ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 11 Digital Signatures and Authentication

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Outline

Digital Signatures

Authentication

Reading Assignment

► This lecture: UC 10.1 – 10.3

► Next lecture: UC 13

Midterm Exam

- ightharpoonup Lecture 1 \sim Lecture 14, see Homework 1 and 2 for sample.
 - Points may be deducted if key steps are missing.
- ➤ Students registered for main campus section: Wed. 10/8, 11:25 AM 12:40 PM, in class.
 - ▶ A physical calculator is allowed. Laptop or any other electronic device or calculator apps running on them are not allowed.
 - ► Closed book/notes. A letter-size page of cheat sheet is allowed.
- Online students may take the exam as above, or contact Charles Scott (scott@iit.edu) to make arrangement and confirm with me.
 - No make-up exam will be offered if you fail to do so.
- ► ADA Accommodations: contact Center for Disability Resource (disabilities@iit.edu)
- Emergency/extraordinary reasons for make-up midterm exams are accepted only with documented proof like docter's notes.

Outline


Digital Signatures

Authentication

Security Services

- ► The services we are familiar with
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity and message authentication
- Nonrepudiation: sender can not deny creation of message.
 - But who is the sender?
- Authentication: who are you?
 - ► A.k.a. entity/user authentication, or identification
 - Within the context of computer cyber security, shall be built on top of a nonrepudiation service (but usually is not!).
- Services enabled by authentication
 - Access control/authorization: decide who can do what.
 - Auditing: provide a proof of who did what.
- Anonymity/privacy: what if we don't want to be identified?
 - E.g. to guard against potential misuse of identity.
 - Can we authenticate an amonynous user?

Principle of Digital Signatures



 $\textbf{Fig. 10.1} \ \ \textbf{Principle of digital signatures which involves signing and verifying a message}$

(Paar and Pelzl)

- ► Nonrepudiation: no shared secret
 - ▶ Bob signs with his private key k_{pr} .
 - Alice verifies with Bob's public key k_{pub}.
- ▶ Sign the hash if the message is too long.

RSA Digital Signature

Basic RSA Digital Signature Protocol

```
Alice
                                                                                                                                                Bob
                                                                                                                   k_{pr} = d, k_{pub} = (n, e)
                                                                                       (n,e)
                                                                                                                   compute signature:
                                                                                                                   s = \operatorname{sig}_{k_{pr}}(x) \equiv x^d \mod n
                                                                                       (x,s)
verify: \operatorname{ver}_{k_{pub}}(x,s)
x' \equiv s^e \mod n
x' \begin{cases} \equiv x \mod n & \Longrightarrow \text{valid signature} \\ \not\equiv x \mod n & \Longrightarrow \text{invalid signature} \end{cases}
```

(page 265, Paar and Pelzl)

- Same key setup as RSA
- RSA digital signature works as inversed RSA encryption!
 - \triangleright sig() is d(), ver() is essentially e().
 - Time complexity is the same as RSA encryption.

Example

- $k_{pub} = (n = 221, e = 5), k_{pr} = (p = 13, q = 17, d = 77)$
- x = 35
- Bob computes the signature: $s = x^d \mod n = 35^{77} \mod 221 = 120$.
- Alice verifies the signature:
 - $x' = s^e \mod n = 120^5 \mod 221 = 35.$
 - ▶ So x == x' and x is indeed generated by Bob.
- What prevent Oscar to forge Bob's signature?

Oscar's Attack

- ▶ To forge a signature s for x, Oscar need to
 - ▶ Either compute d and then $s = x^d \mod n$.
- Both are equivalent to break RSA.

Elgamal Digital Signature

- Setup Bob's key pair as in DHKE and Elgamal
 - A well-known large prime p and an integer α .
 - ► $k_{pr} = d \in \{2, 3, ..., p-2\}$
 - $ightharpoonup k_{pub} = \beta = \alpha^{d} \mod p$
- ▶ To sign a message $x \in \{0, 1, 2, ..., p-1\}$ with (r, s),
 - ▶ Choose a random ephemeral key $k \in \{0, 1, ..., p-1\}$ such that gcd(k, p-1) = 1.

 - Solve $x \equiv ks + dr \pmod{p-1}$ for s
- ▶ To validate the signature (r, s) for the message x,

 - ▶ Apply Fermat's Little Theorem, $r^s \equiv \alpha^{ks} \equiv \alpha^{x-dr} \pmod{p}$
 - So $t \equiv \beta^r r^s \equiv \alpha^{dr} \alpha^{x-dr} \equiv \alpha^x \pmod{p}$ should hold.

