline

Key Establishment

Midterm Exam

- ightharpoonup Lecture 1 \sim Lecture 14, see Homework 1 and 2 for sample.
 - Points may be deducted if key steps are missing.
- ➤ Students registered for main campus section: Wed. 10/8, 11:25 AM 12:40 PM, in class.
 - A physical calculator is allowed. Laptop or any other electronic device or calculator apps running on them are not allowed.
 - ► Closed book/notes. A letter-size page of cheat sheet is allowed.
- Online students may take the exam as above, or contact Charles Scott (scott@iit.edu) to make arrangement and confirm with me.
 - No make-up exam will be offered if you fail to do so.
- ► ADA Accommodations: contact Center for Disability Resource (disabilities@iit.edu)
- ► Emergency/extraordinary reasons for make-up midterm exams are accepted only with documented proof like docter's notes.

Reading Assignment

► This lecture: UC 13

Next lecture: UC 13

Outline

Key Establishment

Key Establishment

- ▶ To establishing a shared secret between two or more parties.
 - ► Which could be used later for secure communication via symmetric cryptography.
- Key transport: one party securely transfers a secret value to others
- ► Key agreement: two or more parties derive the shared secret
 - ▶ Ideally, none of the parties can control what the secret will be.
- ▶ Key establishment assumes identification.
 - What about the $O(n^2)$ keys needed to support pair-wise communication among n parties if we use symmetric cryptography?
 - What about the Man-in-the-Middle attack if we use public-key cryptography?

Key Freshness


- Many security systems prefer to use one secret key only for a limited period of time.
 - Less damage if the key is exposed.
 - Less ciphertexts under the same key are available for attackers to analysis.
 - More works for attackers to decrypt same amount of ciphertexts.
- Session keys or ephemeral keys.
 - New keys are generated for each Internet connection, or within a matter of minutes, or sometimes even seconds.
- ► But how?
 - ▶ Need to be efficient in both computation and communication.

Outline

Key Establishment

- ▶ Based on symmetric cryptography.
- ▶ Developed by MIT in 80's.
- ▶ Standardized as RFC 1510 in 1993, currently RFC 4120.


Key Distribution Center (KDC)



(page 337, Paar and Pelzl)

- A trusted third-party.
 - Able to identify each party.
 - Won't leak secret and will follow protocol faithfully.
- ► KDC identifies each party with its Key Encryption Key (KEK).

Basic Key Establishment using KDC



- ► Basic key establishment protocol
 - ▶ Alice requests to establish communication with Bob.
 - ▶ KDC generates k_{ses} and distributes to Alice (y_A) and Bob (y_B) .
 - \blacktriangleright KDC may ask Alice to distribute y_B to Bob.
- Does any channel need to be secure or authentic?


Advantages of KDC

- System wide, only KEKs need to be stored in long term.
 - \triangleright O(1) storage per party.
 - \triangleright O(n) storage per KDC
- ► The $O(n^2)$ keys needed to support pair-wise communication are all generated on-the-fly and ephemeral.
- Party updates are all handled by KDC.
 - Leave
 - Join
 - KEK update

Attacks


- ▶ Replay attack: Oscar may replace y_A and y_B from KDC.
 - With y'_A and y'_B that correspond to a previously compromised session key.
- Key confirmation attack: what is protected by KEKs?
 - ▶ The basic key establishment protocol: k_{ses} only in y_A and y_B .
 - Imply a valid session but not necessarily a session between Alice and Bob – how Bob confirms messages encrypted by k_{ses} from Alice?
 - Give Oscar, a <u>legitimate but malicious</u> user, opportunities to attack the system.

Key Confirmation Attack



- (page 339, Paar and Pelzl)
- Oscar could further establish a session with Bob and forward x to Bob in order to impersonate Alice to Bob.
 - ► Consider this as Man-in-the-Middle attacks for symmetric cryptography when more than two parties are involved!

Improving Basic Key Establishment



(page 337, Paar and Pelzl)

- Need to include session information in y_A and y_B .
 - Challenge-response: no replay attack on Alice.
 - Participating parties: who are you talking to.
 - Time: no replay attack on Bob.

Kerberos

Key Establishment Using a Simplified Version of Kerberos Alice KDC Bob KEK: k_A KEK: k_A , k_B KEK: k_B generate nonce r_A $\mathsf{RQST}(\mathit{ID}_A, \mathit{ID}_B, r_A)$ generate random k_{sax} generate lifetime T $y_A = e_{k_A}(k_{ses}, r_A, T, ID_B)$ $y_B = e_{k_R}(k_{ses}, ID_A, T)$ y_A, y_B $k_{ses}, r'_A, T, ID_B = e_{k_A}^{-1}(y_A)$ verify $r'_A = r_A$ verify IDB verify lifetime T generate time stamp T_S $y_{AB} = e_{k_{Ses}}(ID_A, T_S)$ y_{AB}, y_{B} $k_{ses}, ID_A, T = e_{k_B}^{-1}(y_B)$ $ID'_A, T_S = e^{-1}_{kses}(y_{AB})$ verify $ID'_A = ID_A$ verify lifetime T verify time stamp T_S $x = e_{k_{see}}^{-1}(y)$ $y = e_{k_{ses}}(x)$

(page 340, Paar and Pelzl)

Remaining Issues

- KEK setup and update require secure channel to KDC.
 - As implied by symmetric cryptography.
- Communication requirements: KDC need to be online.
 - Performance concerns: need to response to every session.
 - Reliability concerns: no more sessions if KDC fails.
 - Should we add a secondary KDC?
- Single point of failure: security disaster.
 - A compromised KDC reveal all KEKs and thus all future communications.
 - And thus all past session keys if Oscar has recorded all sessions.
 - And this is highly possible since attackers know this weakness!
- Perfect forward secrecy (PFS): can we protect <u>past</u> session keys if KEKs are compromised?
 - ► KEKs are used to authenticate parties and to exchange session keys. Can we seperate these two purposes?

Summary

► Kerberos: key establishment based on symmetric cryptography may work, but has a lot of potential issues.