Oscar's Attack

▶ To forge a signature (r, s) for x, Oscar need to solve

$$\alpha^{\mathsf{x}} \equiv \beta^{\mathsf{r}} r^{\mathsf{s}} \pmod{p}$$

- ▶ Oscar could first choose any k and $r = \alpha^k \mod p$, then
 - ▶ Either solve $r^s \equiv z \pmod{p}$ directly with some z
 - ▶ Or find *d* first and then solve for *s* as the signature process.
- ▶ Both are equivalent to break DHKE.

Practical Considerations

- For both RSA and Elgamal digital signature, padding is needed to prevent other attacks.
- ► Elgamal digital signature is rarely used in practice. Instead, a variant named DSA and an ECC generalization named ECDSA are widely used
 - ► Check FIPS PUB 186-4 (2013) for details.

Digital Signature vs. MAC

- Digital signatures provide stronger guarantees (nonrepudiation) than MAC (message authentication), and thus can replace MAC.
 - Assume no man-in-the-middle attack.
- Practically, MAC is more efficient.
 - MAC is almost as efficient as hash at both sides.
 - Digital signature need to compute exponentials at both sides in addition to hash.
 - Use MAC if nonrepudiation is not required.
- While we prefer to apply MAC to ciphertext for authenticated encryption, digital signatures are almost always applied to plaintexts if the messages need to be encrypted.

Outline

Authentication

Digital Signatures Revisited




Fig. 10.1 Principle of digital signatures which involves signing and verifying a message

(Paar and Pelzl)

- ▶ What should be sent over an authentic channel?
 - $ightharpoonup k_{pub}$, if Alice need a proof that k_{pub} is indeed Bob's public key.
- \blacktriangleright What if k_{pub} is sent over an insecure channel?
 - Nonrepudiation still works in some sense: Alice can confirm that x is created by someone who owns k_{pr} .

Public Key and Identity

- ▶ Authentication: Bob need to decide if Alice is Alice.
 - For recurring activities.
 - Two steps: Alice first leaves Bob some information for her identity, and then everytime Bob uses such information to verify that Alice is Alice.
- Public key is identity.
 - Without an authentic channel: Bob receives a public key and names it Alice.
 - "Anonymous": this identity associates to no real-world entity.
- Public key as a representation of identity.
 - With an authentic channel: Alice need to prove she is Alice to Bob, e.g. via a passport, before she can provide a public key for Bob to store.
 - ► The public key could be revoked, e.g. when Alice lost her private key.
- ▶ Which one is better? Depending on the application.

Authetication with Digital Signatures

- With Alice's public key on file, Bob authenticates by asking whoever claims to be Alice to sign a message with Alice's private key.
- This seems to be very secure.
 - Assume Alice keeps her private key as a <u>secret</u>, and Bob stores Alice's public key in a way no one can modify it.
 - Oscar cannot forge digital signatures.
 - Even if Oscar steals Alice's public key from Bob, he/she cannot use it to prove he/she is Alice to another party.
- Replay attack: but Oscar may record the message with Alice's signature and replay it to Bob at a later time.
 - ▶ Bob need to ask Alice to sign a chosen message!
- Challenge-response authentication.
 - Challenge: Bob generates a nonce and sends it to Alice.
 - ▶ Response: Alice signs the nonce and replies to Bob.
 - Any possibility of man-in-the-middle attack?

Mutual Authentication

- In many cases Alice also need to be sure that Bob is Bob.
- ▶ Alice may authenticate Bob by Bob's public key.
 - Same as how Bob setups Alice's public key.
- Complications
 - The two channels Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice could be different
 - Both are authentic.
 - Both are not authentic.
 - One is authetic and the other is not authentic.
 - ► The need for confidentiality.

Practical Applications and Considerations

- Common people used to have limited access to public-key cryptography.
 - Due to sophiscated/costly hardware/software, patents, business practices etc.
- Servers usually identify themselves via digital signatures.
 - ► Mostly via HTTPS.
 - Still, people with little knowledge about cyber security and digital signatures are subject to phishing scams.
- ► For professionals nowadays, adoption of Linux makes authentication with digital signatures widely available.
 - ► Mostly via SSH, e.g. GitHub.
 - Sometimes even enforced, e.g. AWS EC2.

Summary

- RSA digital signature
 - Key generation: by Bob, $k_{pub} = (n, e)$, $k_{pr} = (p, q, d)$
 - Sign: Bob only, $s = d_{k_{pr}}(x) = x^d \mod pq$.
 - Verify: everyone, $x' = e_{k_{\text{nub}}}(s) = s^e \mod n$, x == x'?
 - Assumption: Oscar cannot factorize n into p and q in polynomial time.
- ▶ Other digital signature algorithms like DSA and ECDSA.
- ► Identification/authentication: solutions exist, but need to make trade-offs